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I didn’t win light in a windfall,
nor by deed of a father’s will.
I hewed my light from granite.
I quarried my heart.
In the mine of my heart a spark hides –
not large, but wholly my own.
Neither hired, nor borrowed, nor stolen –
my very own.
(H. Nahman Bialik)
THESE PAGES ARE DEDICATED TO MY MOTHER,
WHO COULD NOT CONTINUE HER STUDIES AS SHE ALWAYS WISHED FOR.
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Introduction
The issue of indirect expropriation is one of the most sensitive and thorny questions in 
international investment law. The topic is not new, as the issue of what constitutes a taking is 
the object of study of international lawyers as of the writings of Prof. Christie.1 Rather, new 
are the legal and political backgrounds against which modern takings take place: numerous 
international investment treaties (IITs) protect foreign investments; diverse arbitral fora settle 
investment disputes, giving rise to a wide corpus of judicial decisions; and, an increased 
amount of regulatory interventions in the host States interfere with foreign investments in the 
country.
Repeatedly confronted with claims for indirect expropriations, international courts and 
investment tribunals are steadily searching for a consensus in the finding of takings. The 
States’ duty to compensate for the deprivation of property rights and the correlative investors’ 
1
1 G. C. Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law”, in British Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 307, 1962, pp. 307-338. See also, J. L. Sax, “Takings and the Police Power”, in Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 74, 1974, pp. 36-76; B. A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 1959, pp. 23 et seq.; R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments 
in International Law”, Recueil des Cours, Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 176, 1982; S. M. 
Schwebel, Justice in International Law,  Cambridge, CUP, 1994; C. Knahr, “Investment ‘In the Territory’ of the 
Host State”, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, S. Wittich (eds. by), International Investment Law for the 
21st Century - Essays in Honor of Christoph Schreuer, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 42-53; R. 
Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriations: New Developments”, in New York University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 
11, 2002, pp. 64-93; R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property”, in ICSID Review-Foreign Investment 
Law Journal, 1986, pp. 41-65; A. S. El-Kosheri, “Le Régime Juridique Créé par Les Accords de Participation 
dans le Domaine Pétrolier”, in Recueil des Cours, Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. IV, n. 147, 1975, 
pp. 218-405; M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, in A. H. Qureshi, X. Gao (eds), International 
Economic Law, Vol. IV, London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 18-69; H. W. Baade, “  Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Wealth and Resources”, in R. S. Miller and R. J. Stanger (eds. by), Essays on Expropriation, Ohio State 
University Press, 1967, pp. 3-40; W. D. Verwey and N. J. Schrijver, “The Taking of Foreign Property under 
International Law: a New Legal Perspective?”, in The Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 15, 1984, 
pp. 8 et seq.; J. Baloro, “Some International Legal Problems Arising from the Definition and Application of the 
Concept of ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Wealth and Natural Resources’ of States”, in CILSA, Vol. XX, 1987, 
pp. 337 et seq.; S. K. B. Asante, “International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal”, in International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 37, 1988, pp. 588-628; C. F. Amerasinghe, “Issues of Compensation for 
the Taking of Alien Property in the Light of Recent Cases and Practice”, in The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 41(1), 1992, pp. 22-65; L. Y. Fortier, and S. L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law 
of International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor”, in ICSID Review- Foreign Investment 
Law Journal, Vol. 19(2), 2004, pp. 293-327; W. A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings,  London, Harvard University 
Press, 1995.
right to obtain redress for the economic loss suffered as a result of the governmental measure 
are the practical, remarkable consequences of such a finding.
The study of indirect expropriation is particularly engaging, given its both academic and 
practical implications. In light of the above, the present work contributes to the discourse on 
indirect expropriation in international investment law by elaborating upon existing literature 
and scholarship and by examining judicial and arbitral decisions. It suggests an alternative 
interpretative framework useful to the analysis and decision of international expropriatory 
cases.
I. Research Design
Regulating indirect expropriation in international investment law is a challenging task 
for investment tribunals. No universally agreed definition of the concept exists and IITs 
provide a defective legal framework––paralleled to that of expropriation tout court––to 
govern the issue.
Customary international law only defines ‘expropriation’ and identifies the requirements 
for its lawfulness. The practice of arbitral tribunals, as reflected also in recent IITs, refers to 
directly expropriatory actions as opposed to indirectly expropriatory measures (or measures 
tantamount to expropriation) in the effort to distinguish them from the governmental exercise 
of regulatory powers. Governmental actions are deemed as indirectly expropriatory when, 
although not interfering with the legal title to property, they substantially erode the economic 
value of ownership to the extent that property may be considered as expropriated and 
compensation shall be paid. Both IITs as the lex specialis applicable to the case and the 
decisions of arbitral tribunals qualify a measure as indirect expropriation to the extent that it 
produces expropriatory effects on the economic value of property. The effects of either direct 
and indirect expropriation on property rights are equated and the focus is on the economic 
loss or deprivation suffered by the owner as a consequence of the measure. In light of this 
2
consideration, this research studies the constitutive elements of ‘expropriation’ to interpret the 
category of indirect expropriation and distinguish it from the State’s exercise of legitimate 
(non-compensable) regulatory powers.
The concept of expropriation finds a well-established definition and legal framework in 
international law. In general terms, expropriation can be defined as the “taking of the assets of 
foreign companies or investors by a host State against the wishes or without the consent of the 
company or investor concerned, and it includes the deprivation of the right to property”.2 
Customary international law provides precise rules to govern any expropriatory measures 
deemed to be lawful. A lawful expropriation has to pursue a legitimate public purpose;3 it has 
to be carried out in a non-discriminatory manner and in accordance with the due process of 
law;4  and it has to be effected against the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective5 
compensation to the deprived owner.6  Accordingly, expropriation is not illegal per se in 
international law. States have the power and the right to lawfully expropriate the property of 
nationals and aliens provided that the above-mentioned conditions are respected.7 
Furthermore, States have the right to act in the public interest and such a sovereign right to 
3
2 S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law - Reconciling Policy and Principle, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008, 
p. 120; See also, Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, (UNCITRAL), Award, 3 September 2001, para 200.
3 Id, pp. 120-121; M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 57. See, British Petroleum v. Libya, 
award, 10 October 1973 and 1 August 1974, in ILR, Vol. 53, p. 297, 1979; Libyan American Oil Company 
(Liamco) v. Lybia, Award, 12 April 1977, in ILM, Vol. 20, 1981, in which the sole arbitrator upheld that no 
separate public purpose was need according to international law, for the nationalization to be lawful.
4 See, F. Francioni, “Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law”, in The European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 20(3), 2009, pp.729-747.
5 This is known as the ‘Hull Formula’ and was developed in correspondence from former US Secretary of State 
Hull to the Mexican government. W. M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in 
the BIT Generation”, in The British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 74, 2004, p. 135. See further in Part I, 
Chapter II. As will be noted in Part II, for the purposes of this research compensation is conceived of a remedy 
or consequence of expropriation, rather than as an autonomous element.
6 G. C. Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?”, pp. 307-338; L. Y. Fortier, 
and S. L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or 
Caveat Investor”, op. cit., pp. 295-296.
7 For the analysis of the conditions according to which an expropriation could be deemed as lawful see further 
below in Part I, Chapter II. See, S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques - L’expropriation indirecte, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, March 2012, p. 3, where it is explained: “il faut préciser que chaque État 
demeure en principe libre d’exproprier. C’est un droit souverain internationalement reconnu. Les traités 
d’investissement n’interdisent donc pas aux États de prendre des mesures d’expropriation. Ils sont seulement 
tenus de ne pas agir de manière discriminatoire, de poursuivre un intérêt public et d’indemniser l’investisseur 
lésé en retour”.
regulate does not necessarily entail compensatory duties. This principle is epitomized in the 
Restatement Third of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, recognized as 
reflecting customary international law, which establishes:
A State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage 
resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other 
action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police power of states, 
if it is not discriminatory [..] and it is not designed to cause the alien to abandon 
the property to the state or sell it at a distress price.8
Expropriation would not take place in the absence of a relevant ‘property’ and the 
measure (i. e., taking) would be lawful if carried out in compliance with customary 
international law requirements; moreover, actions falling within the police powers of States, 
that are pursuing a regulatory objective/public purpose of the State, would not necessarily 
entail the aliens’ right to be compensated. This definitional pattern inspires the structure of 
this work, which in Part II respectively examines the concept of property (Chapter IV), the 
concept of taking (Chapter V), the lawfulness or unlawfulness of expropriation (Chapter VI) 
and the concept of public purpose (Chapter VII).
In Part I, two introductory chapters clarify the state of the international law of 
expropriation.
Chapter I highlights the legacy of the domestic experiences of Germany and the United 
States on the so-called international takings doctrine and contends that a comparative 
approach to indirect takings issues would be beneficial and effective to shed light on current 
interpretative obstacles faced by arbitral tribunals. The choice to analyze both the German and 
the American ‘taking doctrine’ draws from the influence that such constitutional and 
administrative systems have exerted on the development of international criteria and 
standards for deciding ‘international taking issues’. Criteria such as the economic impact of 
the governmental action, the assessment of its adverse effects on property, the interference 
with legitimate expectations and, the inquiry into the character of the governmental measure 
4
8 A. Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 248-249. [Emphasis added]
are applied in national takings case-law and are also the leading standards endorsed in 
investment arbitration.9 Therefore, the German and American national practices are employed 
to give a new insight into the characteristics of indirect expropriation at the international 
level. In fact, comparable difficulties are faced by domestic and international adjudicators 
called to decide expropriatory claims and distinguishing them from the State’s exercise of 
regulatory powers. Accordingly, domestic approaches are interpreted as both the root of, and a 
benchmark for, the international investment law doctrine on indirect expropriation-regulatory 
taking.10  The traditional approach11  adopted by investment tribunals to decide indirect 
expropriatory cases may be traced back to the the German and American case-law and 
therefore “a common thread may be found in the case-law of domestic and international 
tribunals”.12
Chapter II reviews the law of expropriation in both customary international law and 
treaty law. The chapter accounts for current developments in IITs, as the lex specialis 
applicable to investment disputes. The recent investment practice demonstrates that the 
adoption of regional investment treaties has superseded the recourse to bilateral ones. The 
dissatisfaction with the investor-State system, that endows arbitrators with ample 
discretionary powers but limits the (non-compensable) regulatory space left to host States is 
the main reason for the shift. In fact, States are boosted to revise their IITs13 in the attempt to 
constrain the power of arbitral panels by refining the law that they are called to apply.14 As 
will be noted, notwithstanding the objectives of current investment treaty practice, the 
5
9 See below, Part I, Chapter I Section V and Chapter II.
10  See T. Waelde, A. Kolo, “Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in 
International Law”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 50, 2011, pp. 811-847. 
11  A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Investment Law”, in ICSID 
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 20(1), 2005, p. 7, speaks about the “orthodox approach”.
12 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law, CUP, 2012, p. 173.
13 See, South Africa and the outcome of the case Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South 
Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, 2010.
14  J. d’Aspremont, “International Customary Investment Law: Story of a Paradox”, in T. Gazzini, E. De 
Brabandere (eds)  International Investment Law. The Sources of Rights and Obligations, Martinus Nijihoff 
Publishers, 2012, p. 28.
wording of recent treaty clauses is still incapable to shed light on the ‘international taking 
doctrine’, since no clear-cut definitions of expropriation and indirect expropriation are 
offered. The review of the law of expropriation especially as reflected in IITs is preliminary to 
the analysis of its application by international courts and arbitral tribunals to decide claims of 
indirect expropriation.
In light of the judicial and arbitral practice, and following a general and preliminary 
overview of the main doctrines applied by international tribunals to decide indirectly 
expropriatory claims (Chapter III), each chapter in Part II examines one constitutive element 
of expropriation. The aim is to further understand the scope of the concept and differentiate 
between compensable and non-compensable takings.
Chapter IV analyzes the notion of ‘property’. International law fails to provide a general 
definition of property and such a lacuna has a bearing on the findings of expropriation, to the 
extent that the understanding of what is a ‘protectable property’ is subjected to contrasting 
interpretations. In international investment law, only property that amounts to an investment 
may be the object of expropriation and be protected under the relevant IIT. Accordingly, 
adjudicators are required to correctly define and identify the investment as a key step in the 
analysis concerning whether an expropriation has occurred. However, arbitral tribunals adopt 
varying approaches to determine whether or not an investment exists15 affecting the degree of 
protection accorded to the investment and the finding of a taking.
Chapter V focuses on the concept of taking, that is the measure whose nature and effects 
have to be characterized by adjudicators as expropriatory for an indirect expropriation to 
occur consequently entitling the owner to compensation. Varying adjectives have been 
interchangeably employed with reference to indirect expropriation:16  indirect, creeping, 
6
15  E.g.: the comprehensive approach, the focus on form or substance, the elements of the investment (risk, 
duration, contribution, contribution to the economic development of the host State).
16  See also, J. Bonnitcha, “Outline of a Normative Framework for Evaluating Interpretations of Investment 
Treaty Protections”, in C. Brown, K. Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, 2011, 
CUP, p. 117: the author argues that six identifiably distinct approaches have been applied by arbitral tribunals to 
distinguish indirect expropriation from legitimate non-compensable regulation.
constructive, disguised, regulatory. Those adjectives have been associated to the term 
expropriation (measure equivalent/tantamount to expropriation) or to the term taking. Here 
the term ‘taking’ is deemed to encompass all the types of actions carrying expropriatory 
effects.17 The term ‘taking’ is interpreted as conveying a more general significance to the 
action concerned and be able to neutrally refer to expropriatory measures that investment 
literature and practice have variously labeled. It is in this light that the expression is applied 
throughout Chapter IV and this research.
Chapter VI distinguishes between lawful and unlawful expropriation. It demonstrates 
that a limited role is assigned to the distinction, although both substantive and remedial 
consequences18 could emanate from it. The chapter argues that the key issue to be solved to 
effectively employ the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation in the 
settlement of investment disputes lies in ‘choice of law’ matters and the discretion of arbitral 
tribunals in this regard.
Finally, Chapter VII examines the function of public purpose in expropriatory claims. 
The concept of public purpose is both a requirement for a lawful expropriation19 and an 
indicator of the regulatory (non-compensable) nature of a governmental measure. The 
regulatory activity of the State that is not subjected to compensation is encompassed under the 
so-called police powers doctrine, which is framed into both a radical and a moderate version. 
The chapter discusses the doctrine and classifies the public purposes that are currently 
accepted as legitimate in international investment law.20 It emphasizes that in the absence of a 
7
17  Adopting the same view, J. H. Dalhuisen, A. T. Guzman, “Expropriatory and Non-Expropriatory Takings 
Under International Investment Law”, 27 August 2012, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2137107, (last accessed on 6 January 2012).
18 Customary international law in principles establishes different remedies in case of unlawful actions of the 
State. See further Part II, Chapter VI.
19  See, C. Lévesque, “Les fondements de la distinction entre l’expropriation et la réglementation en droit 
international”, in Revue générale de droit, Vol. 33, 2003, p. 68.
20 In the words of the arbitral tribunal in CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/8, Award, 12 May 2005, para 320: “As is many times the case in international affairs and international law, 
situations of this kind are not given in black and white but in many shades of grey. It follows that the relative 
effect that can be reasonably attributed to the crisis does not allow for a finding on preclusion of wrongfulness”.
value system capable to hierarchically order public concerns at the international level, broader 
(or global) public interests fail to be adequately taken into consideration before arbitral 
tribunals. The crucial significance of the choice of law with respect also to the notion of 
public interest is underlined, to the extent that general international law is––or is not––
deemed to prevail over the IITs’ provisions in regulating the State-investor relationship.21
The study concludes with an outline of the research and some remarks on the research’ 
outcomes. On the one hand, the current international approach to indirect expropriation is 
traced back to the German and the United States practice on takings, whose focus is on the 
balancing test and proportionality analysis. The comparative analysis of the national 
experiences underlines the thread connecting the national and international dimension in 
expropriatory matters. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the lack of an international consensus 
about the function of property at the international level may deprive adjudicators from 
guidance in deciding international claims for (indirect) expropriation.
In addition, it is contended that further investigation of the interplay between the fair 
and equitable standard of treatment (FET) and expropriation is needed, as the breach of the 
standard is commonly pleaded by investors as a litigation strategy coupled with a claim for 
indirect expropriation, with which therefore the FET interacts.
On the other, in light of the analysis of the judicial practice on takings, a 
reconceptualization of indirect expropriation as unlawful de facto expropriation is advocated, 
also as a prospect for future developments. The adjective indirect is deemed superfluous and it 
is claimed that non-expropriatory interferences with property rights are to be sanctioned by 
means of other substantive standards of protection (e.g.: FET). Furthermore, it is suggested to 
revitalize the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation, as well as the role of 
public purpose as a key criterion to assess the character of a governmental measure. While 
8
21  It seems that a State’s capacity to invoke regulatory expropriation would broaden insofar as customary 
international law is regarded as the law governing the investor-State relationship.
arbitrators generally focus on determining which right prevails between the private economic 
interest of the investor and the sovereign power of the State to decide claims for indirect 
expropriation, such claims pose a wide range of other side-problems, for instance in terms of 
legitimacy of the public policies of either domestic and international nature. A degree of 
deference to host States is welcomed, to the extent that provisions in IITs are stipulated in a 
more specific manner. As a consequence, a revision of relevant provisions in IITs is called for 
that duly defines legitimate regulatory purposes and takes into account the consequences of 
unlawful conducts.
II. Definition and Methodology
Recently, the United Nation Commission on Trade and Development (‘UNCTAD’) has 
published a research paper which provides the following operational definition of indirect 
expropriation. Indirect expropriation is described as
(a) An act attributable to the State; an (b) Interference with property rights or other 
protected legal interests; (c) Of such degree that the relevant rights or interests 
lose all or most of their value or the owner is deprived of control over the 
investment; (d) Even though the owner retains the legal title or remains in 
physical possession.22
The present work accepts such a description of indirect expropriation as the operational 
definition to delineate the scope of the investigation. However, other factors will be 
considered as distinctive elements of an indirect expropriation that may be incorporated in a 
description of it. The State’s failure to substantiate the regulatory foundation of its measure, or 
the State’s action in breach of specific commitments given to the investor23 are additional 
9
22  UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, in Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, 2012, p. 12. 
[Hereinafter referred to as ‘UNCTAD Study’]. See for a comparison the definition presented in UNCTAD, 
“Taking of Property”, in Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, 2000, p. 20, where indirect 
expropriation is described as “not the physical invasion of the property that characterizes nationalizations or 
expropriations that has assumed importance, but the erosion of rights associated with ownership by State 
interferences”.
23  For instance, in SAUR International SA v República Argentina, ICSID Case n. ARB/04/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Liability, 6 June 2012, para 406, the tribunal lists among the requirements for a legitimate 
expropriation the compliance with specific commitment existing between the host State and the foreign investor. 
See Part II, Chapter VI, paragraph IV.
indicators of the indirectly expropriatory nature of the measure. They may be instrumental to 
the finding of an expropriation as opposed to a regulatory exercise of governmental powers.
The research adopts a ‘case-law oriented’ methodology. It will proceed inductively, 
drawing from the decisions of several international courts and arbitral tribunals. The practice 
of 1) the Permanent Court of International Justice (‘PCIJ’) and the International Court of 
Justice (‘ICJ’); 2) the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (‘Iran-US Claims Tribunal’); 3) the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’); and, 4) other fora whose pronouncements are 
relevant to indirect expropriation are examined in each chapter of Part II. The legal 
framework applied and applicable to indirect expropriation will be marshaled as a result of 
this analysis, pointing at the possible (in)consistencies24 between the positive rules (contained 
in IITs) and their interpretation and implementation, when appropriate.25 
Re-constructing the international doctrine of indirect expropriation from the arbitral and 
judicial practice on takings offers an understanding of the real stage of its development and of 
the current problems associated to it. Judicial and arbitral decisions ratify the evolution of 
existing rule(s) of international investment law and affect their interpretation and application. 
Furthermore, the international practice on takings illustrates the strategies adopted by the 
parties to advance their claims or defences and thereby it accounts for the interaction between 
indirect expropriation and other substantive standards of investment protection that may 
influence its finding.
10
24 According to McLachlan, indeed, what is important is not the consistency of investment decisions, rather the 
consistency in the process of making interact special investment treaty provisions and general international law. 
See, C. McLachlan, “Investment Treaty and General International Law”, in International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 57, 2008, pp. 364 et seq.
25 M. Koskenniemi, “What is International Law For?”, in M. D. Evans (ed. by), International Law, Second Ed., 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 70-72. As Koskenniemi observes, the missing link between formal 
law and the results it is aimed to, is the professional activity of ascertaining and expressing underlying ideals. 
The ‘justice administrators’ and their reasonings fill this gap, whereas their modus operandi together with the 
verdicts they come up with may account for the de facto outcomes of that flat surface that is the law in abstracto: 
decidedly, a court’s decision tends to be a choice between alternatives that claims to be universal and objective, 
although being partial and subjective.
This study cannot and aims not at answering the question concerning where to draw a 
dividing line between regulation and compensable indirect expropriation, as this is deemed to 
remain a case-by-case decision of investment tribunals. Rather, this research proposes a fresh 
look over indirect expropriation by advancing an interpretative framework useful to the 
analysis and decision of international expropriatory cases. To this end a new conceptualization 
for expropriation is suggested that removes trivial categories and misleading characterizations 
and focuses on the actual variables at stake––compensable expropriation vis-à-vis non-
compensable regulation. In light of this consideration, the adjective ‘indirect’ would fall and 
be subsumed into the notion of de facto expropriation, as opposed to a de jure expropriation.26 
Those de facto expropriatory measures are deemed unlawful and on this basis are considered 
compensable. In fact, de facto governmental measures that may have expropriatory effects on 
ownership but prove a regulatory foundation would constitute a non-compensable regulatory 
activity of the State; whereas, de facto non-expropriatory interferences with the investor’s 
property rights would be sanctioned through other substantive standards established in IITs.
By drawing from both international and national models, such a framework may 
reconcile or guide arbitral approaches to takings issues to develop an intelligible legal 
methodology.27
11
26 A de jure expropriation is interpreted as an expropriation that affects the legal title to property.
27  D. D. Caron, “Investor-State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on Legitimacy”, in Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review, Vol. 32(2), 2008-2009, p. 516 arguing that “As expressed by Professor Ortino, the 
current system lacks the ideal level of coherence in several respects. First, there is an inconsistency of reasoning, 
which results in a loss of guidance and second, there is also poor reasoning that limits guidance even further and 
erodes confidence. Both of these circumstances are a consequence in part of varying methods of interpretation 
utilized by panels”.
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PART I
The Origins of the Law of Expropriation

Chapter I
The Legacy of National Experiences
“Part of what it means to be a member of society, to be an owner among owners, is to be part of a real or 
imagined social contract that limits liberty to enlarge liberty, that limits property to secure property”.1
I. Introductory Remarks
The choice to analyze both the German and the American ‘taking doctrine’ draws from 
the influence that such constitutional and administrative systems2  have exerted on the 
development of international criteria and standards for adjudicating ‘international taking 
issues’. Criteria such as the economic impact of the governmental action, the measure of its 
adverse effects on property, the interference with legitimate expectations and the inquiry into 
the (expropriatory v regulatory) character of the governmental measure as they are applied in 
German and American judicial practice are also the leading standards endorsed in investment 
arbitration.3 Therefore, the reference to both the German and the American national practice 
provides an interesting insight into the features of indirect expropriation. Domestic and 
international adjudicators are confronted with comparable difficulties when qualifying a claim 
15
1 J. W. Singer, “The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investment and Just Obligations”, in 
Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 30, 2006, p. 329.
2  G. Van Harten and M. Loughlin have argued that “investment arbitration is best analogized to domestic 
administrative law” due to its specific features that subject the regulatory conduct of states to control of a 
“compulsory international adjudication”. They claim that “[n]ot only is the regime of investment arbitration 
established by a sovereign act of the state; it is also designed to resolve disputes arising from the exercise of 
public authority. The subject matter of investment arbitration is a regulatory dispute arising between the state 
(acting in a public capacity) and an individual who is subject to the exercise of public authority by the state. [...] 
[and] the general consent authorizes the adjudication of regulatory disputes by an international tribunal”. 
Furthermore, it is concluded that “[t]he regime is therefore to be distinguished from reciprocally consensual 
adjudication, as conventionally used to resolve international disputes between states or commercial disputes 
between private parties; it is not based on a reciprocal relationship between juridical equals, but engages a 
regulatory relationship between the state and an individual”. G. Van Harten, M. Loughlin, “Investment Treaty 
Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law”, in The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 17
(1), 2006, pp. 146, 149; see also, G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, OUP, 2007, pp. 
45 et seq.
3 In addition, one may also consider the topical debate involving the US and European scholars and judges on the 
effectiveness of proportionality analysis in investment arbitration. Such a debate epitomizes the central role that 
the US and European doctrines––including the German one––may exert: indeed, although being a general 
principle applicable to the fundamental rights in Germany, and thus not substantially akin to the analytical nature 
of the investment technique, proportionality analysis finds its origin in the German administrative and 
constitutional law. See below, Section V and Chapter II.
as expropriatory or as the State’s exercise of regulatory powers. The domestic approaches will 
be interpreted as both the root of, and a benchmark against which to evaluate the international 
investment law doctrine on indirect expropriation and regulatory takings.4 The ‘orthodox’ 
approach5  adopted to decide indirect expropriation is traceable to the German and the 
American case-law so that “a common thread may be found in the case-law of domestic and 
international tribunals”.6
As for the main differences between the domestic and the international approach, at the 
international level a ‘constitutionalized’ or widely accepted global system of values, against 
which to assess the validity of the ‘international taking doctrine’, fails to be adopted. 
Consequently, to avoid an excessive ‘judicialization’ of investment arbitration, other 
mechanisms should be devised in order for the far-reaching functions of arbitral tribunals to 
be kept under control. In this respect, both the German and the American domestic examples 
may be instructive of the perils associated to judicial law-making in takings issues. The 
analysis of these States’ judicial practice points out an almost unfettered capacity of national 
judges to develop doctrines and criteria conferring them the power to take policy-driven 
decisions. As is almost always the case with national constitutional systems with regard to 
constitutional and legislative clauses, in international law arbitrators formally “lack the 
16
4  See T. Wälde, A. Kolo, “Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in 
International Law”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 50, 2011, pp. 811-847. The authors 
draw extensively from the comparative analysis “primarily of the US jurisprudence and the debate on ‘regulatory 
taking’ and the somewhat more conservative judicial decisions by the European Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights”. Accordingly, the authors concluded that “the constitutional law character of 
these cases makes them particularly apposite to serve as a laboratory––but also as a relative precedent––for the 
interpretative challenges in multilateral treaties now arising”. However, the authors also advised that “such 
national experiences cannot be automatically transposed into the process of treaty interpretation. One needs to 
bear in mind the specific policies and conditions of the treaties and their application”.
5 A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Investment Law”, in ICSID 
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 20(1), 2005, p. 7.
6 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law, CUP, 2012, p. 173.
mandate”  to create norms exceeding the scope of the contracting parties’ consent, as 
enshrined in the applicable law––IIT.7
A second aspect differentiating the domestic and the international ‘taking doctrine’––
here under scrutiny––concerns a stronger emphasis that is apparently put at the domestic level 
on the ‘reasonable foundation’ of the public purpose, or on the ‘social obligation’ inherent in 
ownership. The consequences of this approach may serve as a useful guideline to appraise the 
progress of international investment law in differentiating between compensable and non-
compensable takings. On the one hand, the national precedents point towards the 
appropriateness of a deferential approach in the assessment of policy objectives which, by 
according to the host State greater leeway to regulate economic activities in the public 
interest, would also mirror emerging ‘macro’ or ‘global’ public concerns shared by 
international subjects.8 On the other hand, they signal the need for investment arbitration to 
resort to other instruments capable of securing the safeguarding of the autonomous will of the 
contracting State parties, as enshrined in investment treaties, from the discretionary power of 
arbitrators.
II. The Judicial Practice on Takings in the United States and German Legal Systems: a 
Foreword
The degree of consistency in current investment practice is subjected to disagreement.9 
Here it is contended that the analysis of both the American and German practice on ‘takings’ 
may prove useful to shed light on the international doctrine of indirect expropriation and its 
fallacies.
17
7 M Sornarajah, “Towards Normlessness - The Ravage and Retreat of Neoliberalism in International Investment 
Law”, in K. P. Sauvant (ed) Yearbook of International Investment Law and Policy 2009-2010,  OUP, 2011, p. 
642.
8 M Sornarajah, “Towards Normlessness”, pp. 50, 146-154.
9 R. Dolzer, “Perspectives for Investment Arbitration: Consistency as a Policy Goal”, World Trade Forum 2011, 
New Directions and Emerging Challenges in International Investment Law and Policy, 2011; see also, S. A. 
Alexandrov, “On the Perceived Inconsistency in Investor-State Jurisprudence”, in J. E. Alvarez, K. P Sauvant 
(eds) The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options, 2011, OUP, pp. 60-69.
The American and the German administrative and constitutional systems are described 
below in the effort to highlight the common bedrock that those national experiences share 
with the international one. More precisely, it is acknowledged that both the American and the 
German judicial practice on ‘takings’ have contributed to the development of current 
doctrines and criteria applied to adjudicate indirect expropriatory claims in investment 
arbitration. Against this background, the two domestic legal systems are regarded as a model 
against which to compare the viability of proposals for the refinement of the indirect 
expropriation doctrine in investment arbitration.
III. The United States
This section illustrates the United States practice on takings. It develops from the 
analysis of the concept of property and the constitutional means for its protection and then 
reviews the relevant judicial decisions of the Supreme Court.
(a) The Concept of Property and Its Constitutional Protection in the United States
The American judicial practice has often dealt with the question whether a State action 
may qualify as a taking although affecting only part of the property and not the whole bundle 
of rights of which it is composed of.10 As it is the case at the international level, an affirmative 
or negative answer to this question may alter the scope of the owner’s compensatory rights; 
thence the importance of defining what ‘protectable property’ is as a precondition to 
understanding ‘what constitutes a taking’.
18
10  A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses - a Comparative Analysis, Kluwer International Law, 
1999, p. 446.
Under the 1787 United States Constitution11 the concept of property is to be understood 
by reading together the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.12 According to the Fifth 
Amendment, “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation”. 
According to the Fourteenth Amendment, no person “shall be deprived of [..] property 
without due process of law”. Thus the property clause consists of two parts, namely the 
‘Takings Clause’ and the ‘Due Process Clause’.13
The definition of taking stems from the distinction between the concepts of ‘eminent 
domain’ and ‘police powers’,14  both related to the sovereign authority of the State.15 Whilst 
19
11 For an analysis of the U.S. Constitutional Law see, D. P. Kommers and J. E. Finn, American Constitutional 
Law,, ITP, 1998. Note that the Bill of Rights and the first ten Amendments was added in 1791 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868, after the Civil War.
12 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, pp. 398-399: Furthermore, it has to be considered that 
property clauses are also included in the states constitutions, and considerable differences in the provisions thus 
exist. See, T. Lundmark, Power and Rights in US Constitutional Law, second Ed., OUP, 2008, pp. 112-113: 
Relevant to the analysis of the US property clause is the ‘state action doctrine’, which has a primacy in the 
recognition and enforcement of all constitutional rights. According to this doctrine, federal constitutional rights 
protect against actions performed by public actors––i.e.: local, state, and federal agencies. The reasons for this 
approach are to be found in the origins of the U.S. Constitution, which was drafted with the aim of shielding 
fundamental rights from governmental threats; T. Lundmark, Landscape, Recreation and Takings in German and 
American Law, Hans-Dieter Heinz, Stuttgart, 1997, p. 304; the general principle is that the legislature may only 
take private property for public uses or purposes. See, US Supreme Court, Lebron v. National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation, 513 U.S. 374 (1995), where the Supreme Court held a railway corporation to be a public 
entity because the Board was appointed by the President of the United States, even though the legislation denied 
that the corporation was a governmental agency.
13  Id, pp. 399, 409.  It has to be noted that the term ‘taking’ under the U.S. Constitution embraces both 
‘expropriation’ and ‘compulsory acquisition’. More precisely, under the U.S. law ‘expropriation’ refers 
specifically to permanent taking of title to property, whereas ‘taking’ includes both expropriation and ‘regulatory 
takings’. Moreover, the theoretical basis of the takings clause is referred to as ‘norm of repose’, to express the 
idea that government must respect vested rights in property and contract, with the result that either certain 
expectations must be protected from governmental interference, or they can be interfered upon only against 
payment of just compensation. In this light, compensation functions as a guarantee that interferences with 
property are justified by the public welfare.
14 Under the police power doctrine the state may expropriate private property by means of its eminent domain 
power, to serve a public purpose; the other side of the coin implies that the state may employ its police powers 
when private property endangers the public––i.e.: nuisance. T. Lundmark, Landscape, Recreation and Takings, p. 
293; W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws and Constitution of England, 3rd Ed., Chicago, 1884, Vol. 4, p. 
167. According to Blackstone, ‘nuisance’ can be defined as ‘either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all 
the king’s subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing that the common good requires’.
15 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law –– Searching for Light in the 
Dark”, in S. W. Schill (edited by), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p. 122; T. Lundmark, Landscape, Recreation and Takings, p. 301: In addition also the 
doctrine of ‘vested rights’ must be mentioned. The formula refers to the protection that the Constitution accords 
to the continuation of legally established rules and which must be distinguished from temporary takings; See, 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); First English Lutheran Church v. Country of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
the concept of ‘eminent domain’ refers to the State’s power to expropriate privately-owned 
property against compensation, the concept of ‘police powers’ is interpreted as referring to the 
general governmental power to legislate for the public good––in matters such as public 
security, order, health, morality, and justice.16 Under both concepts, however, due process and 
public purpose must be complied with.17  This means that property is not protected by 
absolutely preventing its violation: police powers allow the State to interfere with property 
rights and even to cause a serious loss to the value of private property, when the action is 
motivated by the pursuance of a public purpose.18 On the other hand, the eminent domain 
power requires that the taking entails a just compensation.19 Thus, property rights may suffer 
a limitation by means of both police powers20 and eminent domain,21  and it is against this 
rationale that the constitutional guarantees for the protection of property are founded.
20
16 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 122; A. J. Van del Walt, 
Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 410.
17 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 403.
18 Id, p. 404.
19 Dolan v. City of Tigard 114 S Ct 2309 (1994).
20 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, pp. 410-411. Police powers should enable the state to 
enforce legitimate restrictions to property rights in furtherance of public purposes such as ‘health, safety, morals 
of the community’, without payment of compensation. Hence, the major problem connected to the exercise of 
police powers is compliance with the public-purposes requirement. As a consequence, a regulation can be 
attacked on two basis: on the bases of its legitimacy, and on the basis of its nature–– that is, the regulation 
assumes the form of regulatory action but it de facto amounts to a taking of property without compensation. The 
latter hypothesis involves a broad interpretation of police powers, and in this case the public purpose 
requirement’s role as a threshold that affects legitimacy is essential. The US Supreme Court in Hawaii Housing 
Authority v.  Midkiff stated the public purpose requirement for both the police-power regulations and the takings 
of property. The case relied on a formal expropriation scheme and the Court referred to its decision in Berman v. 
Parker to maintain that an expropriation for redistribution or redevelopment of land was for a legitimate 
purpose. The decision clarified that a regulatory law has to serve a legitimate public purpose, and that the means 
selected to serve the purpose must be rational. See, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, at 160 [4]: it is argued 
that ‘a taking is effected if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, [..] or denies an 
owner economically viable use of its land’, creating the impression that a regulatory limitation imposed for an 
improper purpose would amount to a taking (as opposed to being invalid); see also, Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 
(1915); Miller v. Schoene,  276 U.S. 272 (1928); compare Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v.  Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 
659 (1878), and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). For a broad interpretation of the notion of police 
powers see, See, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
21  Id, p. 405; See also, N. S. Garnett, “The Public Use Question as a Taking Problem”, in The George 
Washington Law Review, Vol. 71, 2003, pp. 934-982.
For the protection accorded by the Fifth Amendment to apply, one has to identify a 
specific property right or property interest allegedly taken by the government.22 By stating 
that a “mere unilateral expectation or an abstract need” 23 does not entitle to claim protection, 
the Supreme Court has differentiated between business as “the sense of the activity of doing 
business”  and business as “the sense of the activity of making a profit”, with the latter falling 
out of the definition of property.24 ‘Intangible property rights’, as well as those property rights 
that are determined by reference to “existing rules and understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as State law”, are regarded as protectable property under the Fifth 
Amendment Clause.25
Such a framework for the protection of property is complemented by the doctrine of 
‘conceptual severance’, according to which compensation shall be paid also against the 
impairment of one ‘component’ of ownership.26 Radin describes ‘conceptual severance’ as 
“delineating a property interest consisting of just what the government action has removed 
from the owner, and then asserting that that particular whole thing has been permanently 
taken”. As a consequence, “this strategy”  has the effect to “hypothetically or conceptually 
‘sever[s]’ from the whole bundle of rights just those strands that are interfered with by the 
regulation, and then hypothetically or conceptually construe[s] those strands in the aggregate 
21
22  E. Shenkman, “Could Principles of Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence Be Helpful in Analyzing 
Regulatory Expropriation Claims Under International Law?”, in New York Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, 
2002-2003, p. 183. It should be a ‘cognizable’ property interest; see, Conti v United States, 291 F.3d 1334 (Fed. 
Circ. 2002); Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co., 467 US 986, 1003 (1984); Phillips v Wash Legal Found., 524 US 156, 
164 (1998). 
23 Webb Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v Beckwith, 449 US 155, 161 (1980).
24  E. Shenkman, “Could Principles of Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence Be Helpful”, pp. 183-184, 
quoting College Sav. Bank v Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 US 666, 675 (1999).
25 Id, pp. 183-184, quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 577 (1972).
26  M. J. Radin, “The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings”, in 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 88(8), 1988, p. 1676. Contra: R. A. Epstein, Takings, Private Property and the 
Power of Eminent Domain, Harvard University Press, 1985.
as a separate whole thing”.27 Such a doctrine was only partly applied in the US case-law.28 
Indeed, as we shall see, the ‘conceptual severance’ test did not obliterate the assessment of the 
effects of the measure on the property as a whole29. Rather, the standard applied by the US 
Courts considers whether a person was forced to bear alone a burden that was to be borne by 
the entire society.30 More precisely, it is since the 1920s that the US Supreme Court has 
focused on the evaluation of the effects of the measures on property, rather than on the formal 
attributes of ownership.31
(b) The Judicial Practice on Takings of the US Supreme Court
The problem of distinguishing between the exercise of police powers and the eminent 
domain power crystallizes into the question of where to draw a line between regulation and 
compensable takings. Justice Holmes addressed the problem in the leading case Pennsylvania 
Coal Co v. Mahon,32 to which the roots of the current takings doctrine in United States are 
traceable.33
In Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon, the US Supreme Court considered governmental 
regulations that ‘go too far’ as amounting to a ‘taking’. Thereby, it was on the one hand 
confirmed the constitutional legitimacy of core police powers in regulating property; on the 
other hand, however, the connection between police powers and the takings clause’s 
22
27 M. J. Radin, “The Liberal Conception of Property”, p. 1676.
28 For instance it has been rejected in Penn Central Transportation Co v. City of New York,  438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
at 130; and, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S 470 (1987), at 496-497, 497-498; 
conversely, it has been applied mostly with regard to the owner’s ‘right to exclude’. See, Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), at 179-180; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) at 
433-434, 432, 434-435; Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) at 831-832, Dolan v.  City 
of Tigard, 114 S Ct 2309 (1994) at IIIB.
29 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 450.
30Id, p. 448.
31 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 129.
32 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
33 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 401; see, also F. Bosselman, D. Callies, J. Banta, The 
Taking Issue: A Study of the Constitutional Limits of Governmental Authority to Regulate the Use of Privately-
Owned Land Without Paying Compensation to the Owners, Washington,  Council on Environmental Quality, 
1973, pp. 126 et seq.: It is explained that the question faced by Justice Holmes in this case was “whether the 
Kohler Act tried to accomplish through police power regulation what could only be accomplished by eminent 
domain”.
constitutional framework was framed in dynamic terms.34 When the regulation ‘goes too far’, 
the qualification of the measure as ‘taking’ and the correlative duty to pay compensation 
balance the interests in conflict:35 to counteract the State’s general discretion in deciding on 
the quantum of the economic ‘readjustment’, Justice Holmes proposed a case-by-case 
approach, that weighed the specific characteristics of each situation.36
Such an approach has shifted the debate on the takings to the search for the point where 
the regulation ‘goes too far’ and becomes a (regulatory) taking requiring compensation 
pursuant to the taking clause.37 As is known, this query puzzles also international law scholars 
since the 1960s.38 Dolzer observed that the problem at the international level is whether there 
is a point at which, or beyond which, either compensation is required regardless of the 
objective nature of the governmental measure, or the governmental measure is justified 
regardless of the impact on the private investor.39
23
34 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 401; F. Bosselman, D. Callies, J. Banta, The Taking 
Issue, p. 134: “in Justice Holmes’ view the difference between regulation and taking was a difference of degree 
not kind”. (emphasis in the original)  To the problem as where to draw a line, Justice Holmes answered that “the 
question depends upon the particular facts”. See, Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (1922): 
Justice Holmes stated “The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”; Contra to the decision in Pennsylvania Coal, see 
Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623 (1887).
35 Id, p. 414.
36 F. Bosselman, D. Callies, J. Banta, The Taking Issue, pp. 137-139.
37 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 401.
38  G. C. Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?”, in British Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 38, 1962, pp. 307-338.
39 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?”, in N. Y. U. Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, 
2002, p. 80.
This same debate continues to present itself in the US Supreme Court case-law.40 In 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City,41 the Court acknowledged its inability to 
provide any “set formula for determining when justice and fairness require that economic 
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government rather than remain 
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons”.42 Compensation is due when it is for the 
community to bear the burden of a measure, whose effects might disproportionately affect the 
owner.43  At the core of this position there seems to be the evaluation of the ‘economic 
impact’ of the governmental action;44 nevertheless, as the decisions of the US Supreme Court 
shows, also the character of the governmental measure is examined.
As mentioned, the US Supreme Court initially opted for a case-by-case assessment, 
weighing the element of each case according to an open-ended, contextual test;45 however, in 
24
40 J. L. Sax, “Takings and the Police Power”, in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 74(1), 1964, pp. 36-76. According to Sax, 
two are the judicial approaches developed to differentiate between ‘exercise of police powers’ and ‘taking of 
property requiring compensation’. Initially, the Courts relied on common law principles, according to which a 
taking was effected when a governmental action implied the acquisition or appropriation of a proprietary 
interest, whereas a regulation was taking place through the mere exercise of control over a nuisance. 
Subsequently, in an effort to remove the formalistic limits of this approach, a case-by-case balancing test, 
weighing public need and private loss, was proposed (the author refers to Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, at 415 (1922)). Whilst in light of this view, compensation was to follow the extent of the loss suffered, 
this modus operandi was never consistently applied by courts. Sax defined property as a fluid phenomenon, more 
precisely it is described as an economic value resulting from competition. Hence, the State might behave as 
either a participant in the competitive process to gain property, or as a mediator, which resolves or mediate 
conflicts between––and for the benefit of––private claims; accordingly, the economic losses that results from the 
state’s role as a participant should be qualified as takings and therefore entail compensation; whereas, losses 
ensuing from the state’s activity as a mediator should be qualified as exercise of police powers and therefore not 
entitling for compensation; T. Lundmark, Landscape, Recreation and Takings, pp. 283, 286: the author maintains 
that the most important tests that are employed to distinguish between compensable and non-compensable 
takings, namely between police powers and harsh limitations of property rights, may be summarized as follows: 
diminution in value caused by regulation; balancing test; equality and fairness of subjecting only some property 
to regulation; the concept of a regulation causing or enabling a ‘physical invasion’ or ‘occupation’ of private 
property; the test of one reasonable, beneficial use; R. E. Young, “A Canadian Commentary on Constructive 
Expropriation Law Under NAFTA Art 1110” in Alberta Law Review, Vol. 43(4), 2006, pp. 1004 et seq.
41 Penn Central Transportation Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
42 Id, paras 123 et seq.
43 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 123.
44 Radin also argues that in Rehnquist’s dissent to Penn Central, the ‘conceptual severance’ strategy was relied 
upon. Similarly it is argued with regard to Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) 
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). M. J. Radin, “The Liberal Conception of 
Property”, pp. 1676-1677.
45 Penn Central Transportation Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); See, T. Lundmark, Landscape, 
Recreation and Takings, p. 288.
subsequent cases this ad hoc approach was apparently abandoned.46  Specifically, the US 
Supreme Court shifted to a rule-bound approach, emphasizing the so-called ‘per se takings’; 
or, conversely, it reiterated the context-related test, but applying it only to cases that could not 
prima facie––or, categorically47––be identified as ‘regulatory takings’.48 More precisely, ‘per 
se takings’, or interferences that always constitute a taking, are defined as those causing a 
‘permanent physical occupation’49 or a ‘deprivation of all economically viable use’.50  In 
addition, regulations that destroy core property rights,51  such as the right to leave property to 
one’s heirs upon death, may also be regarded as ‘per se takings’.52
A permanent physical invasion or occupation of property is perceived as very invasive, 
divesting the owner of its right to exclude foreigners as well as of its right to use––and control 
the use of––the property.53 In particular, the ‘right to exclude’ is conceived of as one of the 
most essential component in the bundle of rights constituting ownership. The US Supreme 
Court developed its reasoning by assessing the character of the governmental action which, in 
case of a per se taking, appropriates a complete part of the property for the benefit of the 
25
46  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
47 Reference is made to the ‘categorical treatment’ advanced in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council at para 
2, from Justice Scalia. According to his test, regulatory actions are classified as takings subject to the 
compensation requirement ‘without a case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the 
restraint’. Particularly, Justice Scalia analyzed permanent physical invasions of property as simply takings, 
whereas regulatory takings were identified in terms of the ad hoc test. 
48 See, A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 402. A number of decisions are at odds with this 
pattern: see, PruneYard Shopping Center v.  Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Pennell City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 
(1988); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992);Conversely, other decisions suggest that the context-
neutral approach was crucial in the 1980s. See: Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
Country of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan City of Tigard, 114 S. C.t. 2309 (1994).
49  Loretto v.  Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Brown v Legal Foundation of 
Washington 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2002).
50 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1017, 1027 et seq.  (1992); Palazollo v Rhode 
Island 533 US 606 (2001); Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 535 US 
302 (2002). See, M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 126.
51 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
52 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 428.
53 See, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); see also, Lloyd Corp v.  Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); 
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
public or a third party. Thus, the rule is centered on the effects of the measure concerned. 
More recently, in Brown v Legal Foundation of Washington54 the scope of the rule has been 
extended as to cover also intangible property rights.55
The destruction of all the economic viable uses of property was considered in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council56  as equivalent to a physical occupation.57  Indeed, the 
functional basis for allowing the government to regulate property, and thereby affect property 
values without compensation does not apply when the government has deprived the owner of 
all the economically beneficial uses of its property.58 This action would constitute a taking59 
and when it is a core property right to be taken or destroyed, compensation is always due.60
The Court sets out an exception, stating that the government may be dispensed with its 
duty to pay compensation when the inquiry “into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that 
the proscribed use interests where not part of his title”.61 Thus, the Court was deciding on the 
basis of the character of the governmental measure, namely the third criteria established in 
Penn Central. In Penn Central, the regulation was readjusting benefits and burdens related to 
property and in this light its non-compensable nature could be justified. Conversely, against 
the destruction of the economic value in its entirety the State’s police powers are exceeded 
26
54 Brown v Legal Foundation of Washington 538 U.S. 216 (2002).
55 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 127.
56 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see, T. Lundmark, Landscape, Recreation and Takings, p. 291.
57 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 435.
58 T. Lundmark, Landscape, Recreation and Takings, p. 291: the author refers to the ‘beneficial use test’ and 
explains that ‘continuation of the present use, at least if economically viable, is also employed as a judicial test 
for determining takings from social obligations’.
59 A. J. Van del Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 435.
60 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
61 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), paras 1027 et seq.: Lucas decision is generally 
referred to as an example of the so-called ‘background principles of law that constitute an inherent limitation on 
title’. In particular, the Court discussed whether the proposed use of property was already prohibited under 
‘background principles of law’, at the time property was acquired. Under such circumstances the proscribed use 
is not to be regarded as part of the title founding the claim. See, also Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v 
DeBenedictis,  480 US 470, 491 n. 20 (1987), quoted in E. Shenkman, “Could Principles of Fifth Amendment 
Takings Jurisprudence Be Helpful”, p. 185.
and compensation has to be paid as a result of the depletion of the entire economic value of 
property.62
When none of the categories constituting a ‘per se taking’ are involved, a three-factors 
test applies.63 It implies the investigation of: 1) the nature of the governmental action; 2) the 
diminution of value that results from the regulation and, 3) the extent to which the regulation 
interferes with reasonable, investment-backed expectations.64 With regard to this test, the case 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York65 shows that the Court avoids a finding 
of a taking when faced with a regulation that advances some public interest; does not destroy 
the most important ‘elements of the bundle of property rights’; leaves ‘much of the 
commercial value of property intact’; and, includes some ‘reciprocity of benefit’.66  It is 
especially noteworthy the US Supreme Court’s statement that legislation should ‘substantially 
27
62  M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 129. The author 
observes also that the Court points to the negative legitimate expectations of the owner, to clarify that some form 
of future regulations shall be expected: as a consequence, it is only when the regulation falls outside this realm 
that compensation becomes necessary, being the regulation allowed even to cause a loss of economic value when 
personal property is concerned; Regarding how to measure the severity of the economic impact, one should refer 
to the ‘parcel-in-the-whole’ rule: according to this principle, applied mainly in the land use context, the 
economic impact of the regulation “must be measured against the full scope of the claimant’s property interest”. 
The Supreme Court in Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council,  Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, argued that 
“[w]here an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not 
a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety”. See, E. Shenkman, “Could Principles of Fifth 
Amendment Takings Jurisprudence Be Helpful”, p. 190, quoting Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council,  Inc v Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
63 See, Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
64 Penn Central Transportation Co v. City of New York,  438 U.S. 104 (1978), para 124; see also, United States 
Model BIT, 2012, Annex B, stating the following criteria to determine whether an action amounts to indirect 
expropriation: “(i)  the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of 
actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not 
establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii)  the extent to which the government action interferes 
with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action”. The 
influence of the national judicial practice seems irrefutable. Accordingly, some authors have also argued that the 
favor towards investors’ protection in international investment law is the result of the “Americanization of 
international law” or amount to an extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. 
See, D. Schneiderman, “NAFTA’s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada”, in University 
of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 46, 1996, p. 499; S. L Karamanian, “Overstating the ‘Americanization’ of 
International Arbitration: Lessons from ICSID”, in Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, Vol. 19, 2003, pp. 
5-34; U. Mattei, “A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on US Hegemony and the Latin Resistance”, in Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 383-448.
65 Penn Central Transportation Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
66 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 439. [Emphasis added].
advance’ a legitimate State interest. In Agins v. City of Tiburon67  the Court maintained that 
“the application of [a general zoning] law to a particular property effects a taking if the 
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate State interests”,68  assessing the 
relationship means/ends implied by the measure, together with the burden imposed on the 
owner and the public harm possibly caused (proportionality or cause/effect test).69
It is not surprising that the relationship between public purpose for the exercise of 
police powers and taking is a thorny issue: ‘purely regulatory matters’ cannot sometimes be 
easily differentiated from takings, given that the public-purpose requirement is the standard 
applicable to both.70  Moreover, when a regulatory measure is not directly aimed at the 
protection of the public interest against a threat, the fact that it apparently serves a public 
purpose does not exempt it from being a taking. The parameter applied draws a comparison 
between the burdensome effects of the action and the public interest served.71 Following Penn 
Central, the Court has progressively refined its tests. Perkams has argued that in Andrus v 
Allard72 three significant aspects concerning the Court’s approach have materialized. First, the 
Court has clarified that the right to use property is conditioned upon the State’s right to 
regulate, and that such regulation might prohibit specific property uses; second, the 
28
67 447 U.S. 255 (1980) at 260 [4]
68 B. Appleton, “Regulatory Takings: The International Law Perspective”, in New York University Environmental 
Law Journal, Vol. 11, 2002-2003, p. 38.
69  Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Nollan v California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 
837-838 (1978); see also, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2315 (1994), where the Court finally 
considered the type of connection between regulation and state interest that promotes the ‘substantial 
advancement’ of the latter, and decided for the application of both the means/ends and the cause/effects standard. 
M. McUsic, “The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and its Impact on Economic Legislation”, in 
Boston University Law Review, Vol. 76, 1996, pp. 632-633. (Notably, the substantial effect of the measure is one 
of the criteria that are applied also at the international level in order to draw a line between expropriation and 
regulation and, possibly, identify cases of indirect expropriation. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal tends to 
follow this approach).
70 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 418.
71 Id, p. 418. It is argued that the kind of public purpose may also be considered to determine whether it is a pure 
exercise of police powers or a compensable regulatory taking; T. Lundmark, Landscape, Recreation and Takings 
in German and American Law, Hans-Dieter Heinz, Stuttgart, 1997, p. 288, making reference to the balancing test 
in order as a technique to weigh the public use against the loss caused, as well as to the equality test which the 
author equates to the German special sacrifice test. More precisely, it is argued that any action threatening an 
owner unequally may be opposed under the equal protection clause, apart from the Fifth Amendment.
72 Andrus v Allard,, 444 U.S. 51, 53 et seq (1979).
expectation of future profits is regarded as not deserving a specific constitutional protection; 
and lastly, the Court has underlined that the regulation of activities economically active 
deserves a closer scrutiny under the takings clause––whereas the government is free to 
regulate future activities.73
The diminution of the property value is deemed insufficient to constitute a taking, 
especially when no physical invasion or permanent appropriation of the ownership is 
performed by the government.74  Accordingly, it is not only argued that a broad range of 
regulations on economic activity can be subjected to a taking claim, but also that indirect 
interferences may only exceptionally be regarded as expropriatory.75
In this light, the opening question concerning whether a regulation possibly amounting 
to an indirect expropriation ‘goes too far’ gives rise to two possible claims: 1) a claim for 
compensation against a regulation which is de facto amounting to a taking––i.e.: in this case, 
the claim disputes the qualification of the measure; or, 2) a claim that the regulation amounts 
to a taking without compensation, in breach of the takings clause and, therefore, is 
constitutionally invalid––i.e., a claim that disputes the lawfulness of the measure on the basis 
of the lack of compensation.76
Property is also protected under the due process clause. As its interpretative history 
shows, the due process clause provides however very limited protection to property rights. 
29
73 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, pp. 125-126; E. Shenkman, 
“Could Principles of Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence Be Helpful”, p. 194, refers to the ‘ripeness 
defense’, according to which “a regulatory takings claim is not ripe unless the government entity charged with 
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulation to the 
property at issue”. See, Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 
172, 186 (1985); Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 620-621, 633 (2001).
74 See, Concrete Pipe & Products v Construction Laborers Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993), paras 643, 645.
75 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 126. [Emphasis added]
76  A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 439: the author refers to the following cases as 
examples: Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co, 272 
U.S. 365 (1926); Penn Central Transportation Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); PruneYard shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Hawaii Housing Authority v.  Midkiff 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Association v.  DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Yee v. City 
of Escondido,  503 U.S. 519 (1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S Ct 2309 (1994).
During the so called Lochner era,77  the clause was applied to investigate the substantial 
purpose of legislation and the relation between this purpose and the means employed to 
promote it, resulting in substantive limits on the regulation of economic activities. From the 
Lochner decision onwards, the meaning of property has expanded as to include the ‘economic 
value’, thereby causing also an expansion of the notion of ‘taking of property’.78 By 1920 the 
Court had recognized the property’s market value as a constitutionally protected component 
of property, so that its diminution was regarded as amounting to a taking in breach of the due 
process clause.79  More precisely, the Court interchangeably applied “the criteria for 
determining when the State deprived an individual of a due-process-protected property 
right”––i.e., in breach of the due process clause––and “the criteria for determining when 
private property had been taken” 80––i.e., triggering the application of the takings clause.
The expansion of the concept of property so as to include its market value had rendered 
property rights “coterminous with [then] existing common law rules”:81 thus, any change in 
the law could become unconstitutional under this approach. By recognizing the “legitimacy of 
police regulations”  the Court aimed at constraining the side-effects of its jurisprudence.82 
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77 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905): the Supreme Court struck down a law that imposed a maximum 
weekly limit of working hours, on the basis that it was imposed for an improper use, that is to redistribute 
property rather than to protect workers; On the contrary, the pre-civil war jurisprudence adopted a narrow 
definition of property, whose appropriation was ascertained only when the title and possession of real or personal 
ownership were affected. Subsequently, the Courts started to find a taking when property was rendered unusable. 
M. McUsic, “The Ghost of Lochner”, p. 613.
78 Id, p. 613; See, Rate Regulations Cases: Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474 (1913); Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. 
Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 687, 696 (1898); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 523-27 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & 
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399, 410-13 (1894); Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 
418, 458 (1889).
79 Id, p. 618; See, Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922).
80 Id, p. 614, 617.
81 Id, pp. 618-619.
82 Id.
Nevertheless, any regulations had to pass both a means/end and a cause/effect test in order to 
be considered in pursuit of a public interest.83
As noted, since the 1930s the Court opted for a factual inquiry84  in its takings’ 
jurisprudence, in an effort not to “interfere with the legislative regulation of economic rights, 
unless explicit constitutional provisions (other than due process) were threatened or 
transgressed”.85 Therefore, the interests of the property owner and the public86 were balanced 
mainly in light of the following criteria: the economic impact of the regulation on the property 
owner, the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations and, the character of the governmental action.87 Consequently, during the post-
Lochner era the procedural due process clause has been applied in order to invalidate 
governmental actions interfering with ‘new property’.88
Presently, the highly property-protective stance upheld in the Lochner era seems to be 
revitalized in the takings’ jurisprudence: the US Supreme Court seems inclined to thoroughly 
examine the relationship between regulatory means and legislative ends, and heightens the 
burden for proving the causal correlation between “the affected owner’s conduct and the harm 
to be remedied”.89 Property interests may no more easily be differentiated according to the 
function they serve, and the Court “has gradually expanded the range of protected interests”, 
addressing especially the commercial and entrepreneurial value of property.90 As will be noted 
31
83 Constitutional public interests were the pursuit of health, safety, and general welfare, that did not further the 
economic interests of some persons at the expense of others. Yet, the Lochner-Era interpretation of the 
Constitution had obvious repercussions on economic regulation in US: the concept of property reshaped the legal 
meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which, as noted, represent the basis of the US Supreme Court 
case-law relating to regulatory takings.
84 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses - a Comparative Analysis, pp. 405-406.
85 Id.
86 Penn Central Transportation Co v. City of New York,  438 U.S. 104 (1978).
87 M. McUsic, “The Ghost of Lochner”, p. 625.
88 A. J. Van del Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 406. Reference is here to Reich’s theory of social rights 
(i.e., the status of individuals) as a ‘new property’ that deserves protection. See, C. A. Reich, “The New 
Property”, in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 73(5), 1964, pp. 733-787.
89 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example”, in Cornell Law 
Review, Vol. 88, 2003, p. 740.
90 Id.
in the following section, this constitutes a major difference between the American and the 
German constitutional property law: in fact, those interests are granted an inferior degree of 
protection in Germany, as they are not so proximate to the fundamental values of human 
dignity and self-realization that permeate the German Basic Law.91
IV. Germany
This section investigates the German practice on takings. It examines the concept of 
property under the German Constitution and according to the relevant case law of the German 
Federal Constitutional, Administrative and Supreme Court.
(a) The Notion of Property in the German ‘Grundgesetz’
The German Constitution, the so-called Basic Law (Grundgesetz (GG))92, incorporates 
all German fundamental constitutional rights. The Basic Law establishes private property’s 
institutional legitimacy and positively protects property93, qualifying it––in the words of the 
Constitutional Court––as “an elementary basic right”.94
In order to grasp the meaning of the property clause under the German GG,95 its general 
legal context should be analyzed. The German Constitution creates not only a Rechtstaat (a 
State governed by the rule of law) but also a Sozialstaat (a social welfare State) endorsing an 
idea of social distribution of public welfare.96 This approach is mirrored in the Constitutional 
32
91 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 740.
92 The German Constitution is called ‘Basic Law’ (Grundgesetz) because in 1949, when it was promulgated, it 
was expected that the division of Germany was a temporary measure and that, consequently, a permanent 
constitution would have been written. Most importantly, the primary importance that is attributed to human 
dignity in the Grundgesetz is a legacy of German negative historical experiences (Art. 1). R. Lubens, “The 
Social Obligation of Property Ownership: A Comparison of German and U.S. Law”, in Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, Vol. 24(2), 2007, p. 404; A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality 
Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 47, 2008, p. 105.
93 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?, p. 736.
94 BVerfGE 50, 290 (339).
95 The terms Basic Law, Grundgesetz and Constitution will be used interchangeably.
96 D. P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1997, pp. 242-243; 
see. Artt. 20(1), 28(1) GG.
Court’s decisions, where human personality is defined as community-centered,97  showing a 
contextual attitude and expressing the idea that the individual––and his rights––should be 
treated in light of the social environment in which they are situated. Such an interpretation, 
founded in the Sozialstaat, has a bearing on the way property rights are understood.98
Although recognizing both liberalism and individual rights, the GG suggests that the 
individualistic approach may be modified––to some degree––for socially-oriented purposes.99 
As a consequence of its social rights clauses, it is predominantly believed that the German 
State is under a constitutional obligation to guarantee a minimal subsistence for its individual 
citizens.100
The commitment to social welfare is fundamental in order to understand the rationale at 
the basis of the treatment accorded to property rights. This commitment is rooted in the 
principle of human dignity (Menschenwürde) which, as mentioned, is at the heart and bedrock 
of the entire German Basic Law.101 The social aspect of human dignity influences the notion 
of property: property is a fundamental right, but it is accorded the highest––constitutional––
degree of protection to the extent that governmental actions interferes with the owner’s ability 
to act as an autonomous, moral and political agent.102  This means that only the core––or 
essence––of property is elevated to the constitutional status of fundamental right: only to the 
extent that property is instrumental to primary constitutional values, such as human dignity 
and self-governance, it may be constitutionally recognized and preserved.103
Article 14 GG reads:
33
97  G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 744; BVerfGE 4, 7 (15-16) 
(Investment Aid Case, 1954).
98 Id, p. 745.
99 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment: The Social Obligation Inherent in Ownership, IUCN Environmental 
Policy and Law Paper, 1976, p. 13.
100 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 743; ; see also, BVerfGE 125, 175, 9 
February 2010 (Hartz IV); BVerfGE 18 July 2012 (Asylum), 1 BvL 10/10, 1 BvL 2/11.
101 Id; see also, Art. 1 GG, which enshrines the principle of human dignity. Noteworthy, this principle is treated 
by German courts as pre-political, objective, and transcendental.
102 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 739.
103 Id.
(1) Private property and the right of inheritance shall be protected. Substance and 
limitations are determined by the laws.
(2) Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.
(3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may only be 
ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of 
compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In 
case of dispute respecting the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to 
the ordinary courts.
Article 14 GG epitomizes the relationship between the protection of property and the 
‘social clause’.104 Property is constitutionally acknowledged in a civic and moral sense,105  
insofar as it is oriented to the development of the individual, both as a moral agent and an 
active member of the community.106  More precisely, a ‘social obligation inherent in 
ownership’ is affirmed, stressing the double dimension––public and private––of property 
rights. The primary function of Article 14 is not to prevent the taking of property without 
compensation, but rather to secure existing property in the hands of its owner.107 The Basic 
Law protects property itself, not its monetary value, and it does so through a civic-oriented 
approach.108 Indeed, the function of property is ‘to secure its holder a sphere of liberty in the 
34
104  W. Geiger, “Die Eigentumsgarantie des Art. 14 GG und ihre Bedeutung für den sozialen Rechtsstaat”, in 
Eigentum und Eigentümer in unserer Gesellschaftsordnung”, Publications of the Walter-Raymond-Foundation, 
Vol. I, p. 185, 1960; A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses,  p. 124, describes the property guarantee 
in Art. 14 GG as ‘(a) a fundamental human right, (b) which is meant to secure, for the holder of property, (c)  an 
area of personal liberty (d) in the patrimonial sphere, (e) to enable her to take responsibility for the free 
development and organization of her own life, (f) within the larger social and legal context.
105 R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 417.
106 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 745.
107 R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 416.
108 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 746; H. Kube, “Private Property in 
Natural Resources and The Public Weal in German Law––Latent Similarieties to the Public Trust Doctrine?”, in 
Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 37, 1997, p. 865: the author refer to the concept of ‘Sozialpflichtigkeit’, as a 
general recognition that private property ‘must be seen in a social context, with the potential to benefit the 
public’. [Emphasis added]
economic field and thereby enable him to lead a self-governing life’109. Hence, property is 
conceived of in connection to the personhood110 of its owner.111 German Constitutional Law, 
in particular, understands liberty in both its positive and negative sense, namely freedom to as 
well as (although more strongly than) freedom from.112 The owner’s freedom from external 
interference is interpreted and valued only as a precondition for his self-realization or self-
development in the society.113  Private ownership, thus, is always perceived as ‘socially 
tied’,114  and this connection exceeds the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,115 to 
express the idea that private property rights cannot outweigh the public good.116 Whilst the 
Constitution protects from encroachments on property rights motivated by public needs, the 
public order essential to both society and the living of citizens counter-limits the exercise of 
property rights. Section 2 of Article 14,117  indeed, clearly underlines property’s 
35
109  BVerfGE 24 at 389: The Court interpreted Art. 14, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Basic Law as protecting 
property “both as legal concept and as a concrete right held by the individual owner”; it associated property to 
the protection of personal liberty, and more precisely to a “personal liberty in the economic field, enabling the 
owner to lead a self-governing life”. “This constitutional right”, maintained the Court, “is conditioned upon the 
legal concept of property”; however, “measures hav[ing]  the effect of removing from the private legal order 
areas belonging to the elementary substance of constitutionally protected economic activities”, will not be 
uphold by the Court. The fundamental essence of the property right, as established in the Constitution, cannot be 
frustrated, and any action in contrast to this basic principle would therefore be deemed as unlawful; G. S. 
Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 767, arguing that German law extends 
substantive––and not merely procedural––protection to property rights; See, BVerfGE 79, 292 (303); 83, 201 
(208); 97, 350 (371); 102, 1 (15).
110 See, M. J. Radin, “Property and Personhood”, in Stanford Law Review, Vol. 34, n. 5, 1982, pp. 957-1015: “to 
achieve proper self-development––to be a person––an individual needs some control over resources in the 
external environment. The necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights”. The author refers 
also to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1821).
111 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 747.
112 Id, p. 747; I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, 1958. [Emphasis added]
113 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 748: accordingly, welfare becomes a 
‘matter of securing the material conditions necessary for the proper development of individuals as responsible 
and self-governing members of the society’.
114 BVerfGE 52, 1 (1979) at 34-35 (Small Garden Plot Case).
115 “So use your own as not to injure another's property”. [Editor’s note]
116 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 750.
117 Article 14 GG contains three distinct rules. Art. 14(1) establishes the right to private property; Art. 14(2)  the 
public function of property; Art. 14(1) sentence 2 and Art. 14(3) the state power to interfere with property rights 
both by defining the content and limits of property and by expropriating property for public interest, against 
compensation. See, M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 130.
instrumentality to the public good;118 in addition, earlier wordings of the Article reinforce this 
substantive meaning of the obligation considered.119
According to the drafters of the German Constitution, it is the essence of fundamental 
rights that cannot be modified.120 The GG guarantees the right to hold property, but it also 
allows the legislature to take into account changing societal needs and therefore redefine the 
substance and limits of property rights. However, as mentioned, it is never possible to alter 
the “basic substance of property”, unless compensation is accorded (upon determination by 
the law).121
Section 3 of Article 14 GG states the conditions upon which the Government may 
legitimately interfere with private property rights and thus perform its regulatory powers. 
Expropriations are lawful and legitimate to the extent that they serve a public purpose and 
compensation is due to the private party in order to counterbalance the loss caused. Therefore, 
any expropriatory act is constitutionally legitimate to the extent that it fulfills such 
requirements. By no means compensation is at the government’s discretion.
As is known, the international scholarship on regulatory takings argues that the State 
should not be exposed to the risk of paying compensation upon any exercise of its sovereign 
regulatory powers––e.g.: for the implementation of a new environmental legislation.122 In 
light of the norm enshrined in Article 14(3) GG, the public interest pursued by the German 
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118 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 60: “The concept of ‘public good’ (Wohl der Allgemeninheit) is 
hardly capable of abstract definition. But the Constitutional Court has decided that it will, in a given case, 
exercise its own judgment as to the existence of the conditions required for the ‘public good’.
119 See, Art. 19, Section 2 GG; R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 17; H. Kube, “Private Property in 
Natural Resources”, p. 861, referring to the concept of ‘Öffentilche Sache’. In addition, the author explains the 
concept of ‘Widmung’ or ‘dedication to the public’, namely an administrative act through which a resource may 
be subjected to restriction in the interest of the public.
120  H. Kube, “Private Property in Natural Resources”, p. 865: only peripheral aspect of property, hence, may 
become public; R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 17.
121 Art. 14 Section 1 GG is also referred to as the ‘cardinal problem’ of German property law. See, R. Lubens, 
“The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 408.
122 See, T. Wälde, A. Kolo, “Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’”, p. 846 
specifically maintains that “it is wrong to infer from the recent cases of direct investor-State litigation [...]  that 
foreign investors can keep governments from pursuing legitimate policies”. See also the ‘regulatory chill’ debate.
government seems not to obliterate the duty to compensate, but to be part of its 
constitutionality.
(b) The German Case-Law on Expropriation
As the Constitution does not incorporate a definition of property, the determination of 
the boundaries of the notion is left to judicial interpretation. German high courts, particularly 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGE),123  the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)124  and the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG)125 attempted to trace a distinction between ‘the social 
obligation inherent in ownership’126 and the conditions for a compensable taking: a line is 
drawn between ‘social obligation’––that does not entail compensation––and ‘taking’––whose 
lawfulness is subordinated to compensation (Article 14, Section 3 GG).127
More precisely, the case-law interpreting ‘the social obligation inherent in ownership’ 
tends to adopt varying criteria, in view of the case under scrutiny and the category of property 
concerned.128  By rejecting a positivist approach, the German courts look at the values 
enshrined in the Basic Law as a whole, in order to determine what the source of the property 
interests protected under Article 14 is: therefore, the scope of the ‘constitutionally protected 
37
123 The German Federal Constitutional Court.
124 The German Federal Supreme Court.
125 The German Federal Administrative Court.
126 R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 422: the social obligation encompasses a duty 
to refrain from socially unjust uses (Unterlassen sozialwidriger Eigentumsnutzungen), and an affirmative duty to 
engage in socially just uses (sozialgerechte Nutzungen).
127  Following the landmark Gravel Mining decision, the BVerfGE distinguished clearly between Art. 14(1)(ii) 
and Art. 14(3): only in cases of physical confiscation of property, expropriation occurs, giving rise to the right to 
be compensated under Art. 14(3). In addition, it is the law that should provide for the type and amount of 
compensation due. See, BVerfGE 58, 300; R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 422: it 
is argued that the ‘regulatory taking’ does not exist in German law. There is a narrow interpretation of taking, 
according to the BVerfGE, that is enger Enteignungsbegriff.
128  R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, pp. 18, 27; The constitutional provision of the ‘social obligation 
inherent in ownership’ has progressively become a practical concept, thanks to the courts’ development of 
specific criteria apt to specific areas (or typologies of property). See, H. Kube, “Private Property in Natural 
Resources”, p. 873; The German Constitutional Court has provided a definition of property which considers its 
‘private, economic function’, as well as ‘the owner’s power to make decisions about his property unburdened by 
external control’. More precisely, the private economic function comprises the power to dispose and to 
effectively use property. J. C. Pielow, E. Ehlers, “Ownership Unbundling and Constitutional Conflict: a Typical 
German Debate?”, in European Review of Energy Markets, Vol. 2(3), 2008, pp. 22-23. See, BVerfGE 42, 263 
(294); 50, 290 (339); 52, 1 (30 f.); 88, 366 (377); 101, 54 (75); BVerwGE 92, 322 (327).
property’ seems broader than that accorded to property under private law’s definition of 
ownership.129
The distinction between Article 14(3) and Article 14 (1)(2) GG is firmly drawn as a 
result of the conceptualization of property under the German Basic Law. What is safeguarded 
is the existence of property as such (Bestandsgarantie) as opposed to its economic value, and 
this approach influences judicial decisions.130 The meaning of property and its (purposeful) 
interpretation affects the scope of the concept of taking. If the primary function of property is 
not the maximization of individual wealth, expropriation does not occur as a result of every 
diminution in the economic value of ownership. What the BVerfG aims at protecting under 
the heading of ‘property’ is a ‘zone of freedom’ that pertains to the individual. Such a ‘zone of 
freedom’, however, is not violated when, for instance, “resources that are vital to the common 
welfare of the public are placed under the authority of the public, rather than the private, legal 
order”.131
As mentioned, the question devised by the German judges is whether “governmental 
regulation flows from the ‘social obligation inherent in ownership’, or is tantamount to a 
taking of property”.132 Dolzer refers to the ‘individual sacrifice’ and ‘intensity of regulation’ 
doctrines, to differentiate between the approaches employed in order to investigate this 
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129 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, pp. 753-755; BVerfGE 51, 193 (216-18) 
(Warenzeichensentscheidung, 1979); BVerfGE 58, 300 (334-36) (Nassauskiesungsentscheidung, 1981); Natural 
resources, being basic to human existence, are qualified as constitutionally protected property, according to the 
BVerfG. See, H. Kube, “Private Property in Natural Resources”, pp. 857-880, explaining that in Middle Ages, 
the legal regime governing property in natural resources in Germany was found in the concept of ‘Regalien’, 
according to which nobility owned natural goods that could be used by citizens. This notion reconciled the 
ownership interests of the sovereigns and the usufructuary interests of the population. Following the impact of 
Roman Law, the concepts of ‘dominium’ and ‘proprietas’ were introduced, and it was combined to the old 
Germanic rules to give rise to new interpretations of traditional statutes. However, despite the promotion of 
private property, this concept was shortly applied to natural resources, whose treatment under the ‘Regalien’ rule 
was largely sustained. It was only at the end of the 19th century that natural resources started to benefit of the 
private, individual ownership regime, due to the increased necessities of the community.
130 Especially, reference is made to BVerfGE 58, 300. (Nassauskiesungsentscheidung, 1981), see below.
131 BVerfGE 58, at 339; R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 393, quoting M. Weiss, 
“Sozialbindung und soziale Gerechtigkeit”, in Politishe Studien (sonderheft 1/2000), 2000, p. 23: the German 
Basic Law pursues a ‘socially just property order’.
132 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 21.
issue.133  According to his analysis, “an owner whose property rights are limited by the 
regulation must be compensated if, and only if, he alone is subjected to the regulation”.134 
This means that the regulation at hand is posing an excessive burden, or individual sacrifice, 
to that owner, altering his legal position and enjoyment of property, while bringing benefits to 
the ‘public’ at large.135 Conversely, when a regulation uniformly affects all owners, little room 
for compensation remains. The fact that others have also been subjected to regulation 
balances the individual loss and reinforces the individual’s partaking to the public good.136
The BGH has adhered to the doctrine of ‘individual sacrifice’ since 1952.137  In the 
reasoning of the Court, it is the number and character of the addressee(s) that determine the 
nature of the act, as well as the governmental obligations stemming from it. According to this 
reasoning, a taking is a “forceful, not equally applicable, special sacrifice for the benefit of the 
public”; it is a substantially unilateral, unconstitutional act, whose ‘unjust’ nature is remedied 
through compensation.138 Initially, therefore, the BGH focused on the effects of the measure, 
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133  R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 21. Prof. Dolzer explains that both the administrative and the 
civil courts did exercise their jurisdiction in the property law matter. Administrative courts have jurisdiction to 
decide whether a taking must be assumed, whereas civil courts decide upon the amount of compensation. 
However, both had the tendency to exercise their independent judgement upon the distinction between social 
obligation and taking. More precisely, the Bundesgerichthof (the highest civil court) has traditionally stressed the 
individual sacrifice doctrine, whereas the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (the highest administrative court) has 
underlined the concept of intensity of the regulation; see also, H. Kube, “Private Property in Natural Resources”, 
p. 866.
134 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 21.
135  Id; G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 763: arguing that the action for 
which the state is liable is similar to, but not ‘technically’, an expropriation.
136 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 21.
137 BGH 6, 270 in Id, p. 61. According to the Court, specifies Dolzer, a taking is characterized by a lawful, forced 
governmental intervention into the property right, in the form of a full taking or a particular burden putting an 
unequal special burden on the individual or the group as compared to third persons, thereby forcing a special 
sacrifice not demanded from third persons [..] For the very purpose of finding an appropriate balance, a taking 
demands a corresponding compensation, whereas a property regulation equally applicable to all owners does not 
demand compensation. [..] A taking is viewed as a ‘single intervention’; Furthermore, the Bundesgerichtshof 
relied on Art. 19 Section 2 GG to clarify that the compensability of a taking arises when the very essence of 
ownership has been detrimentally affected through the governmental action.
138 BGHZ 6, 270, 279 et seq.
in order to distinguish expropriations and regulations of the content and limits of property.139 
Specifically, expropriation was intended as an interference imposing a special sacrifice to a 
specific societal group,140  thereby interpreting the right to equal treatment as a constitutive 
element of expropriation.
However, the essence of the problem still lies in describing what a taking is, and what 
actions and interferences may prompt it.141 Comparing the situation of the affected owner 
with that of other owners a tentative answer was provided by the BGH.142 Thus, the notion of 
‘situational commitment’ (Situationsgebundenheit) of property has been applied in order to 
draw the line between social obligation and taking: it implies the consideration of all the legal 
and economic circumstances relevant to property.143  The notion of ‘potential social 
obligation’ (soziale Pflichtigkeit) is employed when “upon a comprehensive examination of 
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139  R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment: The Social Obligation Inherent in Ownership, IUCN 
Environmental Policy and Law Paper, 1976, p. 61; see also, M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation 
in Comparative Public Law”, p. 131: the author argues that according to the German Federal Supreme Court a 
violation of the right to equal treatment is recognized as a constitutive element of an expropriation. BGHZ 6, 
270, 279 et seq.
140 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 131. It is the so-called 
‘Sonderopfer’ or special sacrifice; The concept of ‘Sonderopfer’––together with its underlying principle that 
‘special sacrifices imposed by regulation on individuals for the benefit of the community at large need to be 
compensated’––,equivalent to the French administrative law ‘égalité devant la charge publique’,is referred to 
also in A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation”, p. 44. The author points out that “the 
purpose of international expropriation law is not to find an optimal balance between regulatory authority and 
protection of foreign investment”, since, on the one hand, “compensatory decisions should be left to states 
because there is no compelling rationale for international law to provide protection against this type of risk”; 
whilst, on the other, “the role of international law is not to harmonize state compensation policy for 
expropriation”. The author suggests relying on international law as a minimum standard which allows for 
experimentation and diversity; thus, the author seems to disregard the role of the predictability of both the 
applicable legal framework and its possible outcomes to prevent distortions in the systems, such as ‘forum 
shopping’.
141  R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 390-391: the author underlines that 
jurisdictions are continuously faced with ‘the questions of whether and when extensive environmental or land-
use regulation can constitute a ‘taking’ or infringement of property rights that requires the government to pay 
compensation’. [Emphasis added]
142 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 132. It is noted that also 
the BVerwGE finally adhered to the doctrine of the ‘analysis of the specific situation of the affected property’.
143  H. Kube, “Private Property in Natural Resources”, p. 866; R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property 
Ownership”, p. 431: the author indicates that the Federal Administrative Court re-formulated the principle, 
holding that Art. 14(2) direct social obligation limits the positive constitutional guarantees to those property uses 
that the owner can reasonably expect to continue, unless the owner should have foreseen that a use would be 
unreasonable because of the natural characteristics or probable development of the area; see, See, BGH 1956, 23 
BGHZ 30 (Green Space case); BVerwG 1971, 38 BVerwGE 209 (219).
all factors, it is shown that the owner must have been aware, even before the existence of the 
regulation, that there would be a conflict with the public interest if he exercised, unfettered, 
his usual property rights”.144
Consequently, if the Government adopts a regulation that limits property rights where 
there exists a ‘potential social obligation’, the State is not held to compensate.145 Dolzer 
explains that under these circumstances, a property right is limited due to the a priori 
characteristics of property and the owner’s corresponding legal position.146  In the area of 
‘potential social obligation’, therefore, the owner is not entitled to any right; conversely, and 
before the regulation, the owner hold a legally protected position.147
This logic explains why an owner may suffer a restriction while others do not, and still 
the government would not be under any obligation to compensate, to the extent that the owner 
is suffering the consequences of the ‘social obligation inherent in ownership’. Reduced 
property values do not necessarily mean compensation per se; only to the extent that the 
ownership right was not subjected to a ‘potential social obligation’, compensation will be 
granted.148  This approach is at variance with the notion of ‘conceptual severance’, as 
developed by Radin:149 by establishing the protection of freedom and human dignity, the 
German Constitutional case-law suggests a view of human beings as non-egocentric 
individuals. Thus, the owner is prevented to use property to the detriment of the public 
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144 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 22.
145 Id; M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 132; BGHZ 87, 66, 
71 et seq.; BGHZ 99, 24, 32; BGHZ 105, 15, 18.
146 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 22.
147 [Emphasis added]
148 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 22.
149 M. J. Radin, “The Liberal Conception of Property”, p. 1667. As noted, the notion of ‘conceptual severance’ 
implies that every incident of ownership, is itself ownership and, consequently, every action affecting private 
ownership would become a taking.
need.150 In addition, the constitutional right to property would not necessarily entitle the 
owner to use such property for its highest economic values.151
The application of this doctrine does not replace a case-by-case evaluation but seems to 
complement it: Dolzer explains that it offers a tool to consider and integrate all aspects of the 
right to ‘property’ into the decision concerning the scope of the owner’s legal protection.152 
The German Constitution rejects a strict individualism and the ‘individual sacrifice’ or 
‘potential social obligation’ doctrine complement this approach. It is held that the scope of the 
protection accorded to property cannot be determined in abstracto; the owner’s legal position 
is alterable, depending upon the context within which property is situated.153
A second doctrine employed by the BGH indicates that a “compensable taking is 
generally assumed if the regulation might hinder or nullify an existing lawful use in the 
future”.154 Accordingly, where the owner has made economic use of the potential of the 
property prior to the regulation, such a property may not be taken without compensation.155 
Public interest is nevertheless favored by the Court,156 as it affirms that an existing prior use 
not always gives rise to a right to compensation.157 Interestingly, the BGH developed a further 
test to distinguishing between social obligation and taking, by relying both on the intensity of 
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150 R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 407: the social obligation inherent in property 
‘protects non-property owners from the impacts of owners’ exercise of property rights’; R. Dolzer, Property and 
the Environment, p. 22-23.
151 BVerfGE 58, at 345; G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 764; C. Larsen, 
“What Should Be the Leading Principles of Land Use Planning? German Perspective”, in Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 29, 1996, p. 988.
152 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 23.
153 H. Kube, “Private Property in Natural Resources”, p. 866.
154 BGH 48, 193, quoted in R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 23.
155 Id; However, the ‘criterion of prior use’ has progressively diminished in importance, favoring instead the idea 
that ‘a reasonable owner, from an economic point of view, would use a resource in a particular way’: see, H. 
Kube, “Private Property in Natural Resources”, p. 867.
156 BGH 60, 126.
157  In this regard, the BVerfGE specified that Art. 14, Section 1, Clause 2, and Art. 3 GG do not require the 
legislature to subject all forms of property to identical legal treatment. See, BVerfGE 3, 407; R. Dolzer, Property 
and the Environment, p. 33; H. Kube, “Private Property in Natural Resources”, pp. 865-866: according to the 
BVerfGE, the social obligation must be legislatively established, in order to set a high standard of protection, as 
the Constitution demands.
government regulation and infringement of equal protection.158 The right to equal protection 
is a formalized method useful in assessing the limits of a lawful social obligation; in order to 
evaluate its substantive element, the Court would assess the intensity of the burden to be 
borne by the affected owners. Thus,
[t]he constitutional protection of property is an example of the negative role of 
individual rights vis-à-vis government regulation [..] and the very notion that the 
government must compensate for taking supports the idea that the individual 
possesses a negative right to have his property protected.159
Although the BGH and the BVerfGE seem to apply differing criteria, the results of their 
decisions tend to correspond,160  as a study of the landmark decision 
Nassauskiesungsentscheidung161  of the BVerfGE may illustrate. As of this decision, the 
Federal Constitutional Court applied a narrow notion of expropriation, characterized by the 
intent of the State to deprive the owner of his property and transferring its title. The Court 
rejected the principle of ‘dulde und liquidiere’ or ‘accept and liquidate’,162 and read Article 14 
as a “comprehensive defense against any unconstitutional interference with the guarantee of 
property”.163 The individual, therefore, is required in the first place to submit the case to 
administrative courts, in order to have the lawfulness of the measure and its compatibility 
with the GG reviewed. Such a revision proceeds from the differentiation between 
expropriation under Article 14(3) and regulation (of the contents and limits of property) under 
Article 14(1) sentence 2. Thus the notions are treated as two autonomous types of 
interference, where the former is depriving a specific group of their title to property (which is 
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158 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 23.
159Id, p. 24.
160 Id, p. 29.
161 BVerfGE 58, 300 (334-36) (Nassauskiesungsentscheidung, 1981).
162  This principle was originally adopted by the Reichsgericht and then accepted by the Federal Constitutional 
Court. It implies that an owner has to accept interferences with its property right, but is then entitled to sue for 
compensation to the extent that the interference amount to an expropriation. M. Perkams, “The Concept of 
Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 131.
163 Id, p. 133.
transferred to the State), whereas the latter is a more general and less intrusive determination 
of the rights and obligations of owners.164
The duty to compensate seems well-established in case of expropriation (Article 14(3)) 
whereas the interpretation/qualification of the cases falling within the scope of Article 14(1) 
sentence 2 is controversial. As mentioned, an expropriatory measure seems to occur when a 
governmental intent oriented at dispossessing the owner is recognizable, stressing the form of 
the measure rather than its underlying situation.165  Conversely, the 
Nassauskiesungsentscheidung grants the individual the opportunity to attack the 
constitutionality of an alleged regulatory governmental measure, and thereby protect its 
property right.166  Regulatory interferences would require compensation, in order to be 
constitutional, as a result of the interplay of the above-mentioned principles: namely, the 
principle that the State’s power to set the content and limits of property is not limitless––i.e., 
the guarantee of property (Article 14(1)); and, the principle that property has to serve also the 
public good––i.e., the social function of property (Article 14(2)).
Thus, a regulation may be adopted provided that it serves the public good and it 
complies with the guarantee of property. Differently, should the balance between the public 
good pursued vis-à-vis the effect of the measure on the individual owner be not proportionate, 
the guarantee of property as established by Article 14(1) GG will result in the duty for the 
State to pay compensation.167 The outcome of this proportionality test qualifies the measure as 
legal or illegal; if the regulation fulfills the test, the individual rights will be protected only to 
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164 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”.
165 Id, p. 134. The author observes that this is in contrast with the substantive concept of expropriation endorsed 
in the US Supreme Court and ECtHR jurisprudence.
166 Id.
167 Id, p. 135. See, BVerfGE 58, 137, 144 et seq.: in the Pflichtexemplarentscheidung it was first accepted that 
compliance with the guarantee of property may involve the payment of compensation; As to the proportionality 
test see R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 28: Dolzer also explains the functioning of the 
proportionality test. A Court should verify whether the limitation was needed to attain the aim, whether it was the 
least onerous method available to the legislator, and whether the public benefits justify the costs imposed to the 
individual owner.
the extent that they are severely impacted upon by the governmental act.168 As a consequence 
of this reasoning, “the concept of a compensable regulation of the contents and limits of 
property (ausgleichpflichtige Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung)”  is regarded as a 
constitutive element of property protection in Germany.169
Notably, both the BGH and the BVerwG continue to rely on their precedents when 
deciding on the compensability of a measure: they tend to apply the principles used to 
distinguish between expropriation and regulation also to the distinction between compensable 
and non-compensable regulation. As the BVerwG noted, in both cases the legal reasoning is 
“based on issues of reasonableness, protection of trust, and sufficient distinction between 
property owners, according to the type and extent of the encumbrance to which they are 
subject”.170  The proportionality test of a regulation will focus on considering whether the 
regulation interferes with an already exercised use or with a use that is objectively acceptable, 
specifically evaluating the owner’s legitimate expectations.171
In addition, the BVerfGE has also explained that a “general regulation of property might 
be unconstitutional even if it provides for compensation”, to the extent that it drastically 
interferes with a protected business operation, causing its termination; or, to the extent that it 
prevents the owner from performing any private (lawful) use of its property.172  Thus, the 
threshold is set by reference to the ‘destruction of the property’s entire economic value’: 
accordingly, the State would be allowed to further its objectives only by having recourse to a 
formal expropriation; its right to regulate finds, in this sense, a constitutional limit.173
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168  H. Kube, “Private Property in Natural Resources”, p. 877: evidently, the question of the importance of a 
particular resource to the society drives the judicial interpretation of the restriction.
169 M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 135.
170 Id, p. 136, BGHZ 87, 66, 71 et seq.; BGHZ 90, 4, 15; BGHZ 99, 24, 32; BGHZ 105, 15, 18.
171 Id, BVerwGE 94, 1, 11. The Court maintained that the ‘social function of property’ ex Art. 14(2) was already 
foreclosed when restrictions affected an use of property already implemented by the owner, and when the 
restrictions eliminated uses that are objectively suitable or necessary, in light of the situation at hand.
172 Id, p. 137, quoting BGHZ 121, 328, 337 et seq.
173 Id.
The German case-law suggests a number of concepts that may function as guidelines in 
the balancing test: the form of the measure, the intensity of the regulation and the individual 
interest constitute the focus of any analysis.174 The essence of property rights,175 which cannot 
be altered without compensation, constitutes the limit that judges have to establish.176 Thus, 
whilst compensation strictu sensu is due against expropriation, in cases of significant burdens 
imposed to an individual as a consequence of a regulatory intervention, it is more appropriate 
to refer to ‘equalization payment’, determined by balancing the private use against the general 
good.177 In cases of expropriation, ‘equalization’ is claimable when it is provided by the 
legislation; if, to the contrary, the regulatory measure does not provide for ‘equalization’, the 
owner may challenge the validity of the act, with the effect that “the Court may void the law 
if it disproportionately burdens property owners without payment or ‘equalization’ ”.178 To 
clarify, the outcome of the balancing test is a finding of the ‘non-
compensable’ (entschädigungslos) nature of the social obligation or, alternatively, of the duty 
to issue an equalization payment (ausgleichpflichtige). As a consequence, when a regulation is 
deemed non-compensable, the corresponding cost is sustained by the property owner as 
expression of his social obligation.179 In addition, German courts favor the application of a 
substantive criterion according to which the meaning of property to a particular owner may be 
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174 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, pp. 26-27; In addition, Dolzer shows that the doctrine of situational 
commitment has been accepted by all courts, having been employed in cases where the idea of social obligation 
was central to the subject matter, but where the doctrine of intensity and individual sacrifice cannot unravel the 
issue. The usefulness of the doctrines of both ‘individual sacrifice’ and ‘intensity’ is maximized when they are 
combined, argues Dolzer. Particularly, he maintains that it is the doctrine of intensity to be decisive, whilst the 
element of individual sacrifice provides a secondary and corrective tool.
175 R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 421:‘The State may regulate private property 
rights by exercising the social obligation insofar as the act constitutes neither a taking nor a infringes the 
constitutionally defined set of core property rights (the Kernbereich)’; G. S. Alexander, “Property as a 
Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 767, arguing that German law extends substantive––and not merely 
procedural––protection to property rights.
176 G. S. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right?”, p. 765.
177 R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 411.
178 Id, p. 412.
179 Id, p. 423; see, Obligatory Sample case, BVerfG 1981, 58, BVerfGE 137 (150).
taken into consideration whilst assessing the proportionality of the governmental 
regulation.180
A balancing mechanism seems therefore unavoidable for the Courts deciding ‘takings 
issues’.181 As in the American system, where the degree of discretion accorded to judges is 
counterbalanced by the doctrine of precedent and the hierarchical structure of the judicial 
power, in civil law countries––as is Germany––it is the structure of codes itself that leads to 
gaps that judges must fill by relying on general rules of interpretation.182 Dolzer, for instance, 
explains how the doctrine of intensity facilitated the application of “more general 
constitutional rules which have been developed to test the legality of State actions against 
individuals”.183
The analysis of the German judicial practice shows a plain division between the notion 
of expropriation (Article 14(3) GG) and regulation (Article 14(1) sentence 2 GG), which is 
rooted in the form of the measure considered. Whilst expropriations address a specific group 
of people and are oriented at transferring the title to property, regulations generally delineate 
the rights and limits to ownership. Regulations, therefore, are deemed as constitutional to the 
extent that they fulfill a balance between the public good (ex Article 14(2) GG) and the 
guarantee of property (ex Article 14(1) GG). The guarantee of property, in particular, triggers 
the duty to pay compensation when proportionality is not respected. The judges performing 
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180 R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property Ownership”, p. 428.
181 See also, J. C. Pielow and E. Ehlers, “Ownership Unbundling and Constitutional Conflict”, pp. 22-23.
182 R. Dolzer, Property and the Environment, p. 25.
183  Id, p. 25, 62:  Dolzer makes reference to other criteria that have been occasionally developed: ‘private 
usefulness’ of property, ‘theory of worthiness of protection’, ‘theory of intolerability’, ‘theory of reduction of 
substance’. Among these constitutional rules, and especially and in the field of police law, the proportionality test 
is relevant. It prevents the invocation of the ‘social obligation’ rationale when a regulation is very burdensome 
for the individual, and of little benefit to the society. Hence, the effects upon the owner are taken into account by 
the courts when examining the nature of the measure’s goal; moreover, it must be proved that no alternatives are 
available to the Government, which are less onerous to the individual. Consequently, the aim pursued needs to be 
meaningful in itself (‘fitted to its nature’)  and in accordance with the public interest as expressed in the statute; 
A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 135; R. Lubens, “The Social Obligation of Property 
Ownership”, p. 423: according to Lubens, the proportionality test involves three phases. A legitimate reason to 
interfere with fundamental rights, and appropriate and necessary means to interfere, and the proportionality of 
the means to the end. See, BVerfGE 19, 348.
this assessment consider the impact of the governmental measure with already exercised uses, 
or with uses that are ‘objectively acceptable’ in light of the property at stake; moreover, 
legitimate expectations and the situations of non-owners are also taken into account to 
appropriately examine each case. Finally, if the regulation proscribes any use of the property, 
the State is required to formally expropriate the owner.
V. A Focus on the Principle of Proportionality and Its Implications for the International 
Takings Doctrine
The principle of proportionality is currently referred to in some recent investment 
treaties184  and applied by international courts.185  It is also advocated by a number of 
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184  E.g.: ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (2009), Columbia-United Kingdom BIT (2010), 
Columbia-India BIT (2010).
185  E.g.: Nicaragua Case, Merits, ICJ Reports, 1986, paras 237, 249; Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports,  2005, para 
168 at p. 223, para 147; Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 1997, 
ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 7, para 85; WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Import of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, 11 December 2000, WT7DS1617AB7R, para 164; Handyside v United Kingdom, App. 
N. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para 48; Dudgeon v United Kingdom, App. N. 7525/76, 22 October 1981, para 
24.
scholars186 as a highly useful tool in international expropriatory cases187. Proportionality is 
employed by the ECtHR188 in order “to solve the conflicts between individual rights under the 
Convention [on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] and public policies of the 
Member States” 189 and, most notably, recent arbitral awards quoting the ECtHR judicial 
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186 B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions 
in the Public Interest – The Concept of Proportionality”, in S. Schill (ed), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 75-104; U. Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings: 
Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State”, in The Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 8(5), 
pp. 717–744; C. Henckels, “Proportionality and the Standard of Review in Fair and Equitable Treatment Claims: 
Balancing Stability and Consistency with the Public Interest”, Working Paper n. 2012/27, Society of 
International Economic Law; C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting 
Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration”, in Journal of International 
Economic Law, Vol. 15(1), 2012, pp. 223-255; R. Moolo, J. Jacinto, “Standards of Review and Reviewing 
Standards: Public Interest Regulation in International Investment Law”, in K. P. Sauvant (ed) Yearbook of 
International Investment Law and Policy, OUP, 2012, forthcoming, currently available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2036243, (last accessed on: 12 January 2013); A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, 
pp. 168-221; see also, T. Kleinlein, “Judicial Lawmaking by Judicial Restrain? The Potential of Balancing in 
International Economic Law”, in German Law Journal, Vol. 12(5), pp. 1141-1174. The author argues that “[p]
roportionality analysis offers a framework for legal discourse about trade-off problems, and balancing may add 
important, output-influencing burdens of justification. Still, its rationalization potential limited. Accordingly, 
recourse to the judicial technique of balancing cannot camouflage that judicial institutions exercise considerable 
authority at regime interfaces”. Contra: W. Burke-White, A. Von Staden, “Private Litigation in a Public Law 
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor State Arbitration”, in University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper N. 09-23, pp. 44 et seq. The authors 
examine a number of standards of review and suggest the adoption of a margin of appreciation mechanism 
traceable to the case-law of the ECtHR.
187 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, in Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, 2012, pp. 100-101. 
[Hereinafter referred to as ‘UNCTAD Study’]
188 See, for instance, Handyside v United Kingdom, para 22; James and Others v United Kingdom,  21 February 
1986, Series A, N. 98, 4; Matos e Silva Lda and Others v Portugal, 6 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 1996-IV at para 92; Mellacher and others v Austria, 19 December 1989, Series A, No. 169, at para 48.
189 B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, p. 84.
practice have endorsed the proportionality analysis.190 Accordingly, an expansionary trend is 
recognized that favors the adoption of the proportionality analysis as a standard technique191 
in investment arbitration.
The proportionality analysis should apply “once that a prima facie case has been made 
to the effect that a right has been infringed by a government measure”.192 Stone-Sweet and 
Mathews explain that this “analytical procedure”  involves four steps: 1) the legitimacy test, to 
confirm that the government is constitutionally authorized to take the measure; 2) the 
suitability test, devoted to establish whether the means adopted by the government are 
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190  SD Myers Inc v Government of Canada (SD Myers v Canada), UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 
2000; Feldman Karpa (Marvin Roy) v United Mexican States (Feldman v Mexico), ICSID Case N. ARB(AF)/
99/1, Decision on the Merits, 16 December 2002; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v The United Mexican 
States (Tecmed v Mexico), ICSID Case N. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003; LG&E Energy Corp.,  LG&E 
Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic (LG&E v Argentina), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, paras 34–71; Total S.A. v Argentine Republic (Total v Argentina), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010, para 197; El Paso Energy International 
Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 October 2011, paras 241, 243; 
Continental Casualty v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/09, Award, 5 September 2008, para 276; 
Azurix Corporation v The Argentine Republic (Azurix v Argentina), ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 
2006, paras 310–12; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del 
Agua S.A. v Argentina, (InterAgua v Argentina), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, 30 July 
2010, paras 147–48: “States have a reasonable right to regulate foreign investments in their territories even if 
such regulation affects investor property rights. In effect, the [police powers] doctrine seeks to strike a balance 
between a State’s right to regulate and the property rights of foreign investors in their territory”; Archer Daniels 
Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v United Mexican States (Archer Daniels v 
Mexico), ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/5, Award, 21 November 2007; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01, Award, 17 July 2006, para 176(j); Pope and Talbot v 
Government of Canada (Pope and Talbot v Canada), UNCITRAL (NAFTA),Award on Merits Phase 2, 10 April 
2001, paras 123, 125, 128, 155; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. 
and The Argentine Republic and AWG Group v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision 
on Liability, 30 July 2010, paras 236–37; Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic (Saluka v Czech Republic), 
UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, paras 304–07; EDF (Services) Limited v Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/13, Award, 8 October 2009, paras 45–64, 293–94; Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America (Glamis 
Gold v US), UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award, 8 June 2009, paras 624–25, 726, 761–71, 779, 803–05.
191  Kingsbury and Schill advised that “intense concerns about the legitimacy in the system of international 
investment treaty law could drive a rapid adoption of proportionality analysis as a standard technique”. Such a 
prediction seems to be verified in the current practice of arbitral tribunals. B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public 
Law Concepts”, p. 104; see also, A. Stone Sweet, “Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier”, in 
Law & Ethics of Human Rights, Vol. 4(1), Art. 4, 2010, pp. 48-76. The author submits that “no arbitral tribunal 
referred to proportionality, even implicitly, before 2000”. The author, however, is of the opinion that the 
post-2000 case law “shows only that a handful of arbitral tribunals have thus far acknowledged that they balance 
under the FET standard, citing the ECHR process” failing to “exhibit a sophisticated understanding of 
proportionality analysis”. Nevertheless, proportionality analysis is regarded as “the best available doctrinal 
framework with which to meet the present challenges to the BIT-ICSID system”.
192  A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, pp. 76-77. The 
assessment of the measure’s legitimacy that characterizes the proportionality analysis has to be distinguished 
from the qualification process that has to be performed at the onset of the decision.
“rationally related to the State’s policy objectives”; 3) the necessity test, i.e., the application of 
the “least-restrictive measures”  criterion––accordingly, the judge will evaluate whether the 
measure “does not curtail the right any more than is necessary for the government to achieve 
its stated goals”; and, 4) the “proportionality strictu sensu”  test, focusing on the relationship 
between means and ends, both considered as variables.193 During this final stage, the judge 
“weighs the benefit of the act against the cost incurred by infringement of the right, in order to 
determine which “constitutional value”  shall prevail, in light of the respective importance of 
the values in tensions, given the facts”.194
It is argued that the proportionality analysis is the result of an “open-ended process” 
whose genealogy195 is traceable to the German administrative and constitutional law. As 
Kingsbury and Schill have also explained, “[proportionality balancing] has migrated from 
these roots as a mode of balancing between competing rights and interests to numerous 
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193 A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, pp. 76-77.
194 Id; see also, A. Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations, CUP, 2012, pp. 349-450.
195 Id, pp. 77, 98 et seq.
jurisdictions in South America, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as to various common law 
jurisdictions”,196 and it is to date increasingly espoused by arbitral tribunals.197
Nevertheless, “analytical differences between balancing and proportionality”  have been 
identified, demonstrating that “despite these steps towards convergence from both sides, we 
are still very far from a model in which balancing and proportionality function the same 
way”.198 Illustrating the case of the United States, Cohen-Eliya reckons that “balancing”  may 
“have gained some acceptance”  in the United States as a “method that can protect rights”.199 
The author notes, however, that the concept is still controversial, “retaining some of its 
antiformalist reputation”; furthermore, Cohen-Eliya observes that the concept is “still subject 
to claims that it amounts to a usurpation of judicial power by allowing judges far too much 
discretion in their decisions”.200  He contends that within the context of European, and 
particularly German constitutional law, proportionality has a “a very different place [...] than 
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196  B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, p. 80; See also, R. Alexy, A Theory of Legal 
Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification,Clarendon, 1989; R. Alexy, 
A Theory of Constitutional Rights, OUP, 2002; and, R. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal 
Positivism, OUP, 2002. Alexy’s “theory of constitutional rights” is regarded as the “most influential work of 
constitutional theory in rights adjudication through proportionality written in the last 50 years”. His analysis 
considers especially the German Federal Constitutional Court case law and its fundamental argument contends 
the “normative force of proportionality based on being a rational mechanism of balancing”. Alexy defines 
“principles” as norms which require the “optimization” of “something relative to what is factually and legally 
possible” (especially, pp. 68-69); to this understanding, the principle of proportionality and its three sub 
principles are a instrumental to this definition. See also, A. A. Marin, “A Preliminary Appraisal of the Use of 
Proportionality Analysis in Chile”, in VIII World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional 
Law, Workshop n. 9, 2010, p. 5, available at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/wccl/en/g9.htm?o=p, (last accessed 
on 12 September 2012).
197 Tecmed v Mexico, para 122: “The Arbitral Tribunal will consider in order to determine if [the measures] are to 
be characterized as expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest 
presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the 
significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the proportionality”; LG&E v Argentina, para 194, 
quoting Tecmed v Mexico para 115; Saluka v Czech Republic, paras 304-306; Continental Casualty v Argentina, 
para 152: “actions properly necessary by the central government to preserve or to restore civil peace and the 
normal life of society (especially of a democratic society such as that of Argentina), to prevent and repress illegal 
actions and disturbances that may infringe such civil peace and potentially threaten the legal order, even when 
due to significant economic and social difficulties, and therefore to cope with and aim at removing these 
difficulties, do fall within the application under Art. XI”.
198 M. Cohen-Eliya, “American Balancing and German Proportionality: The historical origins”, in International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 8(2), 2010, pp. 263-276.
199 Id, p. 276.
200 Id, p. 276.
balancing has in the United States”, having gained the “status of a central and 
noncontroversial doctrine, which does not have to fight for its legitimacy”.201
Indeed, as noted, the BVerfGE did adopt the principle of proportionality to reconcile 
conflicts between constitutional principles as of the 1950s.202 As mentioned, the Grundgesetz 
aimed at guaranteeing the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and, to this end, a 
“sophisticated legal balancing”  method was needed.203  In the landmark decision 
Apothekenurteil,204 the BVerfGE attempted to solve a “conflict between individual rights and 
public goals”.205 The Court established:
the constitutional right has the purpose to protect the freedom of the individual, 
while exceptions to its regulation ensure sufficient protection of societal interests. 
The individual’s claim to freedom will have [...] a stronger effect, the more his 
right to free choice of a profession is put into question; the protection of the public 
will become more urgent, the greater the disadvantages that arise from the free 
practicing of professions. When one seeks to maximise both [...] demands in the 
most effective way, then the solution can only lie in a careful balancing 
[Abwägung] of the meaning of the two opposed and perhaps conflicting 
interests.206
In the Apothekenurteil, the BVerfGE demonstrated “a concern for optimization”  which 
has progressively become more structured and confident in subsequent cases.207  Such an 
approach is cognate with Alexy’s theory of constitutional rights.208 Alexy defines “principles” 
those norms which require the “optimization”  of “something relative to what is factually and 
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201  M. Cohen-Eliya, “American Balancing and German Proportionality”, p. 276. The author maintains that 
“Historical reasons are, undoubtedly, in part responsible for this state of affairs”.
202  A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, pp. 98 et seq. The 
authors highlight that German jurists “immediately began arguing for the recognition of proportionality as a 
constitutional principle”. Especially, Rupprecht Krauss and Peter Lerche.
203 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, p. 174.
204  German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment, 1 June 1958, 1 BvR 596/56, BVerfGE 7, 377 at p. 404. 
(“Pharmacy Judgment”). The case dealt with the interference with “a Bavarian law regulating drug stores based 
on the freedom of occupation provision of Article 12, para 1 of the GG”. A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, 
“Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, p.108.
205 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, p. 175.
206 A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, p. 108; B. Kingsbury, 
S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, p. 80; A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, p. 175.
207 Id, p. 110. See also, BVerfG, 15 December 1965, 19 BVerfGE 341, pp. 348-349; BVerf, 5 March 1968, 23 
BVerfGE 127, p. 133; BVerf, 15 January 1970, 27 BverfGE 344, p. 352.
208 R. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, OUP, 2002.
legally possible” 209 and the principle of proportionality and its sub-standards are considered 
instrumental to this definition. The fact that the BVerfGE recognized the constitutional status 
of the proportionality principle and clarified that this is a “transcendent standard for all State 
actions binding all public authorities”  seems to logically proceed from such an approach.210 
Against this background, the “emergence of the proportionality analysis as a formal procedure 
for dealing with rights claims”  has been regarded as the German contribution to global 
constitutionalism.211
The increased recourse to the proportionality analysis in investment arbitration well 
illustrates how principles may percolate from one level to the other. Scholars have 
acknowledged a degree of cross-fertilization212  between the domestic and international 
dimension that seems to further support the appropriateness for investment arbitrators of 
granting more deference to national legal systems in the determination of regulatory 
matters.213  However, at the domestic level the proportionality analysis has also generated 
“processes that served to enhance, radically, the judiciary’s role in both lawmaking and 
constitutional development”.214 At the international level, appropriate guarantees to cope with 
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209 R. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice, pp. 68-69.
210  A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, p. 110, quoting 
BVerf, 5 March 1968, 23 BVerfGE 127, p. 133.
211  Id, pp. 108, 111-112 et seq. The author further maintain that “the emergence and early consolidation of P
[roportionality] A[nalysis] depended heavily on the influence of legal scholar on judging, in Germany, and then 
on the influence of Germany on European Law”. (p. 162) Furthermore, the “detailed set of prescriptions about 
how legislators and administrators should behave, if they wish to exercise their authority lawfully in virtually all 
important policy domains” was indeed adopted in other national and international legal systems. The German 
legislative process has also accordingly been described as judicialized. The author refers to Canada, South 
Africa, Central Europe, Israel and also to the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights 
and the World Trade Organization, as contexts where the proportionality analysis is applied.
212 See, for instance, C. Brown, “The Cross-Fertilization of Principles Relating to Procedure and Remedies in the 
Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals”, in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative 
Law Review, Vol. 30, 2008, pp. 219-245. From the analysis of the practice of international courts, the author 
concludes that “there is a discernible tendency for international courts to reach out and consider the practice of 
other international tribunals”. Accordingly, the author argues that “this is resulting in the emergence of what can 
be called a ‘common law of international adjudication’ ”.
213 E. g., recently, S. W. Schill, “Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualizing the Standard of 
Review”, in Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 3(3), 2012, pp. 577-607. See, further Chapter VII, 
Public Purpose.
214  A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, p. 161; A. Stone 
Sweet, “Investor-State Arbitration”, p. 67. The author argues that investor-state arbitration has also been 
‘judicialized’.
this undesirable side effect seem thus far not available. It has been argued that proportionality 
analysis “does not camouflage judicial law making. Properly employed, it requires courts to 
acknowledge and defend––honestly and openly––the policy choices that they make when they 
make constitutional choices”.215
Yet, at the international level, where the constitutional safeguards are either absent or 
more tenuously framed, such far-reaching functions and law-making capacities of 
international judges and arbitrators need to be guided or restricted. Especially in view of the 
absence of a multilateral or global international investment agreement to function as a 
‘positive Constitution’ in this field, it is hardly possible for arbitrators to draw from the law 
applicable to a case any constitutional or supra-legislative guidance––and, likewise, it is 
hardly possible for the system to limit arbitrators’ ‘creativity’.
Indeed, proportionality analysis in investment arbitration not always balances interests 
that are identified and regulated against the framework of either the investment treaty or the 
host State’s domestic law. More frequently, the interests that are subjected to the 
proportionality analysis fall outside the scope of the investment treaty216––or they are under-
regulated in the investment treaty. Therefore, arbitrators are called upon to appraise the 
legitimacy of such interests and to prioritize one over the other. As a result, since deference to 
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215  A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, p. 78. [Emphasis 
added].
216 Kingsbury and Schill have contended that “[f]undamental to the application of proportionality analysis (and 
comparable techniques of balancing)  in investment arbitration is the question of the relationship of 
proportionality analysis to the applicable law, and in particular to the applicable international law”. Considering 
that “a particular feature of most investment treaties is that they make provisions for investor rights without 
addressing in a comprehensive fashion the relationship of these to continuing powers of state regulation”, 
Kingsbury and Schill have advised to opt for “a good faith reading of the text of the applicable treaty”. They 
have contended, indeed, that “it is likely that state parties typically did not intend a severe occlusion of state 
regulatory powers”. B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts” p. 88; G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Public Law, OUP, 2007, p. 122: “Under investment treaties, it is clear that the scope and 
substance of the adjudicative role is expressed at a high level of generality and that this allocates considerable 
discretion to arbitrators. As where courts interpret broadly framed public law standards that constrain 
government, such as in the case of human rights norms, this gives arbitrators a significant part in determining the 
appropriate role of government in relation to business. Thus, although they are by no means alone in the world of 
adjudication in this regard, it is none the less the case that arbitrators sometimes make choices of profound 
regulatory importance”.
host States in regulatory matters is deemed appropriate,217 the adoption of a proportionality 
test seems to require the concomitant application of apposite procedural218 rules to constrain 
the discretionary power of arbitral tribunals.
Investment treaties are the expression of the autonomous will of two (or more) 
contracting State parties, and this feature ought not to be obliterated by means of arbitral 
decision-making powers.219 Thus, de jure condendo, an effective remedy against this risk may 
be identified in a careful drafting of investment treaties’ provisions220 regulating the exercise 
of the police powers exception and its interpretation. This would clarify the substance of the 
law applicable to the parties and thereby curtail arbitrators’ discretion in investment treaty 
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217 R. Moolo, J. Jacinto, “Standards of Review and Reviewing Standards”, forthcoming.
218  The “need for procedural and structural reforms” had been advanced (with respect to the issue of public 
interest in investment arbitration)  by D. M. Gruner in 2003. The author contends that international arbitration is 
“ill-equipped to deal with the growing scope of arbitrability” as “there remain unresolved problems regarding the 
adequacy of its methods to address public interest concerns that arise in the context of private disputes”. The 
reforms suggested concerns confidentiality and intervention, in addition to a proposal for the creation of an 
international regulatory body. D. M. Gruner, “Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration: The 
Need for Procedural and Structural Reform”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 41, 2002-2003, 
pp. 924, 955 et seq.; procedural reforms have been called for also by J. Delaney, D. B. Magraw, “Procedural 
Transparency”, in P. Muchlinski et others (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, OUP, pp. 
743-746; C. Tollefson, “Games Without Frontiers: Investor Climas and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA 
Regime”, in Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, 2002, p. 184 (public participation); J. Harrison, “Human 
Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social Justice”, in P-M. Dupuy et others (eds) 
Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, OUP, 2009, p. 405, interpreting the amicus 
curiae submissions “as a mechanism for allowing participation of those who are representing broader public 
interest considerations”; T. Weiler, “Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a 
Different Legal Order”, in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 27(2), 2008, pp. 
429-452 suggesting a counterclaim mechanism to give effectiveness to human rights obligations in investment 
treaties and arbitration.
219  As mentioned, Sornarajah argues that arbitrators “lack the mandate to create norms that extend beyond the 
consent that is to be found in the treaties that create substantive remedies for investors. In the interest of the 
international investment regime itself, we need to return to a situation in which the bargain involved in 
international investment treaties is more clearly struck, to allow for a variety of defenses and exclusions of 
liability to provide for circumstances in which it is necessary to exercise the regulatory power of the state”. M 
Sornarajah, “Towards Normlessness”, p. 642; A. Stone Sweet, “Investor-State Arbitration”, p. 48, poses the 
following (unaswered)  question: “To what extent are arbitrators Agents of contracting parties, and to what extent 
are they Agents of a larger global community?”.
220 Id, pp. 610-612. According to Sornarajah a “move towards balanced [investment] treaties” may be identified. 
Especially focusing on expropriation law, the author submits that new (model) treaties have include “provisions 
that recognise the fact that the state must act in order to protect social interests and that in this function it should 
not be deterred by narrower interests of foreign investment protection”.
interpretation.221 In this regard, deference to host States would also involve their efforts 
towards a precise stipulation of investment treaty provisions, that could justify the ‘good 
faith’ of their future regulatory actions. Such an approach would reconcile the different 
variables at stake.
De jure condito, a more careful application of procedural rules may be useful to restrict 
arbitrators’ discretion also in cases where the proportionality analysis applies. For instance, 
this may be possible through a sensible application of the rules governing the burden of proof 
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221  As Vadi noted, “[i]n this fragmented landscape, where arbitral tribunals seem to have the last word on 
important themes at the crossroads of culture and economics, treaty interpretation is of fundamental importance”. 
This means that treaty interpretation can play a crucial role. By carefully drafting the clauses that are to be 
interpreted, adjudicators’ discretion in treaty interpretation can also be governed. V. S. Vadi, “When Cultures 
Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, Natural Resources, and Indigenous Heritage in International Investment 
Law”, in Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 42(3), 2011, p. 865; see also, T. W. Wälde, “Interpreting 
Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples”, in C. Binder and others (eds) International Investment Law for 
the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, 2009, CUP, pp. 724-781; J. R. Weeramantry, Treaty 
Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, 2012, OUP; M. Paparinskis, “Investment Treaty Interpretation and 
Customary Investment Law: Preliminary Remarks”, in C. Brown, K. Miles (eds)  Evolution in Treaty Law and 
Arbitration, CUP, 2011, pp. 65-96.
and the assessment of evidence.222 The principle actori incumbit probatio may be effectively 
interpreted to constrain the discretionary power of arbitral tribunals with regard to the 
determination of “the probative force of evidence”223 and the allocation of the burden of 
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222 The general principle governing the burden of proof is identified in “that the burden of proof lies on him who 
asserts a proposition”. C. F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, Cambridge, Grotius 
Publications Limited, 1990, p. 278. Amerasinghe has also observed that “virtually in all municipal legal systems, 
whether they are adversary or investigatory, there is generally some division of the burden of proof and that in 
none of them does one of the parties to a litigation bear the entire burden of proof”. He quoted K. Buschbeck, 
“Evidence: Procedures of Judicial Discovery and Burden of Proof”, in Gerichtsschutz gegen die Exekutive, Vol. 
3, 1971, pp. 164-166. However, the issue concerning the burden of proof before investment tribunals should be 
addressed against the governing provisions in the relevant Arbitration Rules. The general rule in the ICSID 
Convention is established in Article 43: “Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it deems it 
necessary at any stage of the proceedings, (a) call upon the parties to produce documents or other evidence, and 
(b) visit the scene connected with the dispute, and conduct such inquiries there as it may deem appropriate”. 
Article 34 of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) come also into play: 
“Evidence: General Principles. (1)  The Tribunal shall be the judge of the admissibility of any evidence adduced 
and of its probative value. (2) The Tribunal may, if it deems it necessary at any stage of the proceeding: (a)  call 
upon the parties to produce documents, witnesses and experts; and (b) visit any place connected with the dispute 
or conduct inquiries there. (3) The parties shall cooperate with the Tribunal in the production of the evidence and 
in the other measures provided for in paragraph (2). The Tribunal shall take formal note of the failure of a party 
to comply with its obligations under this paragraph and of any reasons given for such failure. (4) Expenses 
incurred in producing evidence and in taking other measures in accordance with paragraph (2) shall be deemed 
to constitute part of the expenses incurred by the parties within the meaning of Article 61(2)  of the Convention.” 
The Explanatory Note to the Article explains that “the power to determine the admissibility, relevance and 
materiality of evidence” is conferred upon the tribunals, which have “full power to decide whether particular 
evidence should be admitted”. The arbitral tribunals are also endowed with “unfettered” discretion “in 
determining the relevance and in evaluating the materiality of any such evidence, i.e., in assessing its “probative 
value””. The Explanatory Note further establishes that the tribunal “can appraise its “weight” according to the 
balance of probabilities. Moreover, the tribunal is not bound to base its findings on evidence alone: it may take 
judicial notice of certain facts”. Tribunals interpret the onus probandi rule under the ICSID Convention as a 
“general principle of international procedure”. This approach has been distinguished from the approach endorsed 
in Article 27(1)  of the UNCITRAL Rules (2010). Article 27(1) UNCITRAL establishes that “each party shall 
have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support its claims or defence”. Similarly it is established under 
the Statute of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. See, A. Tsatsos, “Burden of Proof in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Shifting?”, in Humboldt Forum Recht, N. 6/2009, para 6, available at http://www.humboldt-forum-recht.de/
english/6-2009/index.html, (last accessed: 28 August 2012).
223  Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case N. ARB/99/6, 
Award, 12 April 2002. The Tribunal acknowledged the rule according to which “[i]nternational tribunals are not 
bound to adhere to strict judicial rules of evidence” since “[a]s a general principle the probative force of the 
evidence presented is for the Tribunal to determine”. See also, Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v United Arab 
Emirates, ICSID Case N. ARB/02/7, Award, 7 July 2004, paras 61-62: “What weight is given to oral or 
documentary evidence in an ICSID arbitration is dictated solely by Rule 34(1)  of the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
[....] In the present instance, it is thus for this Tribunal to consider and analyse the totality of the evidence and 
determine whether it leads to the conclusion that Claimant has discharged his burden of proof”. [Emphasis 
added]
proof.224 Indeed, “an erroneous allocation of the burden of proof may constitute a ground for 
setting aside an arbitration award either by way of a vacatur before national courts or by way 
of annulment pursuant to Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention”.225
The consequences of misapplying the rules allocating the burden of proof are practically 
significant226  also in cases where the proportionality analysis applies. Considering the 
decision of the arbitral tribunal in LG&E v Argentina, one may note that the tribunals’ 
insufficient assessment of Argentina’s measures under Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT 
resulted from the application of a “doubtful burden of proof which shifted the burden of proof 
to the claimant”.227 Accordingly, the tribunal “escaped a proper interpretation of Article XI of 
the Argentina-United States BIT and its application to the Argentine case through its extensive 
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224 T. F. Gordon, D. Walton, “Proof Burden and Standards”, in I. Rahwan, G. R. Simari (eds) Argumentation in 
Artificial Intelligence,  2009, Springer, pp. 239-258. The authors describe the different typologies of legal burden 
of proof. Reference is firstly made to “the burden of claiming”. Accordingly, “[a] person who feels he has a right 
to some legal remedy has the burden of initiating the proceeding by filing a complaint, which must allege facts 
sufficient to prove the operative facts of legal rules entitling him to some remedy. The second type of burden of 
proof is called the burden of questioning or contesting. During pleading, any allegations of fact by either party 
are implicitly conceded unless they are denied. The third type of burden is called the burden of production. It is 
the burden to discover and bring forward evidence supporting the contested factual allegations in the pleadings. 
The fourth type of burden of proof is the burden of persuasion. In a civil proceeding, this burden becomes 
operative only at the end of the trial, when the evidence and arguments are put to the jury to decide the factual 
issues. In a civil proceeding, the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion for all operative facts of his complaint and 
the defendant has the burden of persuasion for all affirmative defenses, i.e. exceptions. [....]  The fifth type of 
burden is called the tactical burden of proof . During the trial, arguments are put forward by both parties, pro and 
cons the various claims at issue. [....]  The tactical burden arises from considering whether the arguments of a 
stage would be sufficient to meet the burden of persuasion with regard to some issue, if hypothetically the trial 
were to end at the stage and the issues where immediately put to the jury. The tactical burden of proof is the only 
burden of proof which, strictly speaking, can shift back and forth between the parties during the proceeding”. 
Such an explanation may be considered in investment arbitration in order to differentiate between the various 
categories of burdens that may be imposed on each party and, in this light, also distinguish between a legal claim 
and a mere argument, tactically advanced to trigger the shift of the burden of persuasion between the litigants. 
The authors comment also upon the so-called proof standards, namely the standards applied to “aggregate or 
accrue arguments pro and cons some claim”. [Emphasis added]
225  A. Tsatsos, “Burden of Proof in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Shifting?”, para 8; C. Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention. A Commentary, 2001, pp. 981-982, margin notes 256-261.
226 Id, para 8: “The burden of proof may affect the allocation of the arbitration costs as well as the legitimacy of 
the award”.
227 C. Binder, “Changed Circumstances in Investment Law: Interfaces between the Law of Treaties and the Law 
of State Responsibility with a Special Focus on the Argentine Crisis”, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, S. 
Wittich (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs, 2009, 
p. 619.
references to Article 25 of the ILC Articles”.228 Thus, as a commentator has pointed out, “it 
would be preferable to have greater clarity from international courts and tribunals that 
reliance on a legal claim is pivotal for the allocation of the burden rather than the assertion of 
factual propositions, without necessary regard for their legal context”.229
Such a procedural aspect ought to be taken into consideration when performing a 
balancing test, especially to the extent that the weight to be accorded to the balanced factors is 
determined at the arbitral tribunal’s discretion. Either the value of the interests concerned is 
established and may be drawn from the applicable law230––IITs or general public international 
law (jus cogens, erga omnes obligations, accepted global public interests)––or ad hoc 
adjudicators would be allowed to determine it. Under the latter circumstance, which 
corresponds to the consuetudo of arbitral practice, the boundary limiting arbitrators’ power 
may be procedural, offered for instance by the rules governing the burden of proof and the 
assessment of evidence.231 Foster has explained that “[t]he maxim actori incumbit probatio is 
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228 C. Binder, “Changed Circumstances in Investment Law”, pp. 619-620; Kingsbury and Schill also submit that 
the Tribunal “denied a finding of indirect expropriation partly because it required a high threshold for 
interferences with investments in order for them to constitute indirect expropriations”. B. Kingsbury, S. W. 
Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, pp. 94-95.
229  The argument is advanced mainly with regard to environmental cases but it seems generally applicable to 
investment case-law. C. E. Foster, “International Adjudication - Standard of Review and Burden of Proof: 
Australia-Apples and Whaling in the Antartic”, in Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law, Vol. 21(2), 2012, p. 86. [Emphasis in the original]; See also, C. E. Foster, “Burden of Proof 
in International Courts and Tribunals”, in Australian Year Book of International Law, Vol. 29, 2010, p. 27; C. E. 
Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle, CUP, 2011, pp. 198–209 and 209–223.
230 According to Wilske and Raible, “arbitratos can and should only consider legitimate issues of public policy if 
there is a sufficient corresponding legal basis”. However the authors also acknowledged that “the argument can 
be made that arbitral tribunals are always bound by basic principles of the international community”. S. Wilske, 
M. Raible, “The Arbitrator as Guardian of International Public Policy? Should Arbitrators Go Beyond Solving 
Legal Issues”, in C. A. Rogers, R. P. Alford (eds) The Future of Investment Arbitration, OUP, 2009, p. 266.
231 Contemporary practice has also criticized “the standard of proof”. Indeed, “international courts and tribunals” 
have been called “to state more clearly the gauge by which sufficiency of proof will be assessed”. See, C. E. 
Foster, “International Adjudication”, p. 86. The author maintains that “[t]he standard that would be most 
appropriate and likely to be adopted would be a ‘preponderance of the evidence standard’”. It is further held that 
“[t]here are grounds to conclude that this standard already generally apply tacitly in practice”. The author quotes 
the Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 
2003, ICJ Rep. Vol. 161, para. 33; the Separate Opinions of Judges Buergenthal and Owada in the same case; the 
Separate Opinion of Judge Greenwood in Argentina v. Uruguay (Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay), 2010, Separate Opinion of Judge Greenwood, para. 26; the risk of a “judicial law-making” or of a 
“gouvernement des juges” as a result of the application of the proportionality analysis is also envisaged in B. 
Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, p. 103.
best understood as referring to actors’ assertions of legal claims”.232 Certainly, as the author 
has observed, “what an actor must prove are all the facts that will make up a claim or 
defence”; nevertheless, “the problem with focusing on the assertion of facts per se is that this 
undermines certainty for litigants about who will bear the burden in relation to each assertion 
of fact”, and this “could create considerable scope for tactical pleading”.233
Introducing a number of safeguards to prevent host States’ substantial abuses of his 
theory of ‘Global Public Interest’, Kulick has recently suggested what he describes as “an 
additional procedural safeguard to be included in the relevant provisions”. The author submits 
that “an effective instrument to counter an attempt of the host State to take the Global Public 
Interest hostage for dishonest purposes would be to make use of the provisional measures 
device in Article 47 ICSID”.234 According to Kulick, “the host State could be barred”  from 
abuses “by being required to raise [those purposes] as a prima facie defense through the 
procedural device of provisional measures before undertaking any action in this regard and 
before alleging those defenses on the merits stage”.235
Irrespectively of the viability of this suggestion,236  the approach endorsed by Kulick 
confirms that an effective benchmark for the assessment of the regulatory foundation of host 
States’ measures and a barrier to arbitrators’ discretionary power could be found in procedural 
norms, not least the rules governing submission of evidence (e.g.: the prima facie defense 
rule). For instance, by requiring the State to raise the regulatory foundation of its measure as 
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232 C. E. Foster, “International Adjudication”, p. 86. The author further states that “It will be helpful to clarify 
this matter when addressing questions that could arise further down the line, such as the possible reversal of the 
burden of proof by application of the precautionary principle”.
233 Id. The author further states that “It will be helpful to clarify this matter when addressing questions that could 
arise further down the line, such as the possible reversal of the burden of proof by application of the 
precautionary principle”.
234 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, p. 215. Article 47 of the ICSID Convention reads: “Except as the parties 
otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional 
measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party”.
235 Id.
236 Id, p. 217. The author himself is cognizant that this proposal “differs somewhat from the original purpose of 
provisional measures and requires an amendment of at least the Arbitration Rules, if not the ICSID Convention”.
“a prima facie defense”,237  the burden of proof would rest firstly on the State-party.238 The 
consequence of a legitimate defense would be mirrored in the amount of compensation and 
damages eventually to be paid to the investor.239  Accordingly, the compass guiding the 
discretion attributed to arbitral tribunals will be tailored to the capacity of the host State to 
effectively and sufficiently sustain the regulatory foundation of its claim.
A similar argument may be applied to the assessment of the probative value of evidence. 
Arbitrators should openly disclose their legal reasoning, justifying their choices in terms of 
applicable law and evaluation of evidence. By “developing stable procedures for arriving at 
decisions”,240 arbitral courts and tribunals may achieve coherence in the adjudicatory process. 
In this regard, a distinction between ‘legal claim’ and ‘factual proposition’ may help to 
legitimize the investment system of adjudication and to accommodate within it the 
proportionality analysis. This would be possible to the extent that only a legal claim is treated 
as an effective and receivable evidentiary framework. More precisely, as the adoption of the 
proportionality analysis will take its place in a legal regime that fails to adopt an actual 
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237 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, p. 217. As to the practical effects of the “prima facie requirements” on the 
parties see for instance Bureau Veritas,  Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V.  v. Republic of 
Paraguay, ICSID Case N. ARB/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 May 2009, paras 
116-117, where the Tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction to hear the claim for expropriation as the claimant 
failed to meet prima facie requirements of showing an arguable case of expropriation.
238  Only to the extent that the evidence adduced prima facie supports the allegation, the burden of proof may 
shift to the other party. See, International Court of Justice, Ambatielos (Greece v United Kingdom),  RIAA, Vol. 
12, 1956, p. 83; and, Asylum (Colombia v Peru), 1950, ICJ Reports, p. 266.
239  A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, pp. 209 et seq.  See also, CME Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, Separate Opinion by Ian Brownlie, 14 March 2003, paras 72-74, 76, 
79: “[a]ny assessment of the commercial approach to compensation in these proceedings must involve and 
adequate appreciation of the character of a bilateral investment treaty [...]  In this context, it is simply 
unacceptable to insist that the subject-matter is exclusively commercial in character or that the interests at issue 
are more or less, those of the investor. Such an approach involves setting aside a number of essential elements in 
a Treaty relation. The first element is the significance of the fact that the Respondent is a sovereign State, which 
is responsible for the well-being of its people. This is not to confer a privilege on the Czech Republic but only to 
recognize its special character and responsibilities. The Czech Republic is not a commercial entity. [...] The 
resources of a corporation entail considerable flexibility in changing the location of assets and in changing the 
organization of assets. The resources of a country, its human and natural resources, are a given: they are 
necessarily fixed”; E-U. Petersmann, “International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration”, in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 16(2), 2009, pp. 513-533, 
arguing that “investor-state arbitrations involving conflicts among private and public interests require reconciling 
the private and public law dimensions within a public law framework that must avoid one-sided preferential 
treatment of investor rights”.
240 A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, p. 89.
Constitution,241  the limits and rules governing the “argumentation framework” 242 available to 
litigants seem decisive. These considerations should be kept in mind appraising the analysis 
of the relevant judicial and arbitral case-law that is to follow in Part II.
VI. Summary
The analysis of the US case-law demonstrates that the question whether a regulation of 
a measure amounts to a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment is still open.243 One 
criterion might be identified in the nature of the States’ role in serving the public purpose but 
it is not a conclusive one, as confirmed by the difficulties that judges encounter in applying 
it.244  A ‘taking’ comprises formal expropriations or compulsory acquisitions under the 
umbrella of the eminent domain doctrine, as well as the exercise of police powers, when it 
‘goes too far’. Thus, the ‘takings clause’ enshrined by the Fifth Amendment applies to both 
categories, and it has consequently been argued that both formal expropriations of title and 
regulatory takings have to satisfy the public use and the compensation requirements as 
established in the taking clause, in order to be deemed lawful.245
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241  On the possible ‘constitutionalization’ of Investor-State arbitration see, among the others, P-M. Dupuy, F. 
Francioni, E-U. Pertersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, OUP, 2009; 
E-U. Petersmann, “International Rule of Law”, pp. 513-533; E. De Wet, “The Role of European Courts in the 
Development of a Hierarchy of Norms within International Law: Evidence of Constitutionalisation?”, in 
European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 5, 2009, pp. 284-306; D. Schneidermann, Constitutionalizing 
Economic Globalization, CUP, 2008; C. Walter, “International Law in a Process of Constitutionalization”, in J. 
Nijman, A. Nollkaemper (eds) New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law, OUP; 
2007, pp. 191-215. The author especially focuses on the opportunity for the “constitutionalization of 
international governance” through a “continuous discourse within and between the various regimes” composing 
international law. It is also suggested a shift from “actor-orientation” to “subject matter-orientation”. This means 
that a “public international law relationship” is called to substitute the quest for a international legal personality; 
For a different view, see, B. Simma, “Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner”, 
in The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20(2), 2009, pp. 265-297, stating that “there is among us 
practitioners no feeling of urgent need for ‘constitutionalization’ of international law”.
242  A. Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, p. 89 quoting G. 
Sartor, “A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation”, in Ratio Juris, Vol. 7, 1994, p. 177; See also, G. Sartor, 
“Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning”, in Rechtstheorie, 1993, pp. 281-316.
243 A. J. Van del Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 420.
244 Id, p. 421.
245 Id, pp. 423-424.
The US Supreme Court consistently reads the ‘public use requirement’246 as ‘public 
purpose’: as a result, the criterion serves as a benchmark for the legitimacy and validity of 
takings in general, and functions as a preliminary condition for the application of the ‘just 
compensation requirement’.247 More precisely, the concept of ‘public use’ has been qualified 
as coterminous with the scope of sovereign police powers, so that the Court would not 
substitute its judgment for that of the legislature as to what constitutes a public use, unless the 
use is “palpably without reasonable foundation”.248 Additionally, the US case-law seems to 
endorse a proportionality test249, to the extent that the sacrifice imposed on individual property 
rights must be proportionate to the result expected from the measure.250
The concept of ‘public purpose’ appears as a significant but fluid tool to discriminate 
between ‘police powers’ and ‘takings’. Legal scholars have focused on the nature of the 
regulatory objective, the suitability of the regulation to the nature of property and the extent of 
the (private) loss, to identify applicable, recurring standards.251 Nonetheless, the segment of 
the population to which the measure is beneficial to, or the severity of the private loss suffered 
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246 See also, Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 2005. The United States Supreme Court considered that 
the economic development is an “appropriate use of the government’s power of eminent domain”. See, M 
Kantor, “New US Case on ‘Public Use’ Requirement for Eminent Domain/Expropriation”, in Transnational 
Dispute Management, Vol. 3(5), 2006; N. S. Garnett, “The Public Use Question”, pp. 934-982. The author 
concludes: “[b]y definition, an exercise of eminent domain ‘singles out’ an individual to bear the burden of a 
government policy (wise or unwise)--a burden for which the owner may not be fully compensated. In light of 
this reality, this Article suggests that means-ends scrutiny in public-use cases is as justified (or more justified) 
than the scrutiny now required of exactions. Means-ends scrutiny will necessarily be a less-than-complete 
antidote to the ills that may attend eminent domain. Requiring a relatively tight connection between an exercise 
of eminent domain and the public policy justifying it will put the government "to its proof," so to speak. So long 
as courts continue to refuse to second guess the ends of government action, however, means-ends review will 
provide only a limited, but important, structural constraint on the power of eminent domain. Just as political 
restraint, rather than judicial intervention, is necessary to limit most regulatory excesses, the political branches 
rather than the judiciary must provide the front-line defense against a temptation to overuse the eminent-domain 
power”.
247 A. J. Van del Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 424; See, A. Van Alstyne, “Taking or Damaging by 
Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria”, in Southern California Law Review, Vol. 44, 
1971, pp. 1-73.
248Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)  at 239. The Court decided that expropriation for 
redistributive purposes is a valid and legitimate public purpose; A. J. Van del Walt, Constitutional Property 
Clauses, pp. 424-425.
249  Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S Ct 2309 
(1994).
250 A. J. Van del Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, p. 426.
251 See, A. Van Alstyne, “Taking or Damaging by Police Power”, pp. 1-73.
as a result of the regulation vis-à-vis the public advantage furthered through it, do not serve as 
stable parameters.
Regulations, indeed, have commonly “incidental beneficial consequences for some 
private interests”.252 Furthermore, the nature of the property concerned may also impact upon 
the validity of the regulation: it is claimed that a rational relationship to regulatory objectives 
should exist,253  so that an arbitrary or confiscatory restriction should be identified when the 
permitted uses of property established in the regulation are incompatible “with the existing 
uses [of surrounding or nearby land]”.254 Finally, as to the extent of the private loss, it comes 
into play in a balancing test against the public gain:255 where a “governmental regulation 
makes a private right essentially worthless”, it should be regarded as a taking giving title for 
compensation.256
As to the German approach, a dividing line exists between expropriation and regulation, 
which is drawn in ‘constitutional terms’. Compensation is a constitutive element of 
expropriation as it is established in the GG; conversely, regulation may be ‘compensable’ to 
the extent that it is judged as ‘unconstitutional’. To be precise, a regulation is constitutional if 
it pursues a public goal whilst not obliterating the fundamental guarantee to property; 
conversely, when the regulatory limits are exceeded, an ‘equalization payment’ is granted to 
the affected owner, to readjust the balance. In addition, when any possible use of property is 
precluded, the governmental measure mandatorily qualifies as expropriation.
From a methodological perspective, the German judicial practice clearly differentiates 
expropriation and regulation. A violation of the limits established in the Constitution is found 
by judges as a result of a balancing test that benchmarks a governmental measure against 
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252 A. Van Alstyne, “Taking or Damaging by Police Power”, pp. 20-21.
253  F. Bosselman, D. Callies, J. Banta, The Taking Issue, p. 206, quoting A. Dunham, “Griggs v Allegheny 
Country in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law”, in Supreme Court Review, Vol. 63, 
1962, p. 75. See, Arverne Bay Construction Co v Thatcher 278 NY 222, 15 NE 2d 587 (1938).
254 A. Van Alstyne, “Taking or Damaging by Police Powe”, p. 33.
255 F. Bosselman, D. Callies, J. Banta, The Taking Issue, p. 208.
256 J. L. Sax, “Takings and the Police Power”, p. 156; it is quoted also in F. Bosselman, D. Callies, J. Banta, The 
Taking Issue, p. 209.
already exercised uses, or uses that are objectively suitable to the property concerned. 
Furthermore, the owner’s legitimate expectations are also specifically considered in the 
assessment.257
As mentioned, moreover, the German constitutional system for the protection of 
property is not aimed at the maximization of the individual wealth. Accordingly, not every 
and each case in which the economic value of ownership is affected by the governmental 
measure may be regarded as amounting to expropriation, as the social dimension of property 
prevails over the individual one. The lesson to be learned here is that the underlying aim of 
‘property norms’––their spirit, purpose and domain––influences the understanding of the 
limits between expropriation and regulation. The spirit and purpose of property norms 
influence the interpretation and application of the rules governing expropriation, especially in 
terms of compensatory rights granted to individual owners.258
This may appear as an obvious statement, but the perspective may change if we apply it 
to the international realm. Indeed, what the ‘property norms’ are aimed at in international law 
is a crucial question that, as we shall see, is still open for future research. Establishing the 
scope of property protection in international law may thus have a bearing on, and guide the 
decisions concerning the distinction between regulation and expropriation––either before 
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257 BVerwGE 94, 1, 11 in M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 
136. The Court maintained that the ‘social function of property’ ex Art. 14(2) was already foreclosed when 
restrictions affected an use of property already implemented by the owner, and when the restrictions eliminated 
uses that are objectively suitable or necessary, in light of the situation at hand.
258  E.g., reference is to the distinction between compensatory rights that arise as a result of a legitimate 
expropriation effected by a State and the right to full reparation/damages that arises as a result of a wrongful 
governmental conduct. In arbitral practice this distinction is generally overlooked and the redress is considered 
the same in the two cases. See Part II, Chapter VI.
international courts or investment tribunals.259 The question is however challenging, as no 
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259 To clarify, should the focus of international norms on property be in its ‘social function’, the list of legitimate 
(and non compensable)  restrictions of private property for the benefit of the ‘international good’ would increase. 
Conversely, should the aim of ‘international norms on property’ be identified in the individual right to 
ownership, a higher threshold limiting governmental interferences with the enjoyment of such a right will 
possibly ensue and apply. The author is well aware that international investment law has its primary function in 
the protection of aliens’ investments in the host State. However, as investment treaties are negotiated and 
concluded between international subjects against the framework of general public international law, it is arguable 
that any clear stance adopted at the level of general public international law, and binding upon states, may 
influence the drafters of investment treaties and in any case at least serve as a guiding principle for adjudicators. 
This assumption should likewise apply with regard to international norms on property, especially considering 
that the host State does not cease to be an international subject, burdened with international obligations, once it 
enters into investment agreements. See, for instance, V. S. Vadi, “Through the Looking-Glass: International 
Investment Law through the Lens of a Property Theory”, in Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, 
Vol. 8(3), 2011, pp. 22-64. The author argues that recent arbitrations have favored the emergence of a property 
theory that acknowledges also the social function of property (and its corresponding limits), together with the 
private interests of the property owner; V. S. Vadi, “Cultural Heritage and Investment Law: A Stormy 
Relationship”, in International Journal of Cultural Property, Vol. 15(1), 2008, pp. 1-24 At p. 4 the author 
explains: “The public purpose of a given regulation has been subject to only limited exploration by tribunals and 
is not per se a defense to a claim of expropriation. Theoretically, the fact that a state enacted regulation in good 
faith should help establishing the boundary that separates unreasonable interference from acceptable exercises of 
police powers. Police power can be defined as “The inherent and plenary power of a sovereign to make all laws 
necessary and proper to preserve the public scrutiny, order, health, morality, and justice. It is a fundamental 
power essential to government, and it cannot be surrendered by the legislature or irrevocably transferred away 
from government”.” Thus, with respect to an ‘international type of good’––e.g., exhaustible natural resources, 
cultural property, common heritage of the mankind––, answering the question about the aim of ‘international 
norms on property’ may also help establishing whether an ‘international police powers’ doctrine may exist and 
what scope it may have. Indeed, Vadi quotes Mr Lagergreen in the ICC, Case N. 1110, 1963, who stated “it 
cannot be contested that there exists a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations that contracts 
which seriously violate bonos mores or international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and the 
they cannot be sanctioned by courts or arbitrators”. Similarly, as further noted by Vadi, in World Duty Free v 
Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case N. ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, para 157, the arbitral panel “referred to 
international public policy and did not allow claims based on bribes or on contracts obtained by corruption”. 
Furthermore, Vadi quotes Methanex, where the Tribunal established that “as a matter of international 
constitutional law, a tribunal has an independent duty to apply imperative principles of law or jus cogens and not 
to give effect to the parties’ choice of law that are inconsistent with such principles”. Therefore, the issue of an 
‘international police powers doctrine’ does not seem a purely academic concern. It is here argued that the answer 
is also dependent upon the approach towards property at the international level. See, ICC, Case N. 1110, 1963, in 
Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, Vol. 21, p. 61, as quoted in V. S. Vadi, “When Cultures Collide”, p. 863; 
see also, M. Hunter, G. Conde e Silva, “Transnational Public Policy and its Application in Investment 
Arbitrations”, in Journal of World Investment, Vol. 4, 2003, p. 370, arguing that arbitrators do apply public 
policy principles, especially with regard to environmental issues; A. Sheppard, “Public Policy and the 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Should There Be a Global Standard?”, in Transnational Dispute Management, 
February 2004, p. 2; A. A. Ghouri, “Positing for Balancing: Investment Treaty Rights and the Rights of 
Citizens”, in Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, Vol. 4(1), 2011, pp. 97-119, referring to the right to 
environment as a “shared property right between citizens of host State and foreign investor”. Accordingly, the 
author advances also a “property rights rationale”  aimed to accommodate the rights and interests of both foreign 
investors and host State’s citizens. The author distinguishes between property ownership (property in shape of 
things capable of being possessed with exclusion of others) and property rights (rights owned by individuals to 
use and protect from damage), and concludes that “the right to environment property can be construed as a 
public right which is not only shared by both citizens of the host States and the foreign investors but also 
clear-cut and comprehensive regulation of property––or ‘law of international property’––
seems to presently exist in international law260 as will be noted in Chapter IV. In light of this 
consideration, one shall also consider what the apposite approach to proportionality analysis 
would be at the international level and, eventually, what safeguards may be devised, in order 
to regulate its judicial and arbitral application.261
The role of courts as well as the principles guiding the balancing test represent a point 
of convergence262 between the American and the German jurisprudence. More precisely, the 
role of public purpose, either as such or reworded as ‘social obligation of ownership’, seems 
crucial: the underlying social objective of the regulation is weighed by both the American and 
the German Courts in an effort to set the boundaries of legitimate regulatory actions; the same 
could be argued with regard to the nature of property and the extent of the loss suffered by the 
individual owner, which are standards referred to by both American and German judges in 
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260 J. Waincymer, “Balancing Property Rights and Human Rights in Expropriation”, in P-M. Dupuy, F. Francioni, 
E. U. Petersmann (eds) Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, OUP, 2009, p. 280, 
arguing that “from a purely positivist perspective, one could [....] conclude that there is no transnational norm 
identifying the nature and ambit of property rights”; For the analysis of the concept of ‘protectable property’ 
under international investment law, see Chapter IV, “The Concept of Property”.
261 A skeptical approach to the adoption of the principle of proportionality, although in the field of disputes on 
human rights, is found in S. Tsakyrakis, “Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?”, in International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 7(3), 2009, pp. 468-493. The author argues that “proportionality analysis 
constitutes a misguided quest for precision and objectivity in the resolution of human rights disputes and 
suggests that courts should instead focus on the real moral issues underlying such disputes”. In human rights 
disputes, the underlying core value pursued by the norm is generally intelligible. Nevertheless, the author 
critically considers the adoption of the proportionality analysis, as it possibly “obscures the moral considerations 
that are at the heart of human rights issues and thus deprives society of a moral discourse that is indispensable”. 
Such an approach may corroborate the assumption that, absent a clear ‘domain of protection’ associated to (a 
comprehensive notion of) property in international law, the impossibility for judges to identify the value pursued 
by the norm, and thus assess its furtherance in any governmental measure affecting property rights (either 
framed as human rights or investor’s rights), may increase. This, of course, may lead to additional difficulties in 
distinguishing between regulation and compensable takings. See also, M. Khosla, “Proportionality: An Assault 
on Human Rights?: A Reply”, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 8(2), 2010, pp. 298-306; S. 
Wilske, M. Raible, “The Arbitrator as Guardian of International Public Policy?”, p. 270: “Unfortunately, but not 
unexpectedly, there is no clear-cut rule where to draw the line between permissible policy considerations and 
impermissible moralism or policy-making. One may accept the basic premise that the “policy dimension” of 
investment disputes can only be considered intra legem, i.e., as an integral part of the applicable legal 
framework, and that the abstract ideas of what is “just” or “good” have no place in arbitrator’s reasoning if they 
are extra legem and lack a clear legal basis in the applicable law. Even with these assumptions, however, the 
legal standard to be applied will very often remain general and vague, leaving the arbitrator to an open-ended 
balancing test, comparing and weighing competing interests.”
262 Contra: M. Cohen-Eliya, “American Balancing and German Proportionality”, pp. 263-276.
their evaluations. Thereby, a flexible notion of protectable property, capable of being adapted 
to supervening societal demands, has been devised: not only the effects, the intensity or the 
severity of the measure are examined, but also its character is scrutinized, seeking a 
proportionate balance between the public and the private sphere. This seems possible thanks 
to the liquid notion of ‘public purpose’ and, to a lesser extent in the American case-law, to the 
methodologically firm distinction between expropriation and regulation.
The role of adjudicators, which at the international level is mainly performed by 
arbitrators, is decisive to the outcome of each case. Each arbitrator in a panel belongs to a 
different jurisdiction and have a diverse legal background to influence his decision of the 
case. Accordingly, at the international level as opposed to the domestic one, the education and 
orientation of adjudicators play a more crucial role and have a highly significant impact upon 
the perception of the issues at stake and the rationales and motives affecting the decision.263
International law scholars agree on the lack of consistency in judicial opinions; yet, at 
both the national and the international level attempts have been made to draw some general 
guiding principles or doctrines to reduce this fragmentation and settle a common and 
authoritative legal basis to cope with ‘taking issues’––for instance through the recourse to the 
proportionality analysis. Nevertheless, both domestic and international courts are presently 
facing a ‘new wave’ of takings issues,264 where the public goal pursued by a State might also 
be framed as a ‘macro’ or ‘global’ objective of interest for the international community as a 
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263  C. Lévesque, “Les fondements de la distinction entre l’expropriation et la réglementation en droit 
international”, in Revue générale de droit, Vol. 33, 2003, p. 50. It is maintained that “une jurisprudence arbitrale 
constante aura toutefois une influence certaine sur les décisions des arbitres et judges, malgré le fait qu’ils n’y 
soient évidemment pas liés”.
264  The other side of the coin implies that the alleged ‘global objective’ disguises a governmental attempt to 
interfere with the investor’s property rights.
whole––e.g., environmental, health legislations.265  Thus, the ‘traditional’ standards are 
expected to accord to the evolving aims of the main actors: an ongoing challenge is posed to 
adjudicators, and in this regard it is interesting to note that they tend not to abandon, but 
rather to regularly recall266 long-established reasonings and decisions formulated in previous 
awards. While acknowledging the inconsistencies in the judicial outcomes, a tendency of 
international adjudicators at least to adopt the same substantive guiding principles and 
doctrines may be discerned, as will be noted in Part II.
Reconstructing the public interest inherent in a regulation and appraising it against the 
meaning of the constitutional protection of property is an arduous task for judges. Indeed, in 
the United States the takings cases have been characterized as “a crazy-quilt pattern of 
Supreme Court Doctrine”, highlighting that “it is not surprising that there are floundering and 
differences among judges and among generations of judges”.267 In light of such a situation 
concerning the takings doctrine at the domestic level, one may be pushed to consider whether 
the existing inconsistencies at the international level might be justified, concluding that no 
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265 For instance, see Philip Morris Norway AS v The Norwegian State - Ministry of Health and Care Services, 
Case E-16/10, 12 September 2011; FTR Holding SA (Switzerland),  Philip Morris Products SA (Switzerland) and 
Abal Hermans SA (Uruguay) v Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case N. ARB/10/7, Request for 
Arbitration, 10 February 2010, para 7; for a recent analysis of the problems intertwining global health 
governance and foreign investment protection see, V. S. Vadi, “Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: 
Trademark Protection v Tobacco Control in International Investment Law”, in Stanford Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 48, 2012, pp. 93-130.
266  See, for instance, S. W. Schill, “System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking”, in 
German Law Journal, Vol. 12, 2011, p. 1109, arguing that “[i]nvestment treaty tribunals create a system of 
persuasive and non binding precedent that States and investors generally focus on in developing normative 
expectations both about how investment treaties should be interpreted by arbitral tribunals and about how States 
should conduct themselves in order to conform to their investment treaty obligations. In doing so, arbitral 
tribunals craft, despite the structural limitations they face, treaty overarching standards of investment protection 
and effectively multilateralize international investment law through interpretation”.
267  F. Bosselman, D. Callies, J. Banta, The Taking Issue, p. 195, quoting A. Dunham, “Griggs v Allegheny 
Country in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law”, in Supreme Court Review, Vol. 63, 
1962, p. 105; contra: S. E. Sterk, “The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence”, in Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 114, p. 271, arguing that “the Supreme Court’s approach is consistent with its institutional role in 
our federal system”.
progress may reasonably be made in the international realm.268  Such an argument is here 
refuted. Clearly, no easy or immediate reply may be advanced to answer this criticism; 
nevertheless, through the analysis of international (investment) law and the corresponding 
judicial practice on takings, it is here contended that one may at least attempt a 
comprehensive understanding of the problem that would not only lead to a degree of 
awareness about the nature and extent of the advancements to be expected in the future, but 
also would prevent the international takings’ doctrine to be “stumped by the use of labels”.269
The analysis of the takings doctrine in Germany and the United States has provided 
useful insights in this regard, focusing on the problems that takings issues pose to judges and 
legislators domestically. Such a perspective sheds light on the crucial dichotomy that 
international investment law faces with regard to expropriation: is the preservation of the 
substance/essence of property as such (Bestandsgarantie) the appropriate underlying rationale 
to adjudicate indirect expropriatory claims, or is it preferable a ‘dulde et liquidere’ approach 
that, by focusing on property’s economic value, aims at fostering its ‘exploitability’, widening 
also the scope of compensatory rights/obligations?
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268  A number of American scholars have recognized the limited progress in the ability of commentators and 
judges to draw a demarcation line between ‘police power’ and ‘takings’. See, among the others, J. L. Sax, 
“Takings and the Police Power”, in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 74, 1974, p. 149; F. I. Michelman, “Property, Utility 
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law”, in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 
80(6), 1967, p. 1171; R. D. Netherton, “Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power v. Eminent Domain”, 
in Land and Water Law Review, Vol. 3, 1968, pp. 37-38; E. Shenkman, “Could Principles of Fifth Amendment 
Takings Jurisprudence Be Helpful”, p. 174, where the author considers that the topic of regulatory takings is 
difficult since the “experience with regulatory expropriation claims under international law is fairly limited”. 
Reference is made to NAFTA case Methanex Corp v United States and it is upheld that, whilst there is a large 
body of expropriation cases decided by international tribunals, mainly the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
nonetheless those cases “rarely involve the types of regulatory takings frequently se[en] in United States 
courts––that is, where the claimant is challenging a valid, non-discriminatory regulation of general 
applicability”; R. Dolzer, “Perspectives for Investment Arbitration”.
269 Quasar de Valores SICAV SA, Orgor de Valores SICAV SA, GBI 9000 SICAV  SA, ALOS 34 SICAV SL v The 
Russian Federation, Award, SCC, 20 July 2012, para 179. In Quasar v Russia the expression is employed with 
reference to the State’s use of the word taxation to camouflage a dispossession of foreign investors. The tribunal 
highlights that such a use of words and “labels” cannot exempt a State that has agreed to the jurisdiction of an 
international tribunal from being subjected to the exercise of its judgement.
It may be contended that in view of the characteristics of international investment law270 
there is a strong need for a deferential approach to endow host States with a degree of 
autonomy in taking policy-driven decisions: with the emergence of ‘global interests’ (such as 
environment, health, safety and security issues) that may be of paramount importance to the 
international community, a Bestandsgarantie would in abstracto be preferable and more 
suitable to international needs, as it is focused on the substance of property. Such an approach 
would accommodate the private interest to the protection of investments with the pursuit of 
both domestic and international policy goals, entitling the host State to prioritize public 
concerns over the protection of foreign investments under specific circumstances.271 However, 
such a view posits a normatively determined right to property in international law; it requires 
that its overall scope and limits are established by international sovereign subjects beyond the 
fragmented protection272 of ‘property rights’ accorded within each international legal regime. 
Conversely, at the international level only ‘international theories’ or ‘discourses’ regarding 
property are emerging,273  which cannot to date accommodate any normative overarching 
determination.
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270  S. W. Schill, “System-Building”, pp. 1084-1110. Especially, see the Chapter II on “The Law of 
Expropriation”.
271 See, A. A. Ghouri, “Positing for Balancing”, pp. 97-119.
272 See for instance the analysis of the “vertical heterogeneity” in legal norms in A. Lehavi, A. N. Licht, “BITs 
and Pieces of Property”, in The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, 2011, p. 154 et seq. Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Cmty v Paraguay, Merits, Reparation and Costs, Judgement, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Series C N. 146, 29 March 2006, paras 136, 140 et seq. The Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community submitted a 
petition to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights alleging that Paraguay had violated the American 
Convention on Human Rights, including the right to property, “failing to recover part of the tribe’s ancestral 
lands”. The Government maintained that the lands were formally owned by German citizens and that the efforts 
to expropriate them were blocked as a result of the application of the Germany-Paraguay BIT provision on 
Expropriation. The Court ruled in favor of the tribe establishing that “the enforcement of BITs does not allow a 
State to avoid its obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights but rather that their enforcement 
should always be compatible with the American Convention”. Furthermore, the Court submitted that the tribe’s 
right to land is “meaningless” if “adequate domestic measures necessary to secure effective use and enjoyment 
of said right [....] are lacking”.
273  V. S. Vadi, “Through the Looking-Glass”, p. 28, further observes that “since international law is a 
decentralized system in which different regulatory frameworks overlap, supplement and complete each other, it 
therefore does not contain any one dominant theory regarding property”.
Once more the German constitutional doctrine of Normgeprägtheit, which is applied to 
the right to property, is instructive in this regard.274 According to it, the State establishes “the 
overall scope and limits of the right ‘according to the needs and resources of the community 
and of individuals’”, so that “public interest considerations and their balance with individual 
rights form an integral part of what defines the right to property in its very core”.275 Thus, the 
intertwined relationship characterizing property and taking, namely the object of protection 
and the act it ought to be protected from, is thereby not only confirmed but also highlighted in 
its relevance. To the extent that “public interest considerations”  are a constituent part of the 
right to property, any restriction of it aimed at satisfying a public need would not qualify as a 
deprivation, but rather as a community-oriented component of the right itself.
Looking at the distinction between compensable takings and non-compensable 
regulations through property concepts and the Normgeprägtheit is enlightening. Indeed, it 
further pinpoints that at the core of the “blunderbuss approach” 276 to takings in investment 
arbitration there might be a pending question concerning the ‘(social) function of property’ at 
the international level. This assumption will be examined through the analysis of 
expropriation in both customary international and treaty-law in Chapter II of Part I and in the 
international judicial practice in Part II.
Chapter II of Part I on the “Law of Expropriation”  further elaborates on the conclusions 
reached through the study of the German and the American experiences. It underlines the 
common thread connecting the two levels of analysis (national and international), focusing on 
customary international law and ‘positive’ international law on expropriation. Part II explores 
the relevant judicial practice and evaluates its degree of (in)consistency in interpreting the 
constituent elements of expropriation to adjudicate takings cases. It suggests to re-
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274 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, p. 265.
275  Id. The author refers to the Tecmed Tribunal and argues that it “acknowledged that public interest 
considerations lie at the very core of the expropriation clause in Article 5 of the Spain-Mexico BIT”.
276  J. E. Alvarez, T. Brink, “Revisiting the Necessity Defence: Continental Casualty v Argentina”, in 
Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 3, 2012, Conclusions.
conceptualize indirect expropriation and provides an (intelligible) interpretative framework 
applicable to adjudicate (indirectly) expropriatory claims.
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Chapter II
The International Law of Expropriation
“He [the Bellman] had bought a large map representing the sea, without the least vestige of land: and the crew 
were much pleased when they found it to be a map they could all understand”.1
I. Introductory Remarks
This chapter delineates the status of the law of expropriation in international law since, 
as will be noted, the law of expropriation is the paradigm against which indirect expropriatory 
measures are assessed and it is also the sole well-established legal framework available to the 
parties and adjudicators. The concept of expropriation will be analyzed against general 
customary international law and in treaty-based clauses in order to shed light on the 
provisions that forms the ‘taking doctrine’ at the international level. As mentioned, indirect 
expropriation is generally defined in the law and judicially interpreted by difference to direct 
expropriation, distinguishing the forms of the two categories but equating their effects and 
remedies for qualification purposes. Such an approach is deemed confusing. More precisely, 
the normative significance of the category ‘indirect expropriation’ is called into question to 
the extent that no specific additional or distinctive consequences result from the finding of the 
indirect expropriatory nature of a measure as opposed to the direct one. Thus, reasons for the 
‘blunderbuss approach’ characterizing indirect expropriation are found firstly in the defective 
conceptualization of the notion in the applicable (and available) law and, secondly (and 
consequently), in the lack of an intelligible judicial methodology to decide claims for indirect 
expropriation, as will be further explained in Part II.
The analysis of the German and the American judicial practice on takings has proved 
the difficulties that characterize the issue domestically. In addition, the analysis of domestic 
experiences has highlighted the existence of lacunae in the international legal framework that 
further complicate the distinction between expropriation and regulation internationally––i.e., 
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1 L. Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark, Fit the Second, The Bellman’s Speech, 1874, p. 46.
between compensable and non-compensable takings.2 Diverse criteria have been identified 
that are generally applied in the domestic judicial practice to assess takings’ claims and it has 
been asserted that the influence of such standards and principles on international investment 
law and arbitration is well-accepted.3 Below, this contention will be further substantiated 
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2  In international law, both the concept of ‘property’ and the meaning of ‘interferences amounting to 
expropriation’ are confusing and, at times, contradictory. As a result, the notion of indirect expropriation is vague 
and its judicial interpretations are inconstant, inasmuch as the understanding of its fundamental components is 
deemed as controversial.
3 American Law Institute, Restatement of Law Third, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol. II, 
para 712, 1987, p. 211. See, the Note to the Restatement Third of The Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States explaining: “It is often necessary to determine, in light of all the circumstances, whether an action by a 
state constitutes a taking [..]  or is a police power regulation or tax that does not give rise to an obligation to 
compensate [..] In general, the line in international law is similar to that drawn in United States jurisprudence for 
purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution in determining whether there has been a 
taking requiring compensation”; Here it is also claimed that general principles of law as intended in Art. 38(1)(c) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice may be of use in clarifying complex issues relating to broad 
substantive standards of treatment, “such as fair and equitable treatment or the concept of indirect 
expropriation”. Furthermore, it is suggested that, by drawing inspiration from the general principles of law, 
arbitral tribunal may dispose of a basis for formulating investor rights as principles. S. Schill, “International 
Investment Law and General Principles of Law”, in General Public International Law and International 
Investment Law–A Research Sketch on Selected Issues, December 2009, ILA German Branch/Working Group, 
pp. 9-10; M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, pp. 111, 121. It is 
maintained that general principles of law can be employed in order to determine the ordinary meaning of 
expropriation. Furthermore, also human rights conventions may be used to interpret expropriation provisions 
contained in IIAs. See, Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, para 122; Continental Casualty v Argentine 
Republic,  paras 276 et seq.; K. Yannaca-Small. “Definition of ‘Investment’: An Open-ended Search for a 
Balanced Approach”, in K. Yannaca-Small (ed by) Arbitration under International Investment Agreements, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 269; See, T. Gazzini, “The Role of Customary International Law in the 
Protection of Foreign Investment”, Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 8, 2007, pp. 691-716; The 
analysis of national system of laws, especially when dealing with expropriatory matters, is not new in 
international law. Already Wortley referred both to French and English Law, as instances respectively of the civil 
and common law traditions, to elucidate the “classical type of expropriation” and the notion of public interest. B. 
A. Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1959, pp. 23 et seq.; Yet, 
reference here is made to the US and German experiences given the traditional comparative analysis that is 
employed in the literature as regards as the taking issue: particularly, the American and German judicial 
approached are referred to also in, S. Ratner, “Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of 
Fragmented International Law”, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 102, 2008, pp. 475-528; S. N. 
Lebedev, “The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties”, in C. Ribeiro 
(ed.), Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, New York, JurisNet, 2006, pp. 106-108; A. Lehavi, 
A. N. Licht, “BITs and Pieces of Property”, p. 130, argue that “tribunals frequently interpret treaty terms such as 
‘expropriation’ and ‘indirect expropriation’ in a way that increasingly resembles the respective ‘takings’ and 
‘regulatory takings’ doctrines in the United States”. Reference is made to Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Judicial Review, 2 May 2001, where ‘indirect expropriation’ is described as depriving 
the owner of a ‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit’. The authors underline the commonality with Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978); in addition, the case Waste 
Management., Inc.  v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3, Award, 30 April 2004, is also quoted, accounting 
for the use of the term “regulatory taking”, typical of the American case-law on takings. In general terms, 
however, one shall also consider that States, as Respondents, are likely to have recourse to their domestic takings 
doctrine in order to defend their position before arbitral tribunals. This conduct may influence the route 
international investment law is heading for, and this is particularly the case with major business partner such as 
United States, relatively often involved in investment disputes.
through the analysis of the current treaty-making practice in investment law. Thus, the alleged 
existence of a common thread between domestic and international courts in terms of standards 
or general principles of law applied to decide taking issues will be further confirmed.
Against this context, the following section will complete the review of the taking 
doctrine by focusing on its international standing. The contact points between the national and 
the international experiences will be emphasized, as well as the irreducible differences 
between the two realms. Such a review will serve as a comprehensive and general basis to 
proceed to the critical examination of the international judicial practice in Part II. 
Accordingly, this section will consider the meaning of ‘property’ and ‘taking’ in international 
(investment) law, focusing especially on the character of the actors involved in the dispute 
settlement mechanism. Secondly, the international law of expropriation will be addressed, 
examining the recent formulae adopted in investment treaties to regulate indirect 
expropriatory cases.
II. The Concept of ‘Property’ and its Social Function from the International Perspective
(a) ‘Property’ and ‘Taking’: Interrelated Notions
The interest in defining a ‘taking’ in the context of expropriation is primarily motivated 
by the investors’ pursuit for compensation. Indeed, only the deprivation of property will give 
rise to compensation,4  thus international and investment tribunals need to identify the object 
of protection and qualify governmental actions, in order to grant where appropriate the 
correlative safeguard. At the international level, the issue is further complicated by the 
multifaceted nature of the question, which involves aspects such as ‘international damages’, 
‘nationalization of foreign property’, and ‘State responsibility’.5  These factors are all 
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4 R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law”, in Recueil des 
Cours, Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 176, 1982, p. 279.
5 Id.
intertwined in the takings’ decision and thus their analysis could affect arbitrators’ legal 
reasoning and qualification of a measure as indirectly expropriatory.
Other difficulties arise with regard to the conceptualization of ‘property’. The term is 
hardly conceivable in a unitary way. The notion per se is not only varying according to the 
national jurisdictions considered,6  but also according to the applicable legal framework, 
which defines the typology of objects that could be qualified as foreign ‘property’ and thus be 
granted international protection.7  More precisely, under international investment law the 
objects eligible for protection have to further qualify as ‘investment’ and satisfy the 
corresponding requirements.8
Despite being considered as the dynamic version of the notion of property,9 the concept 
of ‘investment’ does not dissolve but rather thickens the interpretative obstacles associated to 
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6 S. Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Hart Publishing, 2009 p. 168; See, Alasdair Ross 
Anderson et al v Costa Rica, ICSID Case N. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, 19 May 2010, paras 53, 55-60, where the 
tribunal emphasized that “the fact that the Contracting Parties to the Canada-Costa Rica BIT specifically 
included [a requirement that investments subject to treaty protection be “made” or “owned” in accordance with 
the law of the host country]  is a clear indication of the importance that they attached to the legality of 
investments made by investors of the other Party and their intention that their laws with respect to investments 
be strictly followed”; See also, F. S. McChesney, “Government as Definer of Property Rights. Tragedy Exiting 
the Commons?”, in T. L. Anderson, F. S. McChesney (eds)  Property Rights. Cooperation, Conflict,  and Law, 
Princeton University Press, 2003, pp. 227-253. The author argues that the gains resulting from defining property 
rights “create incentives for private actors to attempt to do so”. Yet, it is concluded that “the case for government 
definition of rights rests on empirical claims about relative costs”.
7 C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, “The Concept of Property in Human Rights and International Investment Law”, in 
S. Breitenmoser, B. Ehrenzeller, M. Sassòli, W. Stoffel, B. W. Pfeifer (eds by), Human Rights, Democracy and 
The Rule of Law - Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber, Nomos, 2007, pp. 743-762.
8 S. Montt, State Liability, p. 236: the author argues that in order to establish the existence of expropriation, one 
should firstly recognize that an investment exists; See, Bayview Irrigation District et al.  v. Mexico, ICSID case 
N. ARB(AF)/05/1, Award, 19 June 2007; Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, NAFTA/
UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, 28 January 2008. The tribunals in these cases rejected jurisdiction because 
the investors had not satisfy the requirement of ‘having made an investment in the host State’. For a 
commentary, see, C. Knahr, “Investment ‘In the Territory’ of the Host State”, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. 
Reinisch, S. Wittich (eds. by), International Investment Law for the 21st Century - Essays in Honor of Christoph 
Schreuer, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 42-53; UNCTAD, “Scope and Definitions”, in UNCTAD 
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/2, Geneva, United Nations 
2011, pp. 7 et seq.
9 K. Yannaca-Small, “Definition of ‘Investment’”, p. 242; P. Juillard, “  L’évolution des sources du droit des 
investissement”, in IV Recueil des Cours 24, 1994.
the quest for an international legal definition of ‘property’.10  As argued by Brownlie, 
‘investment’ may correspond to ‘property’ but the two concepts are not interchangeable and, 
as a result, the protection granted to foreign property in investment treaties applies only to 
property rights that qualify as an investment.11 More precisely, the division among scholars 
and tribunals results from their contrasting opinions concerning the application of an 
‘objective’,12 ‘subjective’,13 or ‘flexible’14 test in the interpretation of the term ‘investment’.15
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10 For an alternative interpretation of the notion of property, offered in the context of American property law, see, 
G. S. Alexander, “The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law”, in Cornell Law Review, Vol. 94, 
2009, pp. 745-820; contra: J. Purdy, “A Few Questions about the Social  Obligation Norm”, in Cornell Law 
Review, Vol. 94, 2009,  pp. 949-958; G. Sacerdoti, “Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment 
Protection”, in Recueil Des Cours, Vol. 269, 1997, p. 382: “The question relates to what constitutes a property 
right, whether possession only or also use and free alienation”. The author refers to ECtHR, Mellacher and 
Others, judgment, Ser. A, No. 169, para 44, 15 December 1989, distinguishing between “a formal expropriation” 
and “a de facto expropriation”.
11 CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic, Final Award, UNCITRAL, 14 March 2003, Separate Opinion 
of Ian Brownlie. At para 33, Brownlie makes clear the distinction between ‘protection of foreign property’ and 
‘protection of investments’.
12 See the approach endorsed by Schreuer and adopted in Salini, according to which the notion of ‘investment’ is 
autonomous and must meet a number of typical features which, however, do not amount to jurisdictional 
requirements. See also, Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID 
Case n. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005, para. 30; Jan De Nul NV  and Dredging 
International NV v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case n. ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 June 2006; 
Helnan International Hotels A/S v The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case n. ARB/05/19, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction, 17 October 2006; Phoenix Action Ltd v The Czech Republic, ICSID Case 
n. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, paras 77-79; Société Générale v Dominican Republic, UNCITRAL, LCIA 
Case n. UN 7927, Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction,19 September 2008.
13 According to this approach the Tribunal may find an investment through specific characteristics, which are 
however not required in every circumstance. Crucial is the agreement of the parties to consider an operation as 
investment. See, in particular Azurix Corp v Argentina, Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case n. ARB/01/12, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 2003, p. 416, 420-422, 435-476; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets 
LP v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case n. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004, para 42; Fraport 
AG Frankfurt Services Worldwide v Republic of Philippines, ICSID Case n. ARB/03/25, Award, 16 August 2007, 
para 305; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v Tanzania, ICSID Case n. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008, para 314; 
RSM Production Corporation v Grenada, ICSID Case n. ARB/05/14, Award, 13 March 2009, paras 130, 235, 
241.
14 The ‘flexible approach’ avails itself of the Vienna Conventions Rules on Treaty interpretation, by analyzing the 
ordinary meaning of the term ‘investment’ within the context of art. 25 of the ICSID Convention. D. Krishan, 
“A notion of ICSID Investment”, in TJ Grierson Weiler (ed by) I Investment Treaty Arbitration and International 
Law, 2008. See, LESI Spa and Astaldi Spa v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case n. ARB/05/3, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 July 2006; Victor Pey Casado and Président Allende Foundation v Republic of 
Chile, ICSID Case n. ARB/98/2, Award, 8 May 2008, para 232; Decision on the Annulment, 18 December 2012; 
Romak SA v The Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case n. AA280, Award, 26 November 2009, paras 195, 207; See 
also the implications of the arbitral approach in GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v Ukraine, ICSID Case N. ARB/
08/16, Award, 31 March 2011. See the analysis in J. Fellenbaum, “GEA v Ukraine and the Battle of Treaty 
Interpretation Principles Over the Salini Test”, in Arbitration International, Vol. 27(2), 2011, pp. 249-266.
15 K. Yannaca-Small. “Definition of ‘Investment’”, pp. 250-251.
In abstracto, investment treaties may offer disparate definitions of what they define as 
‘property’ for the purpose of investment protection. However, in practice, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) tend to adopt similar provisions,16  so that the threshold for protection is by 
and large the same across the international community. Nonetheless, the definition of 
investment is unstable17 and this confuses any prediction regarding how otherwise ‘shared 
standards’ would be applied in order to meet societal, governmental and also investors’ 
demands.18
Difficulties in drafting a workable and consistent definition of ‘investment’ have 
repercussions on investment arbitration, raising doubts on the original intent of the consenting 
80
16  Four are the basic elements commonly identified in BITs’ definitions of ‘investment’: the form of the 
investment, the area of the investment economic activity, the time at which the investment is made and, the 
connection between the investor and the other contracting State. J. W. Salacuse, N. P. Sullivan, “Do BITs Really 
Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain”, in Harvard International Law 
Journal, Vol. 46(1), 2005, p. 80.
17 G. Sacerdoti, “Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments”, p. 305; R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, Principles of 
International Investment Law, Oxford University Press, 2007; C. McLachlan, International Investment 
Arbitration, Substantive Principles, Oxford International Arbitration Series, Oxford University Press, 2008; E. 
Gaillard, “Identity or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment in ICSID Practice”, in 
C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, S. Wittich (eds. by), International Investment Law for the 21st Century - 
Essays in Honor of Christoph Schreuer, Oxford University Press, 2009; S. Manciaux, Actualité de la notion 
d’investissement international, in La procédure arbitrale relative aux investissements internationaux: aspects 
récents, 2010, pp. 145-173; D. Krishan, “A notion of ICSID Investment”, in TJ Grierson Weiler (ed by), 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law, Vol. 1, Juris Publishing, 2008; K. Yannaca-Small, 
“Definition of ‘Investment”. The author underlines that “the ‘legal’ definition of investment remains one of the 
most controversial issues of international investment law and arbitration”; L. Liberti, “The Definition of Investor 
and Investment in International Investment Law”, in International Investment Law: Understanding Concept and 
Tracking Innovations,  OECD, 2008; Z. Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims, Cambridge, CUP, 
2009, pp. 161 et seq.; W. Shei, “Beyond the Scope of ‘Investor’ and ‘Investment’: Who Can Make an Arbitration 
Claim under a Chinese BIT? - Some Implications from a Recent ICSID Case”, in Asian International Arbitration 
Journal, Vol. 6(2), 2010, pp. 164-185; ; A. Lehavi, A. N. Licht, “BITs and Pieces of Property”, p. 116 et seq: the 
authors are skeptic about BITs’ ability to protect property rights “beyond property law’s traditional boundaries”, 
and therefore they do reject any “property discourse” as it may be developed within BITs’ regime; E. Cabrol, 
“Pren Nreka v Czech Republic and The Notion of Investment Under Bilateral Investment Treaties”, in K. P. 
Sauvant (eds) Yearbook of International Investment Law and Policy 2009-2010, OUP, 2011, pp. 217-231. The 
author suggests “to apply similar criteria to investments under all investment treaties” in order to “bring unity to 
a field that lacks cohesion”.
18 Besides, the international threshold for protection has to be accorded to the local laws in the host State, which 
regulate the admission of foreign investments on the whole. S. Montt, State Liability, p. 248, quoting R. Dolzer, 
“Indirect Expropriations: New Developments”, p. 78; A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory 
Expropriation”; and, Z. Douglas, “The Hybrid Foundation of Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in British Yearbook 
of International Law, Vol. 74, 2004, p. 201, as sharing the view that investors voluntarily entering the host State 
accept its rules, so that international law looks also to domestic law to determine the scope of acquired rights; see 
also, EnCana Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador (UNCITRAL), LCIA case n. UN 3481, Award, 3 February 
2006, paras 180-183.
States.19 The concept of investment may in fact be interpreted both as a subset of assets and as 
a process or action; in addition, purely contractual rights, indirectly-held equity investments, 
as well as participation in management,20  pose serious problems21 to the definition, further 
confusing the investment/non-investment distinction and possibly giving rise to a 
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19  N. Rubins, “The Notion of ‘Investment’ in International Investment Arbitration”, in N. Horn (ed by) 
Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes, Vol. 19, 2004, p. 284; See also, Salini Costruttori Spa v Kingdom of 
Morocco, ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, paras 52-58, where the Tribunal first found the 
typical requirements for an investment to exist. Moreover, the Tribunal qualified the existence of an investment 
under the ICSID Convention as an objective condition of jurisdiction in addition to consent (“Salini test”–see 
further in this paragraph). Furthermore, the Tribunal clarified that for the purpose of ICSID jurisdiction, the 
claimant must establish firstly, that the investment falls within the scope of the consent to arbitration; and, 
secondly, that the requirements set in the Washington Convention’s definition of investment are satisfied. This 
twofold and incremental test, however, is not always respected in the judicial practice, which tends oftentimes to 
focus on the second test––i.e.: ‘investment for purposes of ICSID jurisdiction––, whilst disregarding the first 
one––i.e.: ‘investment for purposes of consent’. See, CME Cement Shipping & Handling Co, SA v Arab Republic 
of Egypt, ICSID Case n. ARB/99/6, Award, 12 April 2002, p. 136; M. Sornarajah, “A Coming Crisis: 
Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in K. P. Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanisms in 
International Investment Disputes, OUP, 2008, p. 54, pinpointing that States may raise doubts on their original 
intent behind a provision, at their advantage, so that “constructing consent without caution could eventually 
undermine the very existence of treaty-based investment arbitration”.
20 Particularly, this element is not included in Prof. Schreuer’s list of typical characteristic of investment for the 
purpose of ICSID jurisdiction. C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention, pp. 125-126, 128: the author notes that the 
notion of investment “may cover almost any area of economic activity”. Moreover, it is underlined that rights 
arising from contracts may amount to an investment. As for the features characterizing an investment, Schreuer 
identifies the following: duration, regularity of profit and return, assumption of risk, substantial commitment, and 
“the operation’s significance for the host State’s development”; see also, C. Schreuer, “Rapport: The Concept of 
Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties”, in C. Ribeiro (ed by) Investment 
Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, 2006, p. 108-168. One should note that the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
held a divergent position with regard to the control or participation in the management of the enterprise and its 
role in determining ownership. As the jurisprudence of the Tribunal reveals, interferences in the appointment of 
managers were regarded as a crucial basis for findings of expropriation, and this shows the significance of 
participation in linking the investor to the property––i.e.: investment––for which protection is sought.
21 Generally, the most significant issues concern the distinction between ‘investments’ that are established and 
‘pre-investment’ activities; the types of asset covered; the grey zone between investments and trade in goods; the 
indirect ownership of assets––i-e.: indirectly-held equity investments; portfolio investments; and, the implication 
of the Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment clause on the degree of protection granted to investors. N. Rubins, “The 
Notion of ‘Investment’”, pp. 300-323.
jurisdictional barrier.22  Investment treaties may adopt varying approaches when defining 
‘investment’: broad and descriptive clauses, providing an ‘illustrative’ or ‘non-exhausting’ list 
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22 In order to bring a claim before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an 
investor has further to prove that the “economic activity” constitutes an investment under Art. 25(1) of the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention). See for instance Saba Fakes v Turkey, Award, 14 July 2010, para 121; the legality of the 
investment under the relevant treaty could also be considered for purposes of establishing jurisdiction. See, e.g.: 
RDC v Guatemala, Second Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 18 May 2010, para 140; Gustav FV Hamester 
GmbH & Co KG v Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case N. ARB/07/24, Award, 18 June 2010, para 123-124 citing 
Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic, para 106; N. Rubins, “The Notion of ‘Investment’”, pp. 316-319: the 
author accounts for the abandonment of the distinction between foreign direct investment and portfolio 
investment. Particularly, ‘portfolio investments’ uncoupled management and control of the company and the 
share ownership in it, and were therefore excluded from protection; to the contrary, it is argued that in current 
international investment arbitration the “relevance of management participation and of the subspecies of 
‘portfolio investment’ has clearly declined”. See, CMS Gas Transmission Company v Republic of Argentina, 
ICSID case n. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003, paras 36, 55, 59; Phillipe Gruslin 
v Malaysia, ICSID Case n. ARB/99/3, Award, 27 November 2000, para 17.1, where the Tribunal accepted 
Malaysia’s argument against the protection of the portfolio investment, finding it difficult to interpret the 
Belgium-Malaysia BIT and basing its conclusion on the burden of proof imposed upon the Claimant; Z. 
Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims, p. 165: the author maintains that “the boundaries of the 
tribunal’s ratione materiae jurisdiction are shaped by the nexus between the claims and the investment”, whilst 
the ratione personae jurisdiction depends on the claimant having control over the investment “at the time of the 
alleged breach”. The jurisdiction ratione temporis, conversely, is established according to the “timing of the 
claimant’s acquisition of the investment”; The issue of ratione materiae jurisdiction has been considered in the 
following decisions: Société Générale v Dominican Republic, UNCITRAL, LCIA case n. UN 7927, Preliminary 
Objections to Jurisdiction,19 September 2008; Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon 
Hizmetleri AS v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008; Chevron 
Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case N. 34877, 
Interim Award, 1 December 2008; Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 
April 2009; RSM Production Corporation v Grenada, ICSID Case N. ARB/05/14, Award, 13 March 2009; 
Malaysian Historical Salvors,  Sdn, Bhd v Malaysia, ICISD Case n. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for 
Annulment, 17 May 2007; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case N. ARB/
05/22, Award and Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, 24 July 2008; The Rompetrol Group NV v Romania, 
ICSID Case N. ARB/06/3, Decision on Respondent's Preliminary Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
18 April 2008; Yukos (Hulley Enterprises) v Russian Federation, PCA Case N. 226, UNCITRAL, Interim Award 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009; Romak SA v The Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA case n. 
AA280, Award, 26 November 2009; Pantechniki SA Contractors and Engineers v Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/21, Award, 28 July 2009.
of categories covered by the definition;23  broad but exhaustive lists of covered economic 
activities;24  and, ‘middle-ground definitions’,25  that by broadly defining ‘investment’ and 
providing a descriptive list of the forms that the investment could take, combine the 
characteristics of the two.26  In addition, also domestic investment laws may include 
definitions of ‘investment’ to determine the scope of the consent to international arbitration.27 
The notion of investment and the meaning of taking are certainly affected also by the rules 
83
23 See, the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Art. I (3); United States BITs: 
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 26 September 1994, Art. I 
(d); Cambodia Model BIT, Art. 8(1), UNCTAD Compendium (Vol. VI, 2002)  466; Iran Model BIT, Art. 12(1), 
ibid. 482; Peru Model BIT, Art. 8(1), ibid. 497; Denmark Model BIT, Art. 9(1), ibid. (Vol. VII) 283; Finland 
Model BIT, Art. 9(1), ibid. 292; Germany Model BIT, Art. 11 ‘divergences concerning investments’, ibid. 301; 
South Africa Model BIT, Art. 7(1) ‘any legal dispute [..]  relating to an investment’, ibid. (Vol. VIII) 276; Turkey 
Model BIT, Art. 7(1), ibid. 284; Mauritius Model BIT, Art. 8, ibid. (Vol. IX) 299; Sweden Model BIT, Art. 8(1), 
ibid. 313; Croatia Model BIT, Art. 10(1), ibid. (Vol. VI) 476; Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union Model BIT, 
Art. 10 (1), ibid. (Vol. VII) 275; Mongolia Model BIT, Art. 8, ibid. (Vol. IX) 306. See also: Asian–African Legal 
Consultative Committee Model BIT, Art. 10(i), UNCTAD Compendium (Vol. III, 1996) 121; Switzerland Model 
BIT, Art. 8, ibid. 180; UK ‘Preferred’ Model BIT, Art. 8, ibid. 189; Egypt Model BIT, Art. 8(1), ibid. (Vol. V, 
2000) 296; France Model BIT, Art. 8, ibid. 305; Indonesia Model BIT, Art. 8(1), ibid. 313; Jamaica Model BIT, 
Art. 10(1), ibid. 321; Netherlands Model BIT, Art. 9, ibid. 336; Sri Lanka Model BIT, Art. 8(1), ibid. 343; 
Bolivia Model BIT, Art. 8(1), ibid. (Vol. XII)  275; Burkina Faso Model BIT, Art. 9(1), ibid. (Vol.XII) 291; Italy 
Model BIT, Art. 10(1), ibid. 301; Kenya Model BIT, Art. 10(a), ibid. 308; Uganda Model BIT, Art. 7(1), ibid. 
317; Romania Model BIT, Art. 9(1). 
24 North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Art. 1139(a), 32 ILM 289 (1993) [NAFTA]. The 
definition includes foreign direct investments, portfolio investment, partnership and other interests that entitle the 
owner to share an income, profit, or asset, tangible or intangible property “acquired in the expectation or used for 
the purpose of economic benefit”, contractual rights involving a “commitment of capital or other resources in the 
territory of a party to economic activity in such territory”. Furthermore, the Agreement expressly excludes from 
the definition of ‘investment’: “claims to money that arise solely from (i) commercial contracts for the sale of 
goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of another 
Party, or (ii)  the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing, other 
than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or (j)  any other claims to money, that do not involve the kinds of 
interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through (h)”. See also, Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 6 February 
1997, Art. G-40, reprinted in 36 ILM 1067 (1990); See also, the Canadian Model Foreign Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreement (FIPA), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/what_fipa.aspx?lang=en&view=d, (last visited: 28 January 2012), whose Annex 
B.13(1)  defines ‘Expropriation’ as such “[..] except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory measures designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriation and are not subject, therefore, to any compensation requirements”.
25 See, United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 6 May 2003, art. 15.1.(13) [USSFTA].
26  N. Rubins, “The Notion of ‘Investment’”, pp. 292-295; Z. Douglas, The International Law of Investment 
Claims, pp. 164 et seq, 235: the author identifies also a fourth category of BITs that adopt a more stringent 
ratione materiae jurisdictional limitation, allowing a tribunal to consider only “the quantum payable in the event 
of a proscribed expropriation”. Instances of this approach are found in the China Model BIT, Art. 9(3), 
UNCTAD Compendium (Vol. III, 1998) 155, and in the so-called ‘first wave’ of BITs replacing the Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation Treaties; see also, UNCTAD, “Scope and Definitions”, pp. 7 et seq.
27 Id, p. 295.
governing treaty interpretation and the issue concerning the arbitrators’ choice of the law 
applicable to the case further affect this matter.28
Thus, as it is the case at the national level, the notion of ‘taking’ mirrors the lack of an 
international consensus on the ‘object’ of expropriation. In addition, the international 
definition of taking has become problematic also as a result of the interchangeable use of the 
terms ‘expropriation’, ‘confiscation’ and ‘nationalization’29: the concepts, however, refer to 
distinct situations and therefore should be used accordingly. A long list of expressions are also 
interchangeably used to refer to indirect expropriation, and this approach further confuses the 
meaning of the category.
Scholars have identified a number of actions that are deemed to fall into the category of 
‘taking’: outright nationalizations in all economic sectors, resulting in the termination of all 
foreign investment in a host country and involving the takeover of all privately-owned means 
of production; outright nationalizations on an industry-wide basis, which is conducive to the 
reorganization of a particular industry and the creation of a State monopoly; large-scale 
takings of land by the State, usually to redistribute it among the population; specific takings, 
targeting a foreign firm or a specific lot of land; creeping expropriation,30  implying the 
incremental State’s interference with the ownership rights of the foreign investor so as to 
diminish the value of the investment although not depriving the investor of the legal title to 
the property; regulatory takings, that fall within the police powers of a State or arise from 
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28 See, for instance, GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v Ukraine. For a commentary, see, J. Fellenbaum, “GEA v 
Ukraine”, pp. 249-266.
29 M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, pp. 19-20. For instance, Sornarajah argues that only the 
“targeting of individual business for interference, for specific, economic or other reasons”, mainly involving 
existing regulatory mechanisms, amounts to ‘expropriation’; B. A. Wortley, Expropriation, pp. 38-57, 
distinguished between ‘confiscation for criminal offences’, ‘taxing and other fiscal legislation’ and, ‘indirect loss 
by restrictions on the use of property’. As for ‘nationalization’ the author defines it as an “expropriation in 
pursuance of some national political programme intended to create out of existing enterprises, or to strengthen, a 
nationally controlled industry”; moreover, it is argued that “nationalization differs in its scope and extent rather 
than in its juridical nature from other types of expropriation” (p. 36).
30 This expression is frequently used interchangeably or as a synonym with ‘indirect expropriation’; according to 
some authors, however, it represents a subcategory of ‘indirect expropriation’ which emanates from a chain of 
actions that incrementally give rise to expropriatory effects against private property.
welfare measures (environment, health, morals, economy, culture).31 However, the list is not 
exhaustive.
As noted, the understanding of ‘taking’ is always dependent upon the philosophical 
understanding of property endorsed in the law, and the law is prone to changes.32 At least a 
virtual consensus has been identified on the significance of the right to property and its 
bedrock. It is acknowledged that property entitles the owner with a set of rights that are 
protected by the law, allowing him the right to use, to absolutely dispose without any limit in 
time (positive aspect), and to exclusively alienate (negative aspect) the property concerned.33 
Not only physical objects, but also intangible rights, or rights emerging out of a contract 
(choses in action) may qualify as property, to the extent that they can be transferred from one 
person to another––e.g., debts, shares in companies, intellectual property.34  Nevertheless, 
Higgins confirms that the task of classifying particular bundles of rights is contentious, as is 
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31  UNCTAD, “Taking of Foreign Property”, in Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15, 2000, pp. 11-12, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd15.en.pdf, (last 
accessed: 9 January 2013). This list is drawn from the first edition of the UNCTAD paper on takings, which 
investigated direct and indirect expropriation mainly from the perspective of the international responsibility of 
the State. The issue of indirect expropriation/regulatory takings has evolved in recent years. Building on the 
2000 research, the 2012 UNCTAD paper on Expropriation further develops the analysis, accounting also for 
current trends in investment treaty law. See below, paragraph III (d) and Part II, Chapter V.
32 As Freyfogle argues ‘if private property is a human creation, a mere mental abstraction, then it is something 
that a culture can change if and when it so chooses’. E. Freyfogle, “The Construction of Ownership”, in 
University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 173, 1996, p. 177; see also, A. Lehavi, A. N. Licht, “BITs and Pieces of 
Property”, pp. 140 et seq. The authors focus on the relationship between the concept of property and culture, to 
claim that “it stands to reason that the world of BITs should be influenced by such deeply rooted societal 
orientations. Societies’ cultural orientations constitute their fundamental institutions. They affect shared, 
implicitly held belief on what is right, legitimate and desirable. Cultural orientations are therefore likely to shape 
views about ownership in property and what might constitute an infringement of property rights. They are also 
likely to shape views about what compensation in case of expropriation would be fair and equitable––a heavily 
value-laden concept––both in the eyes of countries party to BITs as well as in the eyes of arbitration tribunals”.
33 R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State”, p. 270; M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, 
p. 61, note 22: In Roman Law ownership constituted ius utendi, ius fruendi et ius abutendi, This formula is the 
source of inspiration for the definition of ‘taking’ in the Harvard Draft Convention on International 
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, whose art. 10 states that a taking of property includes ‘not only an outright 
taking of property but also any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property 
as to justify and inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the property within 
a reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference’. 
34 R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State”, p. 271.
finding and establishing the amount of compensation due for the loss of choses in action.35 
The author refers to the problems that are posed by the legal nature of petroleum concessions 
and contends that establishing “whether they are property rights or mere contract rights is a 
critical issue affecting the right of the State to interfere with such rights”.36
Domestic constitutional law shows similar inconsistencies. Nevertheless, as Montt has 
argued, constitutional interpretations of property tend to follow a “two-tiered strategy”, 
according to which a “strong protection is provided to property rights at their core or essence, 
and a weak protection is granted to them at their periphery”. This approach enables to avoid 
“either an overprotection of the status quo, or the evisceration of acquired rights through an 
over-reliance on legislatures”.37 Such a ‘dual treatment’, which is constitutionally recognized 
for instance under Articles 14(2) and 19(2) of the German GG and was achieved through 
judicial practice in countries such as the United States, show the widespread recognition of 
the idea that governmental interferences with property rights may (only) encroach upon some 
of the rights of which property is composed of.38 As a consequence, the value of ownership in 
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35 R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State”, p. 272. See also, A. S. El-Kosheri, “Le Régime Juridique 
Créé par Les Accords de Participation dans le Domaine Pétrolier”, in Recueil des Cours, Hague Academy of 
International Law, Vol. IV, n. 147, 1975, pp. 218-405; in general, see A. Lehavi, “The Property Puzzle”, in 
Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 96, 2008, p. 2002; A. Lehavi, A. N. Licht, “BITs and Pieces of Property”, pp. 
135-182.
36 Id, p. 272.
37  S. Montt, State Liability, pp. 175-176. It is also underlined that this dual treatment receives explicit 
constitutional recognition also in Spain––art. 33(2) and art. 53(1)of the Spanish Constitution––, and Chile––art. 
19 n. 24 and n. 26 of the Chilean Constitution; Radin talks about “conceptual severance” to express the view 
that, even in cases where only a portion of property is impacted upon, compensation is due. Yet, the notion of 
conceptual severance has been only partly applied in the case-law, and one can observe that the underlying 
question is always whether one person was forced to bear alone a burden that should be borne by the society as a 
whole. Yet, the conceptual severance test does not obliterate the assessment of the effects of the measure on the 
property as a whole. A. J. Van del Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses, pp. 448, 450. For instance it has been 
rejected in Penn Central Transportation Co v. City of New York,  438 U.S. 104 (1978) at 130; and, Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S 470 (1987), at 496-497, 497-498; conversely, it has been 
applied mostly with regard to the right to exclude. See, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), at 
179-180; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV  Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) at 433-434, 432, 434-435; Nollan 
v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)  at 831-832, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S Ct 2309 
(1994) at IIIB.
38 Id, pp. 175-176.
the property is reduced39 although the point beyond which a right to compensation is found 
still remains a controversial question.
Both the United States Courts and the Iran-US Claims tribunal judicial practice 
concentrate on dissecting the notion of property, defining different types of taking 
accordingly. As noted, in the US legal system the protection of individual and absolute 
property became a hallmark, following the Lockean philosophy on the function of property in 
the political society. However, US Courts did not favor the adoption of a general rule giving 
title to compensation against each case of regulatory taking. Rather, in the American judicial 
practice the relevant circumstances of each case are weighed up to determine whether 
compensation should be paid at all.40 This understanding of ownership was also transplanted 
in colonial contexts where, consequently, the communitarian view of property has been 
progressively narrowed down. The Iran-US Claims tribunal was largely influenced by the 
legal techniques developed in the US legal system, to such an extent that its decisions adhered 
faithfully to American views. Such a circumstance had a deep-rooted impact on investment 
arbitration, and its effects are still visible.41
The decisions under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other 
Treaties signed by the US are also accelerating the tendency to advance the disaggregation of 
property’s ownership into its components.42 Apparently, awards rendered under the NAFTA 
endorse absolute theories of property rights: not only the notion of expropriation is given an 
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39 M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 24.
40 Id, pp. 24-25.
41 Id. See, Part II.
42  Id, p. 26. The author explains that the notion of ‘creeping expropriation’ hinges upon the idea of the 
unbundling of property rights. It entails the reduction of foreign investors’ interests while preserving their direct 
ownership over the investment, and hence it could take place under a number of circumstances. The recurring 
element is the decrease in the value of the interest in the long-run; C. Lévesque, “Les fondements de la 
distinction”, p. 49: reference is made to some authors maintaining that American and Canadian decisions have, 
or should have an influence on the (international) definition of expropriation in virtue of the NAFTA; See, R. E. 
Young, “A Canadian Commentary”, pp. 1010 et seq.
expansive scope of application, but also wide formulations of expropriatory measures43 are 
adopted, broadening the scope of application of the notion, as well as the grounds for 
claiming compensation.44 In the European context, conversely, property has been traditionally 
conceived of as serving a social purpose. Therefore, prior societal interests govern the 
regulation of property and such an approach seems reflected in the decisions of the ECtHR.45 
The case-law of the ECtHR and its proportionality approach to the protection of property will 
be discussed in Part II. Suffice here to say that the ECtHR’s interpretation of the concept of 
property exerts a significant influence on the ‘margin of appreciation’ left to States and on the 
compensability of governmental measures.
The ‘social function’ is an inherent aspect of property and also the legal basis that 
entitles the State to interfere with private rights in order to meet public needs. This applies 
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43 Reference is made to formulae such as ‘tantamount to a taking’, ‘equivalent to a taking’. The expansionary 
approach causes concern in developed States which are convened as defendants in expropriation claims, so that 
they tend to contest broad definition of taking.
44 G. Van Hecke, “Agreements Between a State and a Foreign Private Person”, in 57-I Annuaire de L’Institute de 
Droit International, 1977, p. 195, quoted in M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 26; and Id., V. 
Bean and J. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protection and the Misguided Quest 
for an International Regulatory Takings Doctrine”, in New York University Law Review, Vol. 78, 2003, p. 30. 
See, Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/97/1, 30 August 2000; 
Ethyl Corporation v.  Canada (UNCITRAL), Award, 24 June 1998; and, Methanex Corporation v. United States, 
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), award, 3 August 2005, in ILM, Vol. 44, 2005, p. 1345; However, in Pope & Talbot Inc. 
v. Government of Canada, (UNCITRAL/NAFTA), Interim Award, 26 June 2000, the tribunal upheld the view 
that ‘tantamount to a taking’ does not add anything to the concept of taking.
45 M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 25. Different Constitutional systems propose varying 
notions of property: Canada, Nigeria, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights do offer diverse 
interpretation of the concept; See, Art. 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1952), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+additional
+protocols/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights/, (last visited: 9 November 2010): “Protection of 
property: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be 
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by 
the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” With regard to the ECtHR 
case-law on Art. 1 Protocol 1, see in particular: Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Appl. ns. 7151 and 7152/75, 
Series A n. 52, 23 September 1982; AGOSI v. UK, A 108, 24 October 1986; Gasus v.  Netherlands, A 306-B, 23 
February 1995; Carbonara and Ventura v.  Italy, Appl. n. 24638/94, 30 May 2000; Belvedere Alberghiera Srl v. 
Italy, Appl. n. 31524/96,  30 May 2000; Broniowski v. Poland, Appl.  n. 31443/96, 22 June 2004; Bosphorus Hava 
Yollari v. Ireland, Appl. n. 45036/98, 30 June 2005; Zlínsat v. Bulgaria, Appl. n. 57785/00, 15 June 2006; Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey, Appl. n. 40998/ 98, 13 December 2007; Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal, 
Appl. N. 73049/01, 11 January 2007; Bimer v. Moldova, Appl. n. 15084/03, 10 July 2007; Marini v. Albania, 
Appl. N. 3738/02, 18 December 2007; Intersplav v. Ukraine, Appl. n. 803/02, 9 January 2007. See further Part 
II, Chapter IV, The Concept of Property.
both at the domestic and at the international level, although the degree of interference with 
property rights that is allowed to a State in furtherance of public needs is much more 
contentious in the international legal context. Against the framework of international 
investment law, moreover, the character of the actors involved is also a complicating factor, to 
the extent that a private non-State actor is entitled to bring a State before an international 
adjudicator. Therefore, investment arbitration is often regarded as an unbalanced dispute 
settlement mechanism and this feature is seemingly exerting an influence over the distinction 
between compensable and non-compensable takings, favoring the protection of the private 
party.46
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46 See, D. D. Caron, “Investor-State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on Legitimacy”, in Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review, Vol. 32(2), 2008-2009, p. 520. The author presents three legitimacy critique of 
investment arbitration, explaining that the third one is “one of representation”. He contends that “this critique 
asserts that the process is illegitimate because the party at interest is not present in the arbitration and is not 
represented. In essence, this is a critique of the State because the State is present as a respondent, yet the 
argument is that the State in fact does not represent the interests of the affected community, a portion of the state 
respondent. This line of thought can be in the observation of Professor Gal-Or regarding the difference in 
procedural capacity between the investor and the investment-impacted community, and her idea that the 
investment-impacted community should be reconceptualized in terms of global citizenship and afforded more 
procedures”. See, N. Gal-Or, “The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New 
Interpretation in the Legitimacy Debate”, in Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Vol. 32(2), 2009, p. 271.
(b) Property Matters in International Law: Differences between the State v. State and 
Investors v. State Relations
As Higgins explains, when the property of a State is physically in the territory of 
another, the two principles of territorial jurisdiction47  and sovereign immunity48  coexist. 
However, it is established that a State may ‘take’ the property located within its territory and 
belonging to a foreign State only in fulfillment of a judgment execution or order against that 
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47  R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State”, pp. 280 et seq.; P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern 
Introduction to International Law, 7th Edition, London and New York, Routledge, 1997, pp. 110-111; see also, 
Island of Palmas case, op. cit., at 839, stating that “territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive right to display 
the activities of a State. This right has as a corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the 
rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and war, together with the 
rights which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory ... Territorial sovereignty cannot limit 
itself to its negative side, i.e. to excluding the activities of other States; for it serves to divide between the nations 
the space upon which human activities are employed, in order to assure them at all points the minimum of 
protection of which international law is the guardian”; See also, V. Lowe, “Jurisdiction”, in M. D. Evans (ed. 
by), International Law, 2nd Ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 342-345.
48  P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction, pp. 118-119: ‘state immunity refers to legal rules and 
principles determining the conditions under which a foreign state may claim freedom from jurisdiction of 
another state’. The author continues by identifying two levels at which state immunity could arise: the first level 
concerns the immunity of a foreign state from the jurisdiction of municipal courts of another state to adjudicate a 
claim against it; the second level concerns the exemption of a foreign state from enforcement measures against 
its state property. Rule on state immunity are regarded as reflecting customary international law. The basis for 
state immunity has to be found in the independent and legally equal nature of state, which results in the inability 
of states to exercise jurisdiction over another state without its consent. Currently, the states tend to adopt the 
‘doctrine of qualified immunity’, according to which immunity is granted to foreign states only with regard to 
their governmental acts (acts iure imperii), not with regard to their commercial acts (acts iure gestionis); M. 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia - The Structure of International Legal Argument, 2nd Ed., Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 486-488: the author suggests that the problem with this rule is in limiting 
or balancing the conflicting sovereignties. Although the standard rule is to distinguish between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ acts, Koskenniemi points to the varying jurisprudence that it has given rise to.
State in respect of acts jure gestionis.49 It is the nature of the contending actors, in light of the 
principle of the equality of States50 that allows them not to submit themselves to local 
jurisdictions, that intensifies the protection accorded to their property.51
Conversely, when States conclude agreements for the protection of foreign property the 
object of such protection is the property of private persons whom they diplomatically 
represent, and the related claims will be submitted to the jurisdiction of the host State.52 The 
answer to the question whether, by virtue of its territorial sovereignty, a State is entitled to 
interfere with foreign (non-State) property rights focuses on the nature of the property and not 
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49  This is recognized as the doctrine of qualified immunity, according to which foreign States are grated 
immunity only in respect of their governmental acts (acts iure imperii) and not in respect of their commercial 
acts (acts iure gestionis); P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction, p. 119; A. S. El-Kosheri, “Le Régime 
Juridique Créé par Les Accords de Participation”, pp. 242 et seq., describing the States’ ‘accords de 
partecipation dans le domaine pétrolier’, explains that the host State as private person participate to the 
industrial and commercial operations led by foreign investors in its territory, outside the realm of public law and 
this is the core of the participation agreement. More precisely, this act of participation entails either the exercise 
of a sovereign act––de jure imperii–– consisting in the State participation decision, and the exercise of a de jure 
gestionis act, comprising all the activities to be performed as a consequence of the participation decision. Yet, the 
author concludes that one cannot argue that the sovereign function of the State is overshadowed by the property-
related one; however, the author presented the opportunity for a new scheme involving a complementary 
understanding of sovereignty and property in the management of oil resources. Moreover, the author envisaged 
the capacity of this ‘joint venture’ to overcome the ‘droit de l’éphémère’ as resulting from the inception of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources; R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State”, p. 
280; Generally, see also M. Zander, “Act of State Doctrine”, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, 
1959, pp. 826-852; R. Higgins, “Asser Institute Lectures on International Law: Certain Unresolved Aspects of 
the Law of State Immunity”, in Netherlands International Law Review,  Vol. 29(2), 1982, pp. 265-276; G. M. 
Abi-Saab, “The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline”, in Howard Law 
Journal, Vol. 9, 1962, pp. 95-121; S. D. Franck, “Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis 
and Proposal for Qualified Immunity”, in New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
Vol. 20, 2000, pp. 1-59; C. H. Brower II, “Mitsubishi, Investor-State Arbitration and the Law of State 
Immunity”, in American University International Law Review, Vol. 20(5), 2005, pp. 907-927; A. Gattini, “The 
International Customary Law Nature of Immunity from Measures of Constraint to State Cultural Property on 
Loan”, in I. Buffard et al (eds)  International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation: Festschrift in 
Honour of Gerhard Hafner, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, pp. 421-439; H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity, OUP, 2nd 
Ed, 2008; C. Tomuschat, “The International Law of State Immunity and Its Developments by National 
Institutions”, in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 44(4), 2011, pp. 1104-1140; Y. Xiaodong, State 
Immuity in International Law,  CUP, 2012; S. W. Schill, “Cross Regime Harmonization through Proportionality 
Analysis; The Case of International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity and Human Rights”, in ICSID 
Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 27(1), 2012, pp. 87-119.
50  See, M. N. Shaw, International Law, Sixth Ed, CUP, pp. 129, 214-215, quoting, among the others, P. 
Kooijmans, The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States, Leiden, 1964; Oppenheim’s International Law, R. Y. 
Jennings and A. D. Watts (eds. by), 9th Ed., London, 1992, Vol. I, p. 52; M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to 
Utopia, pp. 92, 393.
51 R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law”, pp. 280-281.
52 Id.
of the actor involved.53 Provided that the requirements for a lawful expropriation are met, the 
extent to which the host State is free to take foreign property (without being required to 
compensate the investor) is controversial.54
The notion of ‘acquired rights’55 has been proposed as a boundary to the host State’s 
sovereign acts, and it has been accompanied by the movement which began in the 1960s 
through the UN Resolutions on ‘the New International Economic Order’ and ‘Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ (PSNR).56 However, as Baade noted, “it seems perfectly 
logical to require that nationalization be in the public interest. The question is, of course, 
whose public interest, as determined by whom”.57 As argued, “the very raison d’être of 
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53 R. Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law”, pp. 285-286.
54 Id, pp. 285-286. [Emphasis added]
55 Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v US), in RIAA, Vol. 2, 1928, p. 829; Case Concerning Certain German 
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, judgment, Series A., n. 7, 25 May 1926, p. 36; E. Paasivirta, 
“Internationalization and Stabilization of Contracts versus State Sovereignty”, in The British Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 60, 1990, p. 330. The issue of acquired rights emerges especially with regard to 
stabilization clauses. They consist in provisions included in the contract between the host State and the foreign 
investor, that aim to stabilize their relation by controlling the legal power of the host State and freezing its law. 
These clauses could considerably limit the prerogatives of the State so that a compromise has been identified in 
their capacity to accord compensation to private party that covers also its prospective gains. However, one 
should observe that it is within the sovereign power of the State to decide to limit or renounce to specific aspects 
of it. Indeed, any State may validly commit itself not to nationalize for a defined period of time, and thereby, the 
State grants irretractable rights to the private investor, that have the character of acquired rights. See, Texaco 
award, establishing that the right to nationalize is a rule of customary international law, which is transformed in 
the case in which the State has concluded and internationalized agreement with a foreign contracting party; See 
also, Wimbledon case, Judgement, 17 August 1923, Series A, n. 1, p. 25; Exchange of Greek and Turkish 
Populations, Ad. Opinion, 21 February 1925, Series B, n. 10, p. 21: the conclusion of the agreement is 
manifestation of the sovereignty of the State, so that it “cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard commitments 
freely undertaken through the exercise of this same sovereignty and cannot through measure belonging to its 
internal order make null and void the rights of the contracting party which has performed its various obligations 
under the contract”; See, AGIP S.p.a. v.  People’s Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case n. ARB/77/1, Award, 30 
November 1979, Rivista di diritto internazionale, Vol. 64, 1981, p. 863; Revue critique de droit international 
privé, Vol. 71, 1982, p. 92; English translations of French original in ILM, Vol. 21, 1982, p. 726; Amco Asia 
Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case n. ARB/81/1, 20 November 1984, in ILM, Vol. 24, 
1985, p. 1029, and Government of Kuwait And American Independent Oil Company, Award, 24 May 1982, in 
ILM, Vol. 21, 1982, p. 976 support an objective interpretation of the notion of sovereignty, which has led to 
opposite results, allowing the State to exercise its sovereign powers to the extent of depriving the contracting 
party of the rights previously granted.
56  GA Res. 1803(XVII), 14 December 1962; UNTDB 88 (XII), 19 October 1972, para. 2; GA Res. 3171 
(XXVIII), 17 December 1973; GA Res. 3201 (S-VI), 1 May 1974; GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.
57 H. W. Baade, “  Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources”, in R. S. Miller and R. J. Stanger 
(eds. by), Essays on Expropriation, Ohio State University Press, 1967, p. 23. (emphasis in the original).
compensation for expropriation ordered in the public interest is the idea that the State––i.e., 
the community––must not benefit unduly at the expense of private individuals”.58
The relationship between State and investors has been traditionally embodied in the so-
called State contracts.59 The qualification of a ‘taking’, therefore, could come to the fore also 
as a possible breach of those contracts60 and the question arose in the doctrine as to the law 
governing this public v. private international relation. One proposal distinguishes between 
situations in which the State acts in its public (de iure imperii) or private (de iure gestionis)61 
capacity, in order to establish the applicable law. Thus, two options arose, one calling for the 
application of the law of the host State and the other considering the contract as 
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58 F. V. García Amador, “Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur –– Responsibility of the State for Injuries 
Caused in its Territory to the Persons or Property of Aliens –– Measuring Affecting Acquired Rights”, Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, 1959, at 1-5, quoted in A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of 
Regulatory Expropriation”, p. 399; Noteworthy, this same reasoning, which focus on the balance between the 
burden imposed on the private person vis-à-vis the social benefit, is fundamental in the German takings’ 
jurisprudence.
59 UNCTAD, State Contracts, 2004, p. 3, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit200411_en.pdf, (last 
visited: 10 November 2010). A ‘State contract’ is defined as “a contract made between the State, or an entity of 
the State, which, for present purposes, may be defined as any organization created by the statute within a State 
that is given control over an economic activity, and a foreign national or a legal person of foreign nationality”. 
They are generally considered as being different from ordinary commercial contracts, since elements of public 
law regulation and governmental discretion are often identified in the host State’s decision to negotiate, conclude 
and terminate such contracts; see also, G. Kojanec, “The Legal Nature of Agreements Concluded by Private 
Entities with Foreign States”, in International Trade Agreements, Colloquium, Hague Academy of International 
Law, Sijthoff, Leiden, 1969, pp. 299-341.
60 Violations of international law in the investment field do not automatically amount to expropriation. Indeed, 
the State could have well breached specific standards, such as the fair and equitable treatment one, or have 
interfered with the investor’s legitimate expectations: yet, for this misbehavior to give rise to an expropriatory 
action, a certain degree of impact on the investment is required, failing which the investor’s claim could 
nonetheless be autonomously focused on the breach, with no further requirements on expropriation. Southern 
Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt,  ICSID Case n. ARB/84/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 27 November 1985, paras. 262 et seq.; Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. 
(UNCITRAL), LCIA n. UN 3467, Award, 1 July 2004: the tribunal dismissed the claim for expropriation due to 
the lack of ‘substantial deprivation’ but it found that the host State had breached the fair and equitable treatment 
standard (paras 180 ss.). A. Siwy, “Indirect Expropriation and the Legitimate Expectations of the Investor”, in 
Austrian Arbitration Yearbook, Vol. 2007, 2007, p. 376.
61 E. Paasivirta, “Internationalization and Stabilization of Contracts”, p. 342. The distinction between acta de 
jure imperii and de iure gestionis constitutes also the basis for narrowing the scope of PSNR as to exclude 
‘downstream’ activities. Indeed, arbitral tribunals do accept a plea of sovereign immunity when production 
activities are at stake, whereas in cases of ‘sale of natural resources’ the same plea has been rejected. See, 
National Iranian Oil Company Revenues from Oil Sales case, 12 April 1983, in ILR, Vol. 65, 1984, pp. 215 et 
seq.; AGIP S.p.a. v. People’s Republic of the Congo, paras 79-88 (on applicable law); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian 
Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), in ILR, Vol. 27, 1958, p. 117; Sapphire International Petroleum v.  National Iranian Oil 
Co., in ILR, Vol. 35, 1963, p. 136, where no mention is made of the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, and this is of significance particularly having regard to the dates of the awards.
internationalized.62 In the former case, the domestic legislation applied as a consequence of 
the principle of PSNR for investments in resource-related spheres; remedies had to be 
searched for in the local laws, covering also claims that the violation of the contract amounted 
to a taking.63  According to the internationalization doctrine, instead, the inclusion of 
arbitration, choice of law and stabilization clauses64 in the document account for the will of 
the parties to treat the contract as internationalized, so that breaches of its provisions entail 
international responsibility.65  As a result, the violation of foreign investment agreements 
through State-induced measures would qualify as a compensable taking. This theory, 
moreover, implies that the obligations arising out of the contract may reside in an external 
system, to be variously termed as either transnational law of business, general principles of 
law, lex mercatoria,66 or international law.67
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62 On internationalization of contracts see, A. A. Fatouros, “An International Code to Protect Private Investment-
Proposals and Perspectives”, in The University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 14, n. 1, 1961, pp. 77-102; A. F. M. 
Maniruzzaman, “State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies”, in 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 12(2), 2001, pp. 309-328; E. Paasivirta, “Internationalization and 
Stabilization of Contracts”, p. 330.
63 E. Paasivirta, “Internationalization and Stabilization of Contracts”, p. 330.
64  Id, pp. 330-331. Stabilization clauses perform an important market function since they attract foreign 
investors. They consist in provisions included in the contract between the host State and the foreign investor, that 
aim to stabilize their relation by controlling the legal power of the host State and freezing its law. The major 
issue that the inclusion of stabilization clauses triggers, concerns their compliance with State’s sovereignty, 
particularly over its natural resources. As it has been noticed, these clauses could considerably limit the 
prerogatives of the State so that a compromise has been identified in their capacity to accord compensation to 
private party that covers also its prospective gains; F. V. Garcia-Amador, “State Responsibility in Case of 
‘Stabilization’ Clauses’”, in A. H. Qureshi, X. Gao (ed. by), International Economic Law, Vol. IV, London, 
Routledge, 2011, pp. 70-93.
65 See, Gustav F. W. Hamester v. The Republic of Ghana, paras. 328-330.
66 See, A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, “The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Challenge for International 
Commercial Arbitration?”, in American University International Law Review, Vol. 14, pp. 657-734.
67 UNCTAD, State Contracts, p. 6.
The distinction between ‘contract-claims’ and ‘treaty-claims’ continues to be relevant 
also in the current ‘BITs generation’ of investment law,68  and has obvious repercussions on 
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68 The leading case on the contract/treaty distinction is Vivendi Annulment Decision, Compañia de Aguas del 
Aconquija S.A. and Compagnie Générale des Eaux/Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case n. 
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, ICSID Report, Vol. 6, p. 340, 365, paras 95-96; Gustav F. W. 
Hamester v. The Republic of Ghana, para. 327: “ICSID tribunals have given different answers to the question 
whether contractual behavior attributed to the State according to international rules of attribution can be, either 
ipso facto or under certain circumstances, not only a contract claim but also a violation of the BIT, and hence a 
‘treaty claim’”; J. Crawford, “Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration”, in Arbitration International, Vol. 
24(3), 2008, pp. 351-374: the author proposes and integrationist approach and concludes that although 
distinction between treaty and contract do exist, “they are part of the same one Work”. Thus, it is argued that “at 
the level of jurisdiction, and subject always to the caveat that what matters is the actual language of the BIT, 
there is no reason to interpret a BIT as not covering contractual claims or counterclaims concerning the 
investment”. Yet, it is submitted that for a contractual claim to be invoked under any dispute settlement clause in 
a BIT, it must be characterized as follows: 1) it must be characterized as “a claim relating to investments”; 2) the 
investment contract must have been concluded with the State itself; 3) “an investor invoking contractual 
jurisdiction must itself comply with its contractual arrangements for dispute settlement with the state”.
the role attributed to public international law in this context.69
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69 S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law - Reconciling Policy and Principle, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008, 
pp. 120-122: International law prescribes that when a State gives consent to the presence of a foreign actor 
within its territory, the exercise of its economic sovereignty is automatically constrained by this decision, having 
the State voluntarily subjected itself to the rules of international foreign investment law; S. K. B. Asante, 
“International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 37, 1988, p. 59: it is noted that the minimum standard of protection that international law establishes with 
respect to alien property, is based on the principles of inviolability or private property and the sanctity of 
contract; on the minimum standard see, R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, “Customary International Law-The 
Emergence of a Minimum Standard”, in A. S. Qureshi and X. Gao (ed. by), International Economic Law, Vol. 
IV, International Investment Law, Routledge, 2011, pp. 3-9: Until the 1917 Russian Revolution there was the 
implicit assumption in the international system that the domestic scheme of protection of the State would have 
offered sufficient guarantees to the foreign investors as well. After the Russian upheaval the Calvo doctrine and 
the opposing Hull doctrine emerged, giving rise to a harsh political debate about the status of the alien in 
general. The result of these disputes was a ‘widespread sense that the alien is protected from unacceptable 
measures of the host State by rules of international law that are independent from those of the host State. The 
sum of these rules became known as the international minimum standard’. See in particular Lena Goldfield v. 
USSR, award, 2 September 1930, in Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 36, 1950, p. 51: in which the Tribunal required 
the Soviet Union to pay compensation to the alien investor, based on the notion of unjust enrichment. The 
Judgement is analyzed in ; ECtHR, James & Others v. UK, 21 February 1986, Appl. n. 8793/79, para 63: 
“Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform, there may well be good 
grounds for drawing a distinction between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned. To 
begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they will generally have 
played no part in the election or designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. Secondly, 
although a taking of property must always be effected in the public interest, different considerations may apply 
to nationals and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater 
burden in the public interest than non-nationals”; R. Dolzer, “Contemporary Law of Foreign Investment: 
Revisiting the Status of International Law”, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, S. Wittich (eds), 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs, 2009, p. 828, 
arguing that international law operates as a framework which domestic law must respect; the function to limit 
domestic law seems to have been performed long before the Serbian Loans case decided by the Permanent Court 
of International Justice in 1929; F. Orrego Vicuña, “Of Contracts and Treaties in the Global Market”, in Max-
Planck United Nations Yearbook, Vol. 8, p. 341, 2004, suggesting that the “general safeguard of international law 
will always be at hand”; See also, on the role of international law as normative system, P. Weil, “Towards 
Relative Normativity in International Law?”, in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 77(3), 1983, 
pp. 413-442; S. M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law, CUP, 1994, pp. 425 et seq.; Serbian Loans case, 
Series A, n. 20, pp. 21, 41, 1929; See also, art. 42 of the ICSID Convention, in C. Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention, pp. 613 et seq.; Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. Liberia, ICSID Case n. ARB/
83/2, Award, 31 March 1986; Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia; Southern Pacific 
Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case n. ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
27 November 1985; Duke Energy International Peru Investments N. 1, Ltd v. Peru, ICSID Case n. ARB/03/28, 
Award, 18 August 2008, in which, however, no explanation is given about the decision to apply international 
law; See, Ambatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), Pleadings, in RIAA, Vol. 12, 1956, p. 83; Losinger & 
Co. Case, Series C, n. 78, 27 June and 14 December 1936, p. 32; See also, UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking, 2007, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
iteiia20065_en.pdf, (last visited: 9 November 2010), arguing that the role of international law is confirmed by 
the number of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded not only between developed and developing 
States, but also between developing States.
BITs confine their scope of application to situations falling within their definition of 
‘investments’,70  in which State contracts are often included. Thus, the breach of a contract71 
might qualify as expropriation––or as a measure equivalent to it––, being therefore 
compensable within the framework of the investment treaty.72  BITs and International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs) aim at providing a scheme that ensures the stability of the 
investment within the host country.73 As a result, any action of the State as private subject 
may be projected on the international scene, being evaluated in light of the obligations 
assumed in its interstate relations; conversely, investors’ obligations vis-à-vis the host State 
may be transformed into justiciable international obligations.74 Originally, in case of investor-
host State disputes, the home State initiated proceedings against the latter on the basis of the 
diplomatic protection model, clearly fitting into the public international law regime. In 
modern investment treaties two options are commonly available: treaty parties (States) can 
bring arbitral claims against each other on the interpretation/application of the treaty; and 
investors can bring arbitral claims against the host State for treaty violations adversely 
affecting the investment.75 Thus, the investor benefits from both procedural and substantive 
safeguards not only by virtue of the host State’s local laws, but also through the sovereign 
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70 This results from the definition of ‘investment’ that is adopted in the treaty. Since such definitions change 
continuously in order to meet the need of the parties and of the market, the breach of contractual obligations has 
been included within the ‘protected assets’ that are covered by the notion of investment in bilateral or 
multilateral treaties. A. Roberts, “Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: the Dual Role of 
States”, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, 2010, pp. 183-184.
71  S. M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law, p. 425: “The question whether the breach by a State of a 
contract between that State or its agency and an alien is a breach of international law has long divided States and 
scholars”; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case n. ARB/
03/29, Award, 27 August 2009, at para. 180: “because a treaty breach is different from a contract violation, the 
Tribunal considers that the Claimant must establish a breach different in nature from a simple contract violation, 
in other words one which the State commits in the exercise of its sovereign power”; Gustav F. W. Hamester v. 
The Republic of Ghana, para. 330; See, M. Hirsch, “Compliance with Investment Treaties: When Are States 
More Likely to Breach or Comply with Investment Treaties?”, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, S. 
Wittich (ed. by), International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs, 
2009, pp. 865-876.
72 UNCTAD, Taking of Foreign Property, pp. 37-38.
73 UNCTAD, State Contracts, p. 6.
74 G. Kojanec, “The Legal Nature of Agreements”, p. 314.
75 A. Roberts, “Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation”, pp. 183-184.
capacity of its home State: thereby, the distinction between domestic v international domains, 
and private v public sphere is inevitably blurred.76
The dual role of States as both treaty parties and actual or potential respondents in 
investor-State disputes is an expression of a twofold interest: respectively, an interest in a 
favourable interpretation of the treaty’s broad clauses––that they contributed to draft during 
the State-to-State negotiations; and, an interest in avoiding liability.77 Such a twofold interest 
further complicates the investment issue both practically and theoretically. On the one hand, 
an expansive interpretation of tribunals favoring the protection of investors’ rights could 
discourage States from negotiating investment treaties78, gradually leading to a deteriorated 
business environment; on the other, the asymmetries in the distribution of power between 
98
76 A. Roberts, “Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation”, pp. 184-185. Three alternatives are 
currently debated in the doctrine: a) investment treaties grant substantive and procedural rights to treaty parties 
and investors are permitted for the sake of convenience to enforce their states’ substantive rights; b) investment 
treaties grant substantive rights to the treaty parties only, and investors are granted the procedural right to enforce 
their states’ substantive rights; c) investment treaties grant substantive and procedural rights to investors, giving 
investors a procedural right to enforce their own substantive rights. For case law on the different positions, the 
author suggests to compare, Corn Products International v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/
04/01, Decision on Responsibility, 15 January 2008, paras. 166-169; and, Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & 
Prod. Co., paras. 14-22, where investors are granted substantive and procedural rights; with, Loewen Group, Inc. 
& Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 26 June 2003; and, Archer 
Daniels Midland Co. v.  Mexico, where investors are granted procedural, not substantive rights. Similar debates 
occurred with respect to whether individual claims could be brought before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; see 
also, K. Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance, pp.268 et seq., arguing that “the institution 
of investment protection actually produces or exacerbates power differences between certain individuals and 
groups both within a state and in the international context”. More precisely, it produces a number of 
“asymmetries” between: “foreign investors and states; foreign investors and ‘everyone else’; arbitral tribunals 
and governments; national and lower levels of government within a state; economic and environmental 
ministries within a state; developed and developing countries”.; See also, T. Wälde, “The Specific Nature of 
Investment Arbitration”, in P. Kahn, T. Waelde (eds) New Aspects of International Investment Law, Martinus 
Nijihoff Publishers, 2007, pp. 43-120.
77 Id, p. 179.
78 This is called “regulatory chilling effect” on law reforms. Opinions in this regard are contrasting, especially 
because there is no evidence of it. However, this is an argument that is generally advanced against the conclusion 
of BITs and IIAs. See, A. Shepperd, “BIT between the Teeth”, in Legal Week, 1 May 2012, p. 22; the fact that it 
is “not efficient” to compensate private actors for regulatory changes was already pointed out by L. Kaplow, “An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions”, in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 99(3), 1986.
investors and States would be reduced, to the extent that they are treated as equals before 
international arbitrators.79
Scholars have furthermore identified a “prominent phenomenon”  associated with the 
legal context of BITs and investment treaties’ property issues. It is argued that foreign 
investors are favored by a “property discourse”  elaborated through the evolving interpretation 
of terms such as ‘treaty’, ‘investment’, ‘rights’ and ‘expropriation’. Thus, mere ‘interests’80 of 
foreign investors are regarded as ‘property rights’ and thereby enjoy an extended protection, a 
sort of “superior, quasi-constitutional extraterritorial”  status, thanks to the BITs regime and 
the lex specialis it gives rise to.81 This is perceived as an additional peril in investment law to 
the extent that foreign investors may take advantage of the investment treaty system, to be 
granted a “beneficial lex specialis” they would not otherwise be entitled to.82
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79  On this regard see, A. Sinclair, “Bridging the Contract/Treaty Divide”, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. 
Reinisch, S. Wittich (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford Scholarship Online 
Monographs, 2009, pp. 92-104 arguing that “investment treaties contain broad dispute settlement clauses that 
appear to indicate that the Contracting Parties intended unilaterally to offer to submit to a tribunal constituted 
under the treaty, disputes arising out of an investment-related State contract with the foreign investor. This, even 
though the claims do not involve any allegation that the treaty itself has been violated”; see, Impregilo S.p.A. V. 
Pakistan, ICSID Case n. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005, upholding the view that normal 
contractual principles apply to determine the parties to a contractual dispute that may be submitted to a treaty-
based tribunal, and not international law rules of attribution; R. Leal-Arcas, “Towards the Multilateralization of 
International Investment Law”, in The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol 10(6), 2009, pp. 865-919: the 
author suggests that the “fragmentation of the international investment regime may also create incentive for 
treaty shopping by those foreign investors who seek protection even in situations where their country has not 
concluded or ratified investment agreements that offer the same level of protection as those achieved in other 
countries”. This is an additional negative consequence related to the current status of international investment 
law. See also, J. E. Alvarez, “The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investments”, in 
Recueil des cours, Vol. 344, 2009, pp. 471 et seq.
80  Consider in this regard the investment tribunals’ failure to distinguish between legal claim and factual 
propositions. C. E. Foster, “International Adjudication”, p. 86. [Emphasis in the original].
81 A. Lehavi, A. N. Licht, “BITs and Pieces of Property”, pp. 117. The authors further argues that “tribunals 
frequently interpret treaty terms such as ‘expropriation’ and ‘indirect expropriation’ in a way that increasingly 
resembles the respective ‘takings’ and ‘regulatory takings’ doctrines in the United States”. See, Mexico v 
Metalclad Corp, Judicial Review, paras 102-112 similar to Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York, 
438 US 104, 125 (1978), with regards to the definition of “indirect expropriation” as depriving the owner of a 
“reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit”.
82Id, pp. 129-130: the authors maintains that “investors often look beyond host governments’ public 
commitments or contractual obligations to ensure broader protection of their ‘property rights’ through BITs”, 
especially as a result of the vague definition of ‘investment’ endorsed in BITs.
III. The International Law of Expropriation
(a) Historical Background
International investment law, as a branch of public international law, should be “read 
against the backdrop of customary international law of foreign investment”.83 Indeed, prior to 
the expansion of investment treaties the protection and treatment of foreign investment was 
regulated by principles of customary international law, in the form of an understanding of 
diplomatic protection shared between the host and the home State.84  More precisely, the 
mechanism of diplomatic protection could be activated only after all the local remedies in the 
host country had been exhausted by the investor.85
The content of customary international law “for the protection and treatment of aliens 
and their property” 86 has been debated with particular regard to the duty of a host State to 
accord to foreign investors the same treatment as its nationals or an “international minimum 
standard”  of protection.87 Mainly, these debates aimed at addressing the lawfulness of an host 
State’s expropriation of foreign property and the corresponding duty to pay full compensation 
to alien owners.88 The existence of the international minimum standard formed the object of 
the exchange of notes concerning the standard of compensation between the US Secretary of 
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83 D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, LexisNexis, 2011, p. 796.
84 Id. The author further explain that “claims that a host had violated customary international law vis-à-vis an 
investor of a home state could lead to the home state espousing a claim against the host state. Espousal-a 
political decision-could take the form of high-level negotiations, cases before ad hoc arbitration tribunals and 
claims commissions, and occasionally cases before the International Court of Justice [...]”; in T. W. Wälde, “The 
Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration”, pp. 73-74, it is explained that the expression originally used to refer 
to the category of ‘foreign/international investment law’ was ‘the international law for the protection and 
treatment of aliens and their property”.
85 See, International Court of Justice, Interhandel Case, ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 27, where the Court stated that “[t]
he rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-
established rule of customary international law”; Finnish Ships Arbitration, in UNRIAA, Vol. 3, 1934, p. 1479; 
Ambatielos Claim, p. 83; See, C. F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, 2nd Ed, CUP, 2005; As 
noted by Schreuer, however, current arbitral practice “confirms that the exhaustion of local remedies is not 
required in contemporary investment arbitration” and this is “one of several advantages it has over the traditional 
remedy of diplomatic protection. C. Schreuer, “Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in 
Investment Arbitration”, in The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 4(1), 2005, pp. 2, 
16.
86 T. W. Wälde, “The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration”, pp. 73-74.
87 D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, p. 797.
88 S. W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, CUP, 2009, pp. 25-26.
State, Cordell Hull, and the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1938.89 The early law on 
takings was developed against the background of this relationship, and justified by the 
American necessity to secure the protection of the investments of its nationals in Latin 
American States, where expropriatory measures were frequently occurring.90  The Hull 
Formula, calling for ‘prompt, adequate, and effective payment’ in case of expropriation of 
private property was at odds with the Mexican position, which challenged both the existence 
of an international minimum standard and the requirement for a prompt compensation.91 Latin 
American States, finding support in the Communist rejection of private property, adopted the 
Calvo doctrine, according to which foreign investors could only invoke national treatment and 
only before the host States’ competent courts.92 In the inter-war period, international courts 
and tribunals did not accept the national standards of treatment as compatible with 
international law. It should be noted, however, that controversies concerning the standard of 
compensation to expropriated investors still lies at the core of international investment law.93
Attempts to multilaterally regulate investment protection were made through the 1948 
Havana Charter and the 1967 OECD Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, as a 
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89 S. W. Schill, The Multilateralization, p. 27.
90 M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 21.
91 S. W. Schill, The Multilateralization , p. 27.
92  S. Montt, State Liability, pp. 33-34, 38, arguing that the Calvo doctrine presents important lesson for 
developing countries in the BIT generation. However, the Calvo doctrine is still described as “the finest legal/
political product to be developed in this regional crusade against diplomatic protection”.
93 S. W. Schill, The Multilateralization,  pp. 27-28; B. Hassane, “Les Contrats Miniers”, in P. K. Kahn, T. W. 
Wälde (eds. by), New Aspects of International Investment Law, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 
265; M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 21: in Asia and Africa, conversely, investment 
protection was achieved through capitulation treaties, and the adoption of most favorable regimes of property; Y. 
Nouvel, “L’indemnisation d’une expropriation indirecte”, in International Law Forum, Vol. 5(3), 2003, pp. 
198-204, who argues that “si les effets de la mesure gouvernent l’éclosion de l’obligation d’indemniser, l’objet 
de la mesure importe dans le calcul du montant de l’indemnisation”; See, Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 
374 US 398 (1964), the US Supreme Court stated that “[t]here are few if any issues in international law on 
which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state’s power to expropriate the alien’s property”.
reaction to the worldwide increase in expropriations.94 However, the international climate of 
the time did not favour such multilateral efforts, as developing countries were overtly 
challenging customary international law rules on property protection in the meetings of the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA).95  UNGA Resolution 3201 incorporated the 
‘Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’. It declared the 
right to nationalize or transfer the ownership to nationals as an expression of the decolonized 
countries’ permanent sovereignty over their natural resources, but it omitted any reference to 
the obligation to pay compensation.96  UNGA Resolution 3281 further reinforced this 
approach: although referring to compensation, it established the competence of domestic 
courts in the host States on the matter.97  Besides these endeavors against international 
investments’ protection, the practice of international arbitration reveals that only GA 
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94N. Schrijver, “Developments in International Investment Law”, in R. St. J. Macdonald (ed), Essays in Honour 
of Wang Tieya, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 718-719. The reliance on BITs may be understood given 
the failures in multilateralizing investment protection. One must consider the controversiality of investment 
provisions in the 1948 Havana Charter or the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property (See, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/39286571.pdf, (last accessed on: 19 February 2012)). These 
difficulties stimulated the conclusion of BITs already in the pre-1990, so that the recourse to BITs prevailed over 
the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN), generally employed to regulate commercial and 
political relations between the contracting States. Vain was also the attempt to establish the OECD Multilateral 
A g r e e m e n t o n I n v e s t m e n t ( M A I , S e e , h t t p : / / w w w. o e c d . o rg / d o c u m e n t /
35/0,3343,en_2649_33783766_1894819_1_1_1_1,00.html, (last accessed on: 19 February 2012)), which was 
forcefully attacked by civil society groups. J. d’Aspremont, “International Customary Investment Law: Story of 
a Paradox”, in T. Gazzini, E. De Brabandere (eds)  International Investment Law. The Sources of Rights and 
Obligations, Martinus Nijihoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 15-17; K. Von Moltke, H. Mann, “Towards a Southern 
Agenda on International Investment: Discussion Paper on the Role of International Investment Agreements”, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, May 2004, p. 12; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, E/CONF.2/78, United Nations publication [Havana Charter]; 
See also, Z. Drábek, “A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Convincing the Sceptics”, in The Policy 
Challenges of Global Financial Integration, The Hague, 1998, available at http://www.fondad.org, (last accessed 
on: 5 September 2011), where the author argues in favor of a Multilateral Agreement, underlining that the 
benefits of such achievement would “greatly exceed the costs”. For a further policy overview see, P. Sauvé, 
“Multilateral Rules on Investment: Is Forward Movement Possible?”, in Journal of International Economic Law, 
Vol. 9 (2), 2006, pp. 325-355; as to the failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment see also, P. T. 
Muchlinski, “The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?”, in Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 34 (3), 2000, pp. 1033-1053.
95 S. W. Schill, The Multilateralization, p. 37.
96 GA Resolution 3201 (S-VI), 1 May 1974, para 4.e.
97 S. W. Schill, The Multilateralization, pp. 37-38; D. E. Vielleville Esq., B. S. Vasani, “Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources Versus Rights Under Investment Contracts: Which One Prevails?”, in Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol. 5(2), 2008, pp. 3 et seq.
Resolution 1803––which provided for adequate compensation in case of expropriation––was 
regarded as an authoritative expression of customary international law.98
Whilst GA Resolutions refer to cases of nationalization or (direct) expropriation, the 
meaning attributed to nationalization or (direct) expropriation has evolved over time together 
with States’s more interventionist approaches.99  Although new types of claims for 
expropriation have arisen––i.e., indirect expropriations––, this has not led to more clarity 
about the policies and other considerations that should guide international tribunals in 
deciding cases of (regulatory) expropriations.100  It is crystal-clear that much attention 
gravitates around expropriation in international law; despite this well-established interest, 
however, “a blunderbuss approach” 101  still characterizes the field and especially the 
distinction between expropriation and (non compensable)regulation.
Investment treaty rules were established with the aim of encouraging secure and 
peaceful international relations in the investment field.102  The substantive standards of 
protection contained in BITs (and Free Trade Agreements, FTAs) complement the relevant 
principles of customary international law that remain applicable to treaty interpretation.103 
The sometimes lax standards enshrined in investment treaties have however contributed to an 
ambiguous and inconsistent arbitral practice with respect to expropriatory matters, “reducing 
the ability of States to regulate in the public interest”.104 Although confronted with “key 
public policies in the area of tobacco control, nuclear phase-out or sovereign debt 
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98 S. W. Schill, The Multilateralization, p. 38. [Emphasis added]
99 L. Y. Fortier, and S. L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It 
When I See It, or Caveat Investor”, in ICSID Review- Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 19(2), 2004, pp. 
293-327.
100 A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation”, p. 394; D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, 
Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, p. 798.
101 J. A. Alvarez, T. Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense”, Conclusions.
102  T. W. Wälde, “The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration”, p. 69.; N. Schrijver, “Developments in 
International Investment Law”, pp. 704-705.
103 D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, p. 798. See also, T. Gazzini, E. De 
Brabandere (eds)  International Investment Law. The Sources of Rights and Obligations,  Martinus Nijihoff 
Publishers, 2012.
104 V. S. Vadi, “Through the Looking-Glass”, p.30.
restructuring”, arbitral tribunals presently “continue to disagree on core IIAs definitions and 
standards, thus further undermining the system’s predictability”.105  Notwithstanding these 
perplexities, there currently is in place a network of investment treaties that thus far 
constitutes the bulk of the international legal framework for the protection of investments, 
replacing diplomatic protection.106 As noted in a recent study, “an emerging trend”  that “re-
balance the network of more than 6,000 IIAs, issues of investor responsibility are also gaining 
ground”. These developments pinpoints the importance of systemic issues, “such as how to 
ensure coherence and build an international investment regime that fosters responsible 
investment and ensures sustainable development”.107 Thus, public policy108 concerns are now 
on the top of the investment agenda. The overview of both the state of customary international 
law and the developments occurring in investment treaty law that is provided in the following 
section will account for the most recent trends in this regard. More precisely, our focus will be 
on whether and how the host State’s regulatory activity coexists next to indirect expropriation 
in international investment law.
(b) The International Law of Expropriation: Customary and Treaty-based Norms
The international ‘law of expropriation’ is composed of three branches. Firstly, the 
relevant rules define the object of protection––i.e., the concept of property; secondly, the 
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105  UNCTAD, “Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, in International Investment 
Agreements Issues Note,  N. 1, April 2012, p. 14, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf, (last accessed on: 18 September 2012). It is further argued that the investor-state 
dispute settlement system has reached “far beyond its original intention”.
106 D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, p. 798; see also, Case concerning 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v Congo) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ, General List n. 103, 24 May 2007, para 
88.
107 UNCTAD, “Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, p.11.
108 It is difficult to provide a definition of the term ‘public policy’. J. Lew wrote “The uncertainty and ambiguity 
as to its actual content is one of the essential characteristics of public policy”. Yet, the concept should be 
distinguished from the notion of ‘transnational public policy’, which involves “the identification of principles 
that are commonly recognized by political and legal systems around the world”. Lalive describes it as “the 
osmosis [....] of the (really international) public policy of the law of nations, upon, or in, the concept of 
transnational public policy”. J. D. M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, Oceana, 
Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1978, p. 531; P. Lalive, “Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy”, in VIII 
Congress on Arbitration ICCA, New York, May 1986, Congress Series n. 3, Kluwer, The Hague, pp. 295-296, 
both quoted in M. Hunter, G. Conde e Silva, “Transnational Public Policy”, pp. 368-369.
concept of ‘expropriation’ is defined;109 thirdly, when an expropriation has been found to have 
occurred, the rules on compensation come into play.110  As Dolzer pointed out, the 
identification of an expropriation––and as a consequence, the question of compensation––is 
the most challenging aspect, particularly since governmental measures having an indirect111 
impact on property rights have become prominent in the investment landscape. Therefore, this 
branch of the law of expropriation deserves specific examination, especially from the point of 
view of legal security and clarity in the evaluation of State practice.112
As noted, expropriation is not illegal per se in international law. States have in principle 
the power and the right to lawfully expropriate the property of nationals and aliens, provided 
that certain conditions are respected.113 This right can be considered as the outcome of the 
interplay of three basic principles:114  1) the right to economic self-determination of States, 
nations, and peoples;115  2) the right of nations to (economic) development; and, 3) the 
105
109 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property”, p. 41, specifies that the thorny issues arise when the 
title remains with the owner but the measure significantly affects the legal status of the owner’s property rights.
110 Id.
111 [Emphasis added].
112 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property”, p. 42.
113 For the analysis of the conditions according to which an expropriation could be deemed as lawful see further 
below; H. W. Baade, “  Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources”, pp. 17-18; C. Schreuer, The 
Concept of Expropriation under the ECT, 2005, p. 2, available at http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/
csunpublpaper_3.pdf, (last visited: 20 November 2010); S. Montt, State Liability, pp. 165-166, arguing that the 
“regulatory State has the constitutional power, recognized by international law, to harm citizens, including 
investors.This does not mean that citizens and investors must always bear the consequences of State action or 
inaction. Yet, neither does it mean that all injuries must be compensated”; T. Gazzini, “Drawing the Line 
between Non-Compensable Regulatory Powers and Indirect Expropriation of Foreign Investment: An Economic 
Analysis of Law Perspective”, in Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 7(3), 2010, pp. 
36-51; S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques - L’expropriation indirecte, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, March 2012, p. 3, where it is explained “il faut préciser que chaque État demeure en principe libre 
d’exproprier. C’est un droit souverain internationalement reconnu. Les traités d’investissement n’interdisent 
donc pas aux États de prendre des mesures d’expropriation. Ils sont seulement tenus de ne pas agir de manière 
discriminatoire, de poursuivre un intérêt public et d’indemniser l’investisseur lésé en retour”.
114  A. Reinisch, “Legality of Expropriations”, in A. Reinisch (ed. by), Standards of Investment Protection, 
Oxfrod, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 174. See, Resolution 1803(XVII), para 4, establishing the need to 
combine public interest and compensation, for the expropriatory measure to be in compliance with international 
law; UN GA Resolution 3171(XXVIII), 17 December 1973, para 3; UN GA Resolution 3281( XXIX), 12 
December 1974, art. 2(2), which clearly shows in their texts the opposing views of developed v. developing 
countries.
115 Island of Palmas case, in RIAA, Vol. 2, 1928, p. 829: “Sovereignty in the relations between States signified 
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of 
any other State, the functions of a State”; See, W. Shan, P. Simons, and D. Singh (ed. by), Redefining Sovereignty 
in International Economic Law, Studies in International Trade Law, Vol. 7, Hart Publishing, 2008.
permanent sovereignty116  of States, nations, and peoples over their natural wealth and 
resources (PSNR).117  More precisely, the right to expropriate is part of the economic 
sovereignty of States,118  as it emerged following the decolonization period: the demands of 
newly independent States were intertwined with the treatment to be accorded to foreign 
investments and the law applicable in the relations between private investors and host 
States.119 The quest for self-determination120  and sovereignty initially led those States to 
invoke the supremacy of their domestic legislation which found partial acceptance in GA 
Resolutions 3201 and 3281. Nevertheless, as States may not invoke their domestic legislation 
to avoid international responsibility,121  they may not in the same way refer to their internal 
legal order to deprive foreign investors of their rights under public international law.122
106
116  S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law, p. 122; N. Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources - 
Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge, CUP, 1997, pp. 369 et seq., arguing that is a well-established principle 
of international law that the PSNR reflects customary international law; the customary nature of the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources has been also recognized in ICJ, Case Concerning the Armed 
Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), judgment, n. 116, 19 
December 2005.
117  W. D. Verwey, N. J. Schrijver, “The Taking of Foreign Property under International Law: a New Legal 
Perspective?”, in The Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 15, 1984, pp. 8, 28-29: Particularly, the 
recognition of economic self-determination as a legal principle was problematic, since it was exposed to abuses 
for the purpose of justifying takings of property; K. N. Gess, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: 
An Analytical Review of the United Nations Declaration and Its Genesis”, in The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 13, n. 2, 1964, pp. 398-449; J. N. Hyde, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and 
Resources”, in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 50, n. 4, 1956, pp. 854-867. The genesis of the 
principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in particular covered three sessions of the United 
Nations Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the thirty-second session of the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly’s seventeenth session.
118  Resolution 3021(S-VI), 1 May 1974, (Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order). On this subject see, P. Verloren van Themaat, “The New International Economic Order”, in Workshop, 
The Hague, 23-25 October 1980, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981; It is well-accepted that PSNR encompasses 
the States’ right to expropriate or nationalize foreign and national property found within their jurisdiction. See, J. 
Baloro, “Some International Legal Problems Arising from the Definition and Application of the Concept of 
‘Permanent Sovereignty over Wealth and Natural Resources’ of States”, in CILSA, Vol. XX, 1987, p. 337. 
Additionally, it seems consistent with the PSNR also the capacity of the State to ‘freeze’ foreign bank deposits 
held by banks located within their jurisdiction; W. D. Verwey and N. J. Schrijver, “The Taking of Foreign 
Property under International Law”, p. 8.
119 R. Dolzer, “Contemporary Law of Foreign Investment”, pp. 818-830.
120 GA Resolution 1314(XIII), 12 December 1958.
121 S. M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law, p. 430.
122 R. Dolzer, “Contemporary Law of Foreign Investment”, p. 826.
Customary international law provides well-established principles to govern any 
expropriatory measure deemed to be lawful: ‘public purpose’,123 ‘non-discrimination’,124 ‘due 
process of law’,125  and payment of ‘prompt, adequate, and effective126 compensation’.127 In 
line with these principles, the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) on State Responsibility clarified that the expropriation of foreign property 
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123 S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law, pp. 120-121; M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 
57. The ‘public purpose’ is a controversial requirement, on which also the pronouncements of Courts and 
Tribunals are equivocal; however, it continues to be employed in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), as a ‘time-
tested formula’ governing interstate and intrastate relations. For instance, both United States and United 
Kingdom protested to the Libyan oil nationalization, adducing the lack of public purpose as a motive. It may 
serve as a criterion for distinguishing between regulatory and non-regulatory taking, although the opinions of 
arbitrators differs on this point. The requirement is also mentioned in the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
on Foreign Relations Law. The BP award and the Liamco case, offer an instance of the disagreement on the role 
of public purpose. In addition, the view of the ECHR follows the trend of not questioning the state’s opinion on 
the public purpose of the taking.; See, British Petroleum v. Libya, award, 10 October 1973 and 1 August 1974, in 
ILR, Vol. 53, p. 297, 1979; Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. Lybia, award, 12 April 1977, in ILM, Vol. 
20, 1981, in which the sole arbitrator upheld that no separate public purpose was need according to international 
law, for the nationalization to be lawful. Moreover, some scholars do not agree that nationalizations to be lawful 
should be non-discriminatory; See, PCIJ, Oscar Chinn Case, judgment, Series A/B, n. 63-79, 12 December 
1934.
124 M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 58: Discriminatory takings arise when the expropriation 
is targeting a individual as a consequence of his race or of his belonging to a specific group. The principle 
against racial discrimination has indeed a jus cogens nature in international law, so that any taking in contrast to 
it is evidently unlawful. Yet, difficulties arise when both racial and economic reasons found the taking. In this 
case, the trend is to initiate a separate cause of action questioning the racial discrimination provoked by the 
taking, so that the responsibility of the host State could be pegged; P. D. Cameron, International Energy 
Investment Law, Oxford, OUP, 2010, pp. 220-221.
125 See, F. Francioni, “Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law”, in The European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 20(3), 2009, pp.729-747.
126  This is known as the ‘Hull Formula’ and was developed in correspondence from former U.S. Secretary of 
State Hull to the Mexican government. The U.S. Secretary asserted that ‘under every rule of law and equity, no 
government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose without provision for prompt, 
adequate and effective payment therefor.’ W. M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation and Its 
Valuation in the BIT Generation”, op. cit., p. 135. The locus classicus on compensation in international law is the 
Factory at Chorzów, Judgment, Series A, n. 17, 13 September 1928, p. 47; for a review of the issue of 
compensation see, C. F. Amerasinghe, “Issues of Compensation for the Taking of Alien Property in the Light of 
Recent Cases and Practice”, in The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 41(1), 1992, pp. 22-65.
127  G. C. Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?”, pp. 307-338; W. M. 
Reisman and R. D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the BIT Generation”, in The British 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 74, 2004, p. 134; L. Y. Fortier, and S. L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in 
the Law of International Investment”, pp. 295-296; W. A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings, London, Harvard 
University Press, 1995, p. 1, referring to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, mention the Eminent 
Domain Clause, the Just Compensation Clause and the Takings Clause, establishing that private property shall be 
taken for public use upon payment of just compensation; UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key 
Issues, 2004, p. 235, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit200410_en.pdf, (last visited: 9 November 
2010); UNCTAD, Taking of Foreign Property, p. 12; see, also, Compañia de Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. 
Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case n. ARB/96/1, Award on the Merits, 17 February 2000; S. P. Subedi, 
International Investment Law, p. 125. See also, O. Schacter, “Compensation for Expropriation”, in American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 78, 1984, pp. 121-130.
may lead to the international responsibility of the expropriating State, unless carried out 
according to specific conditions, namely ‘public utility’, ‘non-discrimination’, and ‘lack of 
arbitrariness’.128 Particularly, ‘unlawful expropriations’ would require restitutio in integrum or 
a financial equivalent, whereas ‘lawful expropriations’ would imply the payment of ‘fair 
compensation’ or ‘the just price of what was expropriated’.129 When a taking is in breach of 
contractual or treaty obligations, it has to be considered illegal.130
The principles according to which illegal expropriation––or confiscation––would entail 
the applicability of the rules on State responsibility were established in the Chorzow Factory 
case131  and restated also in Amoco and Texaco v. Libya.132 The attribution of a customary 
nature to these criteria has been achieved through a long process, in which the obligation to 
fully compensate the expropriated investor represented the most controversial requirement.133 
Evidence of this can be found in the United Nations practice and in the process that led to the 
adoption of the UN GA Resolutions establishing the right to expropriate as an expression of 
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128 A. Reinisch, “Legality of Expropriations”, p. 173; S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law, pp. 120-121; 
on the application of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in 
Investor-State Arbitration, see, M. Endicott, “Remedies in Investor-State Arbitration: Restitution, Specific 
Performance and Declaratory Awards”, in P. Kahn, T. W. Wälde (ed. by), New Aspects of International 
Investment Law, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, pp. 517-552; see, de Sabla Claim (US v.  Panama), 
award, 29 June 1933, in UNRIAA, Vol. 6, p. 358.
129  E. Paasivirta, “Internationalization and Stabilization of Contracts”, p. 334, noting that the lack of payment 
might affect the legality of the taking, although the standard of compensation is debated in international law. See, 
Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. Lybia, Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, 
ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/98/3, p. 1.
130 M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 55; See, Art. 10 Harvard Law School Draft Convention 
on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, which explains that a taking is wrongful “if it 
is not for public purpose clearly recognized as such by a law of general application in effect at the time of the 
taking, or if it is in violation of a treaty”; moreover, “even if the taking is for public purpose, it must be 
accompanied by prompt payment of compensation ..”, as quoted in B. H. Weston, “Community Regulation of 
Foreign-Wealth Deprivations: A Tentative Framework for Inquiry”, in R. S. Miller and R. J. Stanger (eds. by), 
Essays on Expropriation, Ohio State University Press, 1967, p. 119.
131 Factory at Chorzów.
132  Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran, Award n. 310-45-3, 14 July 1987, para. 264; Texaco v 
Libya, award, 1977, in ILR, Vol. 53, 1979, p. 422; C. F. Amerasinghe, “Assessment of Compensation for 
Expropriated Foreign Property: Three Critical Problems”, in R. St. J. Macdonald (ed), Essays in Honour of Wang 
Tieya, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 56-57.
133  M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment,. 3rd Ed, CUP, 2010, p. 149; See also, A. 
Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd Ed, OUP, 2008.
PSNR.134 Thus, while it is accepted that PSNR encompasses the right of States to expropriate 
or nationalize foreign and national property within their jurisdiction, the issues of 
compensation and the definition of what amounts to a taking under international law remain to 
a great extent controversial.135
In general terms, expropriation can be defined as the “taking of the assets of foreign 
companies or investors by a host State against the wishes or without the consent of the 
company or investor concerned, and it includes the deprivation of the right to property”.136
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134  See, N. Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, pp. 374-377. Arguments to support the jus cogens 
nature of the PSNR are to be found in the frequent identification of permanent sovereignty as ‘inalienable’ or 
‘full’, or in the arts 25 and 47 of the two International Covenants on Human Rights. However, in light of the art. 
53 of the VCLT, which establishes the mechanism for the formation of a jus cogens norm, the PSNR is yet to be 
accorded a jus cogens nature, failing to be supported by many states ‘principally concerned’. Additionally, also 
its non-derogable character is questionable. Controversial, it is the PSNR nature as jus cogens norm. On the 
meaning and formation of jus cogens see: Art. 53 VCLT; see also Arts 64, 71 VCLT; on the consequences arising 
out of the violation of a jus cogens norm see the Art. 41(2) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility; on the 
relationship between jus cogens norms and the UN Charter see Art. 103 of the UN Charter and Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measure, Order of 13 
September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, 325, 440 [Bosnia case]. With regard to the ICJ jurisprudence one could 
note that the Court used to refer to ‘intransgressible principles of international law’ or to ‘peremptory norms’: 
See, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J.Reports, 2004. Its endorsement of the ‘jus cogens’ denomination is very recent and can be found in both the 
Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Judgment, 26 February 2007, General List n. 91 [Bosnia Genocide case], and Accordance with International 
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, 
General List n. 141 [Kosovo Advisory Opinion]; G. M. Danilenko, “International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-
Making”, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, 1991, pp. 42-65: A concerted effort aimed at 
elevating a particular norm to the rank of jus cogens is provided by the negotiations at the Vienna Conference on 
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts. One of the most controversial issues at 
the Conference was the legal nature of the principle of the permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
proclaimed in a number of the UN General Assembly resolutions. Art. 15(4) requires agreements between a 
predecessor state and a newly independent state concerning succession to state property not to “infringe the 
principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural resources”. Relying on the 
ILC commentary, which observed that some of the members of the Commission were of the opinion that the 
infringement of the principle of permanent sovereignty in an agreement between the predecessor state and the 
newly independent state would invalidate such an agreement, the developing states claimed that the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over wealth and natural resources was a principle of jus cogens. However, lacking the 
support of the Western states, which maintained that these efforts were 'an attempt to give legal force to mere 
notions to be found in various recommendatory material emanating from the General Assembly’, is not possible 
to ultimately argue in favor of a jus cogens nature of the permanent sovereignty; See also UN, Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property,  Archives and Debts, 1983 (not yet in force), 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_3_1983.pdf, (last visited: 8 
September 2010).
135 G. C. Christie, “What Constitute a Taking of Property under International Law?”, pp. 307-338.
136  S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law, p. 120; See also, Ronald S.  Lauder v. Czech Republic, 
(UNCITRAL), award, 3 September 2001, para 200.
However, as noted, the concept of taking is inherently intertwined with that of property, 
which is mutable in nature according to the national jurisdiction concerned. According to 
Stern, IIAs do not provide a definition of expropriation, rather they employ several terms in a 
generic manner in order to define dispossession.137 Along the same line, IIAs do not provide a 
definition of indirect expropriation, so that the phenomenon is regulated only by prohibiting 
the State to
expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly 
through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization (“expropriation”), 
except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non discriminatory manner; (c) on 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation and; (d) in accordance 
with due process of law and minimum standard of treatment.138
As a consequence, one can argue that also from the point of view of treaty-based 
investment law, only the requirements for a lawful expropriation are clearly identified: public 
purpose, non-discrimination and compensation are typically cited.139 The provisions in IITs 
recognize the admissibility of expropriation, provided that the above mentioned requirements 
are respected.140
The rules on the protection against dispossession141 fulfill two primary functions of 
BITs: on the one hand, the protection of investments against arbitrary conducts of host States 
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137 B. Stern, “In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation”, in A. W. Rovine (ed) Contemporary Issues in 
International Arbitration and Mediation, 2007, pp. 30 et seq.
138 United States Model BIT 2012, Art. 6, “Expropriation and Compensation”, at para 1. The 2012 Model BIT 
however includes the Annexes A and B establishing the rules for the interpretation of the provision. See below.
139 A. Reinisch, “Legality of Expropriations”, p. 176; E. Sciso, Appunti di diritto internazionale dell’economia, 
2nd Ed., Giappichelli, 2012, p. 196.
140  Id. The author clarifies that the level of compensation demanded varies from treaty to treaty, and that the 
requirement concerning that expropriation is made in due process is not always mentioned and could vary. See, 
R. D. Edsall, “Indirect Expropriation under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA: Potential Inconsistencies in the Treatment 
of State Public Welfare Regulations”, in Boston University Law Review, Vol. 86, 2006, pp. 931-962; NAFTA, art. 
1110, ‘Expropriation and Compensation’: ‘1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation of such an investment (“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b)  on a non-
discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of 
compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.[...]’.
141  J. W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign 
Investment in Developing Countries”, in The International Lawyer, Vol. 24(3), Fall 1990, p. 664.
that could affect private property located within their jurisdiction;142 and, on the other hand, 
the improvement of the investment climate in the host countries, boosting investors’ 
confidence.143 However, in addition to those rules, BITs include other substantive provisions, 
that are “remarkably similar across different country investment treaties”.144 These “common 
substantive rights”  concern the scope of application, the conditions for the entry of foreign 
investment, the general standards of treatment,145  the monetary or currency transfer, the 
operational conditions for the investment, the compensation for losses from armed conflict or 
internal disorder, the umbrella clause to guarantee contractual obligations,146 and the dispute 
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142  P. Makanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction, pp. 109 et. seq: According to the author, the term 
‘jurisdiction’ has to be cautiously used, having a number of different meaning. The ‘specialized meaning’ of 
domestic jurisdiction in the UN Charter is complemented by the use of the term to refer to the ‘powers exercised 
by a State over, persons, property, or events’. In addition, one has to distinguish according to the type of powers 
that are under scrutiny (i.e.: legislative, prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction).
143 J. W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT”, pp. 661-663, 670; W. M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation 
and Its Valuation”, p. 116. According to Salacuse, BITs establish a ‘symmetrical legal relationship’ between the 
contracting States. Thus, BITs may advance the goal of both capital-exporting and capital-importing States, by 
establishing rules that could secure the protection of investments abroad whilst attracting foreign capital in the 
host country.
144 D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, p. 799.
145  The minimum standards of treatment generally comprises: fair and equitable treatment, full protection and 
security, non-discrimination, national treatment and most favored national treatment.
146 ‘Umbrella clauses’ generally require each contracting party to ‘observe any obligations it may have entered 
into with regard to investments of nationals or companies’ of the other contracting party. A. C. Sinclair, “The 
Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection”, in Arbitration International, 
Vol. 20, 2004, p. 411; R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, OUP, 2008, pp. 153 et 
seq.; J. W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT”, p. 667.
settlement clauses.147 Such standards are described as open-textured principles that allow for 
arbitrators “far-reaching functions” 148 through the exercise of their interpretative task.
Thus, the multitude of BITs concluded since 1960 is deemed to have reshaped the 
international law of foreign investments. In fact, despite their being instruments of public 
international law that bind two State-actors, BITs have introduced rules for private foreign 
investments that have not only come to be shared by the majority of (contracting) States, but 
have also influenced every single dispute between investors and host States.149 Such treaties 
constrain their scope of application by defining what they mean by ‘nationals’, ‘territory’ of 
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147  Many BITs allow the investor to choose the bodies before which to bring their disputes (e.g.: ICSID,, 
International Court of Arbitration (ICA), Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCOC), London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA), all of which have its own rules; the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade (UNCITRAL) Law Rules are also available and commonly used). This opportunity could 
facilitate forum shopping. In this regard, see, S. Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions”, in Fordham Law Review, 
Vol. 73, 2005, p. 1521; Moreover, BITs could also include provisions concerning the settlement of disputes 
related not only to the violation of the BIT, but also arising out of an investment-related State contract. These 
provisions are known as ‘generic’ or ‘broad’ dispute settlement clauses, whereas potential claims under it as 
‘purely contractual claims’. See A. Sinclair, “Bridging the Contract/Treaty Divide”, pp. 92-103; J. Crawford, 
“Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration”, in Arbitration International, Vol. 24, 2008, pp. 351-374; in 
addition, the concept of “treaty shopping” has also arisen, meaning that “companies [that]  are incorporated in a 
certain state by nationals of a third state simply to take advantage of BIT protections has provoked controversy, 
particularly when the incorporation occurs after a dispute has arisen”. See, Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic; 
Mobil Corporation v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case N. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, 10 
June 2010, as quoted in D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, p. 776.
148 B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, p. 103.
149 R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, “Customary International Law”, pp. 3-9; J. W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT:”, pp. 655-675.
the parties, ‘investor’ and, most importantly, ‘investment’ that benefit of protection150, but 
they do so through substantially similar provisions.151 As a consequence, the interpretation of 
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150  J. W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT”, p. 664. No clear-cut definition of ‘investments’ is available in international 
law: as a consequence of the continuous evolution of the notion, broad definitions are often employed in BITs, 
listing specific types of investments eligible for protection. In the arbitral decisions as well the notion is 
controversial. For instance, in Malaysian Historical Salvors & Phoenix Action, Ltd., ICSID Case n. ARB/05/10, 
Award, 17 May 2007, and decision on the application for the annulment, 16 April 2009 in ILM, Vol. 48 n. 5, 
2009: the 2007 award declining the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals were annulled. The reason for rejecting 
jurisdiction had been identified in the fact that the investment did not promote the economic development of 
Malaysian economy, being therefore outside the scope of the ICSID Convention. This accounts for the divide 
that exists either in the jurisprudence and in the doctrine on the definition of investment in international law; E. 
Gaillard, “Identity of Define?”, pp. 403-416; S. A. Riesenfeld, “Foreign Investments”, in R. Bernhardt (ed. by), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. II, 1995, pp. 435-439: it is distinguished between ‘direct 
investments’ which may take the form of new ventures or of the acquisition of existing enterprises, and ‘ 
portfolio investments’, which includes debt instruments as well as equity instruments. The distinguishing factor 
is recognized in the degree of managerial control acquired by the investor; on the notion of investment 
specifically in the energy sector, see, P. D. Cameron, International Energy Investment Law, pp. 23-26, referring 
specifically to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) art.1(6) and (5), the ICSID Convention which although not 
providing a definition, in art. 25 limits its jurisdiction to legal disputes arising ‘directly out of an investment’, 
and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) art. 1139; B. Poulain, “L’investissement international: 
définition ou définitions?”, in P. Kahn, T. W. Wälde (ed. by), New Aspects of International Investment Law, 
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, pp. 123-150, emphasizing that no consistent definition of 
‘investment’ exists in international investment law; recent ICSID cases on the relationship between ‘investment’ 
and the local laws of the host State are: Salini Costruttori; Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine, ICSID Case n. ARB/02/18, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004; Bayindir Insaat v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan; Aguas del Tunari S.A. 
v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case n. ARB/02/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005; Inceysa 
Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case n. ARB/03/26, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 August 
2006; Fraport AG Frankfurt v. Republic of the Philippines; Ioannis Kardassopoulos v.  Georgia, ICSID Case n. 
ARB/05/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 July 2007.
151 Moreover it is argued that any arbitral decision, when interpreting a specific treaty clause or standard, may 
indirectly impact upon other states, not parties to that treaty, by influencing how the clause would be analyzed in 
their possible future disputes. Gazzini, however, clearly points out that whilst the “high number of treaties [may 
have] influenced customary international law”, [..]  “textual differences [may] militate against it”. Hence, it is 
suggested that “ascertaining whether a specific rule uniformly included in hundred of BITs has developed in 
customary international law [..] requires an accurate assessment of state practice and opinio juris that must 
necessarily consider inter alia the attitude of States in their day-to-day relationship with other States and private 
investors––especially in the absence of investment-related treaties––as well as in the settlement of disputes”. T. 
Gazzini, “The Role of Customary International Law”, pp. 703-704.
the obligations of one State by ad hoc arbitrators could affect the obligations of all signatory 
States,152 prompting the evolution of the whole international (investment) law.153
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152  A. Leeks, “The Relationship between Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Wider Corpus of 
International Law: the ICSID Approach”, in University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review, Vol. 65(2), 2007, p. 8.
153  See, C. Congyan, “International Investment Treaties and the Formation, Application and Transformation of 
Customary International Law Rules”, in Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 7(3), 2008, pp. 659-679; T. 
Gazzini, “The Role of Customary International Law”, p. 702, referring to the obligation of full compensation 
against expropriation; S. W. Schill, “Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator”, in Leiden Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 23, 2010, p. 429. The author argues that “investment treaty arbitration [..] has effects as a 
governance mechanism on stakeholders that are not parties to the proceedings. This is the case, above all, 
because awards in investment treaties arbitration often become public and influence, as non-binding precedent, 
not only the litigation behavior of parties in other investment proceedings, but heavily influence the decision-
making of arbitral tribunal themselves”; A. K. Bjorklund, “The Emerging Civilization of Investment 
Arbitration”, in Penn State Law Review, Vol. 113(4), 2009, p. 1294: “While it is axiomatic that decisions of 
international courts and tribunals do not have formal precedential value, it is nearly as axiomatic that such 
decisions often have a practical precedential value”. However, the author considers that “Notwithstanding the 
practical considerations leading arbitrators towards placing wight on prior decisions, investment arbitration is ill 
suited to establish a formal system of precedent. The better analogy, and the approach towards which investment 
arbitration is headed, is to the jurisprudence constante of the French civil law tradition.”. See, also, G. Sacerdoti, 
“New International Economic Order”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law on line, 2011.
In addition, “a de facto practice of precedent”  has been recognized as a result of the 
tendency of arbitral tribunals to read and be influenced by previous arbitral decisions on 
similar issues.154 This occurs despite no formal doctrine of precent binds arbitrators.155
Furthermore, BITs are conceived of as “straddl[ing] the divide between public and 
private international law”.156  While any obligation owed by the host State to investors is 
private in nature, “the conflict between a host State’s BIT obligations and its other 
international law obligations cannot simply be resolved by declaring public international law 
115
154 D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, p. 800, quoting C. Schreuer, M. 
Weiniger, “A Doctrine of Precedent?”, in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law, OUP, 2008, p. 1196. M. Paparinskis, “Sources of Law and Arbitral Interpretations 
of Pari Materia Investment Protection Rules”, in O. K. Fauchald, A. Nollkaemper (eds), Unity or Fragmentation 
of International Law: The Role of International and National Tribunals, Hart Publishing, 2011, p. 3, available at 
SSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697835, (last accessed on: 5 September 2011): “Still, while there are shades of 
difference between arguments, there is a point when reliance on earlier awards goes further than that. The case 
law regarding open-textured substantive rules (particularly most-favoured-nation (‘MFN’)  treatment, indirect 
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment) shows a case-by-case fleshing out and refinement of 
presumptions, criteria and sub-criteria, often developed on the basis of particular case-specific factual 
circumstances by references to earlier awards”. On the role of precedents in international investment law see, 
Chemtura Corporation v Canada, UNCITRAL Case, Award, 2 August 2010, para 109, and Saipem S.p.A. v 
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional 
Measures, 21 March 2007, para 67.
155  Id.  As to the duty to follow consistent case-law, see: G. Kaufmann-Kohler, “Arbitral Precedent: Dream, 
Necessity or Excuse?”, in Arbitration International, Vol. 23, 2007, pp. 357, 377; Saipem S.p.A. v Bangladesh, 
para 67; Victor Pey Casado v Republic of Chile, para 119; the call for a jurisprudence constante is manifest in, 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Cases n. ARB/02/6 and ARB/
04/08, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para 97; A. K. Björklund, 
“Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante”, in C. B. Picker et al. (eds) International 
Economic Law: State and Future of the Discipline, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 265; the normative 
relevance of earlier cases is denied in: RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v Federation of Russia, SCC V 079/2005, Award on 
Jurisdiction, November 2008, paras 49, 136-137; Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v Argentina, ICSID Case N. 
ARB/04/14, Award, 8 December 2008, paras 178-184, 194; See also, Chemtura Corporation v Canada, para 
109; C. Schreuer, M. Weiniger, “A Doctrine of Precedent”, in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer (ed. by), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, OUP, 2008, pp. 1189-1206.
156  A. Leeks, “The Relationship between Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration”, p. 3; A. K. Bjorklund, “The 
Emerging Civilization”, p. 1270, where it is argued that “[i]nvestment arbitration often involves public 
international law grafted onto a substructure of private commercial arbitration”. Furthermore it is also 
maintained that “[i]nvestment treaty arbitration, on the other hand, is blossoming. A state, via an investment 
treaty, effectively offers advance consent to the settlement by arbitration of future disputes that are currently 
undefined but that are related to investments owned or controlled by foreign investors. The claims against the 
state are usually based on international legal obligations found in the treaty, some of which are based on 
customary international law, such as the obligation not to expropriate except for a public purpose, without 
discrimination, and on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation”.
triumphant”.157 Rather, the rights of the investors and those of both the host State and the 
international community as a whole should be balanced.158 Cognizance of this need is more 
and more apparent in investment practice. The tension between private and public rights has 
also been explained with reference to Article 42159 of the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention).160 
The provision establishes the substantive law that ICSID tribunals should apply and provides 
that, failing any agreement between the parties, “the tribunal shall apply ... such rules of 
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157  A. Leeks, “The Relationship between Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration”; See also, A. Mills, “The 
Public-Private Dualities of International Investment Law and Arbitration”, in C. Brown, K. Miles (eds)  Evolution 
in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, CUP, 2011, pp. 97-116. The author endorses the ‘public-private 
distinction’ to analyze international investment law and identify its distinctive features; W. Shan, “From ‘North-
South Divide’ to ‘Private-Public Debate’: Revival of the Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in 
International Investment Law”, in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 27, 2007, pp. 
631-664. The author concludes that “recent years have witnessed a shift of tension on international investment 
law-making, from “strong states” versus “weak states” (i.e., a “North-South divide”), towards “state 
sovereignty” versus “corporate sovereignty” (i.e., a “Private-Public debate”). If this is what is happening, 
there should be a better chance to strike a sensible global deal on the protection, supervision, promotion, and 
regulation of international investment for the general good of the world”.
158 According to the UNCTAD World Investment Report, some IIAs include innovations for instance with regard 
to sustainable development strategies in the host countries that focus on inclusive economic growth, policies for 
industrial development, and the environmental and social impact of the investment. Reference is made to the 
2012 Joint Statement by the European Union and the United States, which includes principles concerning broad 
market access for foreign investors, non-discrimination, a high level of legal certainty and protection against 
unfair or harmful treatment of investors and investments, and effective and transparent dispute settlement 
procedures. In addition, the Joint Statement refers to the need to promote responsible business conduct, preserve 
government authority to regulate in the public interest and avoid attracting foreign investment by weakening or 
failing to apply regulatory measures. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012 - Towards a New Generation of 
Investment Policies, 2012, p. 89, available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Publications.aspx, (last accessed: 18 
September 2012). In addition, one shall also consider the debate concerning the ‘public role’ of arbitrators and 
the recourse to the principle of proportionality, which is advocate as an effective standard to balance private 
interests and the governmental right to regulate. See supra Chapter I, Part I, and Chapter VII, Part II.
159 ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp, (last accessed on: 9 November 2010), art. 
42: “(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. 
In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute 
(including its rules on the conflict of laws)  and such rules of international law as may be applicable. (2) The 
Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of the law. (3)  The 
provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2)  shall not prejudice the power of the Tribunal to decide a dispute ex aequo et 
bono if the parties so agree.”. The ICSID Convention came into force on October 14, 1966; The ICSID was 
indeed created under this Convention and founded by the World Bank.
160  A. Leeks, “The Relationship between Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration”, p. 3; A. K. Bjorklund, “The 
Emerging Civilization”, pp. 1271-1272. The author explains that “[a]rbitrating under the ICSID Convention adds 
a public international law dimension even to contract-based investment disputes. Article 42 of the ICSID 
Convention is a choice-of-law clause that sets forth the laws to which an arbitral tribunal should turn when 
deciding disputes”; J. O. Voss, The Impact of Investment Treaties on Contracts between Host States and Foreign 
Investors, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, pp. 110 et seq.,  highlighting the role of domestic law under the 
international investment law regime.
international law that may be applicable”.161  The ICSID case-law, however, shows that 
investment disputes are not treated in light of the wider corpus of international law. Even 
when the issue of applicable law is overtly discussed, international law is considered mainly 
for purposes of treaty interpretation and in cases where the host State attempts to avail itself 
of conflicting international law obligations to justify a BIT’s violation.162 It is noteworthy that 
ICSID tribunals tend to give preference to investment obligations, deviating from the wording 
of Article 42, even in the latter case.163
Thus, the interplay between general public international law and the lex specialis 
represented by BITs is far from clear.164  Furthermore, the lack of an intelligible legal 
reasoning in arbitral awards, especially concerning the arbitrators’ establishment of the 
applicable law, affects the settlement of a consistent and coherent corpus of investment law. It 
is in this light that the proposal advocating the application of general principles of 
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161 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention, pp. 613 et seq., 621-631; see also, Y. Caliskan, “Dispute Settlement in 
Investment Arbitration”, in Y. Aksar (ed), Implementing International Economic Law, Martinus Nijhoff Trade 
Law Series, 2012, p. 141. The author refers to the relationship between international law and domestic law, 
which is deemed to have played an essential role in the ICSID jurisprudence.
162 See, CMS v.  Argentina, ICSID Case n. ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 2005; Compañia de Desarrollo de Santa 
Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica.
163 A. Leeks, “The Relationship between Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration”, p. 40; A. K. Bjorklund, “The 
Emerging Civilization”, p. 1272: “In practice, tribunals tend to turn to international law for gap-filling purposes. 
In addition, arbitrating under the ICSID Convention also means that the dispute must meet the jurisdictional 
requirements of the ICSID Convention as well as any jurisdictional limitations contained in the governing treaty 
or investment agreement”; M. Hunter, G. Conde e Silva, “Transnational Public Policy”, pp. 372-373 observe that 
“only the arbitral tribunal is in a position to establish whether transnational public policy should be applied and 
under what conditions. [...]”.
164  Evidence of this problem can be found in the United States Model BIT 2012 which includes the Annex A 
concerning the definition of “Customary International Law”. The need to clarify the parties’ “shared 
understanding” of “customary international law” confirms the difficulties that are associated to the interplay 
between customary international law and investment treaty law. It is established that: “The Parties confirm their 
shared understanding that “customary international law” generally and as specifically referenced in Article 5 
[Minimum Standard of Treatment]  and Annex B [Expropriation] results from a general and consistent practice of 
States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation. With regard to Article 5 [Minimum Standard of 
Treatment], the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all customary 
international law principles that protect the economic rights and interests of aliens”.
international law with a gap-filling or supportive role in investment arbitration165should be 
interpreted. Such an approach is deemed capable to enhance the understanding of investment 
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165 T. W. Wälde, “The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration”, pp. 100-103: the author refers to the role of 
general principles as sources of international investment law. He recognizes the importance of UNIDROIT 
principles; the activity and the law emerging from administrative or general courts exercising powers of judicial 
review of government acts, which is performed at the international level by the WTO judicial bodies, the ECJ, 
the ECtHR and the LACHR; comparative law of civil and administrative procedure; C. McLachlan, “Investment 
Treaty and General International Law”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 57, 2008, p. 361: 
the author maintains that the systemic integration of ‘general principles of international law’ with customary 
international law, by means of a treaties’ interpretative process––”structured process of treaty interpretation”––, 
leads to the application of international law to investors v states arbitrations; it has also been argued that general 
principles of international law may leave a margin of appreciation to the host State in every circumstance in 
which there are inconsistencies in the state practice. W. Burke-White and A. Von Staden, “The Need of Public 
Law Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations”, in S. Schill (ed by), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 701; M. Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect 
Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”; A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, p. 171, argues that the principle of 
proportionality is possibly emerging as a general principle of international law; see also, R. Dolzer, “Indirect 
Expropriation of Alien Property”, pp. 59-65. M. N. Shaw, International Law, pp. 98-109; H. Thirlway, “The 
Sources of International Law”, pp. 127-129; On the role of general principles of law as ‘transnational law’ of 
State contracts, see, J. F. Lalive, “Contracts between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company: Theory 
and Practice: Choice of Law in a New Arbitration Case”, in The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 13(3), 1964, pp. 987-1021. See also, Factory at Chorzów; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, 
Limited,  Second Phase, judgement, ICJ Reports, Vol. 4, 1970, p. 3; Amco Asia Corporation and others v. 
Republic of Indonesia; Starrett Housing Corp v. Iran, Interlocutory Award n. ITL 32-24-1, 19 December 1983, in 
ILR, Vol. 85, p. 34; Petroleum Development Co. Ltd v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Award, 28 August 1951, in ILR, 
Vol. 18, p. 144; ; on the gap-filling role played by general principles of international law see also Expropriated 
Religious Properties (France, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal), Award, 4 September 1920, RIAA Vol. 1, 1920, 
pp. 7, 12; I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment, 
Oxford Monographs in International Law, OUP, 2008, p. 86.
arbitration within the framework of public international law166 and it may even counteract the 
legitimacy crisis affecting investment arbitration.167
The following section analyzes the investment treaty provisions on expropriation. As 
mentioned, no definition of expropriation or indirect expropriation is traditionally contained in 
IITs and this lacuna, together with the broad substantive standards characterizing investment 
treaties, leaves a wide, almost unfettered decision-power to arbitrators. Needless to say, with 
regard to the problem of indirect expropriation in view of the current “conception large de 
l’expropriation indirecte, cette dernière pourrait recouvrir toutes les mesures édictées par les 
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166  A. Leeks, “The Relationship between Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration”, p. 40; A. A. Ghouri, 
“Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Development of International Investment Law as a ‘Collective Value 
System’: A Synopsis of a New Synthesis”, in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Vol. 10(6), 2009, p. 921, 933. The 
author pinpoints, however, that international investment law has “its own philosophy, characteristics, contents 
and principles, that investment treaty arbitration is required to reflect”; V. S. Vadi, “Overlapping Regulatory 
Spaces: The Architecture of NAFTA Chapter 11 and the Regulation of Toxic Chemicals”, in European Journal of 
Risk Regulation, Vol 4, 2011, p. 589. See, also Chemtura Corp (formerly Crompton Corp) v Government of 
Canada, Award, 2 August 2010, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1278, (last accessed 
on: 1 April 2012); A. Reinisch, “The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat 
of Fragmentation vs The Promise of a More Effective System? Some Reflections From the Perspective of 
International Investment Arbitration”, in I. Buffard, J. Crawford, A. Pellet, S. Wittich (eds.), International Law 
between Universalism and Fragmentation. Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner, Koninklijke Brill NV, The 
Netherlands, pp. 107-126; on the alleged multilevel and multilateral structure of investment arbitration see, S. W. 
Schill, The Multilateralization; ILA German Branch - Working Group, General Public International Law and 
International Investment Law, Heft 105, March 2011, pp. 43 et seq.; P. Muchlinski, “Corporations and the Uses 
of the Law: International Investment Arbitration as a ‘Multilateral Legal Order”, in Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 
Vol. 1(4), 2011, pp. 3-25; R. Leal-Arcas, “Toward the Multilateralization of International Investment Law”, pp. 
865-919.
167 W. Burke-White and A. Von Staden, “The Need of Public Law Standard of Review”, p. 690; M. Sornarajah, 
“A Coming Crisis”, pp. 39–45; A. Afilalo, “Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-)construction of 
NAFTA Chapter 11”, in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 25(2), 2005, p. 282; S. D. 
Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions”, in Fordham Law Review,  Vol. 73, 2005, p. 1523; A. Afilalo, “Towards a Common Law 
of International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis”, in 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Vol. 17, 2004, pp. 51-96; C. H. Brower II, “Structure, 
Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter”, in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 36, 2003, pp. 
37-94; C. N. Brower, C. H. Brower II, J. K. Sharpe, “The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System”, in 
Arbitration International,  Vol. 19, 2003, p. 415; C. N. Brower, “A Crisis of Legitimacy”, National Law Journal, 
7 October 2002, B9; D. D. Caron, “Investor-State Arbitration”, pp. 513-524; S. W. Schill, “From Sources to 
Discourse: Investment Treaty Jurisprudence as the New Custom?”, Paper presented at The Sixteenth Investment 
Treaty Forum Public Conference: Is There and Evolving Customary International Law on Investment, 6 May 
2011, British Institute of International and Comparative Law: the author argues that “the move from sources to 
discourse in order to create a multilateral order for international investment relations will only be legitimate and 
accepted by States if it remains linked to one of the traditional sources of multilateral order under international 
law, that is either a multilateral treaty, customary international law, or general principles of law. 
Methodologically, general principles of law may be the only doctrinally viable and convincing way to justify the 
multilateralization of international investment law through the discourse of investment treaty tribunals”; M. 
Perkams, “The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 111.
autorités locales qui se répercutent négativement sur un investissement privé étranger, sans 
égard à toute autre considération”.168
The failure to define or constrain the scope of indirect expropriation in IIAs seems to 
have resulted in the emersion of a litigation strategy, where investors adversely affected by a 
governmental measure and seeking for compensation are encouraged to attempt a claim for 
indirect expropriation before arbitral tribunals as a default move. As IIAs fail to specifically 
regulate and establish the scope of non-compensable regulatory measures, investors may rely 
on the interpretative discretion of arbitral panels in order to try to benefit from an extended 
domain of protection.169
(c) The Definition of Indirect Expropriation in Investment Treaties
All international instruments concerning the protection of foreign investments contain 
provisions that refer to indirect expropriation and to measures equivalent or tantamount to 
expropriation.170 Typically, international investment treaties do not define expropriation.171 
More precisely, investment treaties “set out the manner in which any expropriation of covered 
investment[s] must be conducted and the compensation consequences of such 
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168  S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques, p. 3. “A broad concept of indirect expropriation could cover all the 
measures imposed by local authorities which impact negatively on foreign private investment, regardless of any 
other consideration”; see also, J. E. Alvarez, “The Public International Law Regime”, p. 459.
169 In this regard, one shall consider the 2011 trade policy statement issued by Australia, where it is announced 
that the Government would stop including an investor-state dispute settlement system in future IIAs. The 
explanation for this decision is that the investor-state mechanism would grant greater legal rights to foreign 
businesses as opposed to national ones, constraining also the Government’s public policymaking ability (the 
Government referred to the country’s tobacco packaging and labelling legislation). In addition, whilst in June 
2011 Bolivia denounced its BIT with United States, terminating the investor-state mechanism, in January 2012 
Venezuela notified its intention to withdraw from the ICSID Convention. See, UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2012, p. 87.
170 C. H. Schreuer, “Rapport: The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT”, p. 111. 
171 LG&E Energy Corp v Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, para 185: “Generally, bilateral treaties do 
not define what constitutes an expropriation –they just make an express reference to “expropriation” and add the 
language “any other action that has equivalent effects.”; BITs text are available through the UNCTAD online 
database at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx (last accessed on: 19 September 2012); S. 
H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques - L’expropriation indirecte, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
March 2012, p. 4, arguing: “[t]outefois, les clauses d’expropriation incluses dans les traités d’investissement 
n’apportent pas de réponses satisfaisantes aux nombreuses questions suscitées par la difficile définition de la 
notion d’expropriation indirecte”.
expropriation”.172 They refer to governmental measures that are ‘equivalent to’ or ‘tantamount 
to’ expropriation173  and provide guarantees against indirect expropriation.174  Neither 
appropriation nor unjust enrichment are taken into account to determine the occurrence of an 
expropriation.175
One typical example of an investment treaty provision on expropriation has been 
mentioned above, by referring to the 2012 United States Model BIT.176 However, almost any 
other BIT may be cited to argue about the widespread diffusion of this formula in the 
investment treaty context, thus highlighting a rough regularity in the wording of most major 
BITs’ expropriation provisions.177  Consider for instance the Canada-Hungary BIT, whose 
Article VI reads:
investment or returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalized, expropriated or subjected to measures having an effect equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as ‘expropriation’) in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose, in a non-
discriminatory manner and provided that it is accompanied by prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation. Such compensation shall be based on the market 
value of the investment expropriated, immediately before the expropriation and 
shall include interest at normal commercial rate until the date of payment, be 
effectively realizable and freely transferable. [...].178
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172 D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, pp. 824-825.
173  See, Article VII Canada-Egypt BIT (1996), Article 5, Barbados/Cuba BIT (1996), Article 5, Netherlands-
India BIT (1995), and French, German, Swedish, UK and United States, Canadian BITs. R. Dolzer, “Indirect 
Expropriation of Alien Property”, pp. 54-55; A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in 
International Law”, p. 414 at note 90.
174 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property”, pp. 54-55; R. Dolzer, M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 1995, p. 99; A. Reinisch, “Expropriation”, in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer (ed. by), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law, OUP, 2008, p. 424: with regard to those BITs that provide more 
detailed definition of ‘expropriation’, the author talks about a “  ‘legislative’ response to the growing field of 
investment dispute settlement”.
175 A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law”, p. 414.
176 See supra, paragraph III (b).
177 In the literature the virtual convergence of the wording of BITs major provisions is accepted. See, S. Schill, 
The Multilateralization, pp. 64, 366: BITs participate to the creation of a uniform regime for the protection of 
investments; J. d’Aspremont, “International Customary Investment Law”, p. 18. Contra: P. Dumberry, “Are BITs 
Representing the ‘New’ Customary International Law in International Investment Law?”, in Penn State 
International Law Review, Vol. 24 (4), 2009-2010, p. 686, where it is argued that BITs are not consistent enough 
as to constitute “the basis for any rule of customary international law”.
178  Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Hungary for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Canada-Hungary BIT), 3 October 1991, Art. VI, available 
through the UNCTAD online database at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx (last 
accessed on: 19 September 2012).
Scholars have been questioning whether the scope of expropriation in modern BITs has 
become broader than that recognized under customary international law.179 For instance, the 
formula ‘measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation’ in Article 1110 of the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)180  has been interpreted not as broadening the 
concept of expropriation but as meaning ‘equivalent to’ expropriation.181 One approach has 
contended that no evidence supports the assumption that States intended to expand the 
meaning of indirect expropriation beyond the customary international understanding. It has 
been argued that ‘effect-based’ definitions of the term have been extensively used to cope with 
the uncertainties about the scope of (indirect) expropriation in customary international law.182 
Furthermore, it has been remarked that States willing to expand the scope of expropriation 
have explicitly included a specific provision in their BITs.183 Other scholars, conversely, have 
argued about the expansion of the notion of expropriation from the simple inclusion of the 
‘tantamount clause’ in investment treaties. By noting that IITs aim at creating favorable 
122
179 R. Suda, “The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights Enforcement and Realization”, in O. 
De Schutter (ed. by), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2006, p. 83, 
arguing that the relationship of BITs to public international law is unclear and that the questions as to whether 
they simply codify international law or rather they provide stronger protections to investors than those found in 
international law, are still unresolved; R. Dolzer, “The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic 
Administrative Law”, in International Law and Politics, Vol. 37, 2005, pp. 958-959; P. Dumberry, “Are BITs 
Representing the ‘New’ Customary International Law”, pp. 676-701; T. Gazzini, “The Role of Customary 
International Law”, p. 691; C. Congyan, “International Investment Treaties and the Formation”, pp. 659-679.
180 North American Free Trade Agreement, 1995, art. 1110: “Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation: 1. 
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its 
territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment 
(“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due 
process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 
through 6; 2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment 
immediately before the expropriation took place (“date of expropriation”), and shall not reflect any change in 
value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include 
going concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as 
appropriate, to determine fair market value.”
181  Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada; See also, M. Sornarajah, “A Coming Crisis: Expansionary 
Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in K. P. Sauvant (ed by) Appeals Mechanism in International 
Investment Disputes, OUP, 2008, p. 69.
182 A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law”, p. 415: the author makes 
reference to the US Model BIT which provides in Annex B that the definition of expropriation “is intended to 
reflect customary international law”; P. Dumberry, “Are BITs Representing the ‘New’ Customary International 
Law”, pp. 676-701: the author explicitly rejects the proposition that BITs represent the ‘new’ customary 
international law; J. d’Aspremont, “International Customary Investment Law”, pp. 1-55.
183 Id, p. 416.
conditions for foreign investments that contemplate, among others, an “effective normative 
framework”, Reisman and Sloane have interpreted the ‘tantamount clause’ as the instrument 
to extend the “scope of indirect expropriation to an egregious failure to create or maintain the 
normative ‘favorable’ conditions in the host State”.184
Nevertheless, as Dolzer has observed, the wording of these formulae falls below the 
threshold of clarity and preciseness185 and could plausibly be aimed at leaving the issue of 
“under what conditions indirect expropriation takes place”  open, until it arises in the 
practice.186 It is no surprise, therefore, that the international law on expropriation is applied 
also to cases of indirect expropriation, being the sole well-established legal framework that is 
available to adjudicators.187 Under such circumstances, moreover, the impact of arbitrators’ 
decision-power in shaping international investment law is further emphasized and, in this 
regard, the increasing number of requests for disqualification of arbitrators signal the 
dissatisfaction with the system.188
Indeed, the practical effect of using broad formulae is “to extend the scope of protection 
beyond what is known as ‘direct’ expropriation, and into what is known as ‘indirect’, 
‘regulatory’ or ‘creeping’ expropriation”.189 Such a tendency boosts the chances for foreign 
investors to be endowed with compensatory rights, to the extent that the occasions for the 
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184 W. M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation”, p. 117.
185 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property”, p. 55.
186 Id, p. 56; T. W. Wälde, “The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration”, p. 95; P. D. Cameron, International 
Energy Investment Law, p. 222: the author pinpoints that while the drafters could be persuaded that customary 
international law is codified in the treaties, the wide definition of expropriation that is generally adopted allows 
for changes that are aimed to be tailored to the modern economic conditions; C. H. Brower, II, “The Functions 
and Limits of Arbitration and Judicial Settlement Under Private and Public International Law”, in Duke Journal 
of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 18, 2008, p. 308, arguing that “[b]ecause investment treaties thus 
tend to delay the allocation of obligation and risks until the point of adjudication, they inevitably require 
tribunals to exercise substantial  amounts of discretion and political judgement”.
187 M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, p. 22.
188  Requests for disqualification have been filed by both investors and States. UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2012, p. 87; see also, K. P. Berger, “The International Arbitrator’s Dilemma: Transnational Procedure 
versus Home Jurisdiction”, in Arbitration International,  Vol. 25(2), 2009, p. 217, arguing that “the approach that 
an arbitrator takes towards the conduct of the arbitration is necessarily influenced by the core legal values and 
principles of his or her home jurisdiction”.
189 D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, p. 825.
State to allegedly interfere with foreign investments through its governmental actions are 
amplified. In addition, the vast majority of investment treaties refer to indirect expropriation 
stipulating the obligation to compensate, thus blurring any distinction with the requirements 
established for a direct or formal expropriation.190
A study of the best practices in indirect expropriation accomplished under the aegis of 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has attempted a classification 
of the treaty provisions on expropriation. It has distinguished between ‘classic provisions on 
indirect expropriation’ and ‘recent practice in investment treaties’, in light of the wording and 
terminology employed in the clauses.191
The label ‘classic provisions on indirect expropriation’ includes two sub-
categorizations. The first draws a distinction between (direct) expropriation or nationalization 
on the one hand and indirect expropriation or equivalent measures or measures having 
equivalent or similar effects on the other. The second categorization distinguishes three forms 
of expropriations: direct expropriation or nationalization; indirect expropriation, and 
equivalent measures or measures having equivalent or similar effects. Article 1110 of the 
NAFTA,192 reads
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190 See, S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques, p. 5; see also, A. Reinisch, “Is Expropriation Ripe For Codification? 
The Example of the Non-Discrimination Requirement For Lawful Expropriations”, in A. K. Bjorklund, A. 
Reinisch (eds) International Investment Law and Soft Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2012, pp. 271-304.
191  Id, pp. 5 et seq. [hereinafter IISD study] For a review of some clauses in recent BITs and FTAs see also, 
UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, in Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, 2012. [Hereinafter 
referred to as ‘UNCTAD Study’].
192  Canada, Mexico and the United States signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on 
December 17, 1992. The agreement, establishing a free trade area, came into force on January 1, 1994, with the 
aim to facilitate trade and protection of investors, between the Member States. Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is 
dedicated to ‘Investments’, and it establishes substantive rights for the protection of investors [Section A], as 
well as provides arbitration as a remedy for host States’ violations under the NAFTA [Section B]. More 
precisely, it contains a private right to direct actions in investment-related matters, by combining both 
substantive and ‘procedural’ rules governing any arbitral litigation. See, J. Granados, “Investor Protection and 
Foreign Investment under NAFTA Chapter 11: Prospects for the Western Hemisphere under Chapter 17 of the 
FTAA”, in Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 13, Spring 2005, p. 190; B. Legum, 
“The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration under NAFTA”, in Harvard Internaitonal Law Journal, Vol. 43(2), 
2002, pp. 531-539; G. A. Alvarez and W. W. Park, “The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 
11”, in Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, 2003, p. 373.
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an 
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment (“expropriation”), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with 
due process of law and Article 1105; and (d) on payment of compensation [....].193
As a result of its “lack of express definitions”  the provision contained in Article 1110 is 
deemed controversial.194 Only measures “enacted pursuant to a government’s police powers, 
provided that the effect is not excessively onerous”, may exempt the government from the 
obligation to compensate the investor, operating as an exception to the general rule providing 
for compensation.195  The reach of the ‘police powers’ exception is however not well-
settled,196  and this has favored criticism197 on the application and scope of Chapter 11 and 
Article 1110, to the extent that it excludes compensation for action negatively impacting on 
the value, profitability and use of the investment.198  Particularly, the recourse to general 
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193  Art. 1110, para 1; J. L. Gudofsky, “Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) Concerning Expropriation: An Environmental Case Study”, in Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, Vol. 21, 2000-2001, p. 255; In addition, regulatory measures are also included 
in the scope of Article 1110, as the NAFTA arbitral Tribunal in Pope & Talbot observed. See also, C-E. Côté, 
“Looking for Legitimate Claims: Scope of NAFTA Chapter 11 and Limitation of Responsibility of Host State”, 
in The Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 12(3), 2011, pp. 321-349; Thomas Wälde argued that “the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) has been largely adopted from NAFTA Chapter XI and UK bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). It often codifies therefore in a ‘progressive directions’ ”. See, T. W. Wälde, “Energy Charter 
Treaty-based Investment Arbitration”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 3, 2004. One shall consider 
Art. 13 ECT that reads “Investment of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting 
Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “Expropriation”) except where such Expropriation is: 
(a) for a purpose which is in the public interest; (b) not discriminatory;(c) carried out under due process of law; 
and, (d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation”.
194  J. Granados, “Investor Protection and Foreign Investment under NAFTA Chapter 11”, pp. 200-201; R. D. 
Dearden, “Arbitration of Expropriation Disputes between an Investor and the State under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement”, in Journal of World Trade, Vol. 29, 1995, pp. 118-119. The author suggest a ‘contextual 
approach’ that “would require the terms ‘expropriation’ and ‘tantamount to expropriation’ to be very broadly 
interpreted” as to “include any type of ‘taking’ of property”.
195 J. L. Gudofsky, “Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North America Free Trade Agreement”, p. 287.
196 Public purpose is also not defined by the NAFTA. R. D. Dearden, “Arbitration of Expropriation Disputes”, p. 
120.
197  Three are the main critics moved to the system: 1)  Art. 1110 and Chapter 11 lead to an “expansive 
interpretation in favor of foreign investors”, which does not take in due consideration environmental protection 
and social interests; 2)   the arbitral tribunals are “unaccountable, non-transparent and lack procedural 
safeguards”; and, 3) “Chapter 11 tribunals undermine state capacity to regulate”. See, J. C. Beauvais, 
“Regulatory Expropriation under NAFTA: Emerging Principles and Lingering Doubts”, in New York 
Environmental Law Journal, vol. 10, 2002, pp. 255-256.
198 J. L. Gudofsky, “Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North America Free Trade Agreement”, p. 303; J. B. 
Fowles, “Swords into Plowshares: Softening the Edge of NAFTA’s Chapter 11 Regulatory Expropriations 
Provisions”, in Cumberland Law Review, Vol. 36 (1), 2005, pp. 84-85.
principles of international law to interpret and apply Article 1110 and NAFTA Chapter 11 is 
charged with vagueness.199  There is an widespread perception that Article 1110 of the 
NAFTA “has turned provisions designed to ensure security and predictability for the investors 
into tools that have created uncertainty and unpredictability for environmental (and other) 
regulations”.200 Indeed, absent a “politically acceptable and practically viable” 201 definition of 
expropriation to guide its application, the standard formulated under Article 1110 is 
considered problematic: NAFTA tribunals mostly recur to the effect test,202  awarding 
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199  J. L. Gudofsky, “Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North America Free Trade Agreement”, p. 303; 
Instances of this criticized approach, may be identified in the DESONA and Pope & Talbot cases, where the 
arbitral Tribunal refused to accord compensation to the affected investor. Conversely, the Ethyl  case is referred to 
as a successful investor’s claim for compensation against an illegitimate legislation. Among the relevant 
NAFTA case law, moreover, Metalclad and SD Myers are important. In Metalclad violations of both Articles 
1105 and 1110 of the NAFTA were upheld by the Tribunal. It was specified that “expropriation includes not only 
open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal obligatory transfer of 
title in favor of the host state, but also covert and incidental interference with the use of property which has the 
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in part, of use of reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of a 
property even if not necessary to the obvious benefit of the host State”. Thus, compensation was accorded to the 
claimant on the basis of having suffered a total loss of all the benefits of ownership. In SD Myers, on the 
contrary, a distinction was drawn between expropriation and regulation, underlying that whilst “expropriation 
tends to involve the deprivation of ownership rights, regulations [imply]  a lesser interference”. A lasting removal 
of the owner’s ability to make use of its economic rights, furthermore, is identified by the Tribunal as 
characterizing expropriation, so that “the real interests involved and the purpose and effect of the government 
measure” are to be assessed; Azinian v United Mexican States, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, 1 
November 1999. The Tribunal was confronted with the question whether the annulment of a concession contract 
could amount to an act of expropriation under NAFTA Article 1110; Ethyl Corporation v Canada (UNCITRAL), 
Award, 24 June 1998; Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, p. 269 (it has also been argued that the 
rule applied in Metalclad with regard to ‘expropriation’ and ‘compensation’ resembles the American takings’ 
jurisprudence in the cases Lucas and Tahoe-Sierra); SD Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada (UNCITRAL), p. 
69; See, J. B. Fowles, “Swords into Plowshares”, p. 97.
200  It is questioned whether Art. 1110 creates a “global Fifth Amendment or results in a constitutionalization 
through the backdoor”. V. Been and J. C. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth Amendment?”, p. 35; The tribunals seem 
to have conservatively interpreted Art. 1110, thereby weakening the rule’s ability to require States to compensate 
foreign investors. In the meantime, the NAFTA system seems to have revitalized the “public purpose” argument, 
whilst affording the investors with an higher degree of protection from governmental arbitrary physical 
deprivations of property. H. Mann and K. Von Moltke, “NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing 
the Impact of the Investor-State Process on the Environment”, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf (last 
accessed on: 17 January 2012); J. B. Fowles, “Swords into Plowshares: Softening the Edge of NAFTA’s Chapter 
11 Regulatory Expropriations Provisions”, in Cumberland Law Review, Vol. 36 (1), 2005, p. 86.
201 J. C. Beauvais, “Regulatory Expropriation under NAFTA”, p. 295.
202 See, among the others: Ethyl Corporation v Canada; S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada; Loewen v. 
United States; Feldman v Mexico; Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, ICSID Case n. ARB
(AF)/99/2, Award, 11 October 2002; Glamis Gold Ltd v The United States of America, Award, 8 June 2009, 
(UNCITRAL); See also, R. E. Young, “A Canadian Commentary”, pp. 1013. The author argues that “[i]n 
considering the factors to be taken into account in determining whether ‘measures tantamount to an 
expropriation’ are in play, the decisions overwhelmingly rely on effect or impact analysis based on the factual 
context of each situation. In this regard, while lacking the structured balancing undertaken by American courts 
arising out of application of the Penn Central test, the ad hoc factual analysis is an important commonality”.
compensation as a result of a balanced approach that weighs the reasonableness of investors’ 
expectations against the economic loss suffered.203
In this light, it is commonsensical that the IISD study questions whether 
chacun de ces termes obéit à des critères de qualification distincts [?] Dans 
l’affirmative, cela signifierait que chaque tribunal arbitral doit faire une 
vérification en trois temps. La mesure étatique est-elle une expropriation directe ? 
Sinon, est-elle alors une expropriation indirecte? A défaut, correspond-elle enfin à 
une mesure équivalente à une expropriation?204
The study concludes that “[e]n général, les tribunaux considèrent que les deux 
expressions recouvrent la même notion”.205 Besides, the IISD study acknowledges that most 
of the expropriation clauses in investment treaties provide indications that are still 
insufficient. However, some provisions explicitly focus on the impact or character of the 
governmental measure for it to be regarded as an expropriation. This is the case of treaties 
that refer to “expropriation or nationalization or any other measures having equivalent effect 
similar to a dispossession”  or “expropriation, nationalization or measures having similar 
effect”. Similarly, for treaties that use the term measures “of the same nature or the same 
effect”, or “having the same nature or the same effect”. These clauses are more explicit than 
the simple mentioning of the term “expropriation”  or “measure equivalent to expropriation”, 
and this may function as a clearer indication for the courts.206 The IISD study further explains 
that few investment treaties include in their wording any reference to measures that are 
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203 J. C. Beauvais, “Regulatory Expropriation under NAFTA”, p. 292. In addition, “parties to Chapter 11 claim 
have disputed the scope of Chapter 11 and how it interacts with the other sections of the NAFTA” underlining 
the existing interconnection among the provisions in Chapter 11. This perspective may cast further doubts upon 
the appropriateness of conceiving any findings about expropriation of as autonomous from those concerning, 
e.g.: ‘most-favored-nation’ or ‘fair and equitable’ treatment. R. D. Bishop and W. W. Russell, “Survey of 
Arbitration Awards Under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement”, in Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 19(6), 2002, p. 563; M. R. Jiménez, “Consideration of NAFTA Chapter 11”, in Chicago Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 2(1), Spring 2001, pp. 247-248, referring to the Metalclad award. It is noted that the 
Tribunal concluded that “in denying Metalclad fair and equitable treatment by preventing it from operating the 
landfill, [..] Mexico also took a measure tantamount to expropriation” (para 104).
204 S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques, p. 6. “Each of these terms is subject to separate qualification criteria [?] If 
so, this would mean that each arbitral tribunal shall conduct a three phases-scrutiny. Does the State action qualify 
as a direct expropriation? If not, then is it an indirect expropriation? Differently, is it a measure equivalent to 
expropriation?”. [Author’s translation]
205 Id. “In general, the courts consider that the two expressions mean the same concept”. See, Feldman v Mexico, 
para 100.
206 S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques, p. 6.
“restrictive”  or that “totally or partially deprive”  the investors of their rights. Such provisions 
seem to suggest that an indirect expropriation may still be found where the limitation is not 
severe/very important.207
As to the ‘recent practice in investment treaties’, three different orders of clauses on 
indirect expropriation are identified by the study. The first typology reaffirms the regulatory 
power of the State; the second excludes certain types of public regulation (that may damage 
investments) from the notion of indirect expropriation; and the third is composed of 
explanatory Annexes to investment treaties, that provide a list of criteria that may guide the 
interpretation of the courts when reviewing a complaint for indirect expropriation.208
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207 S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques, p. 7.
208 Id, pp. 8 et seq. A controversial clause on “Expropriation and Compensation” may be found in the recently 
entered into force Japan-Korea and China Trilateral Investment Agreement. In light of its wording and 
terminology, it seems that the Trilateral Agreement may be presented as an example of both a ‘classic clause’ and 
the ‘exclusion’ approach to indirect expropriation. Article 11 of the Trilateral Agreement avoids to mention 
indirect expropriation among the measures having expropriatory character. More precisely, the provision 
establishes that “No Contracting Party shall expropriate or nationalize investments in its territory of investors of 
another Contracting Party or take measure equivalent to expropriation or nationalization [...] except: for a public 
purpose; on a non-discriminatory basis; in accordance with its law and international standard of due process of 
law; and, upon compensation pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4”. The amount of compensation due is 
“equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investments at the time when the expropriation was 
publicly announced or when the expropriation occurred, whichever is the earlier”, and “shall not reflect any 
change in market value occurring because the expropriation had become publicly known earlier”. 
Notwithstanding this traditional definition of expropriation, the Trilateral Agreement presents a cutting edge 
approach to the issue of the domestic regulatory space. Indeed, it safeguards a number of domestic investment 
policies and adopts a deferential approach according to which a regulatory space is left to the States in order to 
pursue specific policy objectives (e.g., exceptions are envisaged with respect to taxation, essential security 
interests and prudential measures). Environmental measures in the host States are specifically dealt with, 
establishing that “[e]ach Contracting Party recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
investors of another Contracting Party by relaxing its environmental measures. To this effect each Contracting 
Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such environmental measures as an encouragement for the 
establishment, acquisition or expansion of investment in its territory”. See, Art. “Expropriation and 
Compensation”, para 1 (a)(b)(c)(d), 2; Art. 18, ‘Security Exceptions’; Art. 20, ‘Prudential Measures’; Art. 21, 
‘Taxation’, and Art. 23, ‘Environmental Measures’ of the Agreement Among the Government of Japan, the 
Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion, 
Facilitation and Protection of Investment, signed on 13 May 2012, available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/
trade_policy/epa/pdf/CJK(English).pdf, (last accessed on: 19 September 2012). The Agreement includes 
provisions concerning the enforcement of domestic intellectual property rights and regulating its coexistence 
with previous BITs. In this regard, it is established that “nothing in the agreement shall be construed to prevent 
investors from relying on existing BITs that may be more favourable to them”. See, Art. 9, ‘Intellectual Property 
Rights’; Art. 25, ‘Relation to Other Agreements’.
Examples of clauses aimed at re-establishing the regulatory space of the host State may 
be found in the NAFTA Article 1114(1) on “Environmental Measures”209 or, more recently, in 
the United States, Dominican Republic and Central America FTA.210 Similar clauses may also 
be found in BITs.211  However, these provisions are limited in scope: serving as a further 
ground for establishing the legitimacy of certain governmental measures aimed at the 
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209  Art. 1114 NAFTA reads: “1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to 
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 2. 
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or 
environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or 
retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that another Party has offered such 
an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view 
to avoiding any such encouragement”. One shall note the similarities with Art. 19 “Environmental Aspects” 
ECT, that reads: “1. In pursuit of sustainable development and taking into account its obligations under those 
international agreements concerning the environment to which it is party, each Contracting Party shall strive to 
minimize in an economically efficient manner harmful Environmental Impacts occurring either within or outside 
its Area from all operations within Energy Cycle in its Area, taking proper account of safety. [....]”. In addition, 
Art. 18 “Sovereignty over Energy Resources” ECT establishes that “1. The Contracting Parties recognize state 
sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources. They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance 
with and subject to the rules of international law.  2. Without affecting the objectives of promoting access to 
energy resources, and exploitation and development thereof on a commercial basis, the Treaty shall in no way 
prejudice the rules in Contracting Parties governing the system of property ownership of energy resources.[....]”. 
As noted by Kolo and Wälde, “[t]he environmental obligations [of the ECT]  may be relied upon by an 
international tribunal in interpreting other provisions of the treaty (e.g. The expropriation or sanctity-of-contract 
provision). Since the distinction between ‘normal’ regulation and a compensable ‘regulatory taking’ is not easy 
and requires a balancing process, the environmental standards recognized in a treaty are suitable to serve as 
factors to be taken into account in such balancing process. They help to define the legitimacy of environmental 
policies underlying national regulation”. T. Wälde, A. Kolo, “Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection 
and ‘Regulatory Taking’”, p. 817; see also, C. Bamberger, “An Overview of the Energy Charter Treaty”, in T. W. 
Waelde (eds) The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Getaway for Investment and Trade, Kluwer Law 
International, Vol. 1, 1996, p. 20.
210  US-CAFTA-DR, Art. 16.2.2 reads: “The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or 
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws. Accordingly, each Party 
shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate 
from, such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces adherence to the internationally recognized labor rights 
referred to in Article 16.8 as an encouragement for trade with another Party, or as an encouragement for the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory”, and Art. 17.2.2 establishing 
that “The Parties shall recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or 
reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure 
that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a 
manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those laws as an encouragement for trade with 
another Party, or as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an 
investment in its territory”. The text of the Agreement is available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text, (last accessed on: 19 September 
2012).
211 See, Mauritius-Comoros BIT, 2001, Art. 12; Chad-Lebanon BIT, 2005, Art. 8; Madagascar-South Africa BIT, 
2003, Art. 3; Switzerland-Mexico BIT, 1995, Protocol and Art. 3; Egypt-Canada BIT, 1996, Art. 17; Mauritius-
Burundi, 2001, Art. 12; Mauritius-Cameroon BIT, 2001, Art. 11; Mauritius-Benin BIT, 2001, Art. 11.
protection of human rights or the environment, they cannot be invoked to clim the 
expropriatory nature of a measure.212
As to ‘exclusions’ it should be noted that they are scarcely employed in investment 
treaties. Nevertheless, some recent agreements explicitly excludes specific actions from the 
definition of indirect expropriation, with the effect that those measures are not to be qualified 
as indirect expropriatory irrespectively of their adverse effects on the investment.213
Annex B para (b) of the 2012 American Model BIT is an example of such an approach. 
It establishes that “[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a 
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212 S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques, p. 9. It is noted that these provisions are silent as to their relationship with 
expropriation clauses that entitle the state to expropriate against compensation; or, they do not explain to what 
extent the state may pursue a regulatory action without being liable to the investor for a compensable indirect 
expropriation.
213 Id, p. 10; A controversial clause on “Expropriation and Compensation” may be found in the recently entered 
into force Japan-Korea and China Trilateral Investment Agreement. In light of its wording and terminology, it 
seems that the Trilateral Agreement may be presented as an example of both a ‘classic clause’ and the 
‘exclusion’ approach to indirect expropriation. The document regulates key concepts such as the definition of 
investment, investor, fair and equitable treatment, most-favoured nation treatment, transparency, expropriation 
and compensation and settlement of disputes. Art. 1, ‘Definitions’; Art. 5, ‘General Treatment of Investments’; 
Art. 4, ‘Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment’; Art. 10, ‘Transparency’; Art. 11, ‘Expropriation and Compensation’; 
Art. 12, ‘Compensation for Losses or Damages’; Art. 15, ‘Settlement of Investment Disputes between a 
Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party”; Art. 18, ‘Security Exceptions’; Art. 20, 
‘Prudential Measures’; Art. 21, ‘Taxation’; Art. 23, ‘Environmental Measures’; Noteworthy, the Agreement 
includes provisions concerning the enforcement of domestic intellectual property rights and regulating its 
coexistence with previous BITs. In this regard, it is established that “nothing in the agreement shall be construed 
to prevent investors from relying on existing BITs that may be more favourable to them”. See, Art. 9, 
‘Intellectual Property Rights’; Art. 25, ‘Relation to Other Agreements’. Article 11 of the Trilateral Agreement 
avoids to mention indirect expropriation among the measures having expropriatory character. More precisely, the 
provision establishes that “No Contracting Party shall expropriate or nationalize investments in its territory of 
investors of another Contracting Party or take measure equivalent to expropriation or nationalization [...] except: 
a) for a public purpose;b) on a non-discriminatory basis; c)  in accordance with its law and international standard 
of due process of law; and, d)upon compensation pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4”. The amount of 
compensation due is “equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investments at the time when the 
expropriation was publicly announced or when the expropriation occurred, whichever is the earlier”, and “shall 
not reflect any change in market value occurring because the expropriation had become publicly known earlier”. 
Notwithstanding this traditional definition of expropriation, the Trilateral Agreement presents a cutting edge 
approach to the issue of the domestic regulatory space. Indeed, it safeguards a number of domestic investment 
policies and adopts a deferential approach according to which a regulatory space is left to the States in order to 
pursue specific policy objectives (e.g., exceptions are envisaged with respect to taxation, essential security 
interests and prudential measures). Environmental measures in the host States are specifically dealt with, 
establishing that “[e]ach Contracting Party recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
investors of another Contracting Party by relaxing its environmental measures. To this effect each Contracting 
Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such environmental measures as an encouragement for the 
establishment, acquisition or expansion of investment in its territory”. Agreement Among the Government of 
Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment, signed on 13 May 2012, available at http://
www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/pdf/CJK(English).pdf, (last accessed on: 19 September 2012).
Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations”.214
Similarly, the Investment Agreement for the Common Investment Area signed under the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (‘COMESA’) provides:
Consistent with the right of States to regulate and the customary international law 
principles on police powers, bona fide regulatory measures taken by a Member 
State that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, shall not constitute 
an indirect expropriation under this Article.215
Likewise, Annex 2 para 4 of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement concluded by 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN’) provides
non discriminatory measures of a Member State that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the 
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214  Annex B, para (b), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP
%20Meeting.pdf, (last accessed on: 19 September 2012).
215  23 May 2007, Art. 20(8), available at http://www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/
Investment_agreement_for_the_CCIA.pdf, (last accessed on: 19 September 2012). On the issues arising with 
regard to the dispute settlement mechanism devised in the Agreement, see, P. Muchlinski, “The COMESA 
Common Investment Area: Substantive Standards and Procedural Problems in Dispute Settlement”, in SOAS 
School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, N. 11/2010, available at www.soas.ac.uk/law/
researchpapers, (last accessed on 19 September 2012).
environment, do not constitute expropriation of the type referred to in sub-
paragraph 2(b) [indirect expropriation].216
As a consequence, a measure that is non discriminatory, is taken in good faith and in 
pursuit of a legitimate public purpose should not qualify as indirect expropriation. The public 
interest pursued that is at the core of the measure excludes its expropriatory character and 
therefore its compensability. As will be noted, however, this approach may be problematic to 
the extent that arbitrators confuse the requirement for the qualification of the measure with the 
requirements for its legality.217 Thus, the IISD study argues that such clauses are not capable 
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216  26 February 2009, Annex 2 para 4; similarly it is established in the Annex on Expropriation and 
Compensation of the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-NewZealand Free Trade Area, entered into 
force on 1 January 2009 (AANZFTA), at para 4. It reads: “Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that 
are designed and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the protection of public health, 
safety, and the environment do not constitute expropriation of the type referred to in Paragraph 2(b) [indirect 
expropriation]”. See below. See, The ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 15 
December 1987, ILM, Vol. 27, 1988, p. 612. The Agreement among the Government of Brunei Darussalam, The 
Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, The Republic of Philippines, The Republic of Singapore, and The Kingdom of 
Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments is commonly known as ASEAN Investment 
Agreement. It provides a high level of protection, with special regard to Member States: more precisely, each 
country has the obligation to ensure full protection an security to investments of other Member States’ citizens, 
avoiding unjustified or discriminatory measures that could affect the management, use, enjoyment, maintenance, 
disposition or liquidation of their investments; a fair and equitable treatment standard is also applied to Member 
States’ investors, as well as a most favored nation treatment rule. Currently, ten are the Member States of the 
ASEAN: the five original members are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, then in 
1984 Brunei joined ASEAN, followed by Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. Singapore and Brunei are 
the smallest yet richest economies, whereas Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnmal (“CLMV”) are the poorest 
and least developed countries in the region. See, C. H. Lin, “A Comparative Study of Investment Regimes in 
ASEAN Economies”, in Acta Juridica Hungarica, Vol. 51(3), 2010, p. 166; J. W. Salacuse, The Law of 
Investment Treaties, Oxford International Law Library, 2010, p. 98; Art. VI regulates “Expropriation” 
proscribing any expropriation, nationalization or any measure equivalent to it and requiring an adequate 
compensation, corresponding to the fair market value of the investment, as of the date immediately before the 
action of dispossession was undertaken. In 1998, the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area 
was adopted in order “to establish a competitive ASEAN Investment Area with a more liberal and transparent 
investment environment amongst Member States [..], and contribute to a free flow of investments by 2020” (Art. 
3). The document is available at http://www.asean.org/7994.pdf, (last accessed on: 20 January 2012). However, 
ASEAN countries tend to restrict aliens to invest in areas of public utilities and in export-oriented industries, in 
an effort to safeguard, and effectively direct, their internal industrial development.
217 See Part II, Chapter VI.
of creating a presumption218 in favor of legitimate regulatory purposes, nor are they capable 
of creating a genuine system of public policy exceptions.219  Nevertheless, the exclusions 
provided by both the COMESA and the ASEAN Agreements appear to be effectively 
framed.220  By relying on the police power exception, the two clauses attempt to firmly 
distinguish between non compensable regulation and expropriation. This would mean that by 
qualifying the measure as an instance of exercise of the State’s police powers––and following 
a stepped legal methodology––, arbitrators would be prevented from reaching the conclusion 
that the measure is indirectly expropriatory.221
With regard to this, a peculiar case seems to be represented by the China-India BIT.222 
The ‘exclusion’ is found in the Additional Protocol to the investment treaty, under “Ad Article 
5”, para 3, which reads:
Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory measures adopted by 
a Contracting Party in pursuit of public interest, including measures pursuant to 
awards of general application rendered by judicial bodies, do not constitute 
indirect expropriation or nationalization.223
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218 Tsatsos has argued that a presumption in favor of the respondent State may significantly alter the degree of 
burden imposed on the claimant. In fact, “imposing the burden of proof to a party to refute a presumption may be 
decisive for the outcome of the award” and may lead to question whether the burden of proof may in fact shift. 
Tsatsos maintains that “the lack of a common understanding regarding the interpretation of the very same 
provision laid down in an investment treaty has led tribunals to apply presumptions incoherently and to 
adjudicate disputes on the basis of totally different international law standards, thus giving the impression that 
the burden of proof constitutes a sort of ‘shifting factor’”. The adjudicator is he who decides on the applicability 
of presumptions and therefore he holds a strong influence to substantially affect the outcome of the award. The 
unpredictability of arbitral decisions if further affected by the discretion of arbitral tribunals with regard to the 
identification of the applicable law and the application of the rules of interpretation. A. Tsatsos, “Burden of Proof 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Shifting?”, paras 9, 16. The author refers to Art. 1102 NAFTA and the 
interpretation of the provision in Pope and Talbot v Canada and SD Myers v Canada. The author argues that “by 
establishing a ‘differential treatment’ under ‘like circumstances’, the claimant creates a presumption that Article 
1102 NAFTA has been violated. Then the burden of proof shifts to the host State which has to prove that the 
discriminatory measures were justified by legitimate national policy considerations”. The approach was followed 
also in Feldman v Mexico but opposed in Methanex Corporation v United States of America, Final Award on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, Part IV, Chapter B, p. 19, para 37.
219 S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques, p. 10.
220 Id, p. 11.
221 For instance, by focusing on the effects of the measure on the investment.
222 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
Chine for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 2 May 2010, available at http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/h/at/201002/20100206778944.html, (last accessed on: 19 September 2012). [China-India BIT]
223 Ad Art. 5, para 3, Protocol to China-India BIT.
It is noteworthy that only in this paragraph the notion of ‘indirect expropriation’ is 
explicitly employed. The substantive provision in the BIT that regulates “Expropriation” 
establishes that
Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, 
expropriated or subjected to measure having effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation [...] in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public 
purpose in accordance with law on a non-discriminatory basis and against fair and 
equitable compensation. Such compensation shall amount to the genuine value of 
the investment expropriated immediately before the expropriation or before the 
impending expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is the earlier, shall 
include interest at a fair and equitable rate until the date of payment, shall be made 
without unreasonable delay, be effectively realizable and be freely transferable.224
In addition, also the remaining paragraphs of Ad Article 5 in the Protocol fail to mention 
any case of indirect expropriation, rather drawing a distinction between direct expropriation 
or nationalization and “measures or series of measures taken intentionally by a Party to create 
a situation whereby the investment of an investor may be rendered substantially unproductive 
and incapable of yielding a return without a formal transfer of title or outright seizure”.225
Further, it is explained that
the determination of whether a measure or a series of measures of a Party in a 
specific situation, constitute measures as outlined in paragraph 1 above requires a 
case by case, fact based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
i. the economic impact of the measure or a series of measures, although the fact 
that a measure or series of measures by a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that 
expropriation or nationalization, has occurred;
ii. the extent to which the measures are discriminatory either in scope or in 
application with respect to a Party or an investor or an enterprise;
iii. the extent to which the measures or series of measures interfere with distinct, 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations;
iv. the character and intent of the measures or series of measures, whether they are 
for bona fide public interest purposes or not and whether there is a reasonable 
nexus between them and the intention to expropriate.226
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224 Art. 5, para 1.
225 Ad Art. 5, para 1, Protocol to China-India BIT.
226 Ad Art. 5, para 2(i)(ii)(iii)(iv), Protocol to China-India BIT.
Thus, a particular emphasis is put on the Government’s intention to expropriate and the 
clause seems to oppose lawful expropriations to forms of regulation that ‘disguise’ 
expropriatory purposes in an effort to avoid the payment of compensation. It seems, therefore, 
that a place for unlawfulness may be identified in the clause’s explicit focus on the “bona 
fide”  in the public interest pursued and its nexus with “the intention to expropriate”. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that also under the China-India BIT and its Additional 
Protocol the key parameter to be considered concerns the assessment of the effects of the 
measure and that such effects to give rise to indemnification obligations should be equivalent 
in nature to those of an expropriation or nationalization.
The last category regards the inclusion of Annexes to investment treaties227, with the 
aim to provide the Parties and the adjudicators with guidance for the interpretation and 
‘reconstruction’ of the will of the Contracting Parties.
Once more, the example of the 2012 US Model BIT may be recalled. Its Annex B on 
“Expropriation”  explains how the substantive provision in the investment treaty ought to be 
interpreted. More precisely, the Annex describes indirect expropriation as “an action or series 
of actions by a Party [that] has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal 
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227  On 9 September 2012, the “Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of Chine for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of the Investments”  (hereinafter: 
Canada-China FIPA) has been signed. The Canada-China FIPA contains important and specific provisions 
concerning ‘Exceptions’ (Art. 8 and ‘General Exceptions’ in Part D, Art. 33), ‘Expropriation’ (Art. 9, especially 
refers to the “domestic due process of law” among the requirements for expropriation), ‘Compensation for 
losses’ (Art. 11), ‘Taxation’ (Art. 14), [settlement of]  ‘Disputes between the Contracting Parties’ (Art. 15 and 
Part C of the Agreement. Art. 30 especially establishes the ‘Governing Law’), ‘Transparency of Laws, 
Regulation and Policies’ (Art. 17). In addition, the Canada-China FIPA includes a number of Annexes: Annex B.
8 on Exceptions, Annex B.10 on Expropriation, Annex B.12 on Transfer and Exchange Formalities, AnnexC.21 
on the Conditions Precedents to Submission of a Claim to Arbitration: Party Specific Requirements, Annex C.29 
on Submissions by Non-Disputing Parties, Annex D.34 on Exclusions. Furthermore it is explained in endnote 13 
that “For China, “national security review” may include a review of various forms of investments for national 
security purposes. At the time of the entry into force of this Agreement, the specific legal document on China’s 
national security review is the Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment of the 
Security Review System For The Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 
focusing on the review of mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign investors”. The Canada-
China Agreement seems to further attest the search for preciseness in investment treaty-making as a 
counterbalance to arbitrators’ judicial far-reaching functions. The text of the Canada-China FIPA is available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/china-chine.aspx?
lang=eng&view=d, (last accessed on: 9 October 2012).
transfer of title or outright seizure” 228 and it further indicates that a “case-by-case, fact-based 
inquiry”  is required to determine “whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a 
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation”229. The Annex, moreover, 
suggests that the following factors be considered in the assessment:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action 
or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an 
investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable 
investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.230
An “Expropriation”  Annex is also contained in the New Zealand-China FTA.231  The 
document distinguishes between direct and indirect expropriation: a “direct expropriation 
occurs when a State takes an investor’s property outright, including by nationalization, 
compulsion of law or seizure”; whereas an
indirect expropriation occurs when a State takes an investor’s property in a 
manner equivalent to direct expropriation, in that it deprives the investor in 
substance of the use of the investor’s property, although the means used fall short 
of those specified in subparagraph (a) above.232
In addition, the Agreement establishes that “in order to constitute indirect expropriation, 
the State’s deprivation of the investor’s property must be (a) either severe or for an indefinite 
period; and (b) disproportionate to the public purpose”.233 Thus, a “deprivation” is deemed as 
“particularly likely to constitute indirect expropriation” where it is found either:
(a) discriminatory in its effect, either as against the particular investor or against a 
class of which the investor forms part; or
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228 US Model BIT, Annex B, “Expropriation”, para 4. Para 2 establishes: “An action or a series of actions by a 
Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right or 
property interest in an investment”. And, para 3, identifies a direct expropriation “where an investment is 
nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure”.
229 US Model BIT, Annex B, “Expropriation”, para 4 (a).
230 Id, para 4 (a)(i)(ii)(iii).
231 D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, pp. 826-827.
232 Annex 13, para 2(b). The full text of the Agreement, which entered into force on 1 October 2008, is available 
at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/0-agreement-downloads.php, (last 
accessed on: 19 September 2012).
233 Annex 13, para 3(a)(b).
(b) in breach of the state’s prior binding written commitment to the investor, 
whether by contract, licence, or other legal document.234
The concepts employed by the New Zealand-China FTA are further elaborated upon in 
the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA.235 The provision contained in para 3 of the Annex 
seemingly corresponds to the wording of the para 4(a) in Annex B of the 2012 US Model BIT. 
It is established that
the determination of whether an action or series of related actions by a Party, in a 
specific fact situation, constitutes and expropriation of the type referred to in 
Paragraph 2(b) requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among 
other factors: 
(a) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action 
or series of related actions by a Party had an adverse effect on the economic 
value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that such an 
expropriation has occurred;
(b) whether the government action breaches the government’s prior binding 
written commitment to the investor whether by contract, licence or other legal 
document; and,
(c) the character of the government action, including its objective and whether the 
action is disproportionate to the public purpose.236
The choice to include explanatory Annexes in the binding text of investment treaties is 
certainly aimed at promoting clarity in the distinction between compensable (indirect) 
expropriation and non-compensable regulation. Thus, one may identify a trend in investment 
treaties supporting a deferential approach237  to regulatory matters in investment treaty-
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234 Annex 13, para 4(a)(b).
235 Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-NewZealand Free Trade Area, entered into force on 1 January 
2009 (AANZFTA). The ASEAN has also concluded agreements with China (2010) and is currently negotiating 
with India.
236 Annex on “Expropriation and Compensation” to the AANZFTA, para 3.
237  In this light consider also J. Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights,  Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 21 March 2011, A/HRC/
17.31, Principle 9: “States should maintain adequate domestic policy space to meet their human rights 
obligations when pursuing business-related policy objectives with other States or business enterprises, for 
instance through investment treaties or contracts”. In addition, the commentary to the Principle clarifies that 
“Economic agreements concluded by States, wither with other States or with business enterprises––such as 
bilateral investment treaties, free-trade agreements or contracts for investment projects––create economic 
opportunities for States. But they can also affect the domestic policy space of governments. For example, the 
terms of international investment agreements may constrain States from fully implementing new human rights 
legislation, or put them at risk of binding international arbitration fi they do so. Therefore, States should ensure 
that they retain adequate policy and regulatory ability to protect human rights under the terms of such 
agreements, while providing the necessary investor protection”.
making. Such an approach takes in due consideration recent challenges to governmental 
regulatory powers,238  and provides a clearer guidance––and constraints––to arbitral 
interpretation. In addition, it is fully consistent with the pronouncement of two ICSID 
tribunals,239 which called for a balanced interpretation in investment arbitration systems such 
as to take “into account both State’s sovereignty and its responsibility to create an adapted and 
evolutionary framework for the development of economic activities and the necessity to 
protect foreign investment and its continuing flow”.240
The practice of including provisions on the right to regulate together with, exclusions or 
explanatory annexes is recent. Therefore, as the majority of BITs concluded prior to 2000 and 
still in force are not provided with similar clauses, they still grant an unfettered interpretative 
power to adjudicators in such matters.241 However, the goal of securing the State’s right to 
regulate, and thus counterbalance the protection afforded to investors, is to date part of the 
sophisticated framework of varied purposes and objectives listed also by the Preamble of 
numerous BITs, which “seek to protect State’s public policy concerns in addition to foreign 
investors”.242 In this regard, it is useful not only to consider the 2008 German Model BIT243, 
whose endeavors to control and foster the legality of governmental measures renders this 
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238  D. A. R. Williams QC, A. Kawharu, Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration, p. 827. Measures related to 
tobacco sales and marketing. See, FTR Holding SA, Philip Morris Products SA & Abal Hermanos SA v Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case N. ARB/10/07, Notice of Arbitration, 19 February 2010; Philip Morris Asia 
Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia, ICSID Case, Notice of Arbitration, 21 November 2011, available at 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Internationallaw/Documents/Philip+Morris+Asia+Notice+of+Arbitration.pdf, (last 
accessed on 19 September 2012). See also, 
239 El Paso Energy International Company v The Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15, 2006; Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v Argentine Republic, 
Decision on Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, 2006; See also, Saluka Investments BV  v 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 2006.
240  El Paso Energy International Company v The Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 70; Pan 
American Energy v Argentine Republic, Decision on Preliminary Objections, para 99.
241 S. H. Nikièma, Bonnes Pratiques, p. 12.
242 P. Muchlinski, “Trends in International Investment Agreements, 2008/2009”, in K. P. Sauvant (ed) Yearbook 
on International Investment Law & Policy 2009-2010, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 73; B. 
Stern, “The Future of International Investment Law: A Balance Between the Protection of Investors and the 
States’ Capacity to Regulate”, in J. E. Alvarez and K. P. Sauvant, The Evolving International Investment Regime: 
Expectations, Realities, Options, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, p. 190.
243 2008 German Model-BIT.
Model BIT effectively “designed to prevent governmental abuses”,244  but also the South 
African case.
The South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) suggested in its 2009 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review, the revision of South African BITs, by 
recognizing their misalignment in favor of investors, “resulting in agreements [..] not in the 
long term interest of RSA245”.246  The conclusions drawn in the DTI Report corroborate 
Guzman’s widely debated theory on foreign investments and BITs,247 according to which the 
welfare of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is negatively affected by the widespread 
adoption of bilateral investment treaties.248  In fact, it is argued that BITs push developing 
countries to bid against one another to attract investments, and this causes losses to 
developing countries as a group, whilst granting them relatively modest gains from an 
increase in total investments.249 As recently noted, “the expectations of developing countries 
vis-à-vis the international investment regime have changed over the last two decades”, given 
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244 B. Stern, “The Future of International Investment Law”, p. 189.
245 Republic of South Africa.
246  DTI, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review, June 2009, p. 5, available at http://
www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=103768, (last visited: 2 September 2011). At p. 41, the policy 
review underlines that the BIT standard does not conform to the South African Constitution. It is underscored 
that the absence of any distinction between regulation and expropriation may result in a finding of indirect 
expropriation, exposing a legitimate governmental regulation to arbitral proceedings.; Moreover, the policy 
review seems to stem from the conclusions on the case Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of 
South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, 2010: an Italian mining investor brought the case before 
the ICSID arguing that his investment had been indirectly expropriated as a result of South Africa’s post-
apartheid equal opportunities and land rights policy. See, P. Muchlinski, “Trends in International Investment 
Agreements, 2008/2009”, p. 61; The South African BIT contains similar provisions to the Canada-Romanis 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA), which is available at http://
www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/eu6-ue6.aspx?
menu_id=40&view=d, (last visited: 24 January 2012).
247 A. T. Guzman, “Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties”, in Vanderbilt Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, 1997-1998, pp. 639-688; A. T. Guzman, 
“Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties”, in K. P. Sauvant and L. E. Sachs (eds), The Effects 
of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and 
Investment Flows, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 73-96; See also, J. E. Alvarez, “The Once and Future of 
Foreign Investment Regime”, in M. H. Arsanjani et al.  (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International 
Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman, Martinus Nijihoff, The Netherlands, 2010, pp. 612 et seq.; J. E. Alvarez, 
“The Public International Law Regime”,, pp. 278 et seq.
248  Id, pp. 683 et seq. See, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012. The Report seems to confirm this 
approach, noting that in 2011 Africa and the LDCs experienced a “third year of declining of FDI inflows”.
249 Id, p. 688.
that South-South investments are “gradually generating dynamics in which developing 
countries not only visualize themselves as host countries for FDI, but also as home countries 
of enterprises investing abroad”.250
Changes in the investment regime, as well as in the needs of its actors, are triggering the 
transformation of IITs’ clauses, in an effort to protect not only investors but also the 
regulatory power of the States. That international investment law provides “the umbrella 
under which the ideological battle for the regulation of global flux[es] of capital” 251 is fought 
is easily understandable, as it is that “intricate political dynamics are at play behind the highly 
legalized regime of investment protection”.252 These remarks, nonetheless, may reinforce the 
assumption that the international investment regime is increasingly considered as a “tool for 
international economic governance”,253  and this seems the direction followed in recent 
investment practice.
As Stern observes, this approach was manifest also in the 2007 Norway Model BIT 
which, despite being aimed to “encourage, create and maintain stable, equitable, favorable 
and transparent conditions for investors of one Party and their investments in the territory of 
the other Party on the basis of equality and mutual benefit”, established also new objectives, 
such as the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development, the 
importance of corporate social responsibility254 and basic principles such as transparency, 
accountability and legitimacy in foreign investment processes.255 Unfortunately, the 2007 
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250  R. Echandi, “What Do Developing Countries Expect from the International Investment Regime”, in . E. 
Alvarez and K. P. Sauvant, The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, p. 19; on developing countries concluding BITs among themselves 
see also, S. W. Schill, The Multilateralization, pp. 362 et seq; R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, Principles, p. 16.
251 J. d’Aspremont, “International Customary Investment Law”, p. 5.
252 Id.
253 R. Echandi, “What Do Developing Countries Expect from the International Investment Regime”,, p. 19.
254 On the point see, P. Muchlinski, “Corporate Social Responsibility”, in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer 
(ed. by), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, OUP, 2008, pp. 638-687.
255  Norway Model BIT 2007 (Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and ––– for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments).
Norwegian Model BIT was rejected, but an analysis of its provision on expropriation may still 
prove useful in order to assess the most recent treaty-making efforts of States.256
Article 6 regulates “Expropriation”  ensuring that “the conditions provided for by the 
law and by the general principles of international law”  are respected in carrying out 
expropriatory measures. Thereby, both national law and international law are referred to as 
constituting the law applicable to a case and binding upon Norway. The provision is oriented 
at both “protect[ing] established investments from open and camouflaged expropriation”  and 
at “  safeguard[ing] the State’s right to implement general regulations and administrative 
decisions without incurring liability to pay compensation”.257  The governmental right to 
interfere with the use of property “in accordance with the general interest, or to secure the 
payment of taxes [..]”  is however guaranteed, and this reflects the “regulative”  nature of the 
Norwegian approach and its high level of protection.258 To this end, the commentary to the 
Model BIT explains that some efforts were made to draft a clear and predictable provision on 
expropriation, which does not obliterate Norwegian law.259  Moreover, as the Commentary 
further clarifies, it is a core objective of the draft to “ensure that the agreements maintain a 
balance between the protection of investors’ legitimate interests and the regulative interests of 
the host country”.260  Finally, no explicit reference to compensation (or to the valuation 
method) is made by the Norwegian Model BIT’s Article on Expropriation. According to the 
Commentary to the Model BIT, the diversity that characterizes BITs’ formulations on the 
point has resulted in varying standards of protection and, therefore, in interpretative 
disagreement among investment tribunals. Norway aimed to adhere to a common 
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256  Norway abandoned the Model BIT after the extensive criticism from business groups. See, P. Muchlinski, 
“Trends in International Investment Agreements, 2008/2009”, p. 59.
257 Norway Model BIT 2007, Comments on the Model for Future Investment Agreements, 19 December 2007, p. 
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norway_draft_model_bit_comments.pdf, (last accessed on: 1 September 2011). It is argued that the expropriation 
provision is based on Art. 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms
258 Id, p. 11.
259 Id.
260 Id, p. 12.
international standard and, to this end, it had considered it satisfactory to conform to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and to its approach on the protection of 
property to foster the application of a shared threshold of protection capable to give guidance 
to tribunals.261
Recent investment practice epitomizes the growing concern for regulatory policies in 
the host State. More precisely, the recent practice demonstrates that the traditional investment 
treaty making is losing ground in favour of regional investment policymaking.262  This 
“gradual shift towards regional treaty making”  is grounded on the opportunity to have a 
“single regional treaty”  that “takes the place of a multitude of bilateral pacts”  as well as 
“regional blocs (instead of their individual members)”  negotiating “with third States”.263 A 
second reason for this shift comes from the increasing dissatisfaction with IIAs and the 
investor-State dispute resolution mechanism, which is regarded as too “controversial and 
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261 Norway Model BIT 2007, Comments on the Model for Future Investment Agreements, pp. 23-24.
262 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012, p. 84. In 2011, 47 IIAs were signed (33 BITs and 14 ‘other IIAs), 
and this trend is “expected to persist through 2012, which saw only 10 BITs and 2 ‘other IIAs’ concluded during 
the first five months of the year”. In 2011, furthermore, the negotiations on the Mexico-Central America FTA 
have also been concluded (p. 86). Audley Shepperd also calls into question the capacity of BITs to fulfill the 
objective of promote investments whilst protecting investors. For instance, it is observed that “Brazil provides a 
notable counterfactual. It resolutely resists entering into BITs, but has not trouble attracting huge investments”. 
However, considering whether “it is worth governments such as the US and China expending political capital to 
agree a BIT”, Shepperd answers yes. The author argues that “BITs are no panacea. They probably do not cause 
an immediate increase in investment. They cannot create a force-field around an investment that protects it from 
interference. Nor do they ensure that any damages fully compensate the investor for all their loss. However, they 
are a strong signal of intention and commitment by the respective governments”. A. Shepperd, “BIT between the 
Teeth”, p. 22. See also the analysis conducted in 2007 by V. Lowe, “Changing Dimensions of International 
Investment Law”, in University of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
N. 4/2007,  March 2007, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=970727, (last accessed 
on: 24 September 2012).
263 Id, p. 84.
politically sensitive”.264 The mobilization of investments is no longer a priority unless it is 
counterbalanced by the contribution to (global) policy and regulatory objectives. Investment 
policies seek to balance the rights and obligations of States and investors, and to “manage the 
systemic complexity of the IIA regime” 265, in an effort to “shield host countries from 
unjustified liabilities and high procedural costs”.266  Accordingly, a “new generation” of 
investment policies is gaining prominence, which includes a renewed attention to sustainable 
development and corporate social responsibility267  and calls for a new understanding of 
indirect expropriation in the evolving international community.
IV. Summary
As observed by Waelde and Kolo in 2001, “so far there are regional (e.g.: North 
American Free Trade Agreement - ‘NAFTA’, ‘MERCOSUR’, ‘ASEAN’) or sectoral (e.g.: 
Energy Charter Treaty - ‘ECT’) treaty systems, but [there is] no global investment code 
143
264 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012, p. 84. The dissatisfaction with the investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism is demonstrated for instance by Ecuador’s initiation, in June 2011, of State–State proceedings against 
the United States. The commentary of the UNCTAD Report highlight that “by doing so, Ecuador effectively 
seeks to overturn the interpretation of a particular clause in the Ecuador–United States BIT, adopted earlier by an 
investor–State tribunal in the Chevron v. Ecuador case”. As a consequence, the absence of a proper mechanism 
for an appellate review has pushed the state “to pursue correction of perceived mistakes by an arbitral tribunal” 
in this way. In addition to that, also the “increasing numbers of requests for disqualification of arbitrators, led by 
both investors and States”, are regarded as another sign of dissatisfaction with the investor-state dispute 
settlement procedures. It is observed that “this is particularly so where an arbitrator is perceived as biased owing 
to multiple appointments in different proceedings by the same party or by the same law firm, or where the 
arbitrator has taken a position on a certain issue in a previous award or in academic writings”. So far, however, 
all such requests have been dismissed. (p. 87)
265 Id, pp. 97 et seq. There is an intensifying trend among scholars who attempt to firmly embed the international 
investment law regime in the general framework of public international law, aiming to identify its existing 
connections with other branches of international law. This conveys an idea of the current understanding of 
international investment law: not its self-containedness, rather its multilevel and multilateral structure is claimed, 
which is furthermore perceived as partaking to the global system that international law creates. A. Reinisch, 
“The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms”, pp. 107-126; See, also Chemtura Corp 
(formerly Crompton Corp) v Government of Canada, Award, 2 August 2010, available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1278, (last accessed on: 1 April 2012).
266  This is one of the primary dissatisfaction with the investor-state dispute system today. UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 2012, p. 136.
267 Id, pp. 135 et seq.; See also, UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, 2012, 
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2012d6_en.pdf, (last accessed on: 19 September 
2012). See also, P. Muchlinski, “Corporations and the Uses of the Law”, pp. 3-25; R. Leal-Arcas, “Toward the 
Multilateralization of International Investment Law”, pp. 865-919.
[..]”.268 The trend is confirmed in recent investment practice pursuant to which, however, the 
adoption of regional investment treaties has superseded the recourse to bilateral ones. A 
reason for this shift in the practice is found in the dissatisfaction with the investor-State 
system, that endows arbitrators with ample discretionary powers269 but limits the (non-
compensable) regulatory space left to host States. Thus, States are prompted to revise their 
IIAs270 in the attempt to constrain the power of arbitral panels by refining the law that they are 
called upon to apply.271 Consequently, the investment treaty-making activity endeavors to 
achieve a high degree of accuracy and specificity capable of constraining the ‘interpretative 
law-making’ by adjudicators and granting more deference to States in regulatory matters. 
Opting for regional treaties could foster consistency and predictability, by enlarging the 
number of addressees of similar provisions. In addition, it could favor the emergence of a 
“property discourse”  that could harmonize the understanding of property at the international 
level, starting from regional, homogeneous blocs of actors. Indeed, it is argued that
to the extent that the affected parties share an epistemological, social, and cultural 
common ground, there is a greater likelihood that supranational norms will have 
in rem validity, even if the respective domestic property systems are otherwise 
different from one another [...] The same holds, moreover, when the parties are 
part of a bottom-up process of creating norms, practices and other socio-legal 
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269  The “highly judicialized character of investment arbitration is commented upon in J. d’Aspremont, 
“International Customary Investment Law”, p. 6.
270 See, South Africa and the outcome of the case Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South 
Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, 2010.
271  J. d’Aspremont, “International Customary Investment Law”, p. 28. The author underlines the paradox in 
some BITs where customary international law is interpreting as a gap-filling and interpretation-harmonizing tool 
that links the separate sub-system of international investment law to the general framework of international law. 
The author contends that “this is a clear manifestation of the reverberating effect of customary international law 
on treaty law. This lacunae-filling effect is not without paradox as it presupposes that the primary norm (treaty) 
can be streamlined or substantiated by the norm derived from it (custom). [..]  Customary international law is also 
often understood as providing a uniform platform of interpretation for all individual BITs when subjected to 
interpretations by arbitral tribunals applying them”; M. Paparinskis, “Sources of Law and Arbitral 
Interpretations”, pp. 87-116.
mechanisms that could affect the way in which BIT cross-border norms are 
applied.272
Such an approach is extremely relevant with regard to the study of indirect 
expropriation, as it confirms that the need to distinguish between non-compensable regulation 
and compensable expropriation is a still crucial (and unsettled) issue at the international level. 
‘Guidance’ and ‘consistency’ are sought in the standards that judges and arbitrators are to 
apply to decide (indirect) expropriation cases: criteria such as the character of the 
governmental measure, its severity and economic impact, the interference with investment-
backed expectations or the assessment of the proportionality between the means and the ends 
pursued by the action are mirrored, for instance, in the numerous Annexes to investment 
treaties. By incorporating in their ‘positive’ law the predominant judicial approaches to the 
‘international taking issues’, States seem to rule and control the arbitral judicial power. On the 
other hand, States are acknowledging the direction taken by arbitrators (and conforming 
investment treaty-law to it). Such a trend finds its origins in the national practice on takings 
and it is the result of the circulation of this model in the international arena, where however its 
limitations are amplified by the lack of a constitution or appellate body to remedy the 
deficiencies of the system.
Notwithstanding the aims pursued by current investment treaty practice, the wording of 
recent treaty clauses has proved incapable of shedding light on the nature of the ‘international 
takings doctrine’, since no clear-cut definition of expropriation and indirect expropriation has 
been offered. What the treaties provide for is a descriptive analysis of the manner through 
which direct or indirect expropriations are usually carried out, equating the effects of the two 
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272 A. Lehavi, A. N. Licht, “BITs and Pieces of Property”, p. 148. In addition, the author refer to the concept of 
“horizontal heterogeneity” in legal norms to highlight that BITs may “exacerbate unwarranted differentiation” 
through their “different procedural and substantive provisions about the protection of investments and property 
rights”. Especially, they consider the possibility of a “single country typically [being] signatory to dozens of 
different BITs”. Thus the result may be “normative over-fragmentation” of the property regime within the host 
country” (p. 157). The conclusion of ‘regional investment treaties’ may thus enable the states to avoid––or limit 
the risk of––such a situation.
phenomena in order to establish a common ground giving rise to a right to compensation.273 
Thus, one could posit that the two variables that conflict in the will of the contracting parties 
are expropriation and regulation: the former is deemed as compensable, in compliance with 
customary international law; the latter is deemed as non-compensable, being an expression of 
the State’s sovereign power to regulate for the public good. What about indirect 
expropriations, then?
As will be explained in further sections, indirect expropriations would be appropriately 
classified as a de facto expropriations that are unlawfully carried out. Indirect expropriatory 
measures274 would epitomize disguised forms of expropriations against which the investor 
could claim damages rather then compensation. This is a re-conceptualization of the variables 
at stake that may have the advantage of revitalizing the legal categories that customary 
international law has devised for expropriatory issues: namely, lawfulness v unlawfulness and 
compensation v damages (or restitution in integrum). Against this framework, also the judicial 
practice applying the law of expropriation in order to qualify and decide upon indirect 
expropriatory cases would find an apposite rationale, as cases of indirect expropriation would 
theoretically be categorized as ‘expropriation’ and not ascribed to a (vague) different category.
The rationale for a normative distinction between expropriation and indirect 
expropriation is called into question by the lack in investment treaties of a substantial 
differentiation between the two categories, especially in terms of legal remedies. To the extent 
that investment treaties are the lex specialis applicable to a case, the will of the contracting 
parties to: 1) endorse ‘expropriation’ as the appropriate paradigm to be employed to assess 
and qualify ‘indirect expropriations’ (e.g., in terms of the effects of the measure), thus 
equating indirect expropriation to expropriation tout court; and, 2) establish identical 
remedies, should be considered as an indication of the normative identity between the two 
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273  As noted supra in this Chapter, this is required by customary international law for an expropriation to be 
deemed lawful.
274 Including ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’.
concepts, with a residual (analytical) distinction is in their (formal) way of execution. The 
analogical reasoning applied by contracting parties holds a legal value and ought to be 
appraised in addressing the question of the status of indirect expropriation in international 
investment law. As a consequence, a line should be devised and drawn between acts that are 
expropriatory and thus compensable, and acts that are regulatory, and thus non-compensable, 
considering that non-expropriatory measures that are compensable result from the violation of 
other substantive standards in investment treaties.275
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published: J. H. Dalhuisen, A. T. Guzman, “Expropriatory and Non-Expropriatory Takings Under International 
Investment Law”, 27 August 2012, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2137107, 
(last accessed on: 6 January 2012). The argument advanced is clearly indebted to the American takings doctrine, 
and especially the decision of the US Supreme Court in Lucas v South Carolina. The authors focus on the 
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from the legal notion of expropriation. But why is it necessary to define as “non-expropriatory taking” a measure 
that is “designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety, and the 
environment”  (pp. 5-6)? This is a (non-compensable) regulation, whose public-oriented underpinning is the basis 
for its non-compensable nature. It is not an “exception”, rather the exercise of the governmental sovereign right. 
Conversely, the “specific commitments [that]  had been given by the regulating government [...]  that [it]  would 
refrain from such regulation” are the exception that the state willingly accepted towards the specific investors 
and, therefore, any violation would amount to a breach of the agreement (with the investor) and not to an 
expropriation. Likewise, regarding environmental issues. In this respect, one shall also consider the recent trend 
in investment treaties favoring the adoption of specific clauses that regulate and promote environmental 
protection together with foreign investments. The category of “incidental government takings as non-
expropriatory takings” is as well deemed as a surplusage. The question that is considered by the authors is “when 
takings that are not specifically in pursuit of public welfare could still be considered non-expropriatory” (p. 9). 
But the customary requirements for expropriation include the furtherance of a public purpose, unless the action 
is unlawful. Accordingly, an action that adversely affects the investor in economic terms and that does not pursue 
a public purpose is either an unlawful expropriation or it is not as an expropriation at all. This second hypothesis 
would apply, for instance, to unfair and inequitable conditions and be protected under other investment treaty 
standards such as the FET, or to exercises of governmental regulatory powers (thus being non-compensable and 
lawful). Clearly, what springs to mind from the analysis of this argument, is once more the importance of the 
applicable law in illuminating the ‘international taking doctrine’. The applicable law (i.e., the investment treaty) 
is in charge to establish the scope of application of each substantive standard and regulate specific exceptions, 
thereby enabling arbitrators to correctly interpret the will of the contracting parties. In this regard, moreover, it 
seems that also the decision to focus on the economic value of property rather than on its social function operates 
a fundamental change in the results with respect to the finding of a compensable taking. The opposition may be 
epitomized by the German and American models. Thus the failure of the international system to opt for one of 
the two possibilities cannot but have repercussions on the judicial practice and legal scholarship, leading to 
inconsistencies and unnecessary technicalities; see also, Nikièma S. H., L’expropriation indirecte en droit 
international des investissements, Geneva, The Graduate Institute Publications, 2012, distinguishing between 
vertical and horizontal measures.
Part II will examine how the international judicial and arbitral practice deals with such 
questions. However, “arbitrators––like judges––can only be as good as the law they apply”:276 
as a consequence, it is perfectly reasonable to expect the case-law to mirror the flaws in the 
applicable law. To the extent that a regulatory or “policy dimension”  remains “extra legem 
and lack a clear basis in the applicable law”, arbitrators “cannot be blamed [for the vagueness 
of a legal standard]”.277 The practice to “papering over disagreements in substance in order to 
reach formal agreement” 278 (i.e., to effectively conclude negotiations over a treaty) may not 
lead to consistent, coherent and predictable judicial decisions. Indeed, how should arbitrators 
be expected to consistently detect cases of indirect expropriation if indirect expropriation is 
inconsistently and ambiguously conceived of by the applicable law?279 This issue will be 
addressed in the following sections.
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278 R. E. Hudec, “GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an ‘Aim and Effects’ Test”, in 
The International Lawyer, Vol. 32, 1998, p. 619.
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PART II
Analysis of International Judicial Practice

Chapter III
Introductory Remarks
This brief section introduces the most recurrent criteria applied by international courts 
and investment tribunals to adjudicate indirect expropriatory claims. Each chapter in Part II 
examines one constitutive element of expropriation with the aim to further understand the 
scope of the concept and differentiate between compensable and non-compensable takings. 
More precisely, Chapter IV examines the concept of property, Chapter V the concept of 
taking, Chapter VI the lawfulness or unlawfulness of expropriation and Chapter VII the 
concept of public purpose. As Part II analyzes and comments upon the relevant international 
judicial practice, a preliminary overview on the judicial interpretative criteria and of the major 
flaws associated to their application seems here appropriate. An introductory review is 
presented below, complemented by some references to key international decisions.
As observed, the question of what amounts to an ‘expropriation’ is a vexed one.1 The 
classic notion describes expropriation as the outright seizure of property, which has to meet 
well-defined requirements to be lawful and is often achieved by transferring the title to 
property. States aiming at attracting investments in their territory should offer a safe, profit-
oriented climate2 and, accordingly, direct forms of expropriation have decreased in number 
and have been replaced by other methods and forms of interference with investors’ property 
rights that do not directly affect the title to property.3
Many expressions are used to refer to forms of expropriation that do not manifest 
themselves as outright seizure of property:4 indirect expropriatory measures are interpreted as 
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1 S. Montt, State Liability, p. 231.
2 A. K. Hoffman, “Indirect Expropriation”, in A. Reinisch (ed)  Standards of Investment Protection, 2008, OUP, 
p. 151.
3 M. Gutbrod and S. Hindelang, “Externalization of Effective Legal Protection against Indirect Expropriation”, 
in The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 7(1), 2006, p. 59.
4 S. Montt, State Liability, p. 231; T. Gazzini, “Drawing the Line between Non-Compensable Regulatory Powers 
and Indirect Expropriation of Foreign Investment”.
having an effect equivalent to expropriation, similarly depriving the owner of the substantial 
benefit of ownership.5 According to Schreuer, such measures may include: the taking of a 
third Party’s property which renders worthless the patents and contracts of a managing 
company (Chorzów Factory);6 an increase in taxes to the extent that the investment becomes 
economically unsustainable (Revere Copper);7 the expulsion of a person who plays a key role 
in the investment (Biloune);8  the replacement of the owner’s management by government 
imposed managers (Starrett,9 Tippett10); the revocation of a free zone permit (Goetz,11 Middle 
East Cement12); the denial of a construction permit contrary to prior assurances (Metalclad);13 
an interference with contract rights leading to a breach or termination of the contract by the 
investor’s business partner (CME);14  the revocation of an operating license (Tecmed).15 
Additionally, the concept of ‘creeping expropriation’ is used to point to forms of indirect 
expropriation that take place incrementally, through a series of actions whose aggregate effect 
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5 S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law, pp. 76-77; C. Schreuer, The Concept of Expropriation under the 
ECT, p. 4.
6 Factory at Chorzów.
7 Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, award, 24 August 1978, in ILM, Vol. 
56, p. 258.
8  Antoine Biloune (Syria) and Marine Drive Complex Ltd (Ghana) v. Ghana Investments Centre and the 
Government of Ghana (UNCITRAL), Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 27 October 1989, in ILR, Vol. 95, p. 
209.
9 Starrett Housing Corp v. Iran, op. cit.
10 Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, award n. 141-7-2, 22 June 1984.
11 Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi, case n. ARB/95/3, award, 10 February 1999.
12 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case n. ARB/99/6, 
Award, 12 April 2002.
13 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States.
14 CME (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award, 13 September 2001.
15 C. Schreuer, The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT, 13-14. It is also noted that the “concept of creeping 
expropriation has its counterpart in the law of State Responsibility”. Art. 15 of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, indeed, reads “Breach consisting of a composite act”, 
and the Commentary to the Article states: “Paragraph 1 of article 15 defines the time at which a composite act 
‘occurs’ as the time at which the last action or omission occurs which, taken with the other actions or omissions, 
is sufficient to constitute a wrongful act, without it necessarily having to be the last of the series”. See, J. 
Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Cambridge, CUP, 2002, p. 
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is to destroy the value of the investment.16 Questions concerning the determination of liability 
and valuation arise; furthermore, none of the actions could per se constitute the international 
wrong.17 Such actions may be interspersed with lawful governmental regulatory measures, so 
that any attempts to discern the precise moment when the expropriation occurs may be 
extremely arduous, requiring the tribunal to carry out a meticulous fact-sensitive inquiry to 
give full effect to compensatory principles.18
International law scholars have in addition developed the concept of ‘consequential or 
‘de facto expropriation’, apparently resulting from misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance 
by the host State19. Reisman and Sloane define it as involving
deprivations of the economic value of a foreign investment, which within the legal 
regime established by a BIT, must be deemed expropriatory because of their 
casual links to failures of the host State to fulfill its paramount obligations to 
establish and maintain an appropriate legal, administrative, and regulatory 
formative framework for foreign investment.20
As known, the most vexed question in cases of indirect expropriation is how to 
distinguish it from the exercise of lawful regulatory powers by the host State. Regulatory 
takings have been regarded as an additional form of indirect expropriation that is enacted for 
regulatory purposes and affects the economic value of the investment to such an extent that it 
could be considered as expropriated. It should be distinguished from the sovereign and 
legitimate exercise of governmental regulatory powers, since only in the former case 
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Protection of Foreign Property, 1967, Art. 3; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, American Law Institute Vol. 2, pp. 196, 1986, para 712; W. M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, “Indirect 
Expropriation and Its Valuation”, pp. 121-123; S. M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law, p. 425 et.  seq., 
while touching upon the issue of the applicability of international law in State v foreign investors disputes, the 
author analyzes the Restatement (Third)  of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and its commentary 
concerning expropriatory measures and the responsibility of the host State.
17 M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation”, pp. 123-125. See also, Benvenuti & 
Bonfanti v. People’s Republic of the Congo, ICSID case n. ARB/77/2, Award, 8 August 1980; Liberian Eastern 
Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. Liberia, op. cit.
18 M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation”, p. 128.
19 S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law,  pp. 78-79.
20 M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation”, p. 130. The authors specify that 
consequential expropriations lack overt “markers to enable a tribunal to set the moment of valuation at some 
point before the investor’s contemporaneous conclusion that it had been expropriated”.
compensation is required.21 One criterion to differentiate between the two cases focuses on 
the discriminatory nature of the measure.22  Traditionally, however, ordinary taxation, 
imposition of criminal penalties or export controls are not classified as takings, and therefore 
they do not entitle foreign investors to compensation.23 Moreover, when public harms or 
concerns are to be addressed, legislation schemes creating regulatory regimes in areas such as 
antitrust law, consumer protection, environmental protection, planning and land use law, are 
not deemed as amounting to compensable takings, since they are conducive to the exercise of 
the State powers.24 On the whole, the notion of ‘police powers’ seems to be interpreted 
broadly, so that bona fide regulations and other actions of such kind tend to preclude the right 
to compensation.25
Arguably, the debate has shifted from the assessment of the legality of the expropriation 
and the valuation of investors’ property for the purpose of compensation,26 to the qualification 
of the governmental act as welfare-related, and therefore non-compensable, or as ‘tantamount 
to expropriation’, and therefore worthy of compensation.27 Most controversies lie in the extent 
up to which governments may affect the value of private property through regulatory 
measures in order to pursue a legitimate public aim, without performing a ‘taking’ and being 
thereby required to pay compensation. Recent awards seem to increase the kinds of takings 
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21  S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law, p. 77. According to M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign 
Property”, p. 28: one can single out the circumstances in which a taking could arise: 1)  forced sales of property; 
2) forced sales of shares; 3) indigenisation measures; 4) taking over management control over investment; 5) 
introducing other to taking over the property physically; 6)failure to provide protection in case of interference 
with the property of foreign investors; 7)administrative decisions that canceled licenses necessary for the foreign 
business to function within the state; 8) exorbitant taxation; 9)  expulsion of the foreign investor contrary to 
international law; 10) acts of harassment––i.e.: freezing of bank accounts, promoting strikes, lockouts and labour 
shortages.
22 Id, p. 78.
23 M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, pp. 23 et seq.
24 Id.
25 A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation”, p. 394.
26 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriations: New Developments”, p. 64; R. Dolzer, “New Foundations of the Law of 
Expropriation of Alien Property”, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 75, 1981, p. 553.
27  OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in International Investment Law”, in Working 
Papers on International Investment, n. 2004/4, September 2004, p. 2.
that are eligible for compensation.28  Classifying the lawful non-compensable regulatory 
purposes as those resulting
from the execution of tax laws; from a general change in the currency; from the 
action of the competent authorities of the State in the maintenance of public order, 
health or morality; or from the valid exercise of belligerent rights or otherwise 
incidental to the normal operation of the laws of the State,29
the arbitral tribunal in Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic 
seems to specifically trace the boundaries of a legitimate ‘police power exception’.30 
However, no approach is consistently followed by investment tribunals confronted with 
claims of indirect expropriation. No general theory that defines and separates ‘regulation’ 
from ‘expropriation’ is on the horizon, so that a case-by-case inquiry31 is generally conducted 
to decide each case. A case-by-case analysis has the beneficial effect of tailoring the judgment 
to the specific circumstances of each case. However,  such an approach may favor a 
fluctuating case-law––detrimental to the assertion of apposite general principles and to the 
legitimacy of investment law––to the extent that such an inquiry is not performed against the 
backdrop of an intelligible legal methodology.
The judgements of international courts and arbitral tribunals are characterized by the 
application of recurrent criteria that suggest a a dominant trend in the decision of indirect 
expropriatory cases. Such criteria are acknowledged also in international investment treaties.32 
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28  See, Compañia de Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, op. cit.; Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 
2003.
29 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award, 17 March 2006, 
para. 257. The Court emphasized that the so-called ‘police power exception’ is not absolute. In addition, the 
Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens is regarded as 
reflecting customary international law. S. P. Subedi, International Investment Law, op. cit., p. 78.
30 See Chapter VII.
31 G. C. Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?”, pp. 307-338; S. Ratner, 
“Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context”, p. 475, argues that “a coherent doctrine to cover all cases of 
regulatory takings beyond a rather general level is impossible, unnecessary. and counterproductive”. The author 
maintains that each regime should possess its own doctrine and decision-making mechanisms.
32 OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 3.
The judicial practice of the Iran-US Claims tribunal,33 the decisions taken under the NAFTA, 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’), and the 
ECtHR with regard to the understanding of ‘property’ are the most relevant sources in the 
field. A review of the criteria that guide the reasoning of tribunals and panels will be provided 
below, judging them in light of the approach adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (‘OECD’).34 Of course, this is not the only scheme that has been 
employed: Stern, for instance, advocates a two-step procedure, founded firstly on a 
quantitative, and secondly on a qualitative evaluation of the measure concerned;35 Schreuer 
analyses two additional options to distinguish between regulation and indirect expropriation, 
namely a quantitative test looking at the severity of the measure, and a purpose oriented test, 
looking for an intention to expropriate;36 Newcombe, acknowledging the seriousness of the 
existing ‘conudrums’ on expropriation, suggests an alternative legal framework that views 
indirect expropriations as ‘appropriations’, to differentiate them from “State measures that do 
not give rise to a right to compensation”.37  More recently, prominent international law 
scholars have proposed to focus on a proportionality analysis,38 highlighting how investment 
tribunals seem to increasingly resort to this method “in ways that have some resemblances to 
those in many domestic legal orders and those in other international dispute settlement 
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33  M. Sornarajah, “The Taking of Foreign Property”, pp. 23 et seq.; G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a 
Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal”, in American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 88, 1994, pp. 609-610, explaining how the Tribunal has treated the issue of 
taking of property.
34 See, OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”.
35  B. Stern, “In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 38: in order to draw the line between 
regulatory measures imposed by governments and illegitimate interference with investors’ property rights, the 
author poses two questions. The first aims to identify the occurrence of expropriation, and in order to do so the 
effects of the governmental measure are assessed; the second, aims to verify whether there could be legitimate 
reasons not to compensate the investor, which is considered ascertainable by evaluating the nature of the 
measure. (emphasis in the original).
36 C. H. Schreuer, “Rapport: The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT”, p. 154.
37 A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation”, p. 40.
38 A Stone Sweet, J. Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism”, pp. 73-165; A. Stone 
Sweet, “Investor-State Arbitration”, pp. 48-76; B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, pp. 75-103; 
C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, pp. 223-255; L. Engan, “In Search of 
Necessity: Congruence, Proportionality, and the Least-Restrictive Means in Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, 
in Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, 2012, pp. 495-521.
systems”.39 It has been suggested that “this is particularly evident in cases concerned with the 
determination of whether host States measures constitute an indirect expropriation or a 
violation of some aspects of fair and equitable treatment”.40  However, it has also been 
contended that “[t]o adopt proportionality-style [necessity] analysis would place arbitrators in 
the position of the balancing judge as perhaps something quite different than arbitrators 
traditionally conceived”.41
Although formally different, the substance of the existing methods seems to converge, 
addressing: the degree of interference with property rights; the nature of governmental 
measures; the interference of the measure with reasonable and investment-backed 
expectations.42 As will be explained in the following section, these criteria correspond to 
leading ‘doctrines’, but no consensus or consistency has so far been reached in investment 
decisions.
The ‘sole effect doctrine’43 concentrates on the effect of the measure, in order to 
evaluate whether the restrictive effect of the governmental action has engendered an 
expropriation; conversely, the ‘purpose test’ analyzes the aim of the measure, determining 
whether it falls within the sovereign police powers of the State. If it does, no right to 
compensation would arise for investors, irrespectively of the severity of the governmental 
action. The purpose test is multifaceted and takes into account a number of significant 
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39 B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, p. 102.
40 Id.
41 A. Stone Sweet, “Investor-State Arbitration”, p. 75; see also, R. Moloo, J. Jacinto, “Standards of Review and 
Reviewing Standards”, forthcoming.
42 A. K. Hoffman, “Indirect Expropriation”, pp. 156-157; see also, T. Gazzini, “Drawing the Line between Non-
Compensable Regulatory Powers and Indirect Expropriation of Foreign Investment”, pp. 36-51.
43 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriations: New Developments”, p. 90; Newcombe describes this method as “the 
orthodox approach”. See, A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation”, p. 8.
features of the alleged expropriation such as the enrichment by the host State44  and the 
deliberate targeting of the investor. Also the promotion of the general welfare is considered, to 
determine the regulatory character of the measure.45 This factor is particularly disputed since 
it is contentious how to determine what permissible ‘regulatory’ purposes may be pursued by 
States. A third approach may also be identified, which balances the purpose and the effect of 
the host State’s action in order to qualify it as regulation or expropriation and granting 
compensatory rights to the foreign investor in the second case. This approach is advocated as 
the more logical tendency to weigh all the circumstances of a case.46
These canons are dealt with hereinafter. Reference will also be made to the role 
attributed by arbitral tribunals to the State’s ‘intention to expropriate’47  and to ‘omissive 
behaviors’. These two concepts are disputed but are occasionally employed in (indirect) 
expropriation inquiry.
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44 L. Y. Fortier, and S. L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment”, pp. 314-315. 
The case law seems to have abandoned the idea that expropriation must entail an enrichment for the host State, 
because this would imply no protection in cases of indirect expropriation. However, there are discordant 
opinions. See, Eudoro A. Olguìn v. Republic of Paraguay,  ICSID Case n. ARB/98/5, Award, 26 July 2001, para 
84; Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 3 September 2001. para 203. The gist of the 
issue, however, is that the measure should be capable of evaporating the economic value of the investment. V. 
Heiskanen, “The Contribution of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to the Development of the Doctrine of 
Indirect Expropriation”, in International Law Forum, Vol. 5(3), 2003, p. 180.
45 Id, pp. 314-319.
46  Id, p. 300; see also, E.-U. Petersmann, “International Rule of Law”, p. 529 et seq.; UNCTAD, 
“Expropriation”, p. 97. According to the UNCTAD, the indicators of the “abnormal or irregular nature of a 
measure” include: “the lack of genuine public purpose, of due process, of proportionality, and of fair and 
equitable treatment; discrimination, abuse of rights and direct benefit to the State”. However, it is clarified that 
“[n]o one particular indicator should be treated as decisive: a global assessment is necessary in order to see – 
against the rather high threshold set by international law – whether the State should be held internationally 
responsible. This is necessarily a very context-specific exercise”. Saluka v Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 
March 2006, para. 264.
47  “‘Intent’ may form part of the analysis regarding the nature, purpose and character of the measure”. 
Furthermore, it may also be interpreted as a correlative aspect of the ‘genuine public purpose’ required under the 
police power doctrine. UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, pp. 80-81, 106.
I. Current International Doctrines and Criteria to Assess Indirect Expropriatory Claims48
(a) The Degree of Interference with Property Rights
To determine whether the act amounts to an expropriation and engenders a right to 
compensation, arbitral tribunals may evaluate the impact of the host State’s measure on the 
investor’s property. The severity of the measure should be evaluated and it seems that a 
‘substantial interference’ is generally required for a finding of expropriation. A ‘substantial 
interference’ occurs when the investor is deprived of fundamental rights, or when the duration 
of the interference is significant49  or when the economic rights of the investor are 
fundamentally impaired.50  This approach considers that, in order to be deemed indirectly 
expropriatory, a State measure should have the same effects on property rights as a direct 
expropriation.51 This view is generally accepted, although it does not seem to provide any 
clear-cut response to the fundamental question posed by Dolzer.52 As this author noted, the 
crux of the problem is whether there is a point beyond which either compensation is required 
regardless of the objective regulatory nature of the governmental measure, or the 
governmental measure is justified regardless of its (economic) impact on the foreign 
investment.53 A balance between the two variables has not been consistently reached by courts 
and by scholars, and this demonstrates the difficulties that arise in weighing and prioritizing 
the values at stake. In fact, as recently noted, the international practice on takings show that 
“[t]here are State acts which – even if they reach the level of total deprivation – do not 
constitute expropriation under international law and are therefore non-compensable”.54 
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48 These cases mentioned in this section will be analyzed in detail in the following chapters.
49 B. Kunoy, “The Notion of Time in ICSID’s Case Law on Indirect Expropriation”, in Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 23(4), 2006, pp. 337-349; See, Gami Investments Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican 
States (UNCITRAL/NAFTA), final award, 15 November 2004, para. 133.
50  OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, pp. 10-11; C. Schreuer, “The Concept of 
Expropriation under the ECT”, p. 145; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. The United Mexican States: in the 
Tecmed v. Mexico case the tribunal investigated whether ‘due to the action of the host State the assets involved 
have lost their value or economic use for their holder and the extent of the loss’. The tribunal qualifies this 
criterion as the rule to distinguish between a regulatory measure and a de facto expropriation.
51 B. Stern, “In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 39.
52 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriations: New Developments”, p. 80.
53 Id.
54 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 75.
Accordingly, the line drawn by international law between expropriation and legitimate non-
compensable measures is neither clear nor precise.55
The first modern international takings decision, the Norwegian Shipowners’ case,56 
underlined the duty to respect ‘friendly alien property’.57  The PCIJ found an indirect 
expropriation in the Factory Chorzów case,58 while the claim was rejected in the Oscar Chinn 
case,59 based on the circumstance that business conditions are subjects to inevitable changes.60 
The Barcelona Traction case61 presented a takings issue before the ICJ, as well as the case 
with Elettronica Sicula case,62  but in both disputes the expropriation claim proved 
unsuccessful.63  In Biloune v Ghana,64  the governmental acts entailing the irreparable 
exclusion from the MDCL’s project of Mr Biloune were classified by the arbitral tribunal as 
‘constructive expropriation’ of MDCL’s contractual rights in the project, and as expropriation 
of the value of Mr Biloune’s interest in MDCL.65
The severity of the deprivation was also assessed by the Iran-US Claims tribunal in 
Starrett Housing v. Iran,66 Tippetts67 and in the Phelps Dodge case.68 In Starrett Housing, the 
Iran-US Claims tribunal found that an expropriation had occurred, noting that the State’s 
measure had rendered the property rights de facto useless, although the title to property 
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55 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 75.
56 Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims, in R.I.A.A., Vol. I, 13 October 1922, p. 307, 332.
57 Id, p. 323.
58 Factory at Chorzów.
59 Oscar Chinn case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Belgium), PCIJ Series A/B, n. 63, 
12 December 1934, paras 71-75 and 88.
60 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriations: New Developments”, pp. 80-81.
61 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., paras 7-8. The merit was not reached, however separate opinions of 
judges Fitzmaurice, Gros, and Tanaka put emphasis respectively on the ‘disguised expropriation’ that took place, 
the ‘total loss of assets’ resulting from unlawful acts and remained unindemnified, and the lack of proof 
concerning the bad faith of the government. These are all issues that remain unanswered and of legal concern 
today.
62 Elettronica Sicula (ELSI) (US v. Italy), Judgment, 20 July 1989, ICJ Reports, pp. 15, 71.
63 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriations: New Developments”, p. 82.
64 Antoine Biloune v. Ghana, (UNCITRAL), p. 209.
65 The cases will be further analyzed in the following chapters.
66 Starrett Housing Corp v. Iran.
67 Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, op. cit.
68 Phelps Dodge Corp. and Overseas Private Investment Corp. and Iran, case n. 99, in ILM, Vol. 25, n. 3, 1986.
continued to be vested in the foreign investor.69 Furthermore, in Tippetts the tribunal focused 
on the activity of the government-appointed manager and classified the appointment as a 
deprivation of property.70
Under the NAFTA,71 the Pope & Talbot case72 mentioned expressly the requirement of 
a ‘substantial deprivation’, and rejected the investor’s claim for expropriation as a result of 
the alleged diminution of profits due to the export control regime introduced by the host 
State.73 In S.D. Myers,74  the investor submitted Canada’s violation of NAFTA Chapter 11 
through the ban on the export of PCB waste to the United States for 18 months. The tribunal 
addressed the meaning of expropriation, describing it as a ‘lasting removal’ of the owner’s 
ability to make use of its economic rights. It specified that at times a either partial or 
temporary ‘deprivation’ could also be considered as amounting to an expropriation depending 
on the circumstances of the case.75 The Metalclad case provided the occasion for a further 
explanation of the meaning of expropriation under the treaty. According to the decision, it has 
to include
covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in part, of the use of reasonably-to-be-expected 
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the 
host State.76
It must be noted that when the investment is not substantially neutralized and deprived 
of its value as a result of the measure, arbitral tribunals seem inclined to refuse to 
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69  Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Starrett Housing Corp v. Iran, op. cit. Conversely, in Sea-Land the 
tribunal did not find any ‘substantial deprivation or interference’, rejecting therefore the claim for expropriation. 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Sea-Land Service Inc. V. Iran, Award n. 135-33-1, 20 June1984.
70 Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v TAMFS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran,  The Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Civil Aviation Organization, Plan and Budget Organization, Iranian Air Force, 
Ministry of Defence, Bank Melli,  Bank Sakhteman, Mercantile Bank of Iran and Holland, Award n. 141-7-2, 22 
June 1984, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 6, 1984 II, pp. 219, et seq.
71 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden.
72 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, para 96.
73 A. K. Hoffman, “Indirect Expropriation”, pp. 156-157.
74 S.D. Myers Inc. v Government of Canada, Partial Award, para 283.
75 In that case the tribunal did not find the temporary interference at issue as amounting to expropriation. A. K. 
Hoffman, “Indirect Expropriation”, pp. 158-159; OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, pp. 
11-12.
76 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, para 103.
acknowledge an expropriation.77 This was the case in Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (CEMSA) v 
United Mexican States:78  the registered foreign trading company CEMSA claimed to have 
suffered expropriation for having been denied certain tax refunds; its claim was rejected by 
the tribunal which found that the company had not been deprived of control over its 
operations, nor had it suffered excessive interference by the regulatory action of the host 
State.79 The ECtHR in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden80  similarly rejected a claim for 
indirect expropriation on the basis that the right to a peaceful enjoyment of possession had 
merely lost some of its substance, but had not disappeared.
In order to assess the degree of host State’s interference, the duration of the regulatory 
measure is equally relevant.81 Also in this regard, however, there is no universally valid 
approach: some tribunals have held that a deprivation is substantial and significant when it is 
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77 B. Stern, “In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation”, op. cit., p. 40; Generation Ukraine v Ukraine, 
ICSID Case n. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003, para 20.32: the failure of the Kyiv City State 
Administration to provide lease agreements was qualified as not creating a ‘persistent or irreparable obstacle to 
the claimant’s use , enjoyment or disposal of its investment’; See also, PSEG Global Inc. The North American 
Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Elektrik Uretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case 
n. ARB/02/5, Award, 19 January 2007, paras 272 et seq., following this approach. The same could be argued in 
the case, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.  P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case n. ARB/01/3, 
Award, 22 May 2007, paras 234 et seq.; Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. 
Argentine Republic (Vivendi II), ICSID Case n. ARB/97/3, Award, 20 August 2007, paras 7.5.1. It has also been 
recognized that the substantial deprivation can be of a ‘partial nature’: see, S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of 
Canada; Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States; Iurii Bogdanov, Agurdino-Invest Ltd and Agurdino-
Chimia JSC v Republic of Moldova, Award, 22 September 2005, at 17; see also, Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. 
Tanzania, paras 464-465, establishing that the determination of ‘substantial deprivation’ is a legal issue and that 
all economic considerations should be treated as questions of causation and damage, being the suffering of an 
economic loss by the investor not a pre-condition for the finding of an expropriation [under art. 5 of the BIT]; 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. Latvia (Energy Charter 
Treaty), Award, 16 December 2003, para. 4.3.1.
78 pp. 39-67 at 59.
79 OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, pp. 11-12.
80 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden.
81  See, G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?”, pp. 585, 588, 593, 609; R. 
Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property”, pp. 48-49; T. Wälde, A. Kolo, “Environmental Regulation, 
Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’”, pp. 811, 837-838; B. H. Weston, “Constructive Takings under 
International Law”, pp. 119-120; R. Dolzer, M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 100; K. Hobér, 
“Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe: Recent Cases on Expropriation”, in Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol. 1(3), 2004, pp. 1-68.
‘permanent’ and ‘irreversible’;82 others, as in S.D. Myers cited above or, in Wena Hotels v 
Egypt83 or Middle East Cement,84  have appraised similarly temporary measures and reached 
differing conclusions. In the first case, 18 months of interference were considered not 
sufficient to a finding of expropriation; in the second, the seizure of two hotels for one year 
was qualified as a non ‘ephemeral’ measure amounting to expropriation; in the third case, the 
tribunal considered the suspension of an export license for four months as not merely 
‘ephemeral’.85 Inconsistencies are not marginal.
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82 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States; Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting 
Engineers of Iran; Phelps Dodge Corp v The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 217-99-2, 19 March 1986, 
reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 10, pp. 619-628; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, ECJ n. 44/79, 13 December 
1979; the loss of control over the investment is also considered as a factor that may signal an expropriation. It is 
alternative to the destruction of value. UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, in Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements, 2012, pp. 70-71. See, CMS Gas Transmission Corp v. The Argentine Republic, Award, 
12 May 2005, para 263; Methanex v USA, Final Award, 3 August 2005; Azurix v Argentina; LG&E v Argentina, 
Decision on Liability; AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
Case N. ARB/07/22, 23 September 2010, Award, paras 14.2.1–14.3.4.
83 Wena Hotels Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/98/4, Award, 8 December 2000, in 
ILM, Vol. 41, p. 896.
84 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling v. Arab Republic of Egypt, p. 602.
85 A. K. Hoffman, “Indirect Expropriation”, p. 159; G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of 
Property?”, p. 589. Anther important arbitral award is the Revere Copper case in which the arbitral tribunal 
acknowledged a taking by the government, which was in breach of a stabilization clause. Revere Copper & 
Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, op. cit., p. 258. On stabilization clauses see further 
Chapter VII and see also, A. Al Faruque, “Typologies, Efficacy and Political Economy of Stabilization Clauses: 
A Critical Appraisal”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 4(5), 2007, where ‘stabilization clauses’ are 
described as “contractual mechanisms for the promotion and protection of foreign investment  in the negotiation 
of petroleum contracts”. As to the arbitrations involving stabilization clauses, see among the others: Lena 
Goldfields, Ltd v USSR, 1930; Sapphire, p. 136; BP Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd v Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, Award, 10 October 1973; Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil 
Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (TOPCO), Award, 19 January 1977; Dispute 
Between Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic,  Award, 
12 April 1977; AGIP Co v Popular Republic of the Congo; L. Cotula, “Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses 
and Sustainable Development”, Paper presented at OECD Global Forum on International Investment VII, Paris, 
27-28 March 2008, p.. 5, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/8/40311122.pdf, (last accessed on: 19 
February 2012): it is mentioned that in “CMS Gas Transmissions v Argentina, international arbitrators held that 
umbrella clauses make iure imperii violations of contractual stabilization commitments (to the exclusion of 
purely commercial disputes arising out of a contract)  a breach of the investment treaty”. See, CMS v. Argentina, 
paras 296-303.
(b) The Nature of Governmental Measures
Governmental measures may be justified under the sovereign right of the State to act for 
a social purpose.86 Under such circumstances, compensation is excluded, since States “cannot 
be held responsible for economic consequences resulting from the State’s adoption of general 
regulatory measures, taken in good faith, in the pursuit of a legitimate interest and in a non-
discriminatory manner”.87
This approach has been referred to as the ‘police powers’ doctrine. It has been exposed 
to criticism since it seems to automatically exempt the State from the obligation to 
compensate, even in the absence of any test balancing the purpose of the governmental 
decision with the other relevant factors of the case.88  The “overwhelming majority of 
doctrinal opinions”, moreover, requires “the regulatory conduct of States”  to “carry a 
presumption of validity”.89
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States comments on 
the law of expropriation and the State’s ‘police powers’.90  It employs the concepts of 
‘unreasonable interference’, ‘undue delay’ and ‘effective enjoyment’ of property.91 
Furthermore, it refers to the so-called ‘creeping expropriation’,92 including other factors in the 
weighing and balancing exercise. The promotion of general welfare is not assessed per se as 
the justifying rationale behind the State’s regulatory measure; rather, this factor is weighed 
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86 CME (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, para 591, p. 166, defining regulatory measures as aimed to “avoid 
use of private property contrary to the general welfare of the host State”.
87 B. Stern, “In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation”, pp. 45-46.
88  OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 18; A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of 
Regulatory Expropriation”, pp. 420-421: the author suggest that while arbitral tribunals seem to share the view 
that States are exempted from paying compensation under such circumstances, the application of this 
‘indisputable’ principle “is anything but clear”; See also, UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, pp. 82 et seq.
89 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 83.
90 OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 18.
91 R. Dolzer and F. Bloch, “Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?”, in International Law Forum, 
Vol. 5(3), 2003, p. 157.
92  The concept, which is at times used as a synonym for indirect expropriation, alludes to ‘the slow and 
incremental encroachment on one or more ownership rights of a foreign investor that diminishes the value of its 
investment’. UNCTAD, Key Terms and Concepts in IIAs: A Glossary, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements, United Nations Publication, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/2, 2004, p. 69.
against all the relevant circumstances of the case, to counter a State’s expropriatory intent 
hidden behind a public purpose’s justification/invocation.93
The Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries 
to Aliens clarifies that international law prohibits “unreasonable interference with the use, 
enjoyment, or disposal of property [..] ”.94 Despite the apparent clarity of the doctrine on this 
point, the challenge for arbitral tribunals is to set the threshold beyond which a measure 
amounts to an unreasonable interference, substantially impairing an investors’ property rights; 
similarly, the tribunals are called upon to distinguish ‘bona fide regulation[s]’ falling within 
the legitimate police powers of the host State and excluding its economic liability.95
The ECtHR apparently leaves a wide margin of appreciation to States with respect to 
the determination of the scope of their welfare-oriented policies.96 National authorities are 
entitled to effect the initial assessment on the existence of a public concern, whose outcome 
should be accepted unless manifestly unlawful/unreasonable.97 Both for ‘deprivations’ of and 
‘controls’ on the use of property, there has to be a reasonable and foreseeable national legal 
basis for the taking; the balance struck between private and public interests should be 
reasonable, the principles of transparency and the rule of law should be respected and the 
measures adopted should be proportionate. The Court proceeds on a case-by-case98 basis and 
follows a ‘three-step’ test, according to the three rules of Article 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR.99
Article 1, Protocol 1 reads:
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93 L. Y. Fortier, and S. L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment”, p. 317.
94 A. S. Weiner, “Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy of ‘Legitimate’ Regulatory Purposes”, in 
International Law Forum, Vol. 5(3), 2003, p. 167.
95 Sedco Inc v National Iranian Oil Co, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 55-129-3, 28 October 1985, reprinted in 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports, Vol. 9, p. 275; Emanuel Too v The United States et al., Award n. 
460-880-2, 29 December 1989, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 23, p. 378; Ronald S.  Lauder v. Czech Republic; 
The practical implication of excluding bona fide regulations form the scope of indirect expropriation is the denial 
of compensation, regardless of the degree of interference caused by the measure. See, M. Perkams, “The 
Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law”, p. 111.
96 OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, pp. 16-17.
97 Id.
98 See, James & Others v. UK.; Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden.
99 OECD, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, pp. 17-18.
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.
In Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden the ECtHR explained the scope of the ‘three rules’ 
of Article 1, Protocol 1: the first rule concerns the “principle of peaceful enjoyment of 
property”; the second rule “covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain 
conditions”; the third rule “recognizes that States are entitled, among other things, to control 
the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they 
deem necessary for the purpose”.100
Thus, a lawful measure has to be adopted in the public interest and has to be appropriate 
and proportionate to the aim pursued by the State. As Ruiz Fabri noted, “[t]he requisite 
balance will be upset when the person concerned has had to bear ‘an individual and excessive 
burden’ or one that is ‘disproportionate’”.101 Accordingly,
[t]he Court will regard the particular circumstances of each case, including, but 
not limited to: the degree of protection from arbitrariness that is afforded by the 
proceedings brought; the possibility for the State to have recourse to other means 
for achieving the aim (although alternative means of achieving an aim would be 
available, the contested act remains to be justified as long as the method chosen 
remains within the state's margin of appreciation); and the consequences of the 
measures for the person affected. Thus, several factors are relevant to whether a 
‘fair balance’ has been reached. As regards deprivation of property, one of these 
factors is whether the applicant has received adequate compensation.102
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100 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden.
101  H. Ruiz Fabri, “The Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of 
Compensation for ‘Regulatory Expropriations’ of the Property of Foreign Investors”, in New York University 
Environmental Law Journal,  Vol. 11, 2002-2003, p. 163. Reference is made to Erkner & Hofhauer v Austria, 
Series A, n. 117, 1987, pp. 39, 66-67; Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, p. 28.
102  Mellacher v Austria, Series A, n. 169, 1989, at 28. The ECtHR noted that “[t]he possible existence of 
alternative solutions does not in itself render the contested legislation unjustified. Provided that the legislature 
remains within the bounds of its margin of appreciation, it is not for the Court to say whether the legislation 
represented the best solution for dealing with the problem or whether the legislative discretion should have been 
exercised in another way”.
Under the NAFTA a substantial analysis of the effects of the measure is required.103 An 
ICSID tribunal has in turn cited the ECtHR case-law in the case Tecnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed SA v The United Mexican States, in order to determine whether governmental 
measures, and the public interest that they aimed at protecting, could be considered 
proportionate104  to the burden imposed upon the foreign investor.105  More precisely, the 
Tecmed arbitral panel, while acknowledging the occurrence of an expropriation, regarded as 
indisputable the principle according to which a State may cause economic damages to 
investors in the exercise of its powers without being held liable for compensation.106 The 
ruling in Chemtura v Canada is also significant in this respect. The tribunal found that the 
relevant State agency
took measures within its mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by 
the increasing awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for human health 
and the environment. A measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid 
exercise of the State’s police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an 
expropriation.107
This decision is an important expression of the application of the doctrine of police 
power, which dispenses the State with its duty to pay compensation against regulatory 
measures that are deemed to pursue a legitimate public purpose.108
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103 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada.
104  See, B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, “Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law”, in A. J. Van Den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New 
York Convention, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer, 2009, pp. 265 et seq.: The Tribunal seem to have used “the 
proportionality analysis to manage tensions between investment protection and competing public policies”. 
Following a two-step analysis to determine the intensity and the effects of the measure, the Tribunal “aimed at 
achieving ‘Konkordanz’ of the various rights and interests affected”, so that a compensable indirect expropriation 
could occur “only when State measures lead to disproportional restrictions of the right to property”. See also, 
LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, para. 194, quoting from Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. 
The United Mexican States, para 115.
105 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States.
106 Id; see also, Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Mexico, para. 250.
107 Chemtura v Canada, para 266.
108 See further Chapter VII.
(c) The Governmental Measure’s Interference with Reasonable Expectations of Investors
The concept of reasonable expectations further points to the conflict between the 
interests of the host State and those of investors. Indeed, the line between the expectations of 
the investor “to receive certain treatment” 109 and “the State’s expectation to freely conduct its 
legitimate activities”110 is difficult to trace. The “[u]nqualified reference to the protection of 
the investor’s subjective expectations has prompted warnings both at the level of case law and 
doctrine”;111 a subjective approach and interpretation of investors’ legitimate expectations 
“seems to imply that the extent of the State’s obligations depends on how the investor has 
understood them”.112 However, also the State holds its own legitimate expectations in terms of 
ability to exercise of its regulatory powers. Thus, whilst both the degree of risk assumption 
and the expected due diligence of the State are at the core of the investors’ expectations and 
right to protection under an IIT, these elements should not be confused with an unrealistic 
safeguard against future changes of, or adjustment in, the conditions in the host State. 
Investment treaties, indeed, are not “insurance policies against business risks which should be 
shouldered by the investors as part of their business operations”.113
Risk is not only “inherent to”  investments, the assumption of risk is indeed one of the 
defining elements of the concept of investment under the ICSID Convention. Therefore, “the 
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109  According to Kläger, the following categories may fall under the definition of legitimate expectations: 
stability of the overall legal framework; stability in the administrative conduct; stability in the contractual 
relationship. See, R. Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law, CUP, 2012, pp. 169 
et seq.
110 A. R. Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration, pp. 77-78.
111 Id, p. 77. See also, MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile Sa v Republic of Chile, ICSID Case N. ARB/01/7, 
Decision on Annulment, 21 March 2007, para 67: “The obligations of the host State towards foreign investors 
derive from the terms of the applicable investment treaty and not from any set of expectations investors may 
have or claim to have. A tribunal which sought to generate from such expectations a set of rights different from 
those contained and enforceable under the BIT might well exceed its powers, and if the difference were material 
might do so manifestly”.
112 Id.
113 A. R. Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration, p. 78.
issue is how to differentiate”  the risks associated with an investment and how to “allocate 
them” 114 in the settlement of investment disputes.
Determining the occurrence of a violation of legitimate expectations may also imply an 
inquiry concerning the unfair and inequitable treatment allegedly suffered by the investor.115 
Thus, the assessment concerning the legitimacy of the investors’ expectations and the 
reasonable risk which it ran when it decided to invest in the host country may have important 
consequences also in terms of international responsibility of the host State.116
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114 A. R. Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration, p. 78; see also, W. W. Burke-White, A. Von Staden, “Investment 
Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluding Measures Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties”, in Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 48(2), 2008, pp. 307-410. Non-
Precluding Measures (‘NPM’) are provisions contained in BITs that “limit the applicability of investors 
protection under the BIT in exceptional circumstances”. More precisely, these clauses “allow states to take 
actions otherwise inconsistent with the treaty when, for example, the actions are necessary for the protection of 
essential security, the maintenance of public order, or to respond to a public health emergency”, so that “[t]he 
interpretation and application of NPM clauses will therefore prove critical to determining both state freedom to 
respond to exceptional circumstances and the scope of investment protections accorded under BITs”.
115 See also, R. Moloo, J. Jacinto, “Standards of Review and Reviewing Standards”. The authors argue that “[n]
early all investment treaties include a provision obligating the host state to provide “fair and equitable 
treatment” (FET) to investors and their investments. In most cases, the text provides little additional guidance on 
what types of conduct would breach that standard. Tribunals are thus confronted with a provision that is, at least 
on its face, decidedly imprecise”. The authors further explains that “fair and equitable treatment is recognized as 
a “legal term of art”, and is understood to encompass certain more precise types of wrongful conduct. Of these 
“components” of the standard, several are particularly pertinent to disputes relating to regulatory actions, 
including: (i) the right to rely on a reasonably stable and predictable legal framework; (ii) protection from 
arbitrary or discriminatory measures; (iii)  protection from unreasonable treatment; and (iv) the right to a degree 
of transparency and procedural fairness.”
116  A. R. Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration, p. 80. See Saluka v Czech Republic, paras 358-360; Eastern 
Sugar BV v Czech Republic, SCC Case N. 088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007, para 236: “That the market 
would remain free or would become even more free could not be within the expectations of an investor such as 
Eastern Sugar. The wish within the Czech population to join the European Union was obvious. In 2000, an 
investor such as Eastern Sugar accordingly had to expect that the regulation of the sugar market would, as 
accession neared, become roughly the protectionist regime prevailing in the European Union countries”; OECD, 
“Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 19; A. von Walter, “The Investor’s Expectations in 
International Investment Arbitration”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 6(1), 2009, p. 1: the author 
questions whether the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is “used as a panacea for the resolution of all 
unresolved questions” in investment arbitrations. He further observes that “the precise contours of the concept, 
the conditions for its application and its legal foundations remain only scarcely explored”; for a recent analysis 
of the principle of ‘legitimate expectations’ see also, F. Wennerholm, “What Can You Expect? The Role of 
Legitimate Expectations in Investment Protection Disputes”, in K. Hobér, A. Magnusson, M. Öhrström (ed. by), 
Between East and West: Essays in Honour of Ulf Franke, JurisNet, New York, 2010, pp. 573-585: the author 
considers also the origins of the standard, exploring whether it may be conceived as a sub-category of the ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’ standard; see also, R. Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment, pp.186 et seq.  The author 
explains that the problems associated with the protection of legitimate expectations arise mostly with regard to 
the “legitimacy or reasonableness of these expectations, since of course no subjective expectation is deemed to 
be protected by fair and equitable treatment”.
Arbitral tribunals tend to presume that investors have diligently assessed the business 
conditions in the country, before deciding to pursue any economic activity.117 Stable business 
conditions at the onset of the investment operation in the host State do not entitle the investor 
to expect such conditions to be immutable. The legitimacy and reasonableness of investors’ 
expectations are assessed by arbitral tribunals in the effort to balance them with the right/duty 
of the host State to regulate in the public interest.
The gist of the issue is to identify the degree of interference on reasonable 
expectations118  so as to evaluate the compensable/non-compensable nature of the 
governmental regulatory act. It is a question of fairness in balancing opposing interests, a 
judgment that is inseparable from the concept of private property rights––rights to use, enjoy 
the fruits of, and alienate one’s property.119 As said, a degree of risk is obviously part of the 
business environment, which is ‘subject to inevitable changes’.120 Thus, the investor’s landfill 
project cannot but rely on the assurance that it satisfies all the local laws and regulations.121 
Accordingly, legitimate expectations122 may be protected as part of the investment under 
international law, to the extent that they are deemed as an expression of the international legal 
principle of good faith.123 In light of these considerations, although the investor’s legitimate 
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117 A. R. Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration, p. 80.
118 [Emphasis added].
119 L. Y. Fortier, and S. L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment”, pp. 306-307; 
See also, Separate Opinion Prof. T. Wälde, International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United 
Mexican States (UNCITRAL), Award, 26 January 2006, at 37.
120 Oscar Chinn Case, p. 65; see also, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Starrett Housing Corp v. Iran, p. 1117.
121 T. Wälde and A. Kolo, “Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’”, p. 844. 
The reference is to the Metalclad award.
122  B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, “Investor-State Arbitration as Governance”, p. 272: “The main difference 
between the concept of indirect expropriation and the protection of legitimate expectations under fair and 
equitable treatment is that indirect expropriation requires interference with a property interest or entitlement, 
whereas the protection of legitimate expectations under fair and equitable treatment is broader and can 
encompass the expectation in the continuous existence and operation of a certain regulatory or legislative 
framework. Balancing tests of different sorts are also beginning to be used in the jurisprudence of investment 
tribunals on other issues, including in the interpretation of umbrella clauses”.
123  A. Siwy, “Indirect Expropriation and the Legitimate Expectations”, p. 369; Wennerholm talks about 
‘transparency’ as a “key factor, operating as a specific element of ‘good faith’” with regard to legitimate 
expectations’ findings. See F. Wennerholm, “What Can You Expect?”, p. 584.
expectation may influence a finding of expropriation, it is also arguable that not every 
investor’s expectation deserves to be protected under international law.124
A tribunal considered the loss of benefits or expectations as a necessary yet not 
sufficient criterion to qualify expropriation, in Waste Management.125 In Waste Management, 
the claimant argued that the host State’s breach of the contract amounted to an expropriation. 
According to the tribunal, only an ‘expropriation under the contract’, meaning the “effective 
repudiation of a right, unredressed by any remedies available to the claimant, which has the 
effect of preventing its exercise entirely or to a substantial extent”, entails the right to be 
compensated.126  Accordingly, only the expectations that are ‘objectively assessable’, as 
originated in the investor as a consequence of the host State’s conduct––or, resulting from the 
investment contract––may entail the protection of foreign investors in case of governmental 
regulatory actions.127
As noted by Wälde and Kolo, however, investors’ expectations may be employed in 
favor of the host State. According to this reasoning, when for instance environmental 
standards are at stake it is plausible that “one cannot postulate that the environmental regime 
should be absolutely frozen ...”. Thanks to such an argument, the State would benefit from a 
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124 A. Siwy, “Indirect Expropriation and the Legitimate Expectations”, p. 369. See, Waste Management,  Inc. v. 
United Mexican States, p. 896; in particular see, Alpha Projektholding Gmbh v Ukraine, ICSID Case n. ARB/
07/16, Award, 8 November 2010.
125 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, p. 896.
126 A. Siwy, “Indirect Expropriation and the Legitimate Expectations”, p. 369.
127 Id, p. 371. For the arbitral practice concerning claims for protection of legitimate expectations, see, Metalclad 
Corporation v. United Mexican States, p. 29; Azurix Corp v. The Argentine Republic, para 283; Antoine Biloune 
v. Ghana, p. 20; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v.  The United Mexican States, para 149; CMS v 
Argentina, para 252 et seq.; Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v.  Arab Republic of Egypt; MTD 
Equity Sdn. Bhd. And MTD Chile S.A. v Republic of Chile, ICSID Case n. ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 2001; 
Saluka v Czech Republic; see also, Duke Energy v. Peru; Nykomb Synergetics v. Latvia; Europe Cement 
Investment & Trade S.A. v Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/07/2, Award, 13 August 2009.
rationale or justification to give grounds for its purported regulatory measure in the 
environmental interest.128
Foreign investors cannot aim at a ‘blanket protection’ of their expectations from 
regulatory changes in the host State’s legislation.129 Nonetheless, the process through which 
tribunals come to ascertain the legitimacy of investors’ expectations with respect to the (non)
reasonable nature of State measures appears controversial.130 The trend adopted by arbitral 
tribunals is to assess the investors’ expectations at the time they entered the host State and that 
might have been determined by contracts or licenses. Additionally, also informal assurances to 
investors, or governmental attempts to create an investment-friendly environment, are 
regarded as binding upon the States.131 Accordingly, arbitral tribunals are required to draw the 
reasonable expectations engendered on the investor from the evaluation of the legislation in 
force at the time the investment was originally made.132
In practice, arbitral tribunals have presumed that investors could foresee the changes in 
the legal environment of the host State. In Parkering v Lithuania the tribunal considered that 
“an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could change, and thus structure its 
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128 T. Wälde and A. Kolo, “Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’”, p. 824. 
See, Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v Costa Rica, where the Tribunal stated that “the purpose of 
protecting the environment [of Costa Rica], did not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate 
compensation must be paid”. The ICSID panel emphasized that expropriatory environmental measures are 
similar to any other expropriatory measure that a state may effect; thus, the expropriation of property for 
environmental purposes, either of domestic or international nature, demands the payment of compensation. 
Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, paras 68-95.
129 Azinian and Others v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award (NAFTA), 1 November 
1999, para. 83.
130  See, Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, para 148; see also, R. Kläger, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment, p. 187.
131 See, F. Wennerholm, “What Can You Expect?”, pp. 582-583; C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, “At What Time Must 
Legitimate Expectations Exist?”, in J. Werner, A. H. Ali (ed. by), Liber Amicorum Thomas Waelde - Law Beyond 
Conventional Thought, CMP Publishing Ltd, 2012, p. 276, available at http://www.ogel.org/liber-amicorum.asp 
(last visited: 1 February 2012): it is maintained that, according to the case-law, “reliance on general or specific 
assurances given by the host State at relevant time” is “the decisive element for the protection of legitimate 
expectations”, examining the investor’s legitimate expectations “for each stage at which a decisive step is taken” 
towards the advancement of the investment.
132 See also, R. Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment, p. 187.
investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal environment”.133 Furthermore, 
arbitral tribunals have considered risky situations as offering also specific opportunities to 
investors. In Generation Ukraine v Ukraine, the tribunal observed that 
the Claimant was attracted to the Ukraine because of the possibility of earning a 
rate of return on its capital in significant excess to the other investment 
opportunities in more developed economies. The Claimant invested in the Ukraine 
on notice of both the prospects and potential pitfalls. Its investment was 
speculative”.134
The case-law of the Iran-US Claims tribunal is also significant in this regard.135 The 
tribunal habitually establishes whether a compensable deprivation of property occurred by 
examining the correlation between the loss suffered by the private actor and the governmental 
action or omission. The tribunal confirmed that in cases of direct nationalizations and 
expropriations, the State is compelled to pay compensation to the investor, irrespectively of 
the public purpose of the measure and of the proof of its discriminatory nature.136 In light of 
these considerations, when there is clear evidence of expropriation, the method 
(discrimination) or the rationale (public purpose) may merely be conceived of as aggravating 
circumstances that do not alter the judgment on the investor’s right to be compensated. Thus, 
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133 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case N. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, 
para 33.
134 Generation Ukraine Inc v Ukraine, para 20.37.
135 See, G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?”, pp. 585-610.
136  V. Heiskanen, “The Contribution of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal”, pp. 186-187. See, Phillips 
Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, award n. 425-39-2, 29 June 1989. According to the author, one 
could distinguish between expropriations that have taken place without a formal legislative decree but to the 
economic benefit of the State––and these do not seem to be appropriately qualified as ‘indirect expropriations’; 
and, deprivations of property that are directly or approximately attributable to the host State but are effected in a 
manner that does not economically benefit the host State per se; A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory 
Expropriation”, pp. 411-412: the author underlines that the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has expressly 
rejected unjust enrichment as the basis of State Responsibility for deprivations; On unjustified enrichment see 
also, C. H. Schreuer, “Unjustified Enrichment in International Law”, in The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol. 22(2), 1974, pp. 281-301.
the reasoning of the tribunal conveys the idea that domestic or international public purpose 
rationales cannot deprive investors of their right to be compensated against expropriation.137
(d) Proportionality Analysis
As mentioned in Chapter I, the principle of proportionality is referred to by some recent 
investment treaty138  and is applied by international courts.139  The ECtHR applies this 
standard140 in order “to solve the conflicts between individual rights under the Convention [on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] and public policies of the Member States”;141 
furthermore recent arbitral awards quoting the ECtHR judicial practice have proved to 
endorse the proportionality analysis.142
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137  In contrast, in International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, (UNCITRAL/NAFTA), Award, 26 
January 2006, para 208, it is argued that “compensation is not owed for regulatory takings where it can be 
established that the investor or investment never enjoyed a vested right in the business activity that was 
subsequently prohibited”; Y. Nouvel, “L’indemnisation d’une expropriation indirecte”, pp. 198-204, who argues 
that “si les effets de la mesure gouvernent l’éclosion de l’obligation d’indemniser, l’objet de la mesure importe 
dans le calcul du montant de l’indemnisation”.
138  E.g.: ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (2009), Columbia-United Kingdom BIT (2010), 
Columbia-India BIT (2010).
139 E.g.: Nicaragua Case, Merits, paras 237, 249; Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda, para 168 at p. 
223, para 147; Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project,  p. 7, para 85; WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures, 
para 164; Handyside v United Kingdom, para 48; Dudgeon v United Kingdom, para 24.
140 See, for instance, Handyside v United Kingdom, para 22; James and Others v UK, p. 4; Matos e Silva Lda and 
Others v Portugal, para 92; Mellacher and others v Austria, para 48.
141 B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, p. 84.
142  SD Myers Inc v Government of Canada; Feldman v Mexico; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v The 
United Mexican States; LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, paras 34–71; Total SA v Argentina, para 197; 
El Paso Energy v Argentina, paras 241, 243; Continental Casualty v Argentine Republic, para 276; Azurix 
Corporation v The Argentine Republic, paras 310–12; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas v Argentina, Decision 
on Liability, paras 147–48: “States have a reasonable right to regulate foreign investments in their territories 
even if such regulation affects investor property rights. In effect, the [police powers] doctrine seeks to strike a 
balance between a State’s right to regulate and the property rights of foreign investors in their territory”; Archer 
Daniels v United Mexican States; Fireman’s Fund v United Mexican States, para 176(j); Pope and Talbot v 
Government of Canada,  paras 123, 125, 128, 155; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and 
Vivendi Universal S.A. and The Argentine Republic and AWG Group v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case N. 
ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, paras 236–37; Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic,  paras 
304–07; EDF v Romania, paras 45–64, 293–94; Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America, paras 624–25, 
726, 761–71, 779, 803–05. Some Tribunals conversely eschewed the margin of appreciation; see Chemtura v 
Canada; Siemens AG v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case N. ARB/02/8, Award, 6 February 2007; EDF 
International SA, SAUR International SA and Léon Participationes Argentina SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case N. ARB/03/23, Award, 11 June 2012.
The Tecmed case is regarded as a particularly significant example of the application of 
the proportionality analysis in indirect expropriatory cases.143
The claim concerned the operation of a hazardous waste disposal facility in a Mexican 
urban area. The authorities decided not to renew the facility’s operating permit and ordered 
the investor to cease its operations despite not having secured an alternative location for a 
new facility. Therefore the investor could not continue its activity nor could it use that 
particular site for other purposes due to the accumulation of hazardous material. According to 
the authorities, the investor had failed to comply with the permit condition and this was the 
reason for withdrawing the permit. More precisely, Mexico maintained that the authorities 
acted under the police power exception, as they were protecting both the environment and 
public health through their actions.144
The proportionality test is applied with the aim of balancing the policy wiggle-room of 
host States and their right to regulate an effective control against the misuse of the public 
interest justification.145 As the proportionality analysis “is contingent on a court or tribunal 
finding that a regulatory objective is legitimate”, in Tecmed “the effect of the finding that the 
measure did not pursue a legitimate objective infected the tribunal’s approach to the other 
stages of proportionality analysis”.146
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143  Contra: C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 231, arguing that “it is a clear 
example of flawed methodology and an overly stringent standard of review”. See, Tecnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed SA v The United Mexican States, paras 130-139, 145-148; see also, Archer Daniels v United Mexican 
States; Azurix Corporation v The Argentine Republic, paras 310–312; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas v 
Argentina, Decision on Liability, paras 147–148; Fireman’s Fund v United Mexican States, para 176(j).
144 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v The United Mexican States, paras 43, 45, 53, 96, 99, 108, 110, 142.
145 C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 225; S. R: Ratner, “Regulatory Takings In 
Institutional Context”, pp. 525 et seq. The author contends: “Tecmed probably made an important step in 
incorporating the European Human Rights Court’s test of proportionality, making explicit what has often stood 
in the background of regulatory takings decisions that reject the sole effect doctrine and consider the purpose and 
context of the government’s actions. In that sense, despite the Court’s view in James that customary international 
law will not inform its decisions, it may well be the case that some of the Court’s doctrines merit consideration 
in other treaty regimes and even in elaborating customary law. But the Tecmed panel’s lack of reasoning on the 
appropriateness of the test represents a missed opportunity for elaborating the criteria for legitimate cross-regime 
harmonization”.
146 Contra: C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 232.
The arbitral tribunal in LG&E v Argentina147 endorsed a more deferential approach to 
the proportionality analysis. It weighed the measure’s degree of interference with the 
investor’s property right against the regulatory power of the State, performing a contextual 
inquiry and analyzing the host State’s purpose.148 The tribunal asserted that
With respect to the power of the State to adopt its policies, it can generally be said 
that the State has the right to adopt measures having a social or general welfare 
purpose. In such a case, the measure must be accepted without any imposition of 
liability, except in cases where the State’s action is obviously disproportionate to 
the need being addressed.149
The reasonableness, fairness and proportionality of the regulatory measure to the aim 
pursued had also been tested so as to qualify the governmental action as indirectly 
expropriatory in El Paso v Argentina150  and Continental Casualty v Argentina.151 
Furthermore, the proportionality analysis has been applied also in the context of fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) inquiries, as the decision in NAFTA cases SD Myers v Canada,152 
Pope and Talbot v Canada,153 InterAgua v Argentina,154 Vivendi and AWG v Argentina,155 
Saluka v Czech Republic,156  EDF v Romania 157  and Glamis Gold v United States158 
demonstrate.159
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147 LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, paras 34–71.
148 Id, para 195.
149 Id; See also, El Paso Energy v Argentine Republic, para 241.
150 Id, para 241, 243.
151  Continental Casualty v Argentine Republic, para 276. The Tribunal held that states should be granted a 
“significant” margin of appreciation in choosing a policy measure to cope with national emergencies; In Total v 
Argentina the arbitral tribunal stated that the measure was “reasonable [...] and proportionate to [its] aim”. Total 
S.A. v Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, para 197.
152 SD Myers v Canada, paras 255, 261, 263.
153 Pope and Talbot v Government of Canada, paras 123, 125, 128, 155.
154 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas v Argentina, Decision on Liability, paras 215-217.
155 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas and Vivendi Universal v The Argentine Republic, paras 236–237.
156 Saluka v Czech Republic, paras 304-307.
157 EDF (Services) Limited v Romania, paras 45–64, 293–94.
158 Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America, paras 624–625, 726, 761–71, 779, 803–805.
159 See further below, especially Chapter V and VII.
Thus, it is possible to detect an expansionary trend that favors the adoption of the 
proportionality analysis as a standard technique160 in investment arbitration. Proportionality 
has also been regarded as an emerging general principle of international law.161  This 
prominence of the principle has been recently confirmed in Oxy v Ecuador,162  where the 
tribunal contended that it is a “legal principle of general application”.163 More precisely the 
arbitral panel was called upon to examine whether the termination of an oil contract was a 
proportionate response to a breach of that contract by the investor.164 The arbitral tribunal 
discusses the setting of the case and recalls other arbitral decisions in which the 
proportionality principle had been applied,165 highlighting that the principle is applicable also 
in the administrative law context. According to the tribunal, the Respondent State could have 
resorted to other, less severe actions in order to counterbalance the investor’s misbehavior and 
it regarded Ecuador’s decision to terminate the contract as a material breach of its treaty 
177
160  Kingsbury and Schill advised that “intense concerns about the legitimacy in the system of international 
investment treaty law could drive a rapid adoption of proportionality analysis as a standard technique”. Such a 
prediction seems to be verified in the current practice of arbitral tribunals. B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public 
Law Concepts”, p. 104; see also, A. Stone Sweet, “Investor-State Arbitration”, pp. 48-76. The author submits 
that “no arbitral tribunal referred to proportionality, even implicitly, before 2000”. The author, however, is of the 
opinion that the post-2000 case law “shows only that a handful of arbitral tribunals have thus far acknowledged 
that they balance under the FET standard, citing the ECHR process”  failing to “exhibit a sophisticated 
understanding of proportionality analysis”. Nevertheless, proportionality analysis is regarded as “the best 
available doctrinal framework with which to meet the present challenges to the BIT-ICSID system”; UNCTAD, 
“Expropriation”, pp. 100-101.
161 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, p. 171.
162  Occidental Petroleum Corporation,  Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case N. ARB/06/11, Award, 5 October 2012.
163  Id, para 422. In footnote n. 35 the Tribunal further highlight that the principle of proportionality is also 
included in the Ecuadorian Constitution.
164 L. E. Peterson, “Liability Ruling in Oxy v Ecuador Arbitration Puts Spotlight on Need for States to Mete Out 
Treatment That Is Proportionate”, in Investment Arbitration Reporter, 5 October 2012, available at http://
www.iareporter.com/articles/20121010_2, (last accessed: 10 October 2012).
165  Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador, paras 402 et seq. The Tribunal refers to 
proportionality analysis as a common feature of many European Legal Systems, including under EU law, the 
WTO law, the case law of the ECtHR and the ICSID.
obligations, especially to accord a fair and equitable treatment.166 The termination was also 
regarded as a measure tantamount to expropriation of the claimant’s investment.167  The 
tribunal found that Ecuador’s decision to terminate a participation contract was a 
disproportionate action, considering that the State’s loss of its contractual rights as a result of 
the investor’s misbehavior had not caused specific practical harms to the State.168 Moreover, 
such a conclusion was corroborated by the tribunal’s analysis of the governing law of the 
contract, identified in the Ecuadorian law, which was deemed to demand proportionality.169 
According to the tribunal, “[t]he test at the end of the day will remain one of overall 
judgment”, that “balanc[es] the interests of the State against those of the individual, to assess 
whether the particular sanction is a proportionate response in the particular circumstances”.170
The decision of the tribunal in Oxy v Ecuador confirms that proportionality analysis is a 
fallible principle, whose application is affected by the interpretation of the variable 
considered. To the extent that “the legitimacy or value of the policy objective is contested”; 
“there is disagreement as to whether there are other means available to achieve that 
objective”; or, the test “is performed in a highly intrusive manner”, proportionality analysis 
reveals its controversial and defective nature.171
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166 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador, para 450. It is maintained that “[t]he Tribunal 
does not necessarily disagree with the reasoning that the Respondent could justifiably have wished to re-
emphasize the importance of adherence to its regulatory regime. But the overriding principle of proportionality 
requires that any such administrative goal must be balanced against the Claimants’ own interests and against the 
true nature and effect of the conduct being censured. The Tribunal finds that the price paid by the Claimants – 
total loss of an investment worth many hundreds of millions of dollars – was out of proportion to the 
wrongdoing alleged against OEPC, and similarly out of proportion to the importance and effectiveness of the 
“deterrence message” which the Respondent might have wished to send to the wider oil and gas community”.
167 Id, paras 453 et seq.
168 Id, para 416. In contrast to the Respondent’s argument that “no State is ever obliged to demonstrate harm to 
itself as a precondition to enforcing its own laws”.
169  Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador: “any penalty the State chooses to impose 
must bear a proportionate relationship to the violation which is being addressed and its consequences. This is 
neither more nor less than what is encapsulated in the Respondent’s own constitutional rules about 
proportionality”.
170 Id, para 417.
171 C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 238.
(e) Debated Standards: State’s Intention to Expropriate and Omissive Conducts
This section examines two standards whose significance for a finding of indirect 
expropriation is debated before arbitral tribunals. The State’s intention to expropriate and the 
parties’ omissive conducts are mostly treated as irrelevant or secondary factors in the decision 
of the case. To the contrary, as will be noted in the following chapters, the role of both the 
State’s intent and the parties’ omissions may prove useful, especially when the measure is no 
prima facie regulatory or expropriatory, or its qualification is contentious.
(i) The State’s Intention to Expropriate
The approach of looking at the State’s ‘intention to expropriate’ as a parameter to assess 
the expropriatory nature, and the ensuing compensability, of governmental actions172 plays a 
limited role in the investment practice: the difficulties in showing a State’s ‘deliberate plan’ to 
expropriate prevent any judicial evaluation on the point from proving decisive. On the other 
hand, a State’s denial of its expropriatory intent cannot ex se effectively serve as a 
counterargument to the claimant’s allegation of having been dispossessed.173 Whilst
[i]n cases of direct expropriation, there is an open, deliberate and unequivocal 
intent [of the State], as reflected in a formal law or decree or physical act, to 
deprive the owner of his or her property through the transfer of title or outright 
seizure,174
in cases of indirect expropriation “intent [only] forms part of the analysis regarding the 
nature, purpose and character of the measure”.175 Thus, ‘intent’ has been recognized as linked 
to “the doctrine of “abuse of rights”  ”  and serving as “a flipside of the requirement that the 
police-powers measure must pursue a genuine public purpose”.176 Indeed, Byrne suggests to 
differentiate between a ‘de jure nationalization’, where the intent to expropriate is explicit; 
and, a ‘de facto nationalization’ where, conversely, the intent to expropriate is latent but it 
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172 S. N. Lebedev, “The Concept of Expropriation in the Energy Charter Treaty”, p. 144.
173 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?”, p. 90.
174 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 7.
175 Id, p. 81.
176 Id, p. 106.
may be drawn from the facts and the result itself of the governmental measure.177 However, 
this distinction is not favorably accepted in the literature as well as in arbitral decisions.178
Reisman and Sloane refer to the notion of ‘consequential expropriation’ and thereby 
oppose a role for the ‘intention to expropriate’. According to their view, a State may effect an 
expropriation regardless of any express intention thereof, so that intentionality may merely 
confirm that an expropriation has occurred. Similarly, Prof. Christie observed in his analysis 
of the Chorzów Factory179 case and the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims180  case that “a State 
may expropriate property, where it interferes with it, even though the State expressly 
disclaims any  such intention”.181  Furthermore, the tribunal in Biloune v Ghana182 refused to 
analyze the motives underlying the actions and omission by the Government in order to 
decide the case;183  in Tecmed v Mexico, likewise, the tribunal plainly declared that “the 
government’s intention is less important than the effects of the measures on the owner of the 
assets or on the benefits arising from such assets affected by the measure [..]”.184 The tribunal 
further highlighted the key role of the measure’s ‘actual effects’ to determine whether an 
expropriation has occurred,185  ratifying the leading function of the ‘sole effects doctrine’ in 
judgments concerning expropriatory issues.186  This is apparent also in the case-law of the 
Iran-US Claims tribunal: its practice focuses on the effects of the measure, rather than on the 
Government’s intention.187
180
177 K. A. Byrne, “Regulatory Expropriation and State Intent”, in Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 
38, 2000, pp. 89, 96, quoted in C. H. Schreuer, “Rapport: The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT”, p. 154.
178 R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, Principles, p. 103. See, Azurix v Argentina op. cit; Tecmed v Mexico, op. cit; Siemens 
v Argentina, op. cit.
179 PCIJ, Factory at Chorzów, judgment, Series A, n. 17, 13 September 1928.
180 PCA, Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims, in R.I.A.A., Vol. I, 13 October 1922, p. 307, 332.
181 G. C. Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?”, p. 311.
182 Antoine Biloune v. Ghana, p. 209.
183 This same approach may be found in Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, p. 226.
184 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, para 116.
185 Id.
186 Dolzer also underlines that the jurisprudence is “heavily focused on the effects on the owner”. See, R. Dolzer, 
“Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?”, p. 91.
187 See, Starrett Housing Corp v Iran, para 154; Tippetts, paras. 225-226; Philipps Petroleum Co v Iran, para 97;
As will be noted, an exception to this trend is the Sea-Land188 case, where the Iran-US 
Claims tribunal required a “deliberate action by the government” and in light of this 
consideration evaluated the State’s intention, to determine whether an indirect expropriation 
had occurred. A second ‘special case’ in this regard is Olguín v Republic of Paraguay:189 the 
ICSID tribunal explained, although as an obiter dictum, that “a theleologically driven action” 
is needed for an expropriation to take place, interpreting the adverb ‘theologically’ as to 
demand an ‘intentional’ conduct by the Government.190
In his review of the ‘boundaries’ of regulatory  expropriation, Newcombe has 
emphasized that the “intent to expropriate is not a necessary element of state 
responsibility”;191  nevertheless, the author suggested a valuable use of this parameter, 
considering it relevant in order to reject any governmental defense based on a “good faith 
exercise of regulatory powers”.192
The principle of good faith is important in the analysis of both the State and the investor 
conduct and it could drive the tribunal’s decision of a case. In Oxy v Ecuador193 the tribunal 
relied on the good faith of the investor to evaluate the breach of the contract lamented by the 
Ecuadorian State. The tribunal, indeed, noted that “the Claimants’ failure to seek ministerial 
authorization was a mistake, a serious mistake, but it was not done in bad faith”.194 According 
to the tribunal the Claimants “may have been negligent but there was no intention on their 
part to mislead. They were simply convinced that they were right and acted accordingly 
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188 Sea-Land Service Inc and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 135-31-1, 20 June 1984, reprinted in Iran-
USCTR, Vol. 6, 1984 (II), p. 166.
189 Olguin v Republic of Paraguay, p. 192.
190 See Chapter V, “The Concept of Taking”.
191 A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation”, pp. 9-11, 20.
192 Id, p. 20.
193 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador.
194 Id, para 380. [Emphasis added]
without seeking to mislead the Ecuadorian government”.195 Such an approach shows the 
substantive effects that a tribunal’s appraisal of the parties’ intent may have on the outcome of 
this kind of disputes.
(ii) Omissive Conducts
A second approach that might be usefully applied to evaluate expropriatory measures 
focuses on the parties’ omissive behaviors. Notwithstanding some references to the fact that 
“the liability of a State can arise through act or omission”,196  both the judicial and arbitral 
practice and the literature dispute the relevance of this criterion. As will be noted, arguing that 
an indirect expropriation has occurred as a result of a State’s omission is plausible, but seldom 
accepted by courts; therefore, it is problematic to conceive a role for ‘omission’ among the 
interpretative criteria to assess expropriation.197
In Amco, the ICSID tribunal found that “expropriation in international law also exists 
merely by the State withdrawing the protection of its courts from the owner expropriated 
[..]”;198 and similarly, in Eureko, it was submitted that “the right of an investor can be violated 
as much by the failure of a Contracting State to act as by its inaction”.199
In GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v Ukraine,200 the omissive conduct of the Ukrainian 
Courts, that failed to enforce the ICC Award201  is analyzed as a ground for claiming 
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195  Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador, para 380. The Tribunal reached this 
conclusion when assessing the Claimant’s duty to obtain the authorization for the transfer of rights under the 
participation contract, as established in Clause 16.1 of the contract, and the right of the corresponding right of 
the State to terminate the contract in case of breach of the provision, as established in Clause 21.1.2 of the 
contract.
196  Asgari Nazari v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 559-221-1, 24 August 1994, 
reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 30, p. 123 et seq., para 125; Judge Holtzmann, Dissenting Opinion on Flexi-Van 
Leasing, Inc v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,  Award n. 259-36-1, 11 October 1986, reprinted 
in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 12, 1986 III, p. 362.
197 See below Chapter V.
198 A. Reinisch, “Expropriation”, pp. 431-432, quoting Amco Asia Corporation v Republic of Indonesia, ICSID 
Case n. ARB/81/1, Award, 20 November 1984.
199  Id, quoting Eureko BV v Republic of Poland, (Netherlands/Poland BIT) Ad hoc, Partial Award, 19 August 
2005, para 241.
200 GEA Group Aktiengesellchaft v Ukraine.
201 Id, para 208.
expropriation; and similarly, in White Industries v India,202 the setting aside of a valid foreign 
award is alleged by the claimant to amount to a taking under the BIT.203
Not only the omissive conduct of the State (or State’s organs) may be considered, but 
also the investor’s failure to act. In the case Waguih Elie Georg Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v 
Egypt204 the investor’s failure to honor its commitments is advanced by the State as the 
ground to justify the expropriation of the investor’s property. The arbitral tribunal rejected the 
allegation as it did not considered it a valid basis to justify an expropriatory measure.
***
The practical difficulties faced by arbitral tribunals when applying the doctrine of 
indirect expropriation are confirmed by the variety of competing doctrinal opinions that favor 
the differing application of criteria and standards.205  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
commentators mostly uphold a case-by-case approach, being skeptical about the possibility to 
fashion a general theory and single out firm principles, for identifying a ‘taking’.
The following sections analyze in further detail the judicial practice of international 
courts and investment tribunals. The decisions by these international judicial and arbitral fora 
will be examined in light of the concepts of property, taking, lawful versus unlawful takings, 
and public purpose, with the aim of illustrating the practical implications of the adjudicators’ 
approaches to indirect expropriation. The lack of both an appropriate conceptualization of the 
object of analysis and an intelligible methodology and standard of review are regarded as the 
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202 White Industries Australia Limited v Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Award, 30 November 2011.
203  Id, paras 12.3.1., 12.3.2; Contra: Swisslion DOO Skopje v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
ICSID Case N. ARB/0916, Award, 6 July 2012, para 310 et seq. See also, I. Kalnina, “White Industries v The 
Republic of India: A Tale of Treaty Shopping and Second Chances”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 
9(4), 2012.
204  Waguih Elie Georg Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case N. ARB/05/15, 
Award, 1 June 2009.
205  A. S. Weiner, “Indirect Expropriations”, pp. 168-169; Gourgourinis draws the distinction between the 
interpretation and application of norms in investment adjudications, and investigates the implications of the two 
concepts’ misconception. See, A. Gourgourinis, “The Distinction between Interpretation and Application of 
Norms in International Adjudication”, in Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 2(1), 2011, pp. 31-57; 
Lalive pinpoints that “the fundamental importance of the reasoning in international awards”, which is even 
greater given the “specific nature of Investor-State arbitration, particularly under the ICSID Regime”. P. Lalive, 
“On the Reasoning of International Arbitral Awards”, in Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 1(1), 
2010, p. 64.
main reasons for the unpredictability of decisions in the field. The legitimacy206 of investment 
decisions is also affected by this situation, that leaves unanswered the question concerning to 
what extent it is appropriate “to accommodate greater space for host States’ to regulate in 
pursuit of the public interest”,207 without compensating aggrieved foreign investors.
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206 The criticism concerning the role of arbitrators, the formation of arbitral panel, as well as their interpretative 
activity are recurring topics in international investment legal literature. See, among the others: W. Park, 
“Investment Claims and Arbitrator Comportment”, in J. Werner, A. H. Ali (ed. by), Liber Amicorum Thomas 
Waelde - Law Beyond Conventional Thought, CMP Publishing Ltd, 2012, pp. 183-210, available at http://
www.ogel.org/liber-amicorum.asp (last visited: 1 February 2012); M. Paparinskis, “Sources of Law and Arbitral 
Interpretations”, pp. 87-116; W. W. Park, “Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration and 
Court Selection”, in Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 8, 1998, pp. 19-56; W. W. Park, 
“National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration”, in 
Tulane Law Review, Vol. 63, 1988-1989, pp. 647-709; W. W. Park, “Duty and Discretion in International 
Arbitration”, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, 1999, pp. 805-823; W. W. Park, “Arbitrator 
Integrity The Transient and The Permanent”, in San Diego Law Review, Vol. 46, 2009, pp. 629-704; G. 
Guillaume, “The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators”, in Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement, Vol. 2(1), 2011, pp. 5-23; S. W. Schill, “Crafting the International Economic Order”, pp. 401-430; C. 
B. Rosenberg, “Challenging Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitrations”, in Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 27(5), 2010, 505-517.
207  C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 254; S. W. Schill, “Deference in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualizing the Standard of Review”, in Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement, Vol. 3(3), 2012, pp. 577-607.
Chapter IV
The Concept of Property
“Definitions are like belts. The shorter they are, the more elastic they need to be. A short belt reveals nothing 
about its wearer, by stretching it, it can be made to fit almost anybody”.1
The object of any actions of expropriation is property. Such a concept holds a 
preliminary function with regard to the definition of taking, either direct or indirect. In 
international law the notion of property has been subjected to a number of interpretations 
aimed at identifying the scope of the right to ownership deserving legal protection. In the field 
of international investment law, only property that amounts to an investment may be the 
object of expropriation and be protected under the relevant IIT. Accordingly, tribunals are 
required to correctly define and identify the investment as a key step in the analysis 
concerning whether an expropriation has occurred.
The notion of investment is not only complicated but also disputed in both literature and 
practice, although a number of characteristics have been associated to the qualification of an 
operation as amounting to an investment.2 The concept is crucial to determining the parties’ 
consent to arbitration and establishing the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute: claims 
unrelated to or falling outside the scope of the definition of investment as agreed in the treaty 
(and interpreted by the tribunal) will qualify the arbitration as not consented by the parties and 
bar the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the dispute.
Arbitral tribunals, however, adopt varying approaches to determine whether or not an 
investment exists3 causing serious difficulties in terms of jurisdiction, legitimacy, consistency 
185
1 S. Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding: An inquiry into the Aims of Science, Indiana University Press, 1961, 
p. 18, as quoted in D. A. R. Williams, S. Foote, “Recent Developments in the approach to identifying an 
‘investment’ pursuant to Article 25(1)  of the ICSID Convention”, in C. Brown, K. Miles (eds), Evolution in 
Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, CUP, 2011, p. 43.
2 See below, paragraph IV ‘Other Tribunals’. It is here assumed that no controversies arise with regard to the 
notion of ‘investor’. In the practice, however, also the notion of ‘investor’ may be problematic and give rise to 
disputes.
3 E.g.: the comprehensive approach, the focus on form or substance, the elements of the investment (risk, 
duration, contribution, contribution to the economic development of the host State).
and predictability of international investment law.4 Their decisions on the qualification of an 
investment may also be influenced by domestic property rights5 to the extent that national 
systems and their evolving notions of common good and social values are “reflected on the 
international level in the parameters of the takings doctrine”.6 Against this framework, one 
may argue that the lack of a overarching international definition of the property7 suitable for 
protection under international law deprives adjudicators of valuable guiding principles to 
assess the nature of ownership for the purposes of foreign investment protection.
The following section illustrates the interpretation of the concept of property before the 
PCIJ, the ICJ, the ECtHR, the Iran-US Claims tribunal, and other investment tribunals. It will 
be highlighted that the substance of the notion is seemingly shared by the diverse fora. The 
parameters that vary are the treatment of property, the standards of review applied and the 
ensuing protection afforded to the owners. In terms of content an homogeneous meaning of 
protectable property may be identified in international investment law. However, the different 
weight that tribunals may assign to the characteristics required to property to amount to an 
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4 “[...] arbitral tribunals to a certain extent have shown concern for the future shape and direction of the law, 
since publication of their decisions and awards has exposed the differences in how tribunals qualify facts and 
understand the law”. A. R. Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration, p. 139.
5 For instance in Iberdorla Energía SA v La República de Guatemala, ICSID Case n. ARB/09/5, Award, 17 
August 2012, para 323, the Tribunal observed that the Claimant relied on the local laws in order to qualify the 
action as expropriatory.
6 As argued by Dolzer, “Of course, the key issue then is where that point on the spectrum is reached which 
designates the line beyond which the property converts into an empty shell. Within the methodology outlined in 
the approach above, the general principles of law will call for a comparative analysis of domestic property 
systems to provide an answer, or at least the basis of an answer. Thus, changing notions of the common good and 
of the priority of social values, as they are slowly shaping national orders of property and the international 
environmental agenda, would also be reflected on the international level in the parameters of the takings 
doctrine”. R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriations: New Developments”, p. 93.
7 Recently, the question of the international notion of property has been explored in J. G. Sprankling, “The 
Emergence of International Property Law”, in North Caroline Law Review, Vol. 90, 2012, pp. 461-509. The 
author maintains that “the effort to create a broad, internationally enforceable right to property has been 
unsuccessful to date” and “[i]t remains and aspiration, not a reality”. However, the author investigates specific 
doctrines that demonstrate “that a significant body of international property law already exists––even if it is not 
conventionally viewed as such”. The author refers also to Independent Expert Report, The Right of Everyone to 
Own Property Alone as Well as in Association with Others 9, UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.
4/1994/19, 25 November 1993, (by Luis Valencia Rodriguez).
investment in light of the law applicable to the case may alter the degree of protection 
granted.8
I. The Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice
Movable and immovable property constitutes protected property under customary 
international law.9 In addition, also intangible rights, such as contractual rights, are protected 
as ‘acquired’ or ‘vested’ rights in arbitral decisions.10 Already the PCIJ acknowledged that 
contractual rights may qualify as property that may be subjected to expropriation.11 In Oscar 
Chinn12  the PCIJ rejected a compensation claim by stating that “[f]avourable business 
conditions and goodwill are transient circumstances, subject to inevitable changes”. However, 
“it apparently accepted the concept of vested rights that might be expropriated”.13
The scope of property rights was broadly approached by the PCIJ also in German 
Interest in Polish Upper Silesia.14 The PCIJ found that 
it is clear that the rights of the Bayerische to the exploitation of the factory 
and to the remuneration fixed by the contract for the management of the 
exploitation and for the use of its patents, licenses, experiments, etc., have 
been directly prejudiced by the taking over of the factory by Poland. As 
these rights related to the Chorzów factory and were, so to speak, 
concentrated in that factory, the prohibition contained in the last sentence of 
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention applies in all respect to them.15
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8 One should note that the ICSID Convention does not define the term investment. Although parties to the 
Convention, the States benefit of a certain degree of discretion in determining what an investment is for the 
purpose of the ICSID. Arbitral tribunals have also distinguished between ‘investment’ under the ICSID 
Convention and under the investment treaty; others have examined the definition of the investment only under 
the investment treaty concerned. See below, para IV.  See also, A. R. Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration, pp. 
56 et seq.
9 U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, “Property, Right to, International Protection”, in R. Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, OUP, online edition, 2009, para 17, visited on 17 August 2012.
10 Rudloff case, Interlocutory, 1903-5, in RIAA, Vol. 9, p. 244; Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway v United 
States of America), 1922, in RIAA, Vol. 1, p. 307.
11 P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, pp. 412-413.
12 Oscar Chinn. See also, C. J. Tams, “Oscar Chinn Case”, in R. Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, OUP, online edition, 2009, visited on 17 August 2012.
13 P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook, pp. 412-413.
14 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland), Judgement, PCIJ, Report Series A, N. 
7, 25 May 1926.
15 Id, p. 44 as quoted in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law, p. 414.
The status of shareholders rights was discussed by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction 
case.16  The ICJ considered whether “a State could protect its shareholders in a foreign 
corporation affected by measures of a third State”, and established that shareholders are not 
entitled to seek compensation under international law unless their direct rights were infringed 
or if a treaty specifically grants such protection.17 The Court held that
[I]n the present state of the law, the protection of shareholders requires that 
recourse be had to treaty stipulations or special agreements directly 
concluded between the private investor and the State in which the 
investment is placed. States ever more frequently provide for such 
protection, in both bilateral and multilateral relations, either by means of 
special instruments or within the framework of wider economic 
arrangements. Indeed, whether in the form of multilateral or bilateral 
treaties between States, or in that of agreements between States and 
companies, there has since the Second World War been considerable 
development in the protection of foreign investments. The instruments in 
question contain provisions as to jurisdiction and procedure in case of 
disputes concerning the treatment of investing companies by the States in 
which they invest capital. Sometimes companies are themselves vested with 
a direct right to defend their interests against States through prescribed 
procedures.18
In Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI)19, the ICJ clarified that 
While there may be doubt whether the word “property”, in Article V, 
paragraph 1, extends, in the case of shareholders, beyond the shares 
themselves, to the company or its assets, the Chamber will nevertheless 
examine the matter on the basis argued by the United States that the 
property to be protected under this provision of the FCN Treaty was not the 
plant and equipment the subject of the requisition, but the entity of ELSI 
itself.20
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16 Barcelona Traction, p. 4. The Court clarified that the criterion for the determination of the nationality of the 
claim is the place of incorporation.
17  P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, p. 82; C. 
Schreuer, U. Kriebaum “The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and International Investment Law”, in 
S. Breitenmoser, B. Ehrenzeller, M. Sassòli, W. Stoffel B. W. Pfeifer (eds), Human Rights, Democracy and the 
Rule of Law-Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber, Nomos, 2007, p. 755; M. Paparinskis, “Barcelona Traction: A 
Friend of Investment Protection Law”, in Baltic Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 8, 2008, pp. 128 et seq. The 
author maintains that “Barcelona crystallised the emerging split between the customary diplomatic protection 
regime (not meant to ensure perfect protection)  and different special treaty regimes (that States may tailor to any 
needs they want, inter alia of perfect protection)”.
18 Barcelona Traction, para 90.
19 Elettronica Sicula, p. 15.
20 Id, para 106.
The ICJ concluded by accepting the protection of foreign shareholders by the State of 
their nationality against the State of incorporation.21 It seems that with regard to shareholders 
rights their protection is perceived as effectively afforded in the treaty context.22 Moreover, 
the ratio of Barcelona seems to suggest the preeminence of “the lex specialis and exceptional 
treaty regime that States have crafted precisely to escape the bounds of custom”.23 Such a 
conclusion seems further confirmed in the Diallo case,24 where the Court held:
The Court is bound to note that, in contemporary international law, the 
protection of the rights of companies and the rights of their shareholders, 
and the settlement of the associated disputes, are essentially governed by 
bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection of foreign 
investments, such as the treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign 
investments, and the Washington Convention of 18 March 1965 on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, which created an International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), and also by contracts between States and foreign 
investors. In that context, the role of diplomatic protection somewhat faded, 
as in practice recourse is only made to it in rare cases where treaty régimes 
do not exist or have proved inoperative. It is in this particular and relatively 
limited context that the question of protection by substitution might be 
raised. The theory of protection by substitution seeks indeed to offer 
protection to the foreign shareholders of a company who could not rely on 
the benefit of an international treaty and to whom no other remedy is 
available, the allegedly unlawful acts having been committed against the 
company by the State of its nationality. Protection by “substitution”  would 
therefore appear to constitute the very last resort for the protection of 
foreign investments.25
In light of the aforementioned, the ICJ recognized the preeminent role of investment 
treaties in the qualification and subsequent protection of foreign property amounting to an 
investment. The Court further highlighted the secondary and gap-filling nature of diplomatic 
protection in current investment practice.
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21 Elettronica Sicula, pp. 15, 23, 48-82.
22  M. Paparinskis, “Barcelona Traction: A Friend of Investment Protection Law”, in Baltic Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 8, 2008, p. 131. The author quotes, among the others, De Visscher who “perfectly 
summarised the ratio of Barcelona” stating that “la difficulté ne pourra être surmontée quepar une réglementation 
conventionnelle dont la Cour n’apas hésité évoquer la nécessité”.
23 Id, p. 133.
24  Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo), 
Preliminary Objections, ICJ Judgment, 24 May 2007.
25 Id, para 88.
II. The European Court of Human Rights
Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR guarantees the right to property.26 According to the 
broad interpretation endorsed by the ECtHR, ‘property’ has an autonomous meaning that 
encompasses, but is not limited to, the ownership of material goods, and which is independent 
from formal classifications in domestic law.27 Existing possessions28  or assets, including 
claims,29 are protected by of Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR, whereas a ‘right to acquire property’ 
is formally excluded from the provision.30 As recently pointed out in the literature31, the Court 
found that are protected under Article 1 Protocol 1: movables and immovables, land and 
buildings;32  usufruct;33  trust and long leaseholds;34  goods to which a title is reserved;35 
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26 Marckx v Belgium, 13 June 1979, A/31, at para 63; see also, Lithgow et al v United Kingdom, 8 July 1968, A/
102, para 106; Tre Traktörer AB v Sweden, 7 July 1989, A/159, para 53; Gasus v Netherlands, para 55: Mazurek 
v France, 1 February 2000, ECHR 2000-II, para 41; Do!an v Turkey, 29 June 2004, ECHR 2004-VI, para 138.
27 C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum “The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law”, p. 745; Brownioski v Poland, 
para 129; Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, para 57; James v UK, para 42; Gasus v Netherlands, para 53; Matos 
e Silva v Portugal, para 75; Iatridis v Greece, 25 March 1999 (GC), ECHR 1999-II, para 54; Beyeler v Italy, para 
100; Former King of Greece et al v Greece, 23 November 2000 (GC), ECHR 2000-XII, para 60; Wittek v 
Germany, 12 December 2002, ECHR 2002-X, para 42; Do!an v Turkey, paras 138-139; Öneryildiz v Turkey, 30 
November 2004 (GC), ECHR 2004-XII, para 124; Intersplav v Ukraine, para 30; Anheuser-Busch Inc v 
Portugal, para 63.
28 Beyeler v Italy, paras 51, 104-105; Brownioski v Poland, paras 136, 140-131, 145, 187; Öneryildiz v Turkey, 
para 124; Maurice v France,  6 October 2005 (GC), ECHR 2005-IX, para 78; Hutten-Czapska v Poland, N. 
35014/97, 19 June 2006 (GC), paras 157, 164.
29 Wendenburg et al v Germany, Decision, 6 February 2003, ECHR-2003-II, at 353; Buzescu v Romania, N. 
61302/00, 24 May 2005, para 81; Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal, para 64; Beyeler v Italy, para 100; Lallement v 
France, N. 46044/99, 11 April 2002, paras 18-24; Stretch v United Kingdom, N. 44277/98, 24 June 2003, para 
32; Tütüncü et al v Turkey, N. 74405/01, Decision, 13 May 2004; Kopeck" v Slovakia, 28 September 2004 (GC), 
ECHR 2004-IX, para 35; Caisse Régionale de Crédit Agricole Mutuel Nord de France v France, N. 58867/00, 
Decision 19 October 2004, at 11; Öneryildiz v Turkey, para 124; Sacilor Lormines v France, N. 65411/01, 
Decision, 12 May 2005, at 41; Maurice v France, 6 October 2005 (GC), ECHR 2005-IX, para 78; Poznanski v 
Germany,  N. 25101/05, Decision, 3 July 2007, at 12; J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd et al v United Kingdom, N. 44302/02, 
30 August 2007 (GC), para 52; Associazione Nazionale Reduci della Prignionia dall’Internamento e dalla 
Guerra di Liberazione et al v Germany, N. 45563/04, Decision, 4 September 2007, at 13. The ECtHR refers to 
the possibility for the applicant to invoke its ‘legitimate expectations’ to enjoy the right to property.
30 Van der Mussele v Belgium, 23 November 1983 (PL), A/70, para 48; Kopeck" v Slovakia, para 35; Stec et al v 
United Kingdom, paras 53-55, Merits, 10 May 2007 (GC), para 34.
31  The list of protectable property is provided in L. Wildhaber and I. Wildhaber, “Recent Case Law on the 
Protection of Property in the European Convention on Human Rights”, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, 
S. W. Wittich (eds)  International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs, 
2009, pp. 659-661.
32 Wiggins v United Kingdom, Decision, 8 February 1978, Decisions and Reports, Vol. 13, pp. 40, 46.
33 Wittek v Germany, 12 December 2002, ECHR 2002-X, paras 43-44.
34 James et al v UK, paras 10-13, 38.
35 Gasus v Netherlands, para 53.
commercial clientele;36 goodwill for professional clientele;37 layoff indemnities;38 exclusive 
rights to use internet domain names;39  shares;40 intellectual property;41  claims arising from 
contracts or torts deemed “sufficiently established to be enforceable”;42  “legitimate 
expectations”;43  license to serve alcoholic beverages in a restaurant;44  permit to extract 
gravel;45 fishing rights in coastal waters on the basis of leases contracted with the State;46 
hunting rights;47 claims to pensions and other social security benefits.
As the ECtHR explained in James et al v United Kingdom, Article 1 Protocol 1 
comprises
[..] ‘three distinct rules’: the first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first 
paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful 
enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained in the second sentence of 
the first  paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it  to 
certain conditions; the third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises 
that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the 
use of property  in accordance with the general interest (Sporrong and 
Lönnroth, Series A no. 52, p. 24, para. 61). The Court  further observed that, 
before inquiring whether the first general rule has been complied with, it 
must determine whether the last two are applicable (ibid.). The three rules 
are not, however, ‘distinct’ in the sense of being unconnected. The second 
and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with 
the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be 
construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule.48
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36 Iatridis v Greece, para 55; Tre Traktörer AB v Sweden, paras 43, 53.
37 Van Marle et al v Netherlands, 26 June 1986, A/101, paras 39-41; Olbertz v Germany, Decision, 25 May 1999, 
ECHR 1999-V, at 434; Döring v Germany, Decision 9 November 1999, ECHR 1999-VIII, at 381; Wendenburg 
et al v Germany, p. 353; Buzescu v Romania, para 81.
38 Tütüncü et al v Turkey.
39 Paeffgen GmbH v Germany, Decision, 18 September 2007, Nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05, 21770/05.
40  Kaplan v United Kingdom, Report, 17 July 1980, 21 DR 5, 23, at para 131; Bramelid and Malmström v 
Sweden, Decision, 12 October 1982, 29 DR 64, 81-83; Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine, 25 July 2002, ECHR 
2002-VII, para 90; Agrotexim et al v Greece, 24 October 1995, A/330-A, para 66.
41 Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal, paras 66-72, 79-87; 
42  Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece, 9 December 1994, A/301-B, para 59; Burdov v 
Russia, / may 2002, ECHR 2002-III, para 40. See also, L. Liberti, “Investissements et droit de l’homme”, in P. 
Kahn, T. Waelde (Eds) New Aspects of International Investment Law, 2004, Brill, p. 812.
43 Id.
44 Tre Traktörer AB v Sweden, paras 43, 53.
45 Fredin v Sweden, 192 ECtHR (Ser A) (1991), at para 40.
46 Posti and Rahko v Finland, 24 September 2002, ECHR 2002-VII, para 76.
47 Chassagnou et al v France, 29 April 1999 (GC), ECHR 1999-III, para 74.
48 James et al v UK, para 37.
States are however granted a wide margin of appreciation,49  although it is for the 
ECtHR to ultimately evaluate the legality and proportionality of their measures. Not all the 
restrictions that a State50 may impose to property rights are justified: the fundamental right to 
property  has a social function, which however does not allow for excessive burdens to be 
imposed on individuals.51  The alleged arbitrariness of domestic authorities has been 
acknowledged as the reason for the “steady increase of right to property cases before 
ECtHR”.52 The right to property seems to have been excessively broaden, to the extent that 
the imposition of a ‘fine’ is interpreted as ‘an element of property’ to be protected under 
Article 1 Protocol 1.53
The concept of ‘possession’ under Article 1 Protocol 1 is complex and it covers a bundle 
of rights and claims related to property. A number of issues related to the interpretation of the 
provision resemble those arising in the investment field54  and according to Tomuschat, the 
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49 See, H. R. Fabri, “The Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights”, p. 150; G. Bongiovanni, G. 
Sartor, C. Valentini (eds), Reasonableness and the Law, Springer, 2009, p. 435.
50  Notably, under the ECHR, disputes between Contracting States and their own nationals are under the 
jurisdiction of the Court. This is an advantage compared to general international law and international 
investment law, that do protect only foreign investors in the host State, and against expropriation without 
compensation. See, U. Kriebaum, “Nationality and the Protection of Property under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 6(1), 2009.
51 L. Liberti, “Investissements et droit de l’homme”, in P. Kahn, T. Waelde (Eds) New Aspects of International 
Investment Law, 2004, Brill, p. 812. The author submits: “D’autres considérations que celles relatives aux 
mesures contestées doivent être prises en compte pour évaluer si ces ingérences équivaudraient à une privation 
du droit de propriété: les effets des mesures adoptées doivent être appréciées dans un contexte plus large, c’est-à-
dire en relation avec la situation patrimoniale globale du propriétaire. La Cour ne s’est pas bornée à 
l’appréciation de la révocation d’une concession ou d’une licence, mais elle a toujours exploré les moyens 
raisonnables d’exploitation alternative des biens”; See also, M. L. Padelletti, La tutela della proprietà nella 
convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, Milano, Giuffrè, 2003, pp. 136-137, note 208 : “In tutti i casi citati, la 
Corte ha considerato gli effetti dei provvedimenti contestati in relazione all’intera situazione patrimoniale dei 
ricorrenti piuttosto che con riguardo allo specifico oggetto dell’interferenza”; G. Bongiovanni et al, 
Reasonableness and the Law, pp. 435-436.
52 L. Wildhaber and I. Wildhaber, “Recent Case Law on the Protection of Property”, p. 675.
53 Mamidakis v Greece, N. 35533/04, 11 January 2007, paras 44, 47-48. The ECtHR held that: “the imposition of 
the fine in question had dealt such a blow to the applicant’s financial situation that it amounted to a 
disproportionate measure in relation to the legitimate aim pursued”.
54 C. Tomuschat, “The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection”, pp. 646 et seq. See also, 
Brownioski v Poland, para 129; Rosenzweig and Bonded Warehouses v Poland, Appl. N. 51728/99, 28 July 
2005, para 49; Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria, Appl. N. 49429/99, 24 November 2005, para 130; Anheuser-Busch 
Inc v Portugal,  paras 66-72.
concept of possession enshrined in Article 1 Protocol 1 “is suited to protect any asset involved 
in an investment project”.55
“Possessions” are “all those rights which are called property  rights in the national 
systems”, although the concept has been autonomously and extensively interpreted by  the 
Court.56  The notion of “possessions” includes immovable as well as movable property, and 
especially
interests in property such as the benefit of restrictive covenants; claims; 
economic and commercial interests such as the value and goodwill of a 
business, a professional clientele, or the interests connected with owning 
property covered by outline planning permission; immaterial rights, such as 
shareholders’ rights or patents; contractual rights; licenses; or even rights 
granted under public law, such as pensions or social rents.57
In Broniowski58, the Court held: 
The concept of ‘possessions’ in the first part of Article 1 of Protocol N. 1 
has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to the ownership of 
material goods and is independent from the formal classification in domestic 
law. In the same way as material goods, certain other rights and interests 
constituting assets can also be regarded as ‘property rights’, and thus as 
‘possessions’ for the purposes of this provisions. In each case the issue that 
needs to be examined is whether the circumstances of the case, considered 
as a whole, conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected 
by Article 1 of Protocol N. 1.59
Accordingly, as noted by Tomuschat,60 “the right to operate a restaurant,61 to manage an 
open-air cinema,62  or to run a warehouse under a special customs regime,63  commercial 
activities dependent on a governmental licence, were considered by the Court to enjoy 
protection” under Article 1, Protocol I ECHR.
The judicial practice of the ECtHR establishes a State’s duty to protect possessions. 
More precisely, when the State legally commits itself with a private investor, any irregular 
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55 C. Tomuschat, “The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection”, p. 647.
56 H. R. Fabri, “Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights”, p. 153.
57 Id.
58 Brownioski v Poland.
59 Id.
60 C. Tomuschat, “The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection”, p. 646.
61 Tre Traktörer v Sweden.
62 Iatridis v Greece, para 54.
63 Rosenzweig and Bonded Warehouses v Poland, para 49; see also, Capital Bank AD v Bulgaria, para 130.
conduct aimed at modifying, rescinding or altering investment contracts is condemned by the 
Court.64 The ECtHR “firmly defend the principle that property protected under Art[icle] 1 Prot
[ocol] 1 has to be shielded against any disproportionate or discriminatory interference”;65 a 
wide margin of appreciation is accorded to States, especially in cases where there is the 
“necessity for interference”  in the public interest.66 It  seems that the test according to which 
governmental measures that have the effect of disproportionately compromising a private 
right to property are to be assessed, is in line with general international law standards. The 
public goal that justifies a restriction on property  rights, indeed, is carefully  assessed by  the 
ECtHR.67
For instance, the ECtHR acknowledged environmental protection as part of the general 
interest in Pinnacle Meat Processors Co v United Kingdom.68 The Court maintained that the 
protection of the people from the possibility of contracting the human form of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is a pre-eminent social interest. Therefore, the right to 
commercialize meat extracted from cattle heads is not to be regarded as a property right of the 
applicants; furthermore, a governmental regulation prohibiting such business does non 
constitute a formal or de facto expropriation.69 To the extent that property rights conflict with 
pre-eminent and superior social interests, their exercise shall be limited and balanced against 
public goals. 
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64  C. Tomuschat, “The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection”, p. 650; See, Zlínsat v 
Bulgaria,  Appl. N. 57785/00, 15 June 2006; Bimer v Moldova, Appl. N. 15084/03, 10 July 2007; Marini v 
Albania, Appl. N. 3738/02, 18 December 2007.
65  Id, p. 655; On the interplay between the protection of human rights and international investments, see L. 
Liberti, “Investissements et droit de l’homme”, p. 825, where the author refers to the positive obligations theory 
as explained in the wording of the ECtHR in Lopez-Ostra v Italia: “la responsabilité de l’Etat pourra être 
engagée non seulement du fait de son ingérence « active » dans tel ou tel droit mais aussi du fait de la non-
adoption des mesures positives que l’application concrète du droit réclamait”.
66 H. R. Fabri, “Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights”, p. 151.
67 L. Wildhaber and I. Wildhaber, “Recent Case Law on the Protection of Property”, pp. 675-676.
68 Pinnacle Meat Processors Co v United Kingdom, App. No. 33298/96, 27 European Human Rights Report 217, 
1998, at 223, as quoted in S. V. Vadi, “Through the Looking-Glass”, p. 32. See also, Fredin v Sweden, para 48.
69Id.
However, as noted in the literature, the differences between the system for the 
protection of human rights under the ECHR and the legal protection of international foreign 
investment “ne semble pas justifier le « dédoublement » de la notion d’expropriation dans les 
deux domaines, compte tenu de l’identité substantielle du bien juridique protégé”.70
III. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
Article II, paragraph I of the Claim Settlement Declaration does not provide a specific 
definition for ‘property’; nonetheless, the Iran-US Claims tribunal endorsed a broad definition 
of the term as to include also intangible property rights. It is by resorting to general principles 
of international law, combined with the use of its interpretative powers, that the tribunal 
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70 L. Liberti, “Investissements et droit de l’homme”, p. 812; See, however, the conclusions drawn in C. Schreuer, 
U. Kriebaum “The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law”, p. 762, where the authors hold that there is 
“divergence in legal development” of the two fields. They argue that the “two fields of specialization” operate 
“in isolation”, so that “[n]otwithstanding evident similarities, there is little interaction and cross citation between 
decision makers and scholars in the two fields”. The authors point to the case Biloune v Ghana, p. 203, where the 
Tribunal declines to deal with human rights issues.
construed the object of expropriatory claims71, including both physical property72  and 
contractual rights.73
The tribunal, firstly confronted with cases of nationalization of companies,74  defined 
‘expropriation’ as including both nationalization and other forms of taking.75 It established 
that the enactment of the ‘Law of Nationalization of Insurance and Credit Enterprise’ had 
incontrovertibly resulted in expropriations of which Iran was responsible, and that allowed the 
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71A. Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, p. 37.
72 William L. Pereira Assocs., Iran and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 116-1-3, 17 March 1984, reprinted in 
Iran-USCTR, Vol. 5, 1984 I, p. 198; Computer Science Corp v Iran, Award n. 221-65-1, reprinted in Iran-
USCTR, Vol. 14, p. 233; Oil Field of Texas Inc v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 
258-43-1, 8 October 1986, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 12, p. 308; Dames and Moore and The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award n. 97-54-3, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 4, pp. 212, 223; Leonard and Mavis Daley 
and The Islamic Government of Iran, Award n. 360-10514-1, 15 April 1988, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 18, 
pp. 244-245; Houston Contracting Company and National Iranian Oil Company, et. al., Award n. 387-173-3, 
reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 20, p. 3; Robert R. Schott v The Islamic Republic of Iran et al,  Award n. 
474-268-1, 15 March 1990, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 24, p. 203 et seq.; Vernie R. Pointon et al v The 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 516-322-1, 23 July 1991, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 
27, p. 49 et seq.; 
73 Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 259-36-1, 11 October 
1986, reprinted in Iran-USCTR Vol 12, 1986 III, p. 336: Flexi-Van argued to have entered into a lease agreement 
with two companies controlled by the Iranian Government––i.e: Star Line and Iran Express––and concerning 
marine transport equipment. According to Flexi-Van the Government took control of the two companies not later 
than the 29 February 1980, causing them to repudiate the contract with Flexi-Van. The claimant asserted to have 
been expropriated of its contractual rights, including rights to payment of accounts receivable and future rentals, 
and rights to the return of leased equipment; consequently, a claim for expropriation and, in the alternative, for 
interference with contractual relations, breach and repudiation of contract and unjust enrichment ‘through 
retention and use of the equipment’, were advanced; Phillips Petroleum Company v The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Award n. 425-39-2, 29 June 1989, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 21, p. 79––It has to be noted that Phillips 
Petroleum case, together with Mobil Oil Iran Inc., et al., v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et 
al., Partial Award n. 311-74/76/81/150-3, 14 July 1987, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 16, p. 3, and Amoco 
International Finance Corporation v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, National Iranian Oil 
Company and Kharg Chemical Company Limited, Partial Award n. 310-56-3, 14 July 1987, reprinted in Iran-
USCTR, Vol. 15, 1987 (II), p. 189, are regarded as the three petroleum cases, concerning the de facto 
nationalization of the petroleum industry––; Petrolane Inc v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Award n. 518-131-2, 14 August 1991, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 27, p. 92, quoting Sedco Inc v The National 
Iranian Oil Company, p. 31; Mobil Oil Iran Inc., et al.,  v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., 
Partial Award n. 311-74/76/81/150-3, 14 July 1987, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 16, p. 3. [Consortium cases]; 
The Tribunal generally distinguished between contract claims and expropriation claims. Yet, in Petrolane Inc the 
tribunal asserted that “the failure of a party to render contractually required assistance towards exportation could 
at some point in time ripen into a taking or conversion of the property affected”: consequently, it is also possible 
to consider whether interferences with contract rights may amount to a taking. See, C. N. Brower, J. D. 
Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, pp. 417-418.
74 INA Corporation and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 184-161-1, 12 August 1985, 
reprinted in Iran-US CTR, Vol. 8, p. 371; American International Group, Inc and American Life Insurance 
Company v Islamic Republic of Iran (Bimeh Markazi Iran), Award n. 93-2-3, 19 December 1983, reprinted in 
Iran-USCTR, Vol. 4, p. 96 et seq.
75 American International Group, p. 102.
expropriated party to recover also the damages for the losses suffered.76  Accordingly, the 
tribunal further clarified that its jurisdiction could be established also on the basis of the 
Declaration granting jurisdiction over “other measure affecting property rights”.77
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76 C. N. Brower, “Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Compensation: A Preliminary Survey 
of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal”, in The International Lawyer, Vol. 21, 1987, p. 643; H. 
Piran, “Indirect Expropriation in the Case Law of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal”, in The Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 6, 1995, p. 214. Under the Iranian Laws and regulations, aliens may not own 
immovable property in Iran. Thus, U.S. nationals did not file claims as such concerning expropriatory matters, 
whereas some individuals having a dual nationality could bring claims for expropriation of real property on three 
alternative basis: physical seizure through acts attributable to the government; the laws and regulations nullifying 
the ownership in undeveloped land; the application of Article 989 of Iranian Civil Code dealing with dual 
nationality; see also, Jalal Moin v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 557-950-2, 25 May 
1994, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 30, p. 70 et seq.; Reza Said Malek v Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Award n. 534-193-3, 11 August 1992, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 28, p. 246 et seq.; Article 989, Book 
Two, “On the Causes of Acquisition” of the Iranian Civil Code considers null and void any other nationality 
obtained by a Iranian national. It states: “Any Iranian national who has acquired foreign nationality after the 
solar year 1280 A. H. (1901-2) without observing the legal requirements, shall have his or her nationality 
declared null and void and shall be regarded as an Iranian subject. But at the same time his or her immovable 
properties will be sold under the supervision on the Public Prosecutor of the place and the proceeds shall be paid 
to him or her after the deduction of the expenses of the sale. Furthermore, he or she shall be deprived of attaining 
the Secretaryship or Acting-Secretaryship of the state, of membership of the Legislative Assemblies, Provincial, 
District and Town Councils and of any government positions”. See, M. A. R. Taleghany, The Civil Code of Iran, 
Rothman & Co., 1995, p. 143.
77  American International Group p. 102; see also, Rouhollah Karubian and The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award n. 569-419-2, 6 March 1996, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 32, p. 3 et seq., para 119, 
127. In Rouhollah Karubian the claimant was a dual national living in the United-States. He had purchased lands 
in Iran between 1957 and 1973 and claimed for expropriation of a number of parcels of land in four different 
Iranian locations, through a series of laws and regulations following the 1979 Revolution. The Tribunal found 
that the 1979 Act regulated the undeveloped land was very general and although it created an uncertainty as to 
the status of the land, no indirect expropriation could be found. The Tribunal clarified that “a showing of 
unreasonable interference by the government with specific property is required for the conclusion of indirect 
expropriation”. Although the claim for indirect expropriation was dismissed, the liability of Iran was found as to 
“other measures affecting property rights”. According to the Tribunal, Iran could be held liable as for those 
“interference created by the cumulative effect of the land reform legislation and related governmental action”; 
[those interference] did not rise to the level of an expropriation, [but] it has been established that the interference 
was of such a degree as to constitute other measures affecting the property rights of the Claimant within the 
meaning of Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. Consequently, the Respondent is 
responsible to the Claimant for damages resulting from these measures”. The Tribunal also quoted Foremost 
where it is stated that an interference “attributable to the Iranian Government or other state organs of Iran, while 
not amounting to an expropriation, gives rise to a right to compensation for the loss of enjoyment of the property 
in question”, and to the Tribunal refers to Eastman Kodak Company v The Government of Iran, Partial Award n. 
329-227/12384-3, 11 November 1987, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 17, p. 169; Foremost Tehran, Inc., et al. 
and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 220-37/231-1, 11 April 1986, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 10, p. 251; 
H. Piran, “Indirect Expropriation”, p. 247, footnote 335; The same is contended in Vernie R. Pointon, p. 49 et 
seq., para 32; in Harza Engineering Company and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 19-98-2, 30 Dec. 
1982, reprinted in Iran-U.S. C.T.R., Vol. 1, p. 504; in Tippets, pp. 225-226.
The judicial practice of the Iran-US tribunal qualifies both contractual rights78 and 
shareholders’ rights79 as amounting to property that may form the object of a taking.80 In 
Mobil Oil Iran Inc. et al81  the tribunal underlined that a contractual right may be the object of 
expropriation.82 In Amoco, the tribunal asserted: “expropriation, which can be defined as a 
compulsory transfer of property rights may extend to any right which could be the object of a 
commercial transaction and thus has a monetary value”;83 similarly, in Philipps the tribunal 
clarified that an expropriation is compensable “whether the expropriation is formal or de facto 
and whether the property is tangible, such as real estate or a factory, or intangible, such as the 
contractual rights involved in the present Case”.84
The tribunal also considered the right to appoint directors and managers as an instance 
of ownership that, together with other factors, can build the owner’s control over the entity 
and thus signal a property right.85 Indeed, the idea of property as a bundle of rights, the 
interference with which may have expropriatory effects was outlined in Starrett.86  The 
tribunal considered whether Starrett’s loans were part of its property rights taken by the 
Government and stated in the Interlocutory Award that 
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78  Starrett Housing, Interlocutory Award, pp. 156-157; Phelps Dodge Corp v The Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Award n. 217-99-2, 19 March 1986, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 10, p. 157; Flexi-Van, p. 348-349; Mobil Oil 
Iran, Partial Award, para 73, p. 25; Phillips Petroleum Company, para 76, p. 106.
79 Tippets, p. 219 et seq; Foremost Tehran, p. 228; Robert R. Schott, p. 203 et seq.; Eastman Kodak Company, 
Partial Award, p. 155-156, and Final Award n. 514-227-3, p. 3; Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc v The Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 519-394-1, 19 August 1991, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 27, p. 122; 
Nasser Esphahanian v Bank Tejerat, Award n. 31-157-2, 29 March 1983, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 2, 1988 
(I), pp. 157 et seq.; Atahollah Golpira v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 32-211-2, 29 
March 1983, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 2, 1988 (I), pp. 171 et seq.
80 Starrett Housing, Interlocutory Award, pp. 156-157; Phelps Dodge, p. 157; Flexi-Van, p. 348-349; Mobil Oil 
Iran, Partial Award, para 73, p. 25; Phillips Petroleum Company, para 76, p. 106.
81 Mobil Oil Iran, p. 3.
82Id, p. 5.
83 Amoco International Finance Corporation, Partial Award, para 108, p. 220.
84 Philipps Petroleum Company, para 76, p. 106.
85 C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 394; A. Mouri, The International 
Law of Expropriation, pp. 51-52, referring to Amoco. The decision of the Tribunal is that interference with 
Amoco’s management rights in Khemco should be considered for valuation purposes, as of the date at which 
measures definitively took effect, is interpreted as conveying the idea that such interference can merely assist in 
determining the date of the taking, and not operate as an independent ground for claiming interference with 
property rights.
86 Starrett Housing, Interlocutory Award, pp. 122 et seq., and Award, pp. 112 et seq.
the property interest taken by the Government of Iran must be deemed to 
comprise the physical property as well as the right to manage the Project 
and to complete construction in accordance with the Basic Project 
Agreement and related agreements, and to deliver the apartments and collect 
the proceeds of the sales as provided in the Apartment Purchase 
Agreements.87
In the final award it concluded that
it is a well-settled rule of customary international law that a taking of one 
property may also involve a taking of a closely related ancillary right; more 
generally, international tribunals have also recognized that taking of contract 
rights, like taking of tangible property, is compensable.88
The tribunal thereby established a limitation requiring “ancillary rights”  to be “closely 
connected”  to the right being expropriated.89 Accordingly, ‘property’ is not conceived in a 
unitary manner but rather as comprising diversified rights, all of which may deserve 
protection against governmental interferences. The tribunal held that “the scope of property 
rights is not unlimited”  and therefore it dismissed some claims for compensation involving 
property interests that other municipal systems may consider compensable.90 Among them, 
for instance, a “claim based upon ‘intentional tort’”  was rejected or a “claim for medical 
expenses for injuries to personnel connected with an attack on the company’s office”  was 
dismissed “as ‘not incurred in connection with the termination of the Contract’”.91
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87 Starrett Housing, Interlocutory Award, pp. 156-157.
88 Id p. 230; C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,  p. 374; G. Lagergren, Five 
Important Cases on Nationalisation of Foreign Property Decided by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
Raul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Report n. 5, Lund 1988, p. 25; see, Amoco 
International Finance Corporation and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Partial Award n. 310-56-3, 
paras. 106-109, 14 July 1987; Rudloff Claim, Review of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 9, pp. 244, 250; 
Shufeldt Claim, Review of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 2, 1949, pp. 1079, 1097.
89 C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 374.
90 Id, p. 375, footnote 1746.
91 Id. The authors refer to the Tribunal’s rejection of: “claim for compensation for mental anguish, grief and 
suffering arising from the assassination of the claimant’s husband while in Iran”; “claim for medical expenses for 
injuries to personnel connected with an attack on the company’s office as ‘not incurred in connection with the 
termination of the Contract’”; “guardian’s claim for son’s personal injury”; “claim based upon ‘intentional tort’” 
etc.
IV. Other Tribunals
As noted in Chapter II, within the context of international investment law a protectable 
property has to qualify as ‘investment’. The two notions of property and investment are not 
interchangeable: they may overlap but only property that qualifies as investment benefit of the 
protection under the IIT.92 In addition, the concept of investment is also a jurisdictional barrier 
to the admissibility of the claim before arbitral tribunals.93
The meaning of the term ‘investment’ is determined according to the object and purpose 
of international law and the applicable investment treaty, and therefore it is generally 
acknowledged that no single definition of what constitutes a foreign investment exists.94 The 
domestic law of the host State does not influence the definition of investment, but it serves as 
a benchmark to evaluate its legality;95 moreover, local laws may be relevant as a fact upon 
which the existence of an investment is conditioned.96
As far as the ICSID Convention is concerned, it is Article 25 that sets the boundaries of 
the definition of investment.97 ICSID tribunals have variously determined the existence of an 
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92 Brownlie pointed out this argument in his Separate Opinion to CME Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v 
The Czech Republic, Separate Opinion to the Final Award, 14 March 2003, para 73.
93 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, (1966) 575 
UNTS 159; (1965) 4 ilm 532. Art. 25(1); See, C. Schreuer, “Investment Disputes”, in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, Online Edition, 
[www.mpepil.com], visited on 21 April 2012; Furthermore, as Brownlie noted in his Separate Opinion to CME 
Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, Separate Opinion to the Final Award, 14 March 
2003, para 73, the notion of investment does not cover all kinds of property but only property that qualifies as 
investment benefit of the protection; M. Hwang S. C., J. FONG Lee Cheng, “Definition of ‘Investment’ - A Voice 
From the Eye of the Storm”, in Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 2011, p. 99.
94  OECD, “The Definition of Investment and Investor in International Investment Law”, in International 
Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations,  2008, p. 46; see also, D. Carreau, P. 
Juillard, Droit international économique, 3e édition, Dalloz, Paris, 2007, p. 403 : “La difficulté que l’on 
rencontre, lorsque l’on veut proposer une définition de l’investissement international, vient de la multiplicité des 
conceptions en cette matière – cette multiplicité des conceptions, en définitive, ne reflétant que la prolifération 
des sources.”; see also, Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic,  Stockholm Chamber Case No. 126/2003, Final Award, 29 
March 2005, paras 69-70.
95  Salini Costruttori, paras 46, 53. However, one should consider that a state’s domestic interpretation of 
property may influence the negotiations and therefore the substantive meaning of the notion of investment in the 
treaty clause.
96 C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum “The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law”, p. 746; EnCana Corporation v 
Ecuador, Award, 3 February 2006, para 184; Gas Natural SDG, SA v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 
June 2005, para 34.
97 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention, pp. 117, 122.
investment by analyzing whether the investment is included “within the terms of the parties’ 
consent (usually the relevant BIT)”  as well as whether it objectively amounts to an investment 
under Article 25.98  This test is generally known as ‘dual test’,99  ‘jurisdictional keyhole’ 
approach,100  or ‘double barred’ test.101  It seems that in the ICSID arbitral practice it is 
disputed which of the two stages of the test should be addressed first. Furthermore, it is also 
controversial whether the meaning of the term investment should be first analyzed under 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention and, secondly, in light of the definition established in 
the IIT as held in Fedax NV v Venezuela,102 or vice-verse. For instance, in Global Trading v 
Ukraine103 the tribunal stated:
the Tribunal turns now to an analysis of the two governing treaties, namely 
the BIT and the ICSID Convention, in the light of the arguments put before 
it by the parties to the Arbitration. There seems to be no set methodology 
among ICSID tribunals as to whether the analysis ought to begin with the 
BIT, which goes to the condition of consent within the meaning of the 
ICSID Convention, or with the notion of investment under the ICSID 
Convention. In the present case, it makes no difference where the analysis 
starts. The Tribunal accordingly finds it convenient to begin with the BIT.104
Other tribunals have however ruled that “there is no definition of investment in Article 
25 of the ICSID Convention that is separate from the definition of investment in the relevant 
treaty or agreement from which the dispute arises”.105 Thus, the tribunals have refused to 
interpret Article 25 of the ICSID Convention as an outer limit to the broad definition of 
investment.106
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98 D. A. R. Williams, S. Foote, “Recent Developments in the approach to identifying an ‘investment’”, p. 45.
99 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention, p. 117.
100 Aguas del Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case N. ARB/05/10, Decision on Respondent’s Objection 
to Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para 278.
101 See, Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDn, Bhd v Malaysia, ICSID Case N. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 
17 May 2007, para 55. D. A. R. Williams, S. Foote, “Recent Developments in the approach to identifying an 
‘investment’”, p. 45.
102 Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case N. ARB/96/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997.
103 Global Trading Resource Corp and Globex International,  Inc v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11, Award, 
1 December 2010.
104 Id, para 46.
105 M. Hwang S. C., J. FONG Lee Cheng, “Definition of ‘Investment’”, p. 100.
106  Id. The authors quote Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia, Decision on the Application for the 
Annulment of the Award; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United Republic of Tanzania.
A tribunal, in Inmaris v Ukraine,107 apparently regarded the parties’ consent to ICSID 
jurisdiction as the primary factor to determine the scope of the investment (and its existence) 
under the ICSID Convention.108 It established that 
in most cases—including, in the Tribunal’s view, this one—it will be 
appropriate to defer to the State parties’ articulation in the instrument of 
consent (e.g. the BIT) of what constitutes an investment. The State parties to 
a BIT agree to protect certain kinds of economic activity, and when they 
provide that disputes between investors and States relating to that activity 
may be resolved through, inter alia, ICSID arbitration, that means that they 
believe that that activity constitutes an “investment”  within the meaning of 
the ICSID Convention as well. That judgment, by States that are both 
Parties to the BIT and Contracting States to the ICSID Convention, should 
be given considerable weight and deference. A tribunal would have to have 
compelling reasons to disregard such a mutually agreed definition of 
investment. The Salini test may be useful in the event that a tribunal were 
concerned that a BIT or contract definition of investment was so broad that 
it might appear to capture a transaction that would not normally be 
characterized as an investment under any reasonable definition. These 
elements could be useful in identifying such aberrations. Indeed, of late a 
number of tribunals and ad hoc committees have expressed the view that 
these elements should be viewed as non-binding, non-exclusive means of 
identifying (rather than defining) investments that are consistent with the 
ICSID Convention.109
This approach “brings one back to the issue and relevance of Salini-type criteria - 
contribution, duration and risk”.110
In Fedax NV v Venezuela111 an objection was moved to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 
maintaining that the underlying transactions did not qualify as an ‘investment’ under the BIT. 
The tribunal disagreed, clarifying that the BIT’s reference to “every asset”  justifies a broad 
interpretation and that “[...] this interpretation is also consistent with the broad reach that the 
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107  Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH v Ukraine, ICSID Case N. ARB/08/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 8 March 2010.
108 D. A. R. Williams, S. Foote, “Recent Developments in the approach to identifying an ‘investment’”, p. 59.
109 Inmaris Perestroika v Ukraine, paras 130-131.
110 D. A. R. Williams, S. Foote, “Recent Developments in the approach to identifying an ‘investment’”, p. 59; E. 
Gaillard and Y. Banifatemi, ‘‘‘Biwater’, Classic Investment Bases: Input, Risk, Duration’’, in New York Law 
Journal, 31 december 2008. The authors seem to support the outer limit approach but they consider that only 
‘contribution’, ‘risk’ and ‘duration’ should serve as hallmarks of the investment; B. Poulain, “L’investissement 
international”, pp. 125 et seq.
111 Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela.
term ‘investment’ must be given in light of the negotiating history of the Convention”.112 
Furthermore, the tribunal held:
The basic features of an investment have been described as involving a 
certain duration, a certain regularity of profit and return, assumption of risk, 
a substantial commitment and a significance for the host State’s 
development. The duration of the investment in this case meets the 
requirement of the Law as to contracts needing to extend beyond the fiscal 
year in which they are made. The regularity of profit and return is also met 
by the scheduling of interest payments through a period of several years. 
The amount of capital committed is also relatively substantial. Risk is also 
involved as has been explained. And most importantly, there is clearly a 
significant relationship between the transaction and the development of the 
host State, as specifically required under the Law for issuing the pertinent 
financial instrument. It follows that, given the particular facts of the case, 
the transaction meets the basic features of an investment.113
It has been argued that before Fedax NV v Venezuela, the ICSID tribunals had 
“examined the question whether an investment was involved without consideration of any 
specific criteria to assess this question”.114 Nevertheless, “[s]ince then, ICSID tribunals [had] 
deemed a variety of transactions to fall under the definition of investment in accepting 
jurisdiction ratione materiae, i.e., financial instruments,115 contracts116 and services117”, whilst 
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112  Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela, para 29; OECD, “The Definition of Investment and Investor in 
International Investment Law”, p. 67.
113 Id, para 43.
114 K. Yannaca-Small, “Definition of ‘Investment’”, p. 252. The cases show that ICSID Tribunals had relied on 
global assessment of the economic operation to establish whether the investment requirement of the Convention 
had been met. See, Kaiser Bauxite Company v Government of Jamaica, 1975 (1993), 1 ICSID Reports, 296; 
Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica Inc v Government of Jamaica 1975, (1979) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. 
IV, 206; Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v Government of the Republic of Liberia, 1984, (1994), 
ICSID Reports, Vol. 2, p. 346; Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels (SOABI) v State of Senegal, 1988, 
(1994), ICSID Reports, Vol. 2, p. 165; Holiday Inns SA,  Occidental Petroleum Corporation et al v Government 
of Morocco, ICSID case N. ARB/72/1.
115 See, Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela; CSOB v The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case N. ARB/97/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999.
116 See, Salini Costruttori; PSEG Global Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ilgin Elektrik 
Uretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case N. ARB/02/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 4 
June 2004.
117  See, Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) SA v Pakistan, ICSID Case N. ARB/01/13, Decision on 
Objection to Jurisidiction, 6 August 2003; Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) SA v Philippines, ICSID Case 
N. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004.
also setting a number of limitations “as to what can be accepted as an investment”, thus 
excluding bank guarantees118 and preinvestment expenditures119 from the category.120 
The typical features of an investment under the ICSID Convention may thus be 
identified on the basis of ICSID Tribunal’s arbitral practice.121 According to Schreuer, the 
typical characteristics of an investment are: the duration of the project; a regularity in profits 
and return; an element of risk for both sides; a substantial commitment and the contribution of 
the investment to the development of the host State.122 However, the reference to each 
characteristics of an investment operation has varied according to the specific circumstances 
of the case and the nature of the activity involved.123
The holding of the tribunal in Salini Costruttori v Morocco124 provided the name to the 
so-called Salini test125  for the evaluation of the existence of an investment based on an 
empirical analysis.126 The tribunal held:
The doctrine generally considers that investment infers: contributions, a 
certain duration of performance of the contract and a participation in the 
risks of the transaction [...]. In reading the Convention’s preamble, one may 
add the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the 
investment as an additional condition. In reality, these various elements may 
be interdependent. Thus, the risks of the transaction may depend on the 
204
118  See, Joy Mining Machinery Limited v the Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case N. Arb/03/11, Award on 
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004.
119 See, Mihaly International Corporation v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case N. ARB/
00/2, Award, 15 March 2002, paras 50-51, 60, 61; Mihaly International Corporation v Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case N. ARB/00/2, Individual Concurring Opinion by Mr. David Suratgar, 7 
March 2002, para 6. The Tribunal considered that preinvestment expenditures do not constitute an investment 
within the meaning of Art. 25 ICSID Convention, and therefore it established its lack of jurisdiction on the 
matter. 
120 K. Yannaca-Small, “Definition of ‘Investment’”, pp. 252-253.
121  OECD, “The Definition of Investment and Investor in International Investment Law”, p. 61; see also, C. 
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention, pp. 139-141.
122 Id. It is clarified that these characteristics do not necessarily qualify as jurisdictional requirements.
123 Id, p. 62.
124 Salini Costruttori.
125  On the ‘Salini test’ see also, D. Krishan, “A notion of ICSID Investment”, in Transnational Dispute 
Management, Provisional Issue, May 2008. Especially, the author argues that the investment’s need to contribute 
to the Host State’s economic development is “incorrect as a matter of fundamental economics”. The test is 
therefore “ideological”, and “it assumes an outdate––and largely discredited––version of economics that is not 
neutral to private investment as a driver of growth”, being based on “personal preference rather than principled 
analysis”.
126 A. Rigo Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration - Judging Under Uncertainty, CUP, 2012, pp. 60 et seq.
contributions and the duration of performance of the contract. As a result, 
these various criteria should be assessed globally even if, for the sake of 
reasoning, the Tribunal considers them individually here.127
The test has been followed by other arbitral tribunals, although with differences in 
considering the interrelationship among factors,128  or the interpretation of the investment’s 
contribution129 to the development of the host State. On the whole, the requirement that an 
investment significantly contributes to the economy of the host State seems to have been 
diluted in practice,130  so as to encompass “human potential, political and social development 
and the protection of the local and the global environment”.131
In Bayindir v Pakistan132  the tribunal applied the case in light of the Salini test; 
similarly, in Jan de Nul NV and Dredging International NV v Arab Republic of Egypt,133 the 
four elements of the test are described as “indicative of an ‘investment’ for purposes of the 
ICSID Convention” 134. The tribunal further held that “being understood that these elements 
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127 Salini Costruttori, para 52; see also, Pren Nreka v Czech Republic, (UNCITRAL), 1 February 2007, quoted in 
K. Yannaca-Small, “Definition of ‘Investment’”, p. 257.
128 See, for instance, MCI Power Group, LC and New Turbine, Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case N. ARB/
03/6, Award, 31 July 2007, para 165: “The Tribunal states that the requirements that were taken into account in 
some arbitral precedents for purposes of denoting the existence of an investment protected by a treaty (such as 
the duration and risk of the alleged investment) must be considered as mere examples and not necessarily as 
elements that are required for its existence. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the very elements of the 
Seacoast project and the consequences thereof fall within the characterizations required in order to determine the 
existence of protected investments”.
129 An comprehensive interpretation of the requirement of ‘contribution’ in light of the Investment Agreement is 
presented in Malicorp Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case N. ARB/08/18, Award, 7 February 
2011, para 110. The Tribunal clarifies that “there must be ‘active’ economic contributions, as is confirmed by the 
etymology of the word ‘invest’, but such contributions must ‘passively’ have generated the economic assets the 
instruments are designed to protect”. The Tribunal points out the complementarity between the two aspects; On 
this requirement, see the analysis of the LCIA in Société Générale v Dominican Republic, para 33, 35; Contra to 
the need for a specific contribution to the host State see, LESI SpA et ASTALDI SpA v Algeria, ICSID Case N. 
ARB/05/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 July 2006, para 72; Victor Pey Casado v Chile, Award, para 232; Saba 
Fakes v Turkey, ICSID Case N. ARB/07/20, 14 July 2010, paras 107-111.
130 D. A. R. Williams, S. Foote, “Recent Developments in the approach to identifying an ‘investment’”, p. 63.
131 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention, p. 14, paras 173, 174.
132  Bayindir Insaat v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 130-138; see also, Helnan 
International Hotels A/S v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case N. ARB 05/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 
October 2006, para 77; Saipem SpA v People’s Republic of Bangladesh,  Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Recommendation on Provisional Measures, paras 99, 111; Ioannis Kardassopoulos v Georgia, ICSID Case N. 
ARB/05/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 July 2007, para 116; Toto Costruzioni Generali SpA v Republic of 
Lebanon, ICSID Case N. ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 September 2009, paras 77-81, 84; Ulysseas, 
Inc v Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 12 June 2012, para 251.
133 Jan de Nul and Dredging International NV v Arab Republic of Egypt, paras 91-92.
134 Id, para 91.
may be closely interrelated, should be examined in their totality and will normally depend on 
the circumstances of each case”.135
This approach is shared in Mitchell v Congo,136 where the Annulment Committe held:
There are four characteristics of investment identified by ICSID case law5 
and commented on by legal doctrine,6 but in reality they are interdependent 
and are consequently examined comprehensively. The first characteristic of 
investment is the commitment of the investor, which may be financial or 
through work; indeed, in several ICSID cases the investor’s commitment 
mainly consisted in its know-how.7 Other characteristics of investment are 
the duration of the project and the economic risk entailed, in the sense of an 
uncertainty regarding its successful outcome. The fourth characteristic of 
investment is the contribution to the economic development of the host 
country, a matter which the ad hoc Committee will review at some length in 
that it is a key point of the debates in the Annulment Proceedings.137
In Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia138, the tribunal ruled:
In unusual situations such as the present case, where many of the typical 
hallmarks of “investment”  are not decisive or appear to be only superficially 
satisfied, the analysis of the remaining relevant hallmarks of “investment” 
will assume considerable importance. The Tribunal therefore considers that, 
on the present facts, for it to constitute an “investment”  under the ICSID 
Convention, the Contract must have made a significant contribution to the 
economic development of the Respondent.139
In Phoenix Action v the Czech Republic140, the ICSID tribunal assessed the investment 
under both customary international law and the general principles of international law, and 
established that the investor had restructured the ownership in order to benefit from the 
protection under the Israel-Czech Republic BIT. The principles of non retroactivity and good 
faith are regarded as constituting the basis of a “contextual analysis of the existence of a 
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135 Jan de Nul and Dredging International NV v Arab Republic of Egypt,  para 91; see also, Noble Energy Inc and 
MachalaPower Cía Ltd v Republic of Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad, ICSID Case N. ARB/
05/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, 5 March 2008, para 128; 
136  Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment of the Award, 1 November 2006.
137  Id, para 27; see also, African Holding Company of America, Inc and Société Africaine de Construction au 
Congo SARL v Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case N. ARB/05/21, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 29 July 2008, para 83.
138 Malaysian Historical Salvors v Government of Malaysia, Award on Jurisdiction.
139 Id,  para 124; See also, Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v. Government of Malaysia, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment, paras 74, 80; Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v Government of Malaysia, 
ICSID Case N. ARB/05/10, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, 16 April 2009, paras 15-21, 
finding that the contribution to economic development is a requirement on an investment under the ICSID 
Convention.
140 Phoenix Action, Ltd v The Czech Republic.
protected investment”, as they enable the tribunal to take into account “the purpose of the 
international protection of the investment”.141 The investment under scrutiny was not a ‘bona 
fide’ investment in light of general principles of international law, according to the tribunal, 
which thereby supplemented the objective requirements of the Salini test.142
In contrast to this approach, the tribunal in Fakes v Turkey143 established that
the principles of good faith and legality cannot be incorporated into the 
definition of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention without doing violence 
to the language of the ICSID Convention: an investment might be ‘legal’ or 
‘illegal’ made in ‘good faith’ or not, it nonetheless remains an investment. 
The expressions ‘legal investment’ or ‘investment made in good faith’ are 
not pleonasms, and the expressions ‘illegal investment’ or ‘investment made 
in bad faith’ are not oxymorons.144
Discussing the scope of the definition of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention in his 
Dissenting Opinion to the Abaclat v Argentina145 decision, Judge Abi-Saab wrote:
The fact that the Salini criteria or the other similar formulations are not 
expressly laid down in the ICSID Convention does not mean that they do 
not articulate, perhaps imperfectly, an obligatory requirement of article 25, 
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142  K. Yannaca-Small, “Definition of ‘Investment’”, p. 257. As the author states, not all the Tribunals have 
followed strictly the Salini test. In a number of cases, Tribunals have shown a more flexible approach: see, LESI 
SpA and Astaldi Spa v Peolple’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Decision on Jurisdiction; Victor Pey Casado v 
Republic of Chile, para 232; Romak SA v The Republic of Uzbekistan. In other contexts, Tribunals have adopted 
a ‘subjectivist’ or ‘intuitive’ approach, focusing on the parties’ consent to de inclusion of the transaction within 
the meaning of ‘investment’, as expressed in the IA: see, Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Jurisdiction; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 
42; Fraport AG Frankfurt v Republic of the Philippines, para 305; Biwater Gauff (Tanzanzia) Ltd v Tanzania, 
para 314; RSM Production Corporation v Grenada, paras 130, 235-236, 241; Malaysian Historical Salvors v 
Malaysia, Decision on the Application of the Annulment, paras 57-58, 69; Panthechniki SA Constructor and 
Engineers v The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case N. ARB/07/21, Award, 30 July 2009, para 42, 45. A strict 
application of test , and especially of the condition on ‘the contribution to the economic development of the host 
State’, is identifiable in Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of the Congo.
143 Saba Fakes v Republic of Turkey.
144 Id, para 112.
145 Abaclat and Others (Case formerly known as Giovanna a Beccara and Others) v Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case N. ARB/07/5, Dissenting Opinion, Georges Abi-Saab, 28 October 2011.
or that this requirement has no constraining effect if States parties to the 
ICSID Convention chose to ignore it in their BITs [...].146
In light of these considerations, It might be concluded, concurring with the holding of 
the tribunal in Joy Mining Machinery v Egypt147  that “[t]o what extent these [Salini] criteria 
are met is of course specific to each particular case as they will normally depend on the 
circumstances of each case”.148 In particular, the treaty-law applicable to the case is the 
context within which the definition of investment should be interpreted, as the tribunal stated 
in Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic149, with regard to the Energy Charter Treaty (‘ECT’). The 
tribunal held that
There is no uniform definition of the term investment, but the meaning of 
this term varies [...] While in ordinary language investment is often 
understood as being capital or property used as a financial basis for a 
company or a business activity with the aim to produce revenue or income, 
wider definitions are frequently found in treaties on the protection of 
investments, whether bilateral (BITs) or multilateral (MITs). The term 
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Casado v Republic of Chile, paras 231-235, the Tribunal held: “Les parties ont fait valoir l’une et l’autre, à juste 
titre, que la Convention CIRDI ne contient pas de définition de la notion d’investissement. L’examen de la 
jurisprudence CIRDI fait cependant apparaître qu’il existe au moins deux conceptions de la notion 
d’investissement au sens de la Convention CIRDI. La première se contente d’identifier un certain nombre de « 
caractéristiques » qui permettraient de conclure à l’existence d’un investissement. Il suffirait, dans cette 
conception, que certaines de ces «caractéristiques» habituelles de l’investissement, pas nécessairement toutes, se 
rencontrent au cas d’espèce pour que l’on puisse conclure que l’on se trouve en présence d’un investissement. 
C’est la solution qu’ont retenue les tribunaux arbitraux dans les affaires Fedax c. Venezuela, CSOB c. Slovaquie 
et, plus récemment, MCI c. Equateur. Cette conception peu exigeante de l’investissement est également défendue 
par certains auteurs. D’autres tribunaux arbitraux retiennent au contraire une véritable définition de 
l’investissement qui suppose la satisfaction de critères spécifiques. Si l’ensemble de ces critères ne sont pas 
cumulativement satisfaits, ils en concluent qu’il ne saurait y avoir d’investissement au sens de la Convention 
CIRDI. Cependant, dans la définition de ces critères, la jurisprudence arbitrale n’est pas totalement uniforme. 
Certains tribunaux ont jugé qu’il existe un investissement dès lors que sont réunis trois éléments : l’existence 
d’un apport dans le pays concerné, le fait que cet apport porte sur une certaine durée et qu’il comporte, pour 
celui qui le fait, un certain risque. D’autres ont estimé, à partir d’une analyse reposant sur le préambule de la 
Convention CIRDI, que l’existence d’un investissement au sens de la Convention CIRDI reposait sur la réunion 
de quatre éléments, les trois précédents étant complétés par l’élément de contribution de l’opération litigieuse au 
développement économique de l’Etat d’accueil. Quelques décisions isolées ont même conclu qu’il ne pouvait y 
avoir d’investissement si le demandeur ne pouvait établir que l’opération réalisée avait contribué positivement au 
développement de l’Etat d’accueil”.
147 Joy Mining v Arab Republic of Egypt, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004.
148 Id, para 53; see also, SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case N. ARB/
07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 February 2010, para 107; see also, Romak SA v Republic of Uzbekistan, para 
177. The Tribunal considers the “ordinary meaning” of the term investment as “the commitment of funds or 
other assets with the purpose to receive a profit, or ‘return’ from that commitment”.
149 Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic.
investment must therefore be interpreted in the context of each particular 
treaty in which the term is used.150
The tribunal suggested that the notion of investment must be interpreted in good faith 
and in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty, put in their context 
and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose, as established by Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Due regard shall be paid to the relevant 
investment treaty applicable to the dispute and to the definitions of investor and investment 
contained therein.
Generally, however, immovable and tangible property are indisputably included within 
the definition of ‘investments’151. Yet, interferences with this category of property rights are 
de facto less common than indirect encroachments upon intangible properties.152 Claims and 
rights to performance are also protected as part of the investment153. In SPP v Egypt154 the 
ICSID tribunal considered the nature of the contractual right155 to build hotels, and established 
that contractual rights may be indirectly expropriated.156  This conclusion was forcefully 
confirmed in Vivendi II157, where the arbitral tribunal stated that
it has been clear since at least 1903, in the Rudolff case, that the taking away 
or destruction of rights acquired, transmitted and defined by contract is as 
much a wrong entitling the sufferer to redress as the taking away or 
destruction of a tangible property158
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150 Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic, paras 69-70.
151 Amco v Indonesia, Award, 31 May 1990, ICSID Rep, Vol. 1, 569; Biloune v Ghana; Compañía del Desarrollo 
de Santa Elena, SA v Costa Rica, 17 February 2000, ICSID Rep. Vol. 5, p. 153; Middle East Cement v Egypt, 
paras 131-151; Generation Ukraine v Ukraine; GAMI Investments, Inc v Government of the United Mexican 
States, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 15 November 2004.
152 C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum “The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law”, p. 748.
153  Contra: B. Poulain, “Petrobart vs. The Kyrgyz Republic – A Few Reservations Regarding the Tribunal’s 
Constructions of the Material, Temporal and Spatial Application of the Treaty”, in Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol 2(5), 1; See also, F. Yala, “La notion d’investissement”, in Gazette du Palais, December 2005, 
and in Transnational Dispute management, Vol. 3(2), 2006, pp. 22, 24-27.
154 SPP v Egypt, Award, 20 May 1992, ICSID Rep, Vol. 3, pp. 189, 228-229.
155 Schreuer excluded that costs incurred during negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a contract do constitute 
an investment, unless the contract is finally signed. C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention, Art. 25, n. 175 et seq., 
as quoted in Malicorp Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt, para 113.
156 SPP v Egypt, pp. 189, 228-229. See also, Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, para 98.
157 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. (Vivendi II) v Argentine Republic.
158 Id, para 7.5.18.
and, more recently, in the ruling of the tribunal in AWG Group v Argentina159, finding 
that “[i]nternational law has recognized that contractual rights may be the subject of 
expropriation at least since the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case”.160
The “business operations associated with physical property”  were also considered part 
of the ‘investment’ in Tokios Tokel!s v Ukraine161. Similarly, in Bayindir v Pakistan, the 
tribunal found it indisputable that “expropriation [..] may extend to contractual rights”.162 
More precisely, the tribunal applied a “four step”  analysis to an expropriation claim related to 
a contract, based on “identif[ying] the assets allegedly expropriated”; “identif[ying] the 
allegedly expropriatory conduct”; “examining whether the alleged interference with the 
property or the rights of the investor has been made in the State’s exercise of its sovereign 
powers”; and, as “[t]he fourth step”[....] analysing “(i) the lack of a public purpose, (ii) 
discrimination, (iii) the absence of payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, 
and (iv) a breach of due process of law and the general principles of treatment”  as provided in 
the Agreement.163
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159 AWG Group Ltd v Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010.
160 Id, paras 151-153.
161 Tokios Tokel#s v Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 83 et seq.
162 Bayindir Insaat v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 130-138; see also, Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v 
The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Administered Case (NAFTA), Award, 31 March 2010, para 
139; see also, Pope & Talbot, Inc v Government of Canada, para 26; SD Myers, Inc v Government of Canada, 
Partial Award, paras 292-294; Bayview Irrigation District v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
05/1, Award on Jurisdiction, 11 June 2007; CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial 
Award, 13 September 2001, para 599-602; Eureko BV  v Republic of Poland, Ad Hoc, Partial Award, 19 August 
2005, para 241; EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case N. UN 3481, Award, 3 February 2006, 
para 194; Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic, paras 314-315; Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case N. ARB/02/16, Award, 28 September 2007, para 281; Saipem SpA v The People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh, paras 129-130; Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control,  BIVAC BV  v 
Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case N. ARB/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 May 
2009, paras 114-117; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija (Vivendi II)v Argentine Republic, paras 7.5.4-7.5.8; 
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Lithuania, paras 442-456; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United 
Republic of Tanzania, paras 458-460; Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v Republic of Tajikistan, ICSID Case No. 
V064/2008, Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 2 September 2009, para 281; White Industries Australia 
Limited v The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 30 November 2011, para12.3.2; SAUR International 
SA v Republic of Argentina, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ICSID Case N. ARB/04/4, 6 June 2012, paras 
391-392, 441.
163 Bayindir Insaat v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 442-446.
As noted by Schreuer investment tribunals accept that “claims arising from contracts 
constitu[te] an investment” that is afforded protection from expropriation and other 
interferences.164 Claims of this kind “arose from loans and other financial instruments,165 civil 
engineering and construction contracts,166  licenses to operate waste disposals,167 pre-shipment 
inspections168 and rights under energy purchase contracts”.169
As most IITs include shareholding or participation in companies in the definition of 
‘investment’, arbitral tribunals have extensively addressed claims on that basis.170
In Alex Genin v Estonia171 the tribunal found that “[the] Claimants’ ownership interest 
in EIB, is an investment in ‘shares of stock or other interests in a company’ that was ‘owned 
or controlled, directly or indirectly’ by Claimants”, and therefore related to an ‘investment’ as 
defined in the relevant BIT.172 In CMS v Argentina, minority shareholders have also been 
granted protection, on the basis that there is “no requirement that an investment, in order to 
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Group Plc v The Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID Case n. ARB/02/14, Award, 17 December 2003; Joy Mining 
Machinery Ltd v Egypt, Award on Jurisdiction, paras 41 et seq.
166  Salini Costruttori v Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 45-58; Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade 
SpA v The Hasemite Kingdom of Jordan , Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 November 2004, in ILM, Vol. 44, 2005, p. 
573, para 67; Impregilo SpA v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 274; Bayindir Insaat v Pakistan, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, paras 111-121, 127-129.
167  Metalclad v Mexico, p. 209; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v Mexico, p. 133; Waste Management v 
Mexico, p. 967.
168 SGS v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 133; SGS v Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 99-112.
169 Nykomb v Latvia, paras 4.3.3 d); Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic, pp. 69-72; see, C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum “The 
Concept of Property in Human Rights Law”, p. 752.
170 Id,  p. 756; Antoine Goetz and others v Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case n. ARB/95/3, Award, 2 September 
1998, in ICSID Rep., Vol. 6, pp. 5 et seq.; Emilio Augustin Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, ICSID Rep., Vol. 5, 369; Compañía de Aguas de Aconquija, PA & Compagnie 
Générale des Eaux v Argentine Republic (Vivendi case), Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, ICSID Rep., Vol. 
6, 340; Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction; LG&E Energy v Argentine Republic, 
Decision on Jurisdiction; American Manufacturing and Trading v Zaire, ICSID Case n. ARB93/1, Award, 21 
February 1997, in ILM, Vol. 361, 1997, p,1531; Alex Genin,  Eastern Credit Limited, INC and AS Baltoil v 
Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case N. ARB/99/2, Award, 25 June 2001; CME Czech Republic v The Czech 
Republic, Partial Award; Camuzzi International SA v Argentina, ICSID Case n. ARB/03/2, Decision on 
Objection to Jurisdiction, 11 May 2005, paras 12, 78-82, 140-142; Gas Natural SDG, SA v Argentina, ICSID 
Case ARB/03/10, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005, paras 32-35, 50-51; AES Corporation v Argentina, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 85-89; Compañía de Aguas de Aconquija v Argentina (Vivendi II), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, paras 88-94; Continental Casualty v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 51-54, 76-89.
171 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited v Republic of Estonia.
172 Id, para 324.
qualify, must necessarily be made by shareholders controlling a company or owning the 
majority of its shares”.173 Arbitral practice, moreover, shows that ownership to the assets of 
the company are also shielded from host State’s interferences.174 In GAMI v Mexico175 the 
tribunal stated that “the issue is rather whether a breach of the NAFTA leads with sufficient 
directness to loss or damage in respect of a given investment”:176 thus, the tribunal analyzed 
whether, as a result of the governmental measure, the economic value of the shareholding had 
been impaired to such an extent as to be considered expropriated.177  In Link-Trading v 
Moldova, the tribunal accepted that an investment may consist of debt financing by 
interpreting broadly the provision of Article I(1)(a) of the 1993 United States-Republic of 
Moldova BIT.178 Conversely, in William Nagel v Czech Republic179 the tribunal did not regard 
the rights derived from a co-operation agreement between the claimant and a State-owned 
enterprise as amounting to an investment under the BIT, relying on the lack of a financial 
value of the rights concerned.180
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173 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, para 51; see also, Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP v 
Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 39, 44, 49, and Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim), 2 
August 2004, paras 21, 22, 29, 39; AAPL v Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 1990, ICSID Rep., Vol. 4, 246; LANCO v 
Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, ICSID Rep., Vol. 5, 367; Compañía de Aguas de 
Aconquija, PA & Compagnie Générale des Eaux v Argentine Republic (Vivendi case), Decision on Annulment, 3 
July 2002, ICSID Rep., Vol. 6, 340; Champion Trading Co and Ameritrade International Inc v Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case n. ARB/029, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 October 2003; GAMI Investments,  Inc v Mexico, 
Award, 15 November 2004; LG&E Energy Corp v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 50-63; 
Sempra Energy v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 92-94; El Paso Energy v Argentina, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, para 138.
174 Id, 12 May 2005 paras 59, 66-69; see also, Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 
69, 73; Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 35, 43-49, 
58-60 and Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim), 2 August 2004, paras 17, 34-35; Siemens AG v Argentine 
Republic,  Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, in ILM, Vol. 44, 2005, 138; GAMI Investments, Inc v Mexico, 
paras 26-33; Camuzzi v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 45-67; Sempra Energy v Argentina, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, paras 73-79; Continental Casualty v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 79; Bogdanov v 
Moldova, SCC Arbitration N. V (114/2009), Award, 22 September 2005., para 5.1.
175 GAMI Investments, Inc v Mexico.
176 Id, para 33.
177 Id, para 35.
178  Link-Trading v Department for Customs of Republic of Moldova, (UNCITRAL), Award on Jurisdiction, 6 
February 2001. Art. I(1)(a) reads: “Every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by [...]  companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment 
contracts; and includes: i) tangible and intangible property [...] (V) any right conferred by law or contract, and 
any licences and permits pursuant to law.”
179 William Nagel v Czech Republic, SCC Case 49/2002, Award 9 September 2003, p. 141.
180 Id, p. 141.
Thus, it is not the quantity of the asset owned that qualifies the investment and makes a 
claim admissible, rather it is the right instrumental to the economic activity considered. Even 
a single transaction that is nonetheless an “integral part of an overall operation that qualifies 
as an investment”  is covered by the definition.181 This approach accepts that an ‘investment’ is 
generally a complex operation, whose components all concur to its favorable economic 
outcome: therefore, “the general unity of an investment operation” is upheld and, accordingly, 
the autonomous legal standing of minor claims is excluded.182 In light of this theory, Joy 
Mining v Egypt183 and Eureko BV v Poland184 examined whether specific aspects or rights 
arising from the operation could independently qualify as investments.185
Although as suggested by the relevant literature the term ‘investment’ in the ICSID 
Convention currently encompasses
capital contributions, joint ventures, loans, as well as modern kinds of 
investment resulting from new forms of association between States and 
foreign investors, such as profit-sharing, service and management contracts, 
turn-key contracts, international leasing arrangements and agreements for 
the transfer of know-how and technology,186
one could argue that “it is the form and the nature of the investment activity, not simply 
the area of economic activity covered, that is the key issue in terms of the reach of ICSID’s 
jurisdiction under Article 25”.187
Recent case law has also demonstrated that investors’ rights under the award may be 
regarded as an investment to be protected. In White Industries v India188 the tribunal did not 
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184 Eureko BV v Poland, Partial Award, para 241.
185 Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 70.
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in New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 24, 1991, p. 452; G. R. Delaume, “ICSID 
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187  C. McLachlan, L. Shore, M. Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, OUP, 
2007, paras 6.06-6.07, as quoted in D. A. R. Williams, S. Foote, “Recent Developments in the approach to 
identifying an ‘investment’”, p. 46.
188 White Industries Australia Limited v Republic of India.
find an expropriation to have occurred,189  on the grounds that “the Indian Courts had yet to 
dispose of either Coal’s India’s set aside application or White’s Application for Enforcement 
of the Award”. The tribunal noted that “the Award has not been ‘taken’ or set aside”, since 
“the determination of its validity has not yet occurred”.190 The reasoning of the tribunal 
clearly pointed out that a ‘foreign arbitral award’ is an ‘investment’ that could be 
expropriated. The tribunal clarified that the “Award is not an investment in itself, but rather 
that the Award is part of the original investment”,191  and it quoted a number of cases to 
support this holding.192  Therefore, the protection afforded to investors concerns their 
“subsisting interests” in the original investment.193
In addition, the tribunal was called upon to evaluate the nature of contractual rights and 
bank guarantees and their qualification as ‘investments’. While noting that “it is well-
established that rights arising from contracts may amount to investment for the purpose of 
many BITs”,194  the tribunal indicates that “White’s rights under those [bank] guarantees, 
standing alone, [do not] constitute an ‘investment’ under the BIT”.195
The analysis of the judicial practice shows that recent arbitral awards have “contribut
[ed] to the emergence of a property theory which acknowledges [..] the social function of 
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to the effect that awards made by tribunals arising out of disputes concerning ‘investments’ made by ‘investors’ 
under BITs represent a continuation or transformation of the original investment”.
193 White Industries Australia Limited v Republic of India, p. 82, note 41.
194 Id, paras 7.4.1, 12.3.2. The Tribunal quotes Souther Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic 
of Egypt.
195 Id, paras 7.5.1, 12.2.
property and the relative limits thereof”.196 However, the lack of a consistent methodology to 
determine the existence of an investment––especially under the ICSID Convention––may also 
lead to an expansionary interpretation of investors’ property rights falling within the meaning 
of investment. Scholars have pointed to the ‘common lexicon’ of BITs, highlighting that a 
general convergence may be identified in their scope and content.197 However, the question of 
the applicable law and its jurisdictional implications198 are only partly resolved through this 
purported harmony in treaty provisions. According to the ICSID Convention, 
the Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as 
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal 
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including 
its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may 
be applicable.199
The arbitrators are therefore called upon to apply the rules of law negotiated by the 
parties to IITs and only in the absence of such treaty, they may apply the law of the 
Contracting State party and general international law. The ICSID Convention does not confer 
a discretionary power to adjudicators with regard to the choice of the governing law of the 
dispute when a IIT is applicable. In light of these considerations, arbitrators’ failure to apply 
the correct set of rules may expose the award to annulment (increasing also the costs of the 
arbitration) under Article 52(1)(c) of the ICSID Convention, on the grounds that the 
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196  S. V. Vadi, “Through the Looking-Glass”, p. 33. The author refers to the ruling of the European Court of 
Justice (‘ECJ’) in Tobacco Products Judgement where the ECJ established that the right to property is not 
absolute and that “its exercise must be restricted, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives 
of general interest [..] and do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very 
substance of the rights guaranteed”. [at p. 32]  See, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health (ex parte British 
American Tobacco Investments Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd) Case C-491/01, December 10, 2002, [2002] ECR 
I-11453, at para 149.
197 C. McLachlan, L. Shore and M. Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration, Oxford, OUP, 2007, p. 6; C. 
McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c)  of the Vienna Convention”, in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 54, 2005, p. 284.
198 Commenting on Pren Nreka v Czech Republic, c raises the question “whether there are compelling reasons to 
make a strict distinction between the concept of an investment under the ICSID Convention (where tribunals 
apply a series of criteria) and the concept of an investment under BITs (where such criteria would be irrelevant 
and mere reference to the treaty-wording would suffice”. See, E. Cabrol, “Pren Nreka v Czech Republic and The 
Notion of Investment Under Bilateral Investment Treaties - Does ‘Investment’ Really Mean ‘Every Kind of 
Asset’?”, in K. P. Sauvant (ed)  Yearbook of International Investment Law & Policy 2009-2010, OUP, 2011, p. 
218. Pren Nreka v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 5 February 2007.
199 Art. 42(1) ICSID Convention.
arbitrators have “manifestly exceeded”  their powers. The lack of an orderly approach to the 
two-stage test mentioned above may result in inconsistent decisions, findings on jurisdictions 
and, eventually, challenges to arbitral pronouncements before ICSID tribunals. This reasoning 
may well apply also to other arbitral panels, to the extent that the interplay between arbitral 
Convention/Rules and IITs is not clarified.200
V. Summary
No expropriation, either direct or indirect, could occur without a property to be taken. 
To identify the object of expropriation, this Chapter has analyzed the kinds of protectable 
property for the purposes of international investment law as they emerge in the decisions of 
international courts and arbitral tribunals. It has been acknowledged that numerous 
conceptions of investment exist.
Both customary international law and investment treaty law recognize movable and 
immovable properties and intangible rights, such as contractual rights, as ‘protectable 
property’. Already the decisions of the PCIJ in Oscar Chinn and German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia acknowledged that contractual rights might qualify as property to be protected 
from expropriation. The status of shareholders rights was discussed by the ICJ in the 
Barcelona Traction case and, more recently, in the Diallo case. The ICJ pointed out that 
shareholders rights are protected against the framework of specific treaties concluded between 
States, or agreements stipulated between the host State and the foreign company, that govern 
the investor-State relationship providing for the degree of investment’s protection and the 
settlement of associated disputes. According to the ICJ, the investment treaty regime devised 
by States holds a pre-eminent role (lex specialis) in both the definition of investment and its 
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200  Sureda maintains: “Restraint would seems the wiser choice for ad hoc tribunals of limited jurisdiction. 
Avoidance of unnecessary pronouncements on contentious issues would help reduce the perception of a ruptured 
international investment legal regime and the resulting uncertainty. An international adjudicator deals with a 
dispute withe the objective of contributing to the pacification and normalization of relations between the parties; 
its decision should not be counterproductive and exacerbate the differences”. A. R. Sureda, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, p. 19.
protection, so that recourse to custom is only made when the treaty system does not exist or is 
inoperative.201
The concept of ‘possession’ under Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR broadly interprets 
the notion of property as to encompass the ownership of material goods as well as contractual 
rights and claims related to property. The ECtHR traditionally tests the proportionality and 
legality of governmental measures interfering with property rights against the public goal 
pursued: superior social interests justify the restrictions to the exercise of private conflicting 
property rights.
In addition to physical property, intangible property rights are included also in the 
definition of property endorsed by the Iran-US Claims tribunal. Both contractual rights and 
shareholders rights qualify as property that could be taken;202 furthermore, the right to appoint 
directors and managers has also been considered as an instance of ownership that, together 
with other factors, could build the owner’s control over an entity and thus signal a property 
right.203
Despite a common lexicon adopted in IITs highlighting a general convergence in the 
scope and content of the notion of investment, the practice of arbitral tribunals shows the 
complexities of the concept.
On the one hand, it is undisputed that immovable and tangible properties are covered by 
the definition of investment, as well as contractual rights. Especially claims and rights to 
performance, or business operations associated to physical property204 are protected under the 
notion of investment. Furthermore, shareholding or participation in companies are also 
claimed to qualify as investment:205  however, their financial value and contribution to the 
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201 Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Preliminary Objections, para 88.
202 Starrett Housing, Interlocutory Award, pp. 156-157; Phelps Dodge, p. 157; Flexi-Van, pp. 348-349; Mobil Oil 
Iran, Partial Award, para 73, p. 25; Phillips Petroleum Company, para 76, p. 106.
203 See, Amoco.
204 Tokios Tokel#s v Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 83 et seq.
205  E.g.: Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and AP Baltoil v The Republic of Estonia; CMS Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, para 51; Link-Trading v Department for Customs of Republic of 
Moldova, Award on Jurisdiction.
overall operation that qualifies as investment must be verified. On the other, the process of 
qualification of property for the purpose of investment protection is complicated by the ‘dual 
test’ established under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, and concerning the parties’ 
consent to arbitration and the objective existence of an investment. Indeed, which of the two 
stages of the test should be addressed first is disputed; furthermore, whether an investment 
should first be determined in light of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention and then in 
compliance with the definition established in the relevant investment treaty is also 
controversial.206
On the basis of the ICSID judicial practice, typical characteristics of an investment has 
been identified in the duration of the project; the regularity in profits and return; the element 
of risk for both sides; a substantial commitment; and, the contribution to the development of 
the host State.207 Such features have been regarded as indicative of an investment for the 
purposes of the ICSID Convention,208  and are to be assessed in light of the specific 
circumstances of each case. Such a contextual analysis has also led some tribunals to 
incorporate in the definition of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention general principles of 
law such as the principles of good faith and non-retroactivity, to supplement the objective 
requirements for an investment established under the Convention.209 This is in view of the 
fact that the definition of investment should be interpreted against the treaty applicable to the 
case, according to its ordinary meaning, object and purpose.210
In light of the aforementioned, an homogeneous content for the notion of property and 
investment may be identified in the decisions of the different fora examined:211 the notion 
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206 Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela, Decision on Jurisdiction.
207 See, Salini test mentioned above at para IV.
208 Jan de Nul NV and Dredging International NV v Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 91.
209 Phoenix Action v Czech Republic.
210  Joy Mining Machinery Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, Award on Jurisdiction, para 53; see also, SGS 
Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of Paraguay, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 107; Romak SA v 
Republic of Uzbekistan, para 177; Petrobart v Kyrgyz Republic, paras 69-70.
211 As noted by Liberti, there is a ‘substantial identity’ in the object of legal protection of both human rights and 
investment law. L. Liberti, “Investissements et droit de l’homme”, p. 812; Contra: C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum 
“The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law”, p. 762.
covers movable and immovable property as well as intangible rights associated to ownership. 
More precisely, the approach concerning intangible property rights has revealed that property 
is conceived of as a bundle of rights, each of which is protected against governmental 
interferences to the extent that it contributes to the investment operation concerned.
It is the treatment of property, and especially the degree of protection accorded to it, that 
varies, and not its core meaning. One shall consider the proportionality test as applied by the 
ECtHR as an instance of a specific standard employed in order to determine the degree of 
protection afforded to property against governmental interferences.212
The proportionality test has gathered increasing attention213 in investment arbitration, 
where it is regarded as a “methodologically robust approach” 214 to evaluate the legitimacy of 
the public purpose pursued through the host State’s action. It is argued that the proportionality 
test aims to foster an understanding of investors’ property rights in compliance with an 
‘international constitutional order of values’ (e.g.: health, sustainable development, 
environmental protection) and that it may be applied to evaluate and take into account host 
States’ regulatory purposes. Recent arbitral awards have indeed “contribut[ed] to the 
emergence of a property theory which acknowledges [..] the social function of property and 
the relative limits thereof”.215 Moreover, recent investment treaties have proved to safeguard 
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212 The social function accorded to property does not allow for excessive burdens to be imposed on individuals. 
See supra Para II.
213  X. Han, “The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v. Mexico”, in Chinese Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 6, 2007, p. 635; J. Krommendijk, J. Morijn, “Proportional’ by What Measure(s)? 
Balancing Investor Interests and Human Rights by Way of Applying the Proportionality Principle in Investor-
State Arbitration”, in P. Dupuy, E. Petersmann, F. Francioni (eds), Human Rights in International Investment 
Law and Arbitration, Oxford, OUP, 2009, p. 422; B. Kingsbury, S. Schill, “Investor-State Arbitration as 
Governance”, p. 5; B. Kingsbury, S. Schill, “Public Law Concepts”, p. 75; A. Stone Sweet, “Investor-State 
Arbitration”, p. 47; E. Leonhardsen, “Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration”, in Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol.1, 2011, p. 1; C. Henckels, “Indirect 
Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, pp. 223-255.
214 C. Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 229: “Proportionality analysis is a more 
methodologically robust approach to legal reasoning than the more amorphous concept of ‘reasonableness’ or the 
(now less frequent, but still observed) phenomenon in investment arbitration in which ‘an extensive summary of 
the facts of the case at hand is followed by the abrupt determination with little intelligible legal reasoning’ that 
the impugned measure is or is not expropriatory”.
215 S. V. Vadi, “Through the Looking-Glass”, p. 33.
public-oriented values in addition to the promotion of investors’ rights.216 Yet, in the absence 
of an absolute theory of property in international law, a conclusive balancing of private versus 
public interests in the decision of taking cases seems impracticable notwithstanding the 
proportionality analysis.217  In fact, proportionality analysis in investment arbitration not 
always balances interests that are identified and regulated against the framework of either the 
investment treaty or the host State’s domestic law. More frequently, the interests that are 
subjected to the proportionality analysis fall outside the scope of the investment treaty218––or 
they are under-regulated in the investment treaty. Therefore, arbitrators are called upon to 
appraise the legitimacy of such interests and to prioritize one over the other. In view of the 
absence of a multilateral or global international (investment) agreement to function as a 
‘positive Constitution’, arbitrators can hardly draw from the law applicable to a case any 
constitutional or supra-legislative guidance for operating a conclusive balancing of the 
interests at stake.219
The concept of taking will be examined in the following Chapter. As the concepts of 
property and taking are interrelated, the analysis of the notion of taking in Chapter V will shed 
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216 S. V. Vadi, “Through the Looking-Glass”, p. 32. See also supra Chapter II of Part I.
217 The proportionality analysis may be effectively applied to indirect expropriatory cases to the extent that it is 
incorporated within a sound legal methodology. See, for instance the criticism advanced to Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v The United Mexican States, with regard to the methodology applied, by C. 
Henckels, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate”, p. 234 et seq. By balancing private and public 
interests, the Tribunal in Tecmed v Mexico set the threshold for a compensable indirect expropriation at the 
disproportional restriction on property rights [at 118 et seq., 136].
218 Kingsbury and Schill have contended that “[f]undamental to the application of proportionality analysis (and 
comparable techniques of balancing)  in investment arbitration is the question of the relationship of 
proportionality analysis to the applicable law, and in particular to the applicable international law”. Considering 
that “a particular feature of most investment treaties is that they make provisions for investor rights without 
addressing in a comprehensive fashion the relationship of these to continuing powers of state regulation”, 
Kingsbury and Schill have advised to opt for “a good faith reading of the text of the applicable treaty”. They 
have contended, indeed, that “it is likely that state parties typically did not intend a severe occlusion of state 
regulatory powers”. B. Kingsbury, S. W. Schill, “Public Law Concepts” p. 88; G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Public Law, OUP, 2007, p. 122: “Under investment treaties, it is clear that the scope and 
substance of the adjudicative role is expressed at a high level of generality and that this allocates considerable 
discretion to arbitrators. As where courts interpret broadly framed public law standards that constrain 
government, such as in the case of human rights norms, this gives arbitrators a significant part in determining the 
appropriate role of government in relation to business. Thus, although they are by no means alone in the world of 
adjudication in this regard, it is none the less the case that arbitrators sometimes make choices of profound 
regulatory importance”.
219 See supra Chapter I, Part I, paragraph V.
further light on the meaning and significance of property. Chapter V investigates what 
governmental measures could interfere with the object of protection under the investment 
treaty. In addition, the Chapter examines under what circumstances a State measure may 
deprive the investor of the use or reasonable economic benefit of ownership220  and thus 
amount to a compensable expropriation.
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220 See, e. g., Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, paras 103-104.
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Chapter V
The Concept of Taking
“International law has not established clear criteria for determining what constitute a taking of an alien’s 
property, short of complete transfer of title [..]”.1
The issue of what constitutes a taking is the object of study of international lawyers as 
of the landmark writings of Prof. Christie.2 International courts and investment tribunals have 
been repeatedly confronted with claims for indirect expropriations; their search for a 
consensus in a definition of taking is unceasing. The 2012 UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements in its study on “Expropriation” purports that
on the basis of State practice, doctrine and arbitral awards, indirect 
expropriations are characterized by the following cumulative elements: (a) 
An act attributable to the State; (b) Interference with property rights or other 
protected legal interests; (c) Of such degree that the relevant rights or 
interests lose all or most of their value or the owner is deprived of control 
over the investment; (d) Even though the owner retains the legal title or 
remains in physical possession.3
The working definition provided for in the UNCTAD Study is the result of “State 
practice, doctrine and arbitral awards”  that have variously attempted to clarify the topic. 
Below a general overview of the arbitral tribunals’ achievements in defining the notion, which 
are undoubtedly indebted with the jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims tribunal, is presented.
International lawyers and judges have provided a number of definitions and descriptions 
of the concept, especially with the aim to distinguish indirect takings from the exercise of 
non-compensable regulatory powers. Despite a broad consensus about the core elements that 
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1 Restatement of Law (Second),  Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Part IV, 1965, Comments to Section 
192, p. 572.
2 G. C. Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?”, pp. 307-338.
3 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 12. See for a comparison the definition presented in UNCTAD, “Taking of 
Property”, in Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, 2000, p. 20, where indirect expropriation 
is described as “not the physical invasion of the property that characterizes nationalizations or expropriations 
that has assumed importance, but the erosion of rights associated with ownership by State interferences”.
may characterize an action as expropriatory, the technicalities of the issue remain obscure.4 As 
Paulsson has noted, “[t]he magical formula for deciding claims of indirect expropriation is the 
international lawyer’s equivalent of proving Fermat’s Last Theorem”,5  and this uncertainty is 
further reinforced as a consequence of the number of fora that, entitled to receive allegations 
against indirect expropriatory actions, have disparately treated these claims.6
The relevant judicial practice of international courts and arbitral tribunals is reviewed in 
the following sections. The choice of the decisions is aimed at clarifying the current status of 
the concept of taking in international law and accounting for both the common and 
exceptional results. The different fora exercise mutual influence on each other, irrespectively 
of the “regime” 7 in which they are placed. This aspect will be highlighted and specific 
attention will also be paid to the recurring criteria applied to decide indirect expropriatory 
claims.
I. The Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice
The judicial practice of both the PCIJ and the ICJ has influenced the development of the 
concept of taking and the formation of the rules concerning its valuation. Indeed, these 
decisions are still referred to by investment tribunals facing a claim against indirect 
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4 As Ratner has noted with regard to the category of ‘regulatory takings’, “decision makers and scholars do agree 
on the core elements of the international law of regulatory takings, at least at a somewhat high level of 
generality”. S. R. Ratner, “Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context”, p. 481. The author, more precisely, has 
claimed that “a more complete explanation for the impossibility of a doctrinal solution [to the problems posed by 
indirect expropriations] centers on the multiplicity of institutions in which regulatory takings claims are made 
and resolved”.
5 J. Paulsson, “Indirect Expropriation: Is the Right to Regulate at Risk?”, in Transnational Dispute Management, 
April 2006, at 1, 9.
6 S. R. Ratner, “Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context”, p. 481. The author, more precisely, has claimed that 
“a more complete explanation for the impossibility of a doctrinal solution [to the problems posed by indirect 
expropriations] centers on the multiplicity of institutions in which regulatory takings claims are made and 
resolved”.
7 See the opinion of S. R. Ratner, “Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context”, pp. 475-528.
expropriation.8 In particular, the issue concerning the protection to be afforded to foreign 
investors has been an object of discussion before the ICJ which was thus called to comment 
upon relevant rules on diplomatic protection.9
Already the case law of the PCIJ in the 1920s and 1930s dealt with the concept of 
expropriation,10  confirming that the “taking away”  or “destruction of rights acquired, 
transmitted or defined by a contract [...]”  are tantamount to a taking of tangible property.11 
However, the question of what constitutes a taking has been further considered by the ICJ in 
225
8 See for instance quoting ELSI: Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, para 127; Alex Genin, 
Eastern Credit Limited v Republic of Estonia, para 371; Noble Ventures, Inc v Romania, ICSID Case N. ARB/
01/11, Award, 12 October 2005, para 176; Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic, para 392; LG&E Energy Corp v 
Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, para 158; Siemens AG v Argentine Republic, para 318; Duke Energy v 
Republic of Ecuador, para 381; quoting ELSI and Barcelona Traction: Republic of Italy v Republic of Cuba, 
UNCITRAL, Award, 15 July 2008. para 204; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case N. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine 
Republic, 25 September 2007, para 69; quoting Barcelona Traction: GAMI Investments, Inc v Government of the 
United Mexican States, paras 29-33, 43; Tokios Tokel!s v Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 54-55; 
Republic of Italy v Republic of Cuba, Dissenting Opinion of Attila Tanzi, 15 July 2008, para 34; Total SA v The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case N. ARB/04/01, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 25 
August 2006, para 78; Telefónica SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case N. ARB/03/20, Decision of the Tribunal 
on Objections to Jurisdiction, 25 May 2006, para 83; Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration 
Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case N. ARB/03/13, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 27 July 2006, 
para 216; Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 82; The 
Rompetrol Group NV v Romania, ICSID Case N. ARB/06/3, Decision on Respondent's Preliminary Objections 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 18 April 2008, para 89; RosInvestCo UK Ltd v Russian Federation, para 605; 
El Paso Energy International Company v Argentine Republic, paras 203, 209-210, 213; quoting Chorzow 
Factory: Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, para 400; ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & 
ADMC Management Limited v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case N. ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal, 2 
October 2006, paras 493, 497-499; ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, paras 129-132; SD Myers,  Inc v Government of Canada, Partial Award, paras 311-315; Metalclad 
Corporation v United Mexican States, para 122; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v United Mexican 
States, para 195 and footnote 239; Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation) and 
Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case N. ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May 2007, para 360; 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija (Vivendi II) v Argentine Republic, paras 8.3.20, 9.2.1-3; Saipem SpA v The 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh, para 201; Gemplus, SA SLP, SA and Gemplus Industrial SA de CV v United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case N. ARB(AF)/04/3 & ARB(AF)/04/4, Award, 16 June 2010, para 81, Part XIII; 
Impregilo SpA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case N. ARB/07/17, Award, 21 June 2011, para 361.
9 Barcelona Traction, pp. 3, 47. See also, Diallo, para 61 the Court noted that “only the State of nationality may 
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the company when its rights are injured by a wrongful act of another 
State”. Furthermore, the ICJ submitted that in contemporary international law the protection of shareholders is 
governed by bilateral and multilateral treaties as well as by contracts between states and foreign investors.
10 Case Concerning Certain German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Polish Republic),  p. 5 et seq.; 
see also, Norwegian Shipowners’ Claim, p. 307.
11 The principle is traceable to the Rudloff case and it was followed by the PCA in the Norwegian Shipowners’ 
case and then endorsed by the PCIJ in the Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, p. 
3. See also, American-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission, Rudloff case, Decision on Merits, in RIAA, Vol. 
9, 1959, pp. 244, 250.
the ELSI case.12 The Court considered the notions of ‘constructive taking’ or ‘creeping 
expropriation’ as well as whether the liquidation of a foreign corporation by a court could 
provide the basis for a claim of denial of justice for which the State was responsible.13 The 
ICJ found that to the extent that “the rules of a State require that a company facing bankruptcy 
should be dissolved, the forced dissolution of the alien company will not amount to a 
compensable taking by the State”.14 More precisely, the Court submitted that “the reference in 
Article V to the provision of “constant protection and security”  cannot be construed as the 
giving of a warranty that property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or 
disturbed”.15
Therefore, the host State’s right to enforce company and securities legislation prevents 
the interferences resulting from this action to be regarded as a compensable taking. 
Furthermore, the need to protect the workforce of the foreign-owned company and the orderly 
functioning of the economic sector in which it operates entitles the host State to intervene in 
the management and control of the company.16 The Court found that the governmental action 
could not be regarded as arbitrary, and established that
arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as 
something opposed to the rule of law [....] it is a willful disregard of due 
process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprise, a sense of judicial 
propriety.17
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12 Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI).
13See also, M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, pp. 87, 382.
14 Id, p. 377; See also, F. A. Mann, “Foreign Investment in the International Court of Justice: the ELSI Case”, in 
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86(1), pp. 92-102; K. J. Hamrock, “The ELSI Case: Toward an 
International Definition of “Arbitrary Conduct”, in Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1992, pp. 837-864.
15 Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI),  para 108 as quoted in R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, Principles of 
International Investment Law, OUP, 2008, p. 150.
16 M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, pp. 400-401.
17 Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI),  para 128. See, R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, Principles,  p. 129. The 
authors relate this finding with the interpretation of the FET standard.
As to the question concerning the standard of compensation, the decision of the PCIJ in 
the Chorzow Factory case18 is the “leading authority on international law on damages”.19 The 
Court stated the “paramount compensation principle” 20 by holding that
it is a principle of international law that the required reparation of a wrong 
may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the 
nationals of the injured State have suffered as a result of the act which is 
contrary to international law.21
The PCIJ further stated that “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed [...]”.22 As will be noted in Chapter VI, the 
PCIJ judgement in the Chorzow Factory case is especially significant with regard to the 
distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation, in terms of the rule governing the 
assessment of the redress.23
II. The European Court of Human Rights
The decisions of the ECtHR have provided international investment law with guidance24 
in terms of the distinction between actions amounting to expropriation v regulatory activities 
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18 The Factory at Chorzow, (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits), PCIJ, Series A, n. 17, 1928. See further in Chapter 
VI.
19  S. Ripinsky, K. Williams, Damages in International Investment Law, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2008, p. 16.
20 Id.
21 The Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity), pp. 27-28.
22 Id, p. 47.
23 As will be explained in Chapter VI, investment treaties generally fail to include specific rules with regard to 
the compensation against violations of obligations different from expropriation. Therefore, investment tribunals 
tend to rely on customary international law, and especially Art. 31 ILC Articles on State Responsibility and the 
PCIJ decision in the Factory at Chorzow case. This means that “arbitral tribunals confronted with non-
expropriatory violations have typically referred to the general principle that a claimant should be fully 
compensated for the loss suffered as the result of the unlawful state conduct”. As to lawful expropriation, 
furthermore, compensation should be limited to the value of the expropriated investment at the time of 
expropriation. S. Ripinsky, K. Williams, Damages, pp. 88-89, 300.
24 Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic, paras 311-312., holding that: “That tribunal sought guidance in the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular, in the case of James and Others”. James and Others v 
UK, paras 50, 63.
of the State.25 However, also with regard to the definition of ‘taking’ the ECtHR has played a 
fundamental role.
To begin with, the ECtHR has recognized the principle according to which the rules of 
international law, that are independent of those of the host State, afford protection to aliens 
against unacceptable measures of the host State. The Court indeed held that “especially as 
regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform”, a distinction may be 
drawn between nationals and non-nationals with regard to compensation. Firstly, “non-
nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation” as, unlike nationals, “they will 
generally have played no part in the election or designation of its authors nor have been 
consulted on its adoption”. Secondly, the Court maintained that different considerations on 
public interest may apply to nationals and non-nationals so that it may be legitimate to “requir
[e] nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-nationals”.26
Secondly, the Court was confronted with the need to define what measures are 
‘unacceptable’. Considering whether the situation could constitute a de facto expropriation, 
the ECtHR ruled in Sporrong & Lönnroth v Sweden27  that the applicants had not been 
formally deprived of their possession, therefore rejecting their claim. The Court interpreted 
Article 1 Protocol I ECHR and established that “in the absence of formal expropriation”, 
meaning a transfer of ownership, it is appropriate “to look behind appearances and investigate 
the realities of the situation complained of [....]”. The Court found that “although the right in 
question lost some of its substance, it did not disappear”  and concluded by denying that “the 
effects of the measure”  could amount to “a deprivation of possessions”.28 The Court further 
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25 Here reference is made to the proportionality approach. This aspect will be examined in Chapter VII on “The 
Concept of Public Purpose”. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v United Mexican States, para 122, where 
the Tribunal tests the proportionality of the measures to the public interest pursued, in order to determine “if they 
are to be characterized as expropriatory”. The Tribunal quotes European Court of Human Rights, n the case 
Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, p. 19.
26 James and Others v UK, para 63.
27 Sporrong & Lönnroth v Sweden. Also the cases Carbonara and Ventura v Italy and Belvedere Alberghiera Srl 
v Italy, 30 May 2000, may be considered as falling under the category of de facto expropriations.
28 Id, para 63.
noted that “the applicants could continue to utilise their possessions”  and more precisely the 
Court considered that, “although it became more difficult to sell properties in Stockholm 
affected by expropriation permits and prohibitions on construction, the possibility of selling 
subsisted”.29
Accordingly, a de facto expropriation may be identified when the owner’s right to use, 
enjoy and dispose of his property is impaired to the extent that the effects of the governmental 
action can be assimilated to a dispossession. Furthermore, the expropriatory character of the 
measure should be established through a fair balancing “between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights” 30 which might then lead to compensation. More precisely the Court 
submitted that a “disproportionate interference”  not justifiable under Article 1 Protocol I 
ECHR would result also from a “taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably 
related to its value”.31 However, the Court pointed out that Article 1 shall not be interpreted as 
a general guarantee of “a right to full compensation”, since “legitimate objectives of ‘public 
interest’, such as pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve 
greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement of full market value”.32 In this 
regard, the Court’s power of review would also be limited “to ascertaining whether the choice 
of compensation terms falls outside the State’s wide margin of appreciation in this domain”.33
This means, therefore, that the payment of less than full compensation is legitimate to 
the extent that the measure pursues an “economic reform” or a “greater social justice”.
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29 Id, para 63..
30 Id,  para 69. At para 147 the ECtHR established: “compensation terms are material to the assessment whether a 
fair balance has been struck between the various interests at stake, and notably, whether or not a disproportionate 
burden has been imposed on the person who has been deprived of his possessions [...]”. The dictum is confirmed 
by the ECtHR also in Jahn and Others v Germany, 30 June 2005, Appl N. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, para 
93; Hutten-Czapska v Poland, 19 June 2006, Appl. N. 35014/97; J. A. Pye v UK, paras 53, 75; Bugajny and 
Others v Poland, 6 November 2007, Appl. N. 22531/05, para 67.
31 Id, para 147. On the issue of compensation see also Lithgow v United Kingdom.
32 Id.
33 Id.
The Court has also condemned as violations of the State’s duty to protect possessions, 
as established in Article 1 Protocol I ECHR, those governmental actions “modifying, 
rescinding or otherwise calling into question existing legal commitments”  between a State and 
the investor.34
Finally, the ECtHR has clarified that expropriation is performed through an 
instantaneous act, that does not create a continuos situation amounting to the “loss of a right”. 
In Malhous, the Court established that it “rappelle et confirme la jurisprudence bien établie de 
la Commission selon laquelle la privation d’un droit de propriété ou d’un autre droit réel 
constitue en principe un acte instantané et ne crée pas une situation continue de « privation 
d’un droit”.35
III. The Iran-United States Claims tribunal
The concept of taking developed by the Iran-US Claims tribunal36 is the yardstick of 
current international investment decisions. In fact, the findings of the Iran-US Claims tribunal 
continue to be quoted and to serve as a point of reference for the decision of present 
investment disputes.
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34 C. Tomuschat, “The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection”, p. 650. The following 
cases are instances of this approach: Zlínsat v Bulgaria, Bimer v Moldova, and Marini v Albania.
35 Malhous v République tchèque,  Decision on Jurisdiction, 13 December 2000, p. 16. The ruling is also quoted 
in Víctor Pey Casado v Republic of Chile, paras 608-610.
36 The notion of taking was influenced by the legal status of ownership under Iranian Laws. Under Iranian Laws 
and regulations, aliens are forbidden to own immovable property in Iran and thus, whilst US nationals did not 
file claims as such concerning expropriatory matters, some individuals having a dual nationality brought claims 
of expropriation of real property. Such claims could be alternatively formulated as physical seizure through acts 
attributable to the government; laws and regulations nullifying the ownership in undeveloped land; and, 
application of Article 989 of Iranian Civil Code dealing with dual nationality. By reading these cases, one may 
immediately identify the gist of the today’s criteria for finding indirect expropriations. Article 989, Book Two, 
“On the Causes of Acquisition” of the Iranian Civil Code considers null and void any other nationality obtained 
by a Iranian national. It states: “Any Iranian national who has acquired foreign nationality after the solar year 
1280 A. H. (1901-2)  without observing the legal requirements, shall have his or her nationality declared null and 
void and shall be regarded as an Iranian subject. But at the same time his or her immovable properties will be 
sold under the supervision on the Public Prosecutor of the place and the proceeds shall be paid to him or her after 
the deduction of the expenses of the sale. Furthermore, he or she shall be deprived of attaining the Secretaryship 
or Acting-Secretaryship of the state, of membership of the Legislative Assemblies, Provincial, District and Town 
Councils and of any government positions”. See, M. A. R. Taleghany, The Civil Code of Iran, p. 143. See, H. 
Piran, “Indirect Expropriation”, p. 214.
Traditionally, cases of nationalization of companies operating in Iran and cases of 
physical seizure of property are considered by the Iran-US Claims tribunal as amounting to a 
taking. The INA Corp37  and the American International Group38  cases are instances of the 
tribunal’s finding that a nationalization had occurred as a result of a 1979 Iranian Law 
nationalizing all insurance companies operating in Iran.39
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37 INA Corporation, p. 371.
38 American International Group, p. 96 et seq.
39  See also, Atahollah Golpira, pp. 171 et seq. . The question before the Tribunal was whether Iran’s 
nationalization of a majority of shares in a company could result in the expropriation of the property interests of 
the minority shareholders. The claimant alleged that following the nationalization of Borzooyeh Medical Group, 
he was dispossessed of 20 shares of stock he owned, and therefore he sought the recovery of the corresponding 
amount. The respondent rejected the nationalization of Medical Group and contended that the tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction, as the claimant had the Iranian nationality. As in Esphahanian award, the tribunal applied the rule of 
the effective and dual nationality. By referring to the Nottebohm case, the tribunal analyzed whether “the factual 
connections with the United States in the period preceding, contemporaneous with and following his 
naturalization as a United States citizen [were] more effective than his factual connections with Iran during the 
same period”. It is a factual criterion and link to the country that substantiates the application of the legal rule on 
diplomatic protection. The tribunal concluded that “a taking of property may occur by virtue of unreasonable 
interference in the use of that property, the Claimant failed to prove interference in the use or enjoyment of his 
property sufficient to constitute any such taking”. At pp. 175 (and footnote 1), 176-177, the tribunal quotes 
Harza Engineering, p. 499; The claimant’s assertion that the Foundation was an instrumentality of the 
Government of Iran is not decided upon by the tribunal, on the basis of its conclusion that expropriation is not 
proved. More precisely, the tribunal suggest that no evidence of the title to property in itself is sufficiently 
provided. The Tribunal found that the management of the Group was carried out by the Oppressed People’s 
Foundation; however, Golpira was still among the stockholders and it received no payment since no dividends 
have been paid to anyone. As will be noted, upon certain conditions also the omission to act may lead to a 
finding of indirect expropriation. Nasser Esphahanian v Bank Tejerat, Award n. 31-157-2, 29 March 1983, 
reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 2, 1988 (I), pp. 157 et seq.; Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), Judgment of 6 April 
1955, ICJ Reports, 1955, pp. 4, 24. The Respondent submitted evidence that the Bahadori family’s shares 
amounted only to 21 per cent of the total shares; in addition, it was admitted that no information concerning the 
status of the investment were sent to the claimant and that since 1977 Medical Group had not been paying any 
dividends to shareholders nor making any profits. See, C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal, p. 411; See also, Merrill Lynch & Co., pp. 122, 141-143, and Asgari Nazari,  para 125. In 
Merrill Lynch & Co the claimants alleged the expropriation of their 40% interest in IFSC, an Iranian financial 
services company. The 60% of the company was owned equally by Bank Melli and the Industrial and Mining 
Development Bank of Iran (“IMDBI”). More precisely, the claimants argued that with the liquidation of IFSC in 
November 1979 a specific act of expropriation was carried out by the Government of Iran, acting through the 
two banks. Although the claimants maintained that they did not take part to the majority’s decision to liquidate 
IFSC, the tribunal considered the measure lawful, regarding the banks’ actions as exercided “in capacity [..]  of a 
shareholder”. Thus, no expropriation of the minority’s ownership interests was found by the tribunal. The same 
was argued in Asgari Nazari: the claimant contented that the Government, by taking the majority shares of the 
company SKBM, had expropriated his interests. Moreover, holding the majority of the shares, the claimant 
argued that the Government was in charge of administering SKBM: since it failed to carry out this task, the 
claimant asked for compensation, maintaining the liability of the Government. To the contrary, the tribunal 
dismissed the claims, establishing that “the existence of the alleged duty to act requires more elements than the 
mere change of the ownership of the majority portion of the company’s shares”.
In American International Group,40  the tribunal held that the term ‘expropriation’ 
includes both nationalization and other forms of taking. The tribunal rejected the 
unlawfulness of the nationalization, either under customary law or the Treaty of Amity, since 
“there is no sufficient evidence before the tribunal to show that the nationalization was not 
carried out for a public purpose as part of a larger reform programme, or it was 
discriminatory”.41
It is further recognized as a general principle of public international law that 
compensation is to be paid also against lawful nationalization of property.42 The enactment of 
the ‘Law of Nationalization of Insurance and Credit Enterprise’ was regarded as causing 
expropriations of which Iran was responsible, and which allowed the expropriated party to 
recover also the damages for the losses suffered.43
The questions concerning the ‘just compensation’ to be paid against nationalizations and 
the standard to be applied for its determination were specifically addressed by the tribunal in 
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40 American International Group, p. 96 et seq. the Iranian Government maintained that an act of nationalization 
does not constitute an expropriation under international law, being therefore excluded from the jurisdictional 
requirements of Article II, para 2 of the Claims Settlement Declaration. In addition, the Respondent maintained 
not only that the right to nationalize property is an universally recognized expression of the permanent 
sovereignty of the State over its natural resources, but also that no customary rule establishing the prompt 
payment of compensation does exist. More precisely, the Government interpreted the international standard as 
requiring the mere intention to compensate a “partial” amount, to be effected within a reasonable time.
41 Id, p. 103.
42 Id, pp. 103, 106. Given the fact that the Respondent accepted to pay compensation, the tribunal focused on the 
valuation of property. The appropriate method is identified in valuing the “company as a going concern, taking 
into account not only the net book value of its assets but also such elements as goodwill and likely future 
profitability, had the company been allowed to continue its business under its former management”. The tribunal 
took into consideration the circumstances of the case, in order to approximately determine the range within 
which the value of the company could be assumed to lie. However, see the Concurring Opinion of Richard M. 
Mosk, on American International Group, pp. 109 et seq.  Judge Mosk filed a concurring opinion contending the 
opportunity for the tribunal to award higher damages to the claimant. More precisely, Judge Mosk argued in 
favor of the strict applicability of the Treaty of Amity, and in particular of its Art. IV para 2 of, as for the 
requirements for compensation. This would have led, according to the Judge, to the application of a different 
rule, calling for the “prompt payment” of a “just compensation”, thus representing the “full equivalent of the 
property taken”. Although the tribunal properly valued the company as a going concern, it failed to take in due 
account the material supplied by the claimant’s experts, thereby reaching a negative estimation about the 
company’s future business prospects, and therefore containing the amount to be paid. It is evident from the 
reasoning of Judge Mosk, how the identification of the law applicable to the case may bring about both 
substantive and remedial repercussions on the assessment of the claim.
43 C. N. Brower, “Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Compensation”, p. 643.
the INA case.44  Deciding on the basis of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and 
Consular Rights as lex specialis, the tribunal identified the “prompt payment of just 
compensation [..] which shall be in an effectively realizable form and shall represent the full 
equivalent of the property taken”, as the standard endorsed in the Treaty.45 Judge Holtzman46 
agreed with the decision of the tribunal in his separate opinion, relying on the ‘full 
compensation’ principle and equating it to the ‘fair market value’ by applying the Treaty of 
Amity. However, he specified that the same result would have been reached through the 
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44 In the INA case the claim dealt with the shareholding in an Iranian insurance company. The claimant was 
seeking compensation against the governmental decision to control the insurance company, which was enacted 
through the Law of Nationalization of Insurance Company following the Iranian Revolution. By nationalizing a 
category of commercial enterprises deemed fundamental for the national economy, the governmental authority 
exercised its sovereign power; the dispute was related to the quantum of compensation to be paid to the investor. 
Whilst INA favored a ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’ relying both on general principles of 
international law and on the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, the Respondent 
considered the ‘net book value’ as the criterion to be applied. See also, G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on 
Nationalisation, pp. 7-8.
45 Art. IV para 2. The tribunal granted to the claimant a compensation equal to the fair market value of its shares, 
assessed as of the date of nationalization. The notions of ‘appropriate’, ‘equitable’, ‘fair’ and ‘just’ are 
interpreted as virtually interchangeable when related to standards of compensation. It was argued that no single 
method exists that could be used in all cases involving compensatory issues, so that a margin of discretion 
always recurs. Dolzer refers to the INA case to draw a line between expropriation that must be granted a fair 
market value and those that may also be subjected to a stricter criterion. Indeed, Dolzer, recognizing that the 
main difficulty for tribunals lies in the identification of relevant factors and their weighing process, pointed out 
that the ‘appropriate compensation’ needs to re-adapt the fair market value standard according to the 
circumstances under which expropriation or nationalization was de facto carried out. This means that such 
standard is to be lowered in cases where the nationalization is part of a large-scale programme or the investor has 
extensively benefitted of the profits before such intervention. See, G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on 
Nationalisation, p. 9; R. Dolzer, “New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation”, pp. 557 et seq.
46 Holtzmann Separate Opinion on INA Corporation and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award 
n. 184-161-1, 12 August 1985, reprinted in Iran-US CTR, Vol. 8, p. 391 et seq.
principles of customary international law,47  pointing out the difficulties associated to the 
question of the law applicable to the dispute.48
The concept of taking before the Iran-US Claims tribunal includes also cases of physical 
seizure of property. The tendency of the tribunal to find an expropriation whenever a seizure 
of property is not merely temporary and results in a non “merely ephemeral”  deprivation of 
ownership (or the use of it), is first illustrated in Malek.49 The ruling of the tribunal confirmed 
that, although it is well established that a State may take possession of private property for a 
limited time especially in pursuance of a public purpose, this legitimate behavior may qualify 
as indirect expropriation in light of the subsequent conduct of the State towards that 
property.50
Furthermore, in Rouhollah Karubian,51  the tribunal clarified that “a showing of 
unreasonable interference by the government with specific property is required for the 
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47 G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, p. 10.
48 Separate Opinion Judge Holtzman, as quoted Id, pp. 10-12. It is argued that “courts and international tribunals 
when faced with the responsibility of deciding actual cases, overwhelmingly follow the rule of awarding full 
compensation for governmental takings”. Conversely, the appropriateness of a partial compensation in 
connection with large scale governmental interferences with private property is contested, doubting its nature as 
established principle of law. In the separate opinion also the cases American International Group, p. 96 et seq. 
and Tippetts are quoted as instances of the application of the principle of the full compensation under customary 
international law. Furthermore, the Judge refers also to the Separate Opinion of Judge Lagergren, who is in favor 
of a standard of ‘appropriate compensation’; Judge Ameli supported the ‘appropriate compensation’ standard, 
instead of the ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’ one. As to the modus operandi, it is proposed to 
firstly analyze the compensation methods as they are established in the legislation of the nationalizing authority, 
and secondly, to consider them in light of the “current requirements of international law that can be proven as 
being generally accepted”. This would enable the testing of national discretion against a concept of ‘fundamental 
fairness’, whose foundation is in international law. In addition, Judge Ameli pointed to the “changes in 
international law” as the measure through which the rule concerning compensation should be determined.
49 Reza Said Malek,  p. 246 et seq.  In Malek the claim was based on article 989 of the Iranian Civil Code, which 
was interpreted by the claimant as triggering an automatic expropriation of his landed properties, as from his 
attainment of the American citizenship. The tribunal considered the interpretation of the Article as inconsistent 
with its text, not regarding the provision as self-executing. The Article established that “a procedure for the sale 
of the real estate must be set in motion under the supervision of the local Public Prosecutor”, and the claimant, 
according to the tribunal, “has not submitted any evidence purporting to prove that this procedure was ever 
implemented in relation to Farmland”. Along the same line see, Alal Moin v The Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award n. 557-950-2, 25 May 1994, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 30, p. 70 et seq.
50 G. C. Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law”, p. 322.
51 Rouhollah Karubian, p. 3 et seq, pp. 119, 127. In Rouhollah Karubian the claimant was a dual national living 
in the United-States. He had purchased lands in Iran between 1957 and 1973 and claimed for expropriation of a 
number of parcels of land in four different Iranian locations, through a series of laws and regulations following 
the 1979 Revolution. The tribunal found that the 1979 Act regulating the undeveloped land was very general and 
created an uncertainty as to the status of the land. Nevertheless, no indirect expropriation could be found.
conclusion of indirect expropriation”.52  Although dismissing the claim for indirect 
expropriation, the tribunal found the liability of Iran as to “other measures affecting property 
rights”.53  According to the tribunal, Iran could be held liable with regard to those 
“interference created by the cumulative effect of the land reform legislation and related 
governmental action”.54 More precisely, “[those interferences] did not rise to the level of an 
expropriation, [but] it has been established that the interference was of such a degree as to 
constitute other measures affecting the property rights of the Claimant”  under the  Claims 
Settlement Declaration. As a consequence, the tribunal found the Respondent “responsible to 
the Claimant for damages resulting from these measures”.55
Interferences with property rights, including omissive conduct, seems to be regarded as 
amounting to a taking to the extent that they cause a substantial deprivation to the owner. In 
Oil Field of Texas,56 the tribunal clarified that an indirect taking may occur not only through 
positive actions and interferences with alien property, but also through the refusal to return 
tangible property temporarily in the possession of the State or its organs, provided that this 
results in a permanent deprivation.57
The Iran-US Claims tribunal was confronted also with claims of de facto expropriations 
resulting from governmental interferences with: the use or enjoyment of property; commercial 
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52 H. Piran, “Indirect Expropriation”, p. 247, footnote 335; The same is contended in Vernie R. Pointon, p. 49 et 
seq., para 32; in Harza Engineering Company, p. 504; in Tippets, pp. 225-226.
53 Rouhollah Karubian, p. 3, para 131. The Tribunal also quoted Foremost where it is stated that an interference 
“attributable to the Iranian Government or other state organs of Iran, while not amounting to an expropriation, 
gives rise to a right to compensation for the loss of enjoyment of the property in question”; Foremost Tehran, p. 
251.
54 Id, p. 3, para 144.
55 Id; the Tribunal refers to Eastman Kodak, Partial Award, p. 169; see also, William L. Pereira, p. 198, where the 
Tribunal found an expropriation of Pereira’s offices in Tehran relying on a copy of notice of confiscation issued 
by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. According to the Tribunal, the conducts of the Guards were attributable to 
the Government of Iran and therefore the claimant was entitled to compensation for the damages suffered as a 
consequence of the unilateral taking of possession of property and denial of its use. See, M. Mohebi, The 
International Law Character of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 310.
56 Oil Field of Texas, p. 308.
57  M. Mohebi, The International Law Character of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Kluwer Law 
International, 1999, p. 310.
activities, (disposition of) shares and dividends; the exercise of control on one’s property 
(e.g., through the appointment of managers); and, the contractual rights of the owner.
In the absence of a formal decree or legislation affecting the title to property,58 thus, the 
tribunal considered the unilateral “taking of possession”  together with “the denial of its use” 
as concurring elements for a finding of expropriation.59 In Sola Tiles, Inc,60 the tribunal held 
that any “interference by a State in the use of that property or the enjoyment of its benefits 
amounting to a deprivation of the fundamental rights of ownership” 61 could constitute a 
taking. More precisely, the tribunal found that the official document issued by the Committee 
[of the Islamic Revolution of the Imam Khomeyni], although not formally an expropriatory 
decree, revealed the intentions62  of the body and constituted a progressive taking of the 
claimant’s business.63
Interferences with the owners’ shares and interests in companies were also considered 
by the tribunal as proper grounds for a taking claim. However, the tribunal held that to be 
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58 A. Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation”, p. 89. It is clarified that “the assumption of control over 
property by a government or by organs for whose acts the government can be considered accountable under 
international law is insufficient for a finding of expropriation of property or deprivation capable of being equated 
to expropriation”.
59 Dames and Moore, p. 233, where the claimant submitted that the furniture and equipment belonging to one of 
its subsidiaries had been expropriated in Iran by the Revolutionary Committee, which made the employees leave 
ordering not to remove anything from the offices. The tribunal found that the claimant’s ownership was 
expropriated: not only the claimant’s evidence was not rebutted, but the Tribunal concluded to be “satisfied that 
Computer Science was thus denied the use of its office equipment and that it was thereafter denied access to the 
equipment”. Commenting upon this case, Mohebi questioned whether an affidavit could be deemed sufficient 
conclusive evidence for a claim of taking. See, M. Mohebi, The International Law Character, p. 310; in Kenneth 
P. Yeager the alleged expropriation of money by the members of the Revolutionary Committee was ratified by 
the Tribunal on the basis of the claimant and his wife’s affidavits. See, Kenneth P. Yeager, Award n. 
324-10199-1, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 17, p. 110, as quoted in A. Mouri, The International Law of 
Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, p. 90; 
conversely, in Ahfi Planning Associates Inc.,  the affidavit presented as the only piece of evidence was regarded 
as “an inadequate basis upon which to find responsibility by the Government of Iran for the expropriation 
claim”. See, Ahfi Planning Associates Inc v The Government of Iran, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 11, 1986-II, 
p. 178, as quoted in M. Pellonpää, “Compensable Claims before the Tribunal: Expropriation Claims”, in The 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution to the Law of the State Responsibility, R. B. Lillich, D. B. 
Magraw (ed by), 1998, p. 243.
60 Sola Tiles Inc v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 298-317-1, 22 April 1987, reprinted 
in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 14, p. 223.
61 Id, pp. 223, 231. The claimant submitted that its premises had been seized and its contents and inventory 
impounded by a Revolutionary Committee.
62 Emphasis added.
63 Sola Tiles Inc, pp. 233-234.
regarded as amounting to a taking, such interferences should have the effect of substantially 
impair the owner’s right to dispose of its shares.
In Foremost64 five companies alleged expropriation of the 31% equity interest held by 
them in “Pak Dairy”, an Iranian joint stock company. The claimants sought damages in 
compensation for the insured portion of 64% and for the insured portion of two cash 
dividends that were declared in 1979 and 1980 and paid to other shareholders but not to 
Foremost.65  Foremost advanced that the combined effect of a number of governmental 
measures resulted in the expropriation of its interest, that had deprived it of its fundamental 
rights as owner of the 31% of Pak Dairy’s shares. The task of the tribunal was 
to evaluate the rights Foremost had in Pak Dairy in the period prior to the 
alleged expropriation; the extent to which these rights were diminished or 
interfered with prior to 19 January 1981; and, finally, whether such 
interference amounts in law to an expropriation giving rise to a right to 
compensation.
To do so, the tribunal had to assess whether the measures adopted were 
not only detrimental in their effect on Foremost, but went beyond the 
legitimate exercise by the majority of the shareholders of Pak Dairy, or by 
its duly elected board of directors, of their right to manage the company’s 
affairs in what they perceived to be its best interests.66
The tribunal, by balancing Foremost’s rights against the adverse actions of the 
government, concluded that the interferences suffered did not amount to an expropriation67 
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64 Foremost Tehran, p. 229.
65 The Tribunal did not find that on 19 January 1981 any action amounting to expropriation were performed 
against the claimant; however, compensation was granted for the impairment of its rights. More specifically, the 
tribunal admitted Foremost to assert its claim although it had previously received partial compensation from its 
insurers. OPIC––a United States’ governmental Agency insuring overseas investments of United States 
nationals––had paid compensation to Foremost under insurance contracts relating to its investment in the Park 
Diary. The Iranian Government opposed the locus standi of Foremost, arguing that rather OPIC was vested with 
the legal title to the claim and underlining that in any event OPIC as a governmental agency could only bring a 
claim “arising out of contractual arrangements between the two states for the purchase and sale of goods and 
services”. On these grounds a claim for expropriation was to be dismissed, according to the Government. By 
analyzing the settlement agreement concluded between Foremost and OPIC, the tribunal found Foremost 
“legally entitled to pursue a claims for recovery of the insured portion of its losses as well as the uninsured 
portion”. More precisely, the tribunal found that this was consistent with the governing law of the settlement 
agreements and that, consequently, the recovery by Foremost of a measure of compensation from its insurer 
cannot affect its title to claim against the State. See, G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, pp. 
29-31.
66 G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, p. 33.
67 Foremost Tehran, pp. 245-250.
since Foremost had failed to “prove the existence of any statutory restriction on its right to 
sell or otherwise dispose of its shares”.68 The tribunal, however, found a “serious impairment 
of the enjoyment and disposition of the claimants’ property”,69  and therefore established that 
the interferences had given rise “to a right to compensation for the loss of enjoyment of the 
property”.70
Judge Holtzmann dissented, maintaining that Foremost suffered expropriation and was 
therefore entitled to a full compensation, covering also the value of its shares (not only the 
two unpaid dividends).71 He quoted the concurring opinion of George Aldrich in the case ITT 
Industries Inc and Islamic Republic of Iran and argued that “subsequent events and the 
passage of time have made [..] unavoidable the conclusion that the Respondents’ action has 
rendered Foremost’s rights of ownership so meaningless as to the equivalent of an 
expropriation of those rights”.72
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68 G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, p. 34.
69 The Tribunal compared the case with the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in Sporrong and 
Lönnroth, para 63.
70 Foremost Tehran, p. 251; G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, p. 35.
71 G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, p. 36.
72 Id; See, ITT Industries Inc and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 47-156-2, 26 May 1983, reprinted in Iran-
USCTR, Vol. 2, pp. 349, 352. The same reasoning and conclusion of Foremost were reached in Eastman Kodak 
Company, pp. 153, 155-156, 167-169, where the Tribunal focused on the issue of control as a decisive factor to a 
finding of expropriation. Rangiran was an Iranian corporation acting as distributor for Eastman Kodak; Eastman 
Kodak was the holder of all but two shares of Rangiran and it claimed expropriation against Iran. Since as of 27 
November 1979 there was a joint management of Rangiran and on 10 March 1980 the shareholders’ decision to 
liquidate Rangiran was successfully implemented: consequently, the Tribunal established that a claim for 
expropriation was incompatible with these facts, finding however that interferences with shareholders’ interests 
were attributable to Iran. According to the claimant, the following measures had the effect of depriving the 
shareholders of their control over Rangiran, transforming it into an entity controlled by Iran: the freezing of 
Rangiran’s bank accounts, the Revolutionary Prosecutor’s grant of management authority to the Workers’ 
Council and the Government’s appointment of a manager. The Tribunal rejected the claim finding at first that 
Rangiran was not an entity controlled by Iran within the meaning of the Claim Settlement Declaration: the 
threshold of control needed excluded a situation where the claimant maintains the capacity to liquidate Rangiran 
and to petition for a declaration of bankruptcy. The tribunal held that the fact that “Iran did not control Rangiran 
virtually precluded any possibility of a finding that a taking had occurred”. Nevertheless, the Tribunal 
established that unlawful interferences with the claimant’s ownership interest were carried out.43
Similarly, interferences with other intangible property rights have also been regarded as 
possibly amounting to expropriation before the Iran-US Claims tribunal.73 Indeed, “the failure 
of a party to render contractually required assistance towards exportation could at some point 
in time ripen into a taking or conversion of the property affected”.74 In Flexi-Van,75 intangible 
property rights were deemed to have been expropriated.76 The tribunal, however, dismissed 
both the claim for expropriation and the alleged interferences with property rights or unjust 
enrichment,77 since 
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73  See, Mobil Oil Iran, pp. 3, 5-6, 10, 37-39, 42. [Consortium cases]  The tribunal maintained that the 
Government of Iran had not expropriated the claimants’ interests in the Consortium Agreement, stating that the 
parties agreed to terminate it.57 The Parties then operated under the 1973 Sale and Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) 
with National Iranian Oil Company (“NIOC”)  which, according to the tribunal, was never fully implemented. 
Rather, the Parties based their relationship on de facto or ad hoc agreements. NIOC proposed the revision of the 
SPA, in an effort to contain the disputes between the parties: no ultimate decision was reached on this regard, 
and therefore the tribunal did not consider the SPA to have been terminated. The tribunal found that the 
Revolution, as a force major condition, had merely suspended the SPA––on the basis that oil production was 
resumed in March 1979. The claimants submitted a de facto expropriation, relying on an exchange of letters with 
NIOC occurred in March 1979. Conversely, the tribunal interpreted these letters and the parties’ conducts prior 
to and after those written communications as expressing a clear intention not to revive the SPA after the 
Revolution, opting instead for a decision to renegotiate the legal and financial consequences of the SPA’s 
conclusion in the future. Therefore, the tribunal dismissed the claim for a de facto expropriation. The tribunal 
maintained that it “need not to pronounce itself on the Claimants’ other contentions, notably that their rights 
under the Agreement were property rights which could be expropriated” (para 130), since the Parties agreed not 
to revive the 1973 SPA; In the jurisprudence of the tribunal it is clear that contractual rights are property 
independently compensable if taken or interfered upon: see, A. Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation, 
p. 44;  As will be noted, in the Amoco case the decision to find an expropriation relied upon the notice of 
nullification from the Special Committee: this was issued on 5 September 1981, after the jurisdictional limitation 
date and when the SPA had already been terminated, and therefore it could not be relied upon in the Consortium 
Cases. See, C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, pp. 417-418, 425.
74 Petrolane Inc, p. 92, quoting Sedco, p. 31.
75 Flexi-Van, pp. 336-337, 339-342; G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, p. 48. Flexi-Van 
argued to have entered into a lease agreement with two companies controlled by the Iranian Government––i.e: 
Star Line and Iran Express––and concerning marine transport equipment. According to Flexi-Van the 
Government took control of the two companies not later than the 29 February 1980, causing them to repudiate 
the contract with Flexi-Van. The claimant maintained to have been expropriated of its contractual rights, 
including rights to payment of accounts receivable and future rentals, and rights to the return of leased 
equipment; consequently, it advanced a claim for expropriation and, in the alternative, for interference with 
contractual relations, breach and repudiation of contract and unjust enrichment ‘through retention and use of the 
equipment’. The Respondent rejected all the accusations. In addition, the Government contended that Flexi-Van 
failed to prove that it owned the equipment and that the two companies entered into lease agreement regarding 
this equipment. The Government submitted that even if it had expropriated the two companies, only the position 
of the shareholders would have changed and not the company’s juridical personality. Therefore, these juridical 
persons were themselves liable for their obligations. The tribunal assumed that certain contractual relationships 
existed between the Claimant and the two Iranian companies; yet, the tribunal made “no specific findings as to 
the existence and validity of each and everyone of the thousands of the alleged leases”. [pp. 346-347]
76Id.
77 Id, pp. 348-349.
[....] Star Line remained a separate legal entity, and surely did not become 
an organ or department of the Government. What the evidence in this case 
does not show, however, are the details of such control, to what extent, if at 
all, this constituted interference with management of Star Line or with its 
business decisions, or what consequences that had with regard to the 
company’s agreement.78
The inclusion of intangible property among the objects of expropriation is the result of a 
process through which the tribunal confirmed the tendency in international law and practice 
towards the adoption of a wide notion of property.79  In this regard the Amoco case is 
particularly relevant.80  There the tribunal, while noting that “the purpose of the second 
sentence of Article IV, paragraph 2 is to protect the property of the nationals of one party 
against expropriation by the other party”, also stated that expropriation “may extend to any 
rights which can be the object of a commercial transaction”.81 The tribunal rejected all the 
arguments advanced by the claimant to support the unlawfulness of the expropriation. The 
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78 Flexi-Van, pp. 348-349. The Tribunal found that according to the evidence submitted, not later then February 
1980 Star Line was “confiscated and put at the disposal of the Foundation”. The tribunal specified that in Hyatt 
International Corporation v Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award n. ITL 54-134-1, 
p. 31, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 9, pp. 72 et seq, it held that the Foundation is an instrumentality controlled 
by the Government of Iran within the meaning of Article VII, para 3 of the Claims Settlement Declaration.
79 M. Pellonpää, “Compensable Claims before the Tribunal”, p. 188.
80 Amoco International Finance Corporation, pp. 189-309.
81 Id, p. 220. See also, W. A. Hamel, “The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Part II, Selection of Awards and 
Decisions of Particular Relevance to Public International Law”, in The Hague Yearbook of International Law, 
1990, pp. 224-225; M. Pellonpää, “Compensable Claims before the Tribunal”, p. 189 at footnote 11, referring 
also to M. Pellonpää, M. Fitzmaurice, “Taking of Property in the Practice of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal”, in Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 19, 1988, pp. 57-60. The claimant, Amoco 
International Finance Corporation (AIFC), was a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Standard Oil Company, an Indiana corporation (United States). In 1966, AIFC’s wholly Swiss owned subsidiary 
Amoco International SA (Amoco) entered into an International Economic Development Agreement with the 
National Petrochemical Company Ltd (NPC), aimed at creating a joint venture for extracting and selling sulphur, 
natural gas liquids and liquified petroleum gas. These gases were by-products of nearby oil production pursuant 
to a Joint Structure Agreement between National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and Amoco Iran. The Agreement 
contemplated a Gas Purchase Agreement to be concluded between the joint venture on the one hand and NIIOC 
and Amoco Iran on the other; it was concluded on 1 April 1967. Such Agreement was then approved by Iranian 
authorities and the joint venture company Kharg Chemical Company Ltd (Khemco) became party in 1967. 
Amoco and NPC each held 50% of Khemco’s capital stock and should have equal representation on Kemco’s 
Board of Directors, receiving also dividends in equal shares. The Agreement was then to be in force for 35 years 
from 2 March 1967 on, or for so long as the Joint Structure Agreement between NIOC and Amoco Iran would be 
in force. After the completion of Khemco’s production facilities, the commercial production started in 1970 and 
continued until the end of 1978. In April 1979, NPC’s Chairman declared that Iran would purchase all foreign 
interests in Iran’s petrochemical industry. In 1979 NIOC and NPC took over Khemco’s sales and marketing 
activities; moreover, Amoco was informed that its participation in Khemco would be terminated from 31 
December 1978. On 24 December 1980 Amoco was notified by a “Special Commission” that the Agreement was 
“null and void”; thus, not having received dividends or loans as contemplated by the Agreement, Amoco decided 
to claim the breach of contract and the expropriation of its rights under the Agreement.
sole ground on which the tribunal agreed regarded the ‘breach of the contract’, which the 
claimant presented both as an argument to support the unlawfulness of expropriation and as a 
separate basis for liability.82
The tribunal found that Iran was the expropriating State, not the party to the Agreement, 
and therefore it concluded that Iran could not be charged with the breach of the contract. 
Furthermore, the tribunal held that the expropriation could not be considered unlawful only 
because it implied the breach of the Agreement.83
De facto expropriations are furthermore identified by the Iran-US Claims tribunal as a 
result of the loss of a business entity or commercial operation in Iran, especially through the 
governmental appointment of managers and supervisory boards for Iranian companies or 
offices in which American claimants had an ownership interest.84  The cases are also 
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82 W. A. Hamel, “The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal”, pp. 225-226. More precisely, the claimant submitted 
that: the expropriation was in violation of either Iranian law, the Treaty of Amity and international law; no 
compensation––or offer thereof––had been made; the expropriation was discriminatory; the expropriation 
violated the Agreement; the decision to expropriate was not in furtherance of a public purpose.
83 Id, pp. 226-227. However, the Tribunal noted that Iran pushed NPC, NIOC and the managing Director to act in 
a way that effectively deprived Amoco of its rights in the management of Khemco, and this enabled the Tribunal 
to protect the contractual rights emanating from the Agreement by awarding to Amoco a compensation as of the 
date in which such measures were effected––rather than the date at which the Special Commission took the 
decision. In this regard Judge Brower contended in his concurring opinion that the date of the expropriation 
should have been the date of first interference, rather than the date of the last act completing expropriation: 
thereby, the date of expropriation would have been set prior to the Special Commission decision’s, entailing the 
unlawfulness of the expropriatory measure at hand. In addition, Judge Brower maintained that the Tribunal 
should have found that even prior to the expropriation NPC did act in breach of the Agreement, and therefore 
Amoco should have been granted damages for the contractual breach suffered. Judge Brower disagreed with the 
distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation carried out by the tribunal by making reference to 
Chorzow Factory case. The Amoco case shows that a claimant could seek a remedy against governmental 
interferences with property rights through either a claim against expropriation and against the breach of the 
contract. This may reinforce the argument according to which, as of the inception of international investment 
law, a multiplicity of grounds have been available to private parties to support their allegations. M. Pellonpää, 
“Compensable Claims before the Tribunal”, p. 193; See, J. Paulsson and Z. Douglas, “Indirect Expropriation in 
Investment Arbitration”, in N. Horn (ed by), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes, Kluwer Law 
International, Vol. 19, 2004, pp. 146-147, where it is argued with regard to indirect expropriation that there is “a 
vast array of two-line definitions that can be employed to defend almost any position along the spectrum”.
84 C. N. Brower and J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 394; G. H. Aldrich, “What 
Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?”, p. 587; H. Piran, “Indirect Expropriation”, pp. 186-187. The 
Iranian Government enacted the “Law of Appointment of Temporary Managers for Industrial, Agricultural, 
Commercial and Service Units”, as emergency measure following the revolution. The Law established the 
appointment of new managers for those companies whose managers have abandoned their workplace, with the 
aim to avoid their shut-down. Thus, most complaints by American claimants before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
arouse as a consequence of this Law.
interesting with respect to the application and evaluation of the degree of control deemed 
necessary to find the attributability of the action to Iran. Among them, Starrett Housing 
Corporation85 and Tippetts86 are the most important ones.
In general, the tribunal considered the right to appoint directors and managers as a 
component of ownership that together with other factors can substantiate the owner’s control 
over the entity.87 The mere appointment of new managers, therefore, was not regarded as a 
dispositive act of expropriation:88 rather, a finding of expropriation required that following the 
appointment of a government-controlled management, “the owner was deprived of 
fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely 
ephemeral”.89
Apparently, the tribunal considered the appointment by the Government of new 
managers as a prima facie proof of the exercise of governmental control over the entity.90 This 
approach proved relevant not only in terms of attributability of the act to the State, but also as 
a signal of the occurring of an expropriation.91 In addition, the tribunal required governmental 
irreversible control over the company, meaning that the owner had to be virtually deprived of 
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85 Starrett Housing, Interlocutory Award, p. 122, and Final Award.
86 Tippetts, p. 220.
87  C. N. Brower and J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 394; A. Mouri, The 
International Law of Expropriation, pp. 51-52, referring to Amoco. The decision of the Tribunal is that 
interference with Amoco’s management rights in Khemco should be considered for valuation purposes, as of the 
date at which measures definitively took effect, is interpreted as conveying the idea that such interference can 
merely assist in determining the date of the taking, and not operate as an independent ground for claiming 
interference with property rights.
88  Id, p. 395, quoting Harold Birnbaum v The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 549-967-2, 6 July 1993, 
reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 29, p. 260 et seq., paras. 22-36; Thomas Earl Payne v The Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 245-335-2, 8 August 1986, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 12, 1986 (III), pp. 
7-11; Phelps Dodge Corp, pp. 129-130; Sedco, Interlocutory Award, pp. 273-279; Tippetts, pp. 224-226; Starrett 
Housing, Interlocutory Award and Final Award, pp. 154-157.
89 Tippetts,  p. 225 and Concurring Opinion of George Aldrich in ITT Industries Inc.,  v The Islamic Republic of 
Iran, The Organization of Nationalized Industries of Iran, Award n. 47-156-2, reprinted in in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 
2, 1988 (I), pp. 351-352.
90 C. N. Brower and J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 396.
91 Id, p. 397; the authors note that the significance of the appointment of Government managers as prima facie 
proof of governmental control of the entity, as opposed to prima facie proof of expropriation, is demonstrated in 
James M. Saghi v The Islamic Republic of Iran,  Award n. 544-298-2, 22 January 1993, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, 
Vol. 29, pp. 20 et seq.
all its property rights: the bare control, indeed, was not regarded as a sufficient threshold for a 
taking to be found.92 However, given the revolutionary fervor in mid-1978, the conducts of 
the Iranian government could have been also regarded as measures responding to an 
emergency and thus directed to avoid the total collapse of the business sector in the country. 
The argument according to which it is well-settled that in situations of hardship a State may 
enjoy broader powers to regulate economic life that do not result in expropriations93 was 
advanced by Judge Kashani94 in his dissenting opinion to the Starrett Housing Corporation 
award.
Starrett Housing Corporation is a well-known case, which involved Starrett as the 
parent company of a group of subsidiaries engaged in construction and development 
projects.95 In 1974, Starrett agreed to take part to a programme for the construction of a 
residential community in the outskirts of Teheran: by creating the subsidiary ‘Shah Goli’, 
Starrett undertook to construct 1600 condominium apartments, grouped in eight 26-storey 
buildings.96  However, the project could not be completed as a consequence of various 
governmental actions that, according to Starrett, deprived it of the effective use, control and 
benefit of the property. Therefore, Starrett advanced a claim for expropriation, amounting to 
more than 112 million dollars (plus interests).97 The Iranian Government argued that Starrett 
profited of the economic crisis of the country to abandon the project, which was bankrupt, and 
this conduct forced the State to appoint a temporary manager for Shah Goli.98
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92 C. N. Brower and J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, pp. 409-410.
93 H. Piran, “Indirect Expropriation”, p. 187; B. H. Weston, “Constructive Takings under International Law: A 
Modest Foray into the Problem of Creeping Expropriation”, in Virginia Journal of International Law, 
1975-1976, pp. 155-156; G. C. Christie, “What Constitute a Taking of Property under International Law”, pp. 
307-338; Oscar Chinn, pp. 65 et seq.; Dickinson Car Wheel Co v Mexico,  in RIAA, pp. 681-682; Barcelona 
Traction, see also the Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, Id, p. 106, et seq., and Judge Gross, Id., p. 256, et 
seq.
94 G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, pp. 20-21. According to the Judge, the revolution 
granted broader power to the Government for the protection of the rights and interests of its population, so that 
the rationale of the regulations issued was clearly the protection of the public interest of Iran.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98Id.
The tribunal concluded that the appointment of Mr. Erfan as Temporary Manager 
deprived the shareholders of their right to manage the company, dispossessing them of the 
effective use and control of Shah Goli.99 Judge Holtzmann, who disagreed with the tribunal as 
to the critical date of the expropriation, argued that the tribunal disregarded a series of actions 
that, far before the 30th January 1980, had commenced the expropriatory progression.100 
According to the Judge, the appointment of a manager was the last and formal step of a chain 
of informal expropriatory measures101 and thereby the Judge advanced the idea of series 
measures each one of which is not entirely expropriatory, but that, taken together, can give 
rise to an expropriation.
Considering whether Starrett’s loans were part of the property rights taken by the 
Government, the tribunal further clarified that 
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99 G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, pp. 14-15. In its Interlocutory Award, the Tribunal 
identified in the 30th January 1980 the relevant date for the taking of the claimant’s contractual rights and shares. 
In qualifying the governmental actions, the Tribunal specified that no decree or order was issued by the 
Government in order to nationalize Starrett’s property or expropriate it; yet, governmental measures interfered 
with property rights to the extent that the rights were rendered useless, and therefore they could be deemed as 
expropriated. According to the Tribunal, the appointment of Mr. Erfan as Temporary Manager deprived the 
shareholders of their right to manage the company, dispossessing them of the effective use and control of Shah 
Goli.
100 Id, p. 17.
101Id, pp. 17-19. Conversely, Judge Kashani dissented. He denied the occurrence of any expropriation and 
attributed the governmental decision to appoint Mr. Erfan as temporary manager, to the shareholders’ failure to 
comply with their obligation of providing capital for the project, resulting in the slowing down of the activities. 
Particularly, there was the need to repay the loan that Shah Goli had obtained from Bank Omran, which was 
risking a tortius liability towards the apartment purchasers, in case the assets of the company were embezzled. 
Therefore, Judge Kashani argued that not only the company was not deprived of its property, but also that it was 
the ultimate beneficiary from Bank Omran’s action. The claim for expropriation is qualified by Judge Kashani as 
an attempt of evading contractual obligations. Particularly, it is pinpointed that the tribunal overlooked that the 
Law for Appointing Temporary Managers was ratified six months before the appointment of Mr. Erfan: during 
this time span, Shah Goli did not take any action to appoint a manger of its own and, furthermore, the company 
was granted great assistance form the Bank. As a consequence, the decision to enforce the Law and appoint an 
external manager was motivated by public interest according to Judge Kashani. In addition, general principles of 
law also justified this choice: Art. 306 of the Iranian Civil Code regulates the ‘gestion d’affaire’, that is the 
management of other persons’ property in their interest. Art. 306 establishes: “If a person administers the 
property of a continuously absent person or the property of someone under interdiction and the like without 
permission, he must give account for the period of his administration. Where it would have been possible to 
obtain such permission at the time of if delay in taking up the administration would have caused no loss, the 
administrator shall have no right to claim his expenses. But where non-intervention or delay in intervention 
would have caused losses to the owner of the property, the intervening administrator is entitle dot receive the 
expenses which were necessary for the administration of the property”. See, M. A. R. Taleghany, The Civil Code 
of Iran, p. 44.
it is a well-settled rule of customary international law that a taking of one 
property may also involve a taking of a closely related ancillary right; more 
generally, international tribunals have also recognized that taking of contract 
rights, like taking of tangible property, is compensable.102
The tribunal found that the compensable property rights included the Claimants’ rights 
to be repaid for the loans made for the purposes of the Project.103  However, as Judge 
Holtzmann pointed out, the analysis of the standard of compensation carried out in the award 
focused on the value of the enterprise, as if it were to be carried on in the future by a 
‘reasonable, willing buyer’.104  According to the Judge, the tribunal failed to differentiate 
between lawful and unlawful expropriation in order to determine the quantum of 
compensation due.105
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102  G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation, p. 25; see, Amoco International Finance, Partial 
Award, paras 106-109, 14 July 1987; Rudloff Claim, pp. 244, 250; Shufeldt Claim, pp. 1079, 1097.
103 Id. “At least by the date of the taking it became apparent that the claimants would not be repaid such loans 
and that their rights to repayment had been taken by the Government”.
104 Id, p. 22. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that “the procedure of using a valuation period antedating the date 
of taking, followed the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Lithgow and Others, 
where the valuation was based on average prices in a period [of six months] which was as recent as possible and 
was also not untypical”.
105 Id, pp. 22, 28.
The definition of taking provided by the tribunal in the Tippetts case106  is also of 
particular relevance. After finding that the Claimant had been subjected to “measures 
affecting property rights, by being deprived of its property interests in TAMS-AFFA since, at 
least, 1 March 1980, and that the Government [was] responsible by virtue of its actions and 
omissions, for that deprivation”,107  the tribunal argued that “the Claimant is entitled under 
international law and general principles of law to compensation for the full value of the 
property of which it was deprived”.108 In addition, the tribunal specified its preference for the 
term ‘deprivation’ in contrast to ‘taking’, as “the latter may be understood to imply that the 
Government had acquired something of value, which is not required”.109  The tribunal 
continued by stating that a deprivation or a taking of property “may occur under international 
law through interference by a State in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of its 
benefits, even where legal title to the property is not affected”. It established that the 
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106 Tippetts, pp. 220-221, 223. Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton (‘TAMS’) was a United States engineering 
and architectural consulting partnership. TAMS and Aziz Farmanfarmaian and Associates (‘AFFA’), an Iranian 
engineering firm, created and equally owned Iranian entity ‘TAMS-AFFA’, with the purpose of performing 
engineering and architectural services on the Tehran International Airport (‘TIA’) project. To this end they 
entered into a contract on 19 March 1975 with the Civil Aviation Organization (‘CAO’). TAMS-AFFA claimed 
against CAO on the basis of the TIA contract for its share of the billed and unbilled amounts, as well as for 
amounts retailed as good performance guarantees by CAO from invoices that were paid to TAMS-AFFA. TAMS 
also alleged the expropriation of its fifty-percent interests in TAMS-AFFA against the Government of Iran140. In 
addition to that, TAMS claimed the restitution of a cash deposit wrongfully retained by Bank Melli, and the 
cancellation of bank guarantees and undertakings related to the TIA project. The Tribunal found its lack of 
jurisdiction on the claims and counterclaims based upon the TIA contract, the claim indeed did arise under “a 
binding contract between the parties specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole 
jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts”. This implied that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction also over 
the Bank guarantees and related undertakings’ claims and counterclaims, given that they emanated from the TIA 
contract. Conversely, the Tribunal found its jurisdiction over the claim for property interests in TAMS-AFFA, 
which was qualified as a claim for ‘expropriation or other measures affecting property rights’. According to the 
Tribunal, TAMS-AFFA operated on the principle of joint control until 1979 when, as a result of the Iranian 
revolution, work on the TIA project stopped almost completely (December 1978-January 1979). On 24 July 
1979 the Plan and Budget Organization of the Government of Iran appointed a temporary manager for AFFA. It 
was not clear whether the manager was in charge only of AFFA or also of TAMS-AFFA; yet, TAMS 
representatives in Iran partially rectified the violation of the partnership agreement until November 1979. After 
that moment, the crisis reversed the trend, and following a number of failing attempts to contact TAMS-AFFA on 
the prosecution of the TIA project, in December 1979 TAMS suspended any communication with TAMS-AFFA. 
The Tribunal maintained that TAMS-AFFA evidently continued to function, although being limited in its 
capacity due to the reduced number of employee and the constraining of its expenditures; moreover, it was 
managed by “the Government-appointed successor to the original Government-appointed manager”.
107 Id, p. 225. [Emphasis added]
108 Id.
109 Id.
conclusion that property has been taken, requiring compensation under international law, “is 
warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of 
ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral”.110 More precisely, 
according to the tribunal, the effects of the measures together with their impact on the owner 
constitute the applicable criteria to evaluate the claim.111
At a closer look, the reasoning of the tribunal seems rather obscure. A deprivation112 is 
found but no characterization of it is offered: a ‘taking of private property’ may be the 
expression of the governmental sovereign authority, to the extent that it pursues a public 
interest and compensation is granted; conversely, an unlawful expropriation is a wrongful 
conduct attributable to the State, that entails the right to either restitution or damages to repair 
the harm caused to the private party. Thus, the process of qualifying the measure as lawfully 
or unlawfully carried out has a bearing on the applicable legal framework, and consequently 
on the valuation of the property concerned. The tribunal failed to draw this distinction, and 
this appears as methodologically flawing the legal analysis conducted, as Judge Holtzmann 
observed in Starrett.
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110 Tippetts, pp. 225-226.
111 Id. The Tribunal plainly established that the intent of the Government and the form of the measures are minor 
aspects compared to the effects and the impact of the measure concerned; see also, James M. Saghi  para 75, pp. 
20 et seq ; the same questioned was posed in Harold Birnbaum, p. 260 et seq., para 27, as “whether, under the 
circumstances of this case, the appointment of a provisional manager for [the company] by the Plan and Budget 
Organization of the Government of Iran allows the conclusion that the Respondent thereby asserted such control 
over [the company]  that the claimant has been deprived of his property interests, and, thus, that he has been 
subjected to “expropriation or other measures affecting property rights” for which the respondent bears 
responsibility”. See also, Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann, Dissenting as to Award on the Claims and 
Concurring As to Dismissal of Counterclaims  to Sea-Land Service Inc and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award 
n. 135-31-1, 20 June 1984, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 6, 1984 (II), p. 207, where it is pointed out that 
“critical question is the objective effect of a government’s act, not its subjective intentions. Acts by the 
government which have the effect of depriving an alien of his property are considered expropriatory in 
international law, whatever the government intentions..”.
112  Id,  p. 226. In Tippetts, the Tribunal reconstructed the relationship between the Government-appointed 
manager of TAMS-AFFA and the Claimant in 1979. Their cooperation is regarded as evidence of an agreement 
between the parties which excludes a ‘deprivation’. The absence of answers since late 1979-early 1980, on the 
contrary, attests the end of the cooperation and thereby of the agreement between the parties. It is the relevant 
date at which a deprivation of property interests could considered to occur. The cessation of performance of the 
contract between the parties, together with the Government-appointed manager, become the foundation of the 
‘deprivation’.
The tribunal discussed also the issue of the governmental ‘control over property’. It 
observed that the exercise of ‘control’ does not automatically entail a taking of the property 
by the Government. Such a result is in fact achieved when ‘fundamental rights of ownership’ 
are infringed upon and denied. Whilst concluding that this was the case, the tribunal avoided 
any explanation of the concepts applied: what a ‘fundamental right of ownership’ is, and 
when an owner is deprived of it in a non-ephemeral way, is not spelled out. Along the same 
line, the effects of the governmental measure and its impact on the owner’s property are 
identified as signaling the deprivation: again, what effects and what degree of impact remain 
implied.
Although the legal reasoning in Tippetts113  may be considered blurred, it has 
fundamentally influenced the formation of the sole effects doctrine as a well-established 
approach to investigate investors’ claims for the taking of their property.
The Iran-US Claims tribunal was faced with a claim for a de facto expropriation also in 
the ITT Industries case.114  The claimant, the Republic of Iran and the Organization of 
Nationalised Industries of Iran entered into a Settlement Agreement on 25 May 1983 to 
resolve the dispute between them, and subsequently filed a request to the tribunal for an 
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113  See for instance Dr. Shafei Shafeiei Reasons not to sign the Award, Tippetts, pp. 256, 260. In addition, the 
Tribunal in Tippets considered that the ‘intent’ of the State is a minor element, in contrast to Sea-Land Service 
case where, as will be noted below, the lack of evidence of an “intentional course of conduct directed against 
Sea-Land” was the parameter to exclude expropriation. Weston as well did suggest that a temporary 
administration of property becomes a taking according to the “original intent of the administrating government 
and, thus, according to the broad ‘regulatory’ competence that States traditionally have enjoyed under 
international law”. See, B. H. Weston, “Constructive Takings under International Law”, p. 170.
114  ITT Industries, pp. 348-361. The Claimant was a Delaware Corporation which was the 100 owner of ITT 
Swenska. This in turn owned IKO Sweden. In December 1980, the time at which the claim arose, IKO Sweden 
owned the 25 percent of the stock in IKO Iran. On 22 December 1980 the Government of Iran appointed four 
members of the Board of Directors of IKO Iran and, after a short period of time, the fifth director, thereby 
ousting the directors elected by shareholders. The action was taken under the Act for the Protection and 
Development of Iranian Industries. As Judge Aldrich observed, the Respondent assumed control of IKO Iran by 
appointing its Board of Directors and, on this regard, the claimant denounced the taking of its property according 
to international law––i.e.: the taking of the 25 percent equity interest in IKO Iran. As a result, the claimant 
asserted its right to a prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the deprivation suffered. Judge Aldrich 
contended that IKO Sweden was clearly deprived of its rights concerning IKO Iran, and that no evidence was 
provided as to the management of the company in the interest of shareholders or broader national interest (to 
exclude the allegation of unlawful expropriation).
Arbitral Award to be rendered on Agreed Terms.115 Judge Aldrich filed a Concurring Opinion 
on the question of whether an expropriation had occurred,116 where he highlighted that the 
title to property needs not to be affected for a taking of property to take place: governmental 
interferences in the use or enjoyment of ownership and its benefits may amount to a 
deprivation of it.117
More precisely, Judge Aldrich stated that having suffered a non-ephemeral deprivation 
of fundamental rights of ownership, the owner is entitled to compensation under international 
law.118  He continued stating that “the intent of the government is less important than the 
effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of control or interference 
is less important than the reality of their impact”.119
Judge Aldrich further underlined the conclusive function exercised by the passage of 
time and subsequent events on the finding of a taking,120 suggesting a valuable clue to assess 
issues of indirect or de facto expropriation. The appointment of the Board of Directors, which 
is the most evident action performed by the Government is not per se the deciding factor. To 
the contrary, its assessment depends on the subsequent conduct of the parties combined with 
the passage of time. Accordingly, not only the de facto behavior of the governmental authority 
is relevant, but also how it further develops over time has relevance.
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115 ITT Industries, p. 348.
116 Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, ITT Industries Inc., pp. 349-355.
117 Id, p. 351.
118  Id, p. 352: “while the assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically and 
immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the government, thus requiring 
compensation under international law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the 
owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely 
ephemeral”.
119  Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, ITT Industries Inc, p. 352; see also, K. Byrne, “Regulatory 
Expropriation and State Intent”, in Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 2000, Vol. 38, pp. 89-120. IKO 
Sweden did not receive profits from the company, including profits accrued prior to the assumption of control by 
the Government, no information about the status of the company, no opportunity to vote or attend meeting of 
shareholders and/or Board of Directors or to participate in the management of the company itself. This 
undeniably rendered “IKO Sweden’s rights of ownership so meaningless as to be the equivalent of an 
expropriation of those rights”, according to Judge Aldrich.
120  Id, p. 352: “while one might have been unsure of this conclusion [that the Claimant’s rights of ownership 
were rendered so meaningless as to be the equivalent of an expropriation] at the time the directors were 
appointed, subsequent events and the passage of time have made it unavoidable”.
Cases concerning de facto expropriations emanating from alleged governmental 
appointment of managers includes also Harold Birnbaum,121  Sedco Inc,122  Phelps Dodge 
Corp,123 Motorola, Inc,124 Otis Elevator125 and Thomas Earl Payne.126
In Harold Birnbaum127  the tribunal decided upon a dual national interest in a 
partnership in AFFA, the same engineering partnership that participated in the TAMS-AFFA 
joint venture. The tribunal found a deprivation of the claimant’s ownership interests in the 
partnership, as a consequence of the appointment of temporary managers.128 The tribunal 
stated that according to the “not merely ephemeral standard”, a taking shall not result from the 
bare governmental appointment of managers. Indeed, the claimant was in principle able to 
enjoy certain benefits of ownership, by cooperating with governmental managers; only as of 
the cessation of the cooperative relations, the taking did in fact occur, and the lack of any 
exchange of information therefrom confirmed this situation.129
Partly different, the situation in Sedco Inc130 led the tribunal to find that a taking had 
occurred by virtue of the owner’s complete deprivation of authority. Indeed, the law 
authorizing appointment of new directors gave to the Government appointees the authority 
necessary to manage the current and routine affairs of the company. Therefore, the decision of 
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121 Harold Birnbaum, pp. 260 et seq.
122 Sedco, p. 248.
123 Phelps Dodge, pp. 129 et seq.
124  Motorola Inc v Iran National Airlines Corporation, Award N. 373-481-3, 28 June 1988, reprinted in Iran-
USCTR, Vol. 19, pp. 73.
125 Otis Elevator Company v The Islamic Republic of Iran and Bank Mellat, Award n. 304-284-2, 29 April 1987, 
reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 14, 1987 (I), pp. 283-306.
126 Thomas Earl Payne, pp. 3-24.
127 Harold Birnbaum, pp. 260 et seq.
128  The partnership was under the control of the Government appointees, no information on the status or 
operation of AFFA was distributed to the claimant, and furthermore, after two years of management the 
Government decided to put AFFA into liquidation: thus, the Tribunal established that “the deprivation could not 
be considered to have been temporary”. The Tribunal specified that “the attempted exercise of ownership rights 
is not a prerequisite to a successful claim for compensation for the loss of those rights”. Harold Birnbaum, para 
32, as quoted in C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1998, p. 400.
129  Harold Birnbaum, para 32, as quoted in C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, p. 400.
130 Sedco, p. 248.
the tribunal that found a taking, suggested that “where the appointment of temporary 
managers results in the claimant being denied access to its corporate funds and deprived of its 
ability to participate in management and control, a taking will be found”.131
In subsequent cases, the tribunal qualified deprivations of property as ‘takings’ and 
found that they had occurred on the date when the government-appointed managers assumed 
their duties.132
In Phelps Dodge Corp133  the defensive arguments that the taking was lawful under 
Iranian Law and that it was carried out pursuant to economic and social objectives was 
rejected by the tribunal.134 Although recognizing the social and economic reasons underlying 
the governmental actions, the tribunal maintained that they “cannot relieve the Respondent of 
the obligation to compensate Phelps Dodge for its loss”.135 More precisely, the liability of the 
Government was related to the way of its conduct, since it had apparently taken control of the 
enterprise and it was running it for its own benefit, without any temporary constraint.136 The 
tribunals’ decision to grant compensatory rights against the deprivations resulting from the 
governmental measure apparently stemmed from the permanent character of the deprivations 
concerned, together with the accountability of the managers to the Government only.137
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131 C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 401.
132 G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?”, p. 589.
133 Phelps Dodge, pp. 129 et seq.
134 G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?”, p. 590. The reference is to the pre-
revolutionary 1964 “Law of Protection of Industries and Prevention of Factories in the Country”. See, Phelps 
Dodge, pp. 129-130.
135 See, Phelps Dodge Corp, p. 130.
136  Whilst the 1964 Law described the managers as trustee ‘for the shareholders’, the lack of information 
concerning the business suggested that they were rather acting as trustee for ‘the Government’. Phelps Dodge 
Corp v The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 217-99-2, 19 March 1986, reprinted in Iran-USCTR , Vol. 10, pp. 
130-131; Contra to the outcome in Phelps Dodge, see the ELSI case, where the United States argued that the 
Italian authorities had improperly interfered with the affairs of the company in question. However, the Court 
dismissed the claim of indirect expropriation. Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (United States of 
America v Italy), p. 15 et seq., para 119.
137 G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?”, p. 590; Weston maintained that “the 
burden of policy proof should be on those who maintained that the measures involved do not give rise to 
compensatory liability (i.e.: host state)”. See, B. H. Weston, “Constructive Takings under International Law: A 
Modest Foray into the Problem of Creeping Expropriation”, in Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, 
1975, p. 170.
The appointment of (provisional) managers not always resulted in the finding of a 
taking.138 In Motorola, Inc v Iran National Airlines Corporation139 the claimant asserted that 
the Iranian branch of its subsidiary (Milcom Communications and Electronics Ltd) had been 
taken by the Government of Iran. The tribunal rejected this allegation, establishing that 
although in previous cases the appointment of managers was considered as a significant 
indicator of a taking, in the present circumstances it did not amount to an expropriation.140 
The reasons were found, for instance, in the fact that the Iranian Ministry of Commerce did 
urge Motorola to appoint a new manager; therefore, according to the tribunal, the conclusion 
that “Iran had assumed such control over Milcom that a taking had occurred”  could not be 
drawn.141
The decision of the tribunal in Otis Elevator142  further confirms that the mere 
appointment of (temporary) managers by the Government does not necessarily give rise to its 
liability.143 The tribunal dismissed the claim for a taking. After declaring that Otis had the 
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138 C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 404.
139 Motorola Inc, p. 73.
140 Id, p. 85.
141  Id, pp. 81-82, 84, 87, 88-92. The Claimant maintained that Milcom continued to operate also during the 
Revolution, at least until March 1979, when armed Revolutionary Guards entered Milcom’s premises and 
ordered all of its employees to depart, whilst imprisoning Milcom’s Iranian manager. The Revolutionary 
Attorney General later on appointed a manager entitled to supervise Milcom and sign checks on its behalf: the 
legal foundation for this action was identified by the Government in the “Act Concerning the Appointment of 
Temporary Directors for the Supervision and Management of Firms and Companies”, and explained with the fact 
that former directors of the entity had “abandoned their positions”. The claimant opposed this assertion and 
requested the restitution of the Company. Subsequently, the parties convened a meeting but no agreement was 
found, and Motorola’s proposal to sell Milcom to Iran was also refused. The Tribunal left open the question 
whether Iran’s refusal to accept Motorola’s sale proposal could constitute a taking, by declaring that by 
September 1979 Motorola had no “going concern value”. Judge Brower dissented to this conclusion (rather, 
omission) and declared the analysis as “wholly unreasonable”. See, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Brower in Motorola Inc v Iran National Airlines Corporation, Award N. 373-481-3, 28 June 1988, reprinted in 
Iran-USCTR, Vol. 19, p. 95.
142 Otis Elevator, pp. 283-306.
143  Id, p. 285. In the case, the claimant sought compensation for its 40% interest in a joint venture company 
registered under Iranian Law, Iran Elevator, which were considered to have been expropriated as a consequence 
of the Ministry of Commerce appointment of a financial supervision for the company; C. N. Brower, J. D. 
Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 409; at p. 398, it is observed that in James M. Saghi, pp. 
20 et seq, the ‘temporary’ appointment of managers did not prevent the Tribunal from finding a taking. More 
precisely, the Tribunal found that in the practice the term ‘temporary’ was a misnomer, since the appointment 
effected a definitive assumption of control. Consequently, the Tribunal did not answer the question concerning 
the threshold at which a ‘temporary’ control results in a taking. 
burden to prove the substantial impairment of its property rights and the consequential loss it 
had suffered as a result of an action attributable to the Iranian Government,144  the tribunal 
reinterpreted the facts submitted by the Claimant. It pinpointed that “a multiplicity of factors 
affected the Claimant’s enjoyment of its property rights in Iran”; however, the balance of the 
evidence provided by the Claimant was insufficient to find that a taking had occurred.145
Finally, the case Thomas Earl Payne146 must be considered. The claimant maintained 
that it was expropriated of its interests in Irantronics Ltd and Berken Company Ltd by the 
Government of Iran. In particular, it was argued that on 5 July 1980 the Minister of 
Commerce appointed a “temporary manager”  for Irantronics, Mr. Zarghami, who then took 
over control also of Berken in August 1980.147 The tribunal concluded that “the sum effect”  of 
the measure “was the deprivation of any interest of the original owners of the companies once 
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144 Otis Elevator, pp. 299-300 “for Otis to be successful in its Claim [..]  it is necessary for it to prove, firstly, that 
its property rights had been interfered with to such an extent that its use of those rights or the enjoyment of their 
benefits was substantially affected and that it suffered a loss as a result, and, secondly, that the interference was 
attributable to the Government of Iran”.
145 Id: “the infringement of rights was caused by conduct attributable to the Government of Iran. [..] The acts of 
interference determined by the Tribunal to be attributable to Iran are not sufficient, either individually or 
collectively, to warrant a finding that a deprivation or taking of Claimant’s participation in Iran Elevator had 
occurred”. Indeed, the tribunal established that the appointment of a financial supervisor in the case at hand was 
to be distinguished from prior practice in light of two factors: first, it was doubtful whether the appointment 
resulted from a governmental initiative, or was a reply to a request filed by the acting managing director of Iran 
Elevator; second, no evidence was provided supporting that the supervisor assumed control of Iran Elevator’s 
operations, since, there was “no activity to be supervised”. In addition, the claimant argued that the lack of any 
information concerning the activity of the enterprise, could be regarded as evidence of “unreasonable 
interference”: nonetheless, the tribunal found that the claimant had not requested any such information, and that 
the activity of the company was limited to a mere administrative level.
146 Thomas Earl Payne, pp. 3-24.
147 Id, pp. 4-5, 8. The claimant contended that, following the appointment of the new director, he did not receive 
any accounting, dividends were not paid, no amounts due to shareholders were repaid, nor they were allowed to 
attend general meetings. In addition, previous manager were deprived of their authority and then dismissed. 
According to the claimant, the taking of the companies was carried out for “reasons of national interest in view 
of the importance which the Laboratory and the electronic spare parts inventories had for the Government of 
Iran”. Conversely, the respondent argued that the appointment of temporary managers was aimed “to safeguard 
the interests of stockholders and to maintain economic activity in the country during a time when the two 
companies were left without supervision”. According to the Government, the decision was taken in accordance 
with the Law of 16 June 1979 which, by setting the limits of the governmental interference, excluded both 
financial and administrative control of the companies, so that the measure could not amount neither to 
expropriation nor to assumption of control.
they were made subject to provisional management by the Government”.148  The tribunal 
recognized that the appointment of governmental managers is a crucial factor in finding that a 
taking did occur; more precisely, “if at the date of government appointment of ‘temporary’ 
managers there is no reasonable prospect of return of control, a taking should conclusively be 
found to have occurred as of that date”.149 Thus, the role of the State’s subsequent conduct 
performed over a time-span following the contested measure is pinpointed.
The issue of control was discussed at large by Judge Sani in Rexnord Inc.150  The 
tribunal was satisfied with the evidence provided by the claimant which demonstrated that 
after the revolution Iran appointed a succession of managing directors for the two companies 
Siporex and Tchacosh. The tribunal observed that the Respondents failed to contest such 
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148 Thomas Earl Payne, p. 10. The Tribunal relied on: 1) the fact that the Respondent did not dispute the lack of 
communication between the governmentally appointed board and the shareholders of the company since July 
1980; 2)  the practice of the Tribunal itself––especially the cases Foremost,  Starrett Housing, Tippetts,  Sedco, 
Phelps Dodge are quoted, to substantiate the contention that “property may be taken under international law 
through interference by a State in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of its benefits”; and, 3) the 
substantial disposition of the Law of 16 June 1979.
149 Particularly, the fact that neither company had ceased its activity and that the companies’ business continued 
during the revolution, is appraised by the tribunal against the respondent. The tribunal referred to its 
Interlocutory Award in Sedco, pp. 40-42, where it analyzed the Law of 16 June 1979 and its effects; Thomas Earl 
Payne, p. 11. It adhered to the Law and its provisions, noting that no prescription as to the length of the 
‘temporary measures’ was included: thus, a possible date for the restitution of property to the original owners 
could not be anticipated; more recently, see Frederica Lincoln Riahi v The Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Final Award n. 600-485-1, 27 February 2003, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 37, 2003, paras 306-313, 
and 314-362, confirming the criterion that the mere appointment of managers is not sufficient to concluded that a 
taking of property was effected; Furthermore, the above mentioned Otis case offers an example of the Tribunal’s 
refusal to consider the expropriation of majority shares as a managerial interference.
150  Rexnord Inc v The Islamic Republic of Iran, Tchacosh Company and Iran Siporex Industrial and 
Manifacturing Works, Limited, Award n. 21-132-3, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 2, 1988 (I), pp. 5, 7-8, 10. 
Rexnord was a United States corporation that entered into an agreement with Siporex and Tchacosh, both 
corporations organized under the Iranian Law, for the sale of stone crushing machinery and other equipment for 
use in a plant to be constructed in Abyek (Iran). The agreement comprised a number of telexed orders and 
invoices beginning on 21 February 1974; it was established that part of the price was to be paid by an irrevocable 
letter of credit as the equipment was delivered, whilst the remaining amount during a period of 42 months upon 
presentation of drafts made to the order of Rexnord. The Claimant submitted that at the beginning in November 
1977 some drafts presented for payment were dishonored, and that after October 1978, payment were refused: 
the total unpaid is UK £287,595.57. The Claimant also submitted that it entered into other agreements with 
Siporex and Tchacosh, that paid the full price of the equipment. A clause of the agreement concluded between 
the parties established that the freight charges in excess of those estimated at the time of purchase and included 
in the purchase price, were to be charge in the purchaser’s account. However, the remaining UK £130,176.01 
was not paid and Rexnord claimed the sum against Siporex. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that both 
Tchacosh and Siporex were under the control of the Iranian Government, as a result of the Government’s 
appointment of directors (August 1979) that managed the companies since.
allegation, rather they objected that no expropriation or nationalization of the two companies 
took place. The tribunal focused on the “power to appoint and dismiss managers and directors 
in charge of the day-to-day management of the companies”, observing that it was vested with 
the Government of Iran. It concluded, therefore, that “in view of this [..] both Tchacosh and 
Siporex are entities controlled by Iran”, avoiding any determination with regard to 
expropriation or nationalization.
In RayGo Wagner Equipment Company,151 the tribunal concluded that
since the revolutionary events in Iran, Express Terminal had not been run by 
its registered Manager and Board of Directors and the shareholders have not 
been in a position to exert their rights and fulfill their duties as shareholders. 
Furthermore, it is clear that Express Terminal has been administered by 
persons who have been appointed by some governmental authority, 
although no formal decree to this effect has been presented.152
As noted in the wording of the tribunal, no formal legal instrument validating and 
proving the appointment of managers was rendered available to the judges. Nonetheless the 
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151  RayGo Wagner Equipment Company v Iran Express Terminal Corporation, Award n. 30-16-3, 19 March 
1983, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 2, 1988 (I), pp. 141 et seq.  The agent of Iran Express Lines was a Florida 
corporation, the Uiterwyk Corporatioin, which held an equity interest in Iran Express Lines. Originally, 49% of 
the shares of Express Terminal belonged to the President and Chairman of Iran Express Lines (Hendrik and Jan. 
D. Uiterwyk) and the remaining to Iranian nationals. Both Iran Express Lines and Express Terminal operated in 
the Port of Khorramshahr. RayGo alleged that the Respondent entered into two equipment rental agreements on 
the 29 August 1977, according to which it was to lease two port packers to be returned at the conclusion of the 
lease period––30 September 1980, with the option to renew it for two successive one year. According to RayGo, 
Express Terminal failed to make the payments due since 1 March 1979 and to either exercise the option or to 
return the equipment, despite demand. In addition, RayGo alleged that Express Terminal is an entity controlled 
by the Government of Iran within the meaning of Article VII, para 3, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, 
asserting thereby the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
152 Id, pp. 143-144. [Emphasis added]
tribunal reached the conclusion that the company was under governmental control.153 The de 
facto dimension seems to prevail over the lack of a legal and official appointment.154
The conclusion reached by the tribunal is contested in the dissenting opinion filed by 
Judge Mosk, who argued that “the government control necessary to establish jurisdiction over 
an Iranian entity under the Claims Settlement Declaration”  does not need to entail the direct 
liability of the Government of Iran as it would result from “such theories as identity, alter ego, 
piercing the corporate veil, interference with contractual or advantageous relations or State 
action”.155 According to Judge Mosk, control does not “require nationalization or ownership 
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153 RayGo Wagner Equipment, pp. 143-144.. The tribunal, observing the insufficient evidence presented by the 
Respondent, satisfied itself with the assumption that ‘some governmental authority’ appointed the managing 
directors of the company. The Tribunal found firstly a––dubious––legal basis on Article 44 of the Iran’s 
Constitution, establishing that “the state sector of the economy is to include, inter alia, the shipping industry”: 
thus, “port loading and unloading facilities, with which Express Terminal is dealing, are an integral part of the 
shipping industry”; secondly, it found a more persuasive argument in the fact that “in a lawsuit before a United 
States Court initiated by RayGo, Express Terminal took the position that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the 
claim raised against it, asserting that the company was administered by the Government of Iran and that under 
the appropriate laws of the United States it was a sovereign entity immune form the jurisdiction of the United 
States Courts”.
154 Id, p. 146. It is interesting to note that by relying on the non-satisfactory, or insufficient proof provided by the 
Respondent, the tribunal received the claim of RayGo. Apparently, the tribunal operates a reversal of the burden 
of proof, pivoting its finding not in the evidence provided by the Claimant, but rather in the insufficient proof to 
the contrary offered by the Respondent. Article 24(1)  of the Tribunal Rules establishes that “each party shall bear 
the burden of proving the facts relied on to support his claim or defense”. It seems that the claimant did not 
provide decisive evidence to support the claim; nonetheless the tribunal drew its conclusion from the insufficient 
evidentiary allegations of the Respondent. It is questionable whether a claimant’s insufficient proof could be 
ratified and turned into a conclusive evidence by means of the lacking submission of the counterpart; rather, in 
such a case, the claim should nonetheless be dismissed on the basis of lack of evidence corroborating it. On the 
contrary, the tribunal found the governmental control, opting for rejecting RayGo’s claim by relying on its failure 
to sufficiently prove a contractual element, that is that the “two rental agreements were ratified through 
Respondent’s receiving, paying for, or using the equipment, so as to make the lease agreements binding on 
Respondent”.
155 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Richard M. Mosk, RayGo,  p. 147; Applying Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Judge Mosk interpreted ‘control’ in light of the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty concerned, in their context and taking into account the object and purpose of 
the treaty itself. Hence, relying on the definition of ‘controlled entity’ as provided by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), he described ‘control’ as entailing a “preponderant influence over the general 
policy”. See, Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, p. 55, 68-69.
of a majority of the capital stock of the entity”, nor is it based “on a rigid formula, such as 
stock ownership”.156
Finally, the Iran-US Claims tribunal was also requested to decide whether forced 
transactions attributable to the State and interferences with shareholders’ property rights in a 
company may be regarded as amounting to a taking.
In the literature it is accepted, that “a forced and price-deficient transaction, attributable 
to the State, may be adjudged as an indirect expropriation”.157 Clearly, the force or violence 
exerted on an alien must be direct and, therefore, a self-conceived fear does not engender the 
responsibility of the State. This rule was expressly linked to the State’s exercise of its police 
powers in the case Emanuel Too.158  The issue of forced transactions amounting to the 
expropriation of property was addressed by the Iran-US Claims tribunal in American Bell 
International.159 According to the tribunal
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156  Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Richard M. Mosk, RayGo, pp. 148, 150-151. In addition, either the 
broad definition of Iran given the in the Claims Settlement Declaration (Art. VII, para 3), and the contention 
before a United States Tribunal that “the Respondent was a sovereign entity”  entitled to sovereign immunity, 
constitute a subsequent practice suggesting that the “Respondent fits within the definition of an entity controlled 
by the Government of Iran”. Judge Mosk, moreover, noticed that the actual shareholders and their directors did 
not exercise their rights and powers: thus, they were not directing or managing the corporation, and it follows 
that, since the corporation was not into bankruptcy proceeding or liquidated, and the Government of Iran had 
appointed provisional directors, to prevent the closure of the entity, it is under the governmental control. Indeed, 
the reason for the governmental intervention is to be found in the company’s contribution to the public sector, 
which strengthens the assumption that the company is “subservient to Government interests and is therefore 
subject to government control”. According to Judge Mosk, the very fact of the appointment of directors results in 
the controlled nature of the entity, at least during the term of such appointment; See, Anaconda v OPIC, 59 ILR 
406, 420, 426, (1975), distinguishing between ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ control.
157 H. Piran, “Indirect Expropriation”, p. 181; B. H. Weston, “Constructive Takings under International Law”, p. 
148; G. C. Christie, “What Constitute a Taking of Property under International Law”, pp. 329 and 338.
158 Emanuel Too, p. 378 et seq., para 56. See also Chapter VII on “The Concept of Public Purpose”.
159  American Bell International Inc and The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
Telecommunications Company of Iran, Award n. 255-48-3, 19 September 1986, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 
12, 1986 (III), p. 170-238. American Bell (ABII) submitted to the tribunal a claim against the Respondent 
seeking recovery for a number of payments due under two contracts and alleging expropriation of certain funds. 
More precisely the funds were held in a bank account jointly owned by ABII and the Telecommunication 
company of Iran (TCI), at Bank Melli in Iran. The claimant maintained that by June 1979 a substantial amount 
of the outstanding obligations of ABII had been settled; hence, ABII objected that the balance of the fund had not 
been released to it, notwithstanding the satisfaction of the obligations. The request was repeatedly reiterated and, 
eventually, on August 1980, ABII was informed of the Ministry of Post, Telephone and Telegraph’s request to 
transfer its funds to a TCI account at Bank Melli. This request was followed by the warning that non-compliance 
would have had serious consequences and would not stop TCI obtaining access to the funds, so the claimant 
proceeded with the transfer of 19,976,850 rials.
there is no need to discuss the applicable law at length. Where, as here, both 
the purpose and effect of the acts are totally to deprive one of funds without 
one’s voluntarily given consent, the finding of compensable taking or 
appropriation under any applicable law––international or domestic––is 
inevitable, unless there is clear justification for the seizure. The only 
conceivable justification for the taking of the funds would have been the 
settlement of outstanding accounts with landlords and creditors of ABII.160
In addition, the tribunal found that “no evidence provided by the Respondents [proves] 
that any outstanding obligation remained unsettled in the following August”, and therefore it 
concluded for the wrongful deprivation of the bank account.161 The right to compensation was 
linked to the wrongfulness of the governmental measure, against which, as the tribunal 
explicitly noted, the respondent failed to provide any justification.162
In conclusion, the doctrine of unjust enrichment must be analyzed. The recourse of the 
Iran-US tribunal to this doctrine is in fact comparable with the application of the FET before 
international investment tribunals. In light of this consideration, a parallel may be drawn 
between the two ‘standards’ for the review of expropriation cases.
As noted by Brower and Brueschke, the theory of unjust enrichment is “one of last 
resort”, which has been employed by the Iran-US tribunal when all other theories of recovery 
were unavailable and not awarding compensation would have unjustly enriched the State.163
In Sea-Land,164 the tribunal deemed the evidence insufficient for upholding a claim for 
expropriation.165 Nevertheless, the tribunal granted compensation to the investor on the basis 
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160 American Bell International, p. 214.
161 Id, p. 215.
162 The question of forced transaction was raised also in the International Technical Products Corporation and 
ITP Export Corporation v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award n. 196-302-3, p. 47, 24 
October 1985, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 9, [ITCP case], but it was dismissed due to ratione temporis 
jurisdictional constraints.
163 C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 427. The authors suggest that the 
rationale for the application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment is established in TCSB, Inc and The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award n. 114-140-2, 16 March 1984, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 5, pp. 160, 171. The Iran-
US Tribunal stated: “Where a valid contract exists, unjust enrichment is a derivative, or at best a secondary 
alternative, legal theory to an action on the contract. While there are some precedents, particularly in the Unites 
States, for permitting a claimant, if he so chooses, to sue on the basis of unjust enrichment, rather than on the 
contract, the preponderance of authority is to the contrary”.
164 Sea-Land Service, p. 149.
165  Id, p. 164. The Tribunal, despite dismissing the claim based on the breach of contract, established that the 
evidence was “insufficient to justify a finding that any expropriation [of the rights] occurred”.
of the doctrine of unjust enrichment166 and after considering the impact of the revolutionary 
context in which Sea-Land had to operate.167 The tribunal observed that “it is well recognized 
that in comparable situation of crisis governmental authorities are entitled to have recourse to 
very broad powers without incurring international responsibility”.168 It further noted that the 
events complained of by Sea-Land took place before 1 August 1979, “during the very period 
of foment and disorder which preceded and accompanied the Revolution, and not as a result 
of the implementation of post-revolutionary policies”.169  According to the tribunal, a 
“deliberate governmental interference with the conduct of Sea-Land’s operation”, having the 
effect of depriving Sea-Land of the use and benefit of its investment170  is required for a 
finding of expropriation; conversely, “a claim founded substantially on omissions and inaction 
in a situation where the evidence suggests a widespread and indiscriminate deterioration in 
management, can hardly justify a finding of expropriation”.171
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is qualified by the tribunal as recognized “into the 
general principles of law available to be applied by international tribunals”.172 The rationale 
for this doctrine is to be found in the balanced evaluation of the relationship between two 
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166  G. Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalisation,  pp. 38-39. Sea-Land Service was a corporation 
operating in the field of international transportation by water of containerized cargo. It challenged the 
Government of Iran and its instrumentality, the Port and Shipping Organization (PSO), arguing the deprivation 
by PSO of the right to continued use of a cargo facility at the port of Bander Abbas, resulting in economic losses. 
Sea-Land alternatively argued that: PSO breached its contractual relationship with Sea-Land; PSO had deprived 
Sea-Land of the use of its enterprise and that this action amounted to expropriation, since PSO had originally 
allowed Sea-Land to proceed with the construction and operation of the container facility; PSO or the 
Government should not be unjustly enriched at Sea-Land’s expense. PSO rejected the claim for expropriation 
and denied the existence of a contractual relationship with Sea-Land.
167 Sea-Land Service, p. 165. PSO operated in the context of the general revolutionary situation affecting Iran. 
However, no targeting of Sea-Land was proved. Nevertheless, because of the nature of Sea-Land’s operation, it 
was deemed more vulnerable being totally dependent on “the speed and expedition with which PSO had hitherto 
been able to clear the incoming vessels”.
168 Id; see also, Dickinson Car Wheel Co v United Mexican States, UNRIAA, Vol. 4, 1931, pp. 681-682.
169 Id, p. 166; see also, Gould Marketing Inc v Ministry of National Defense of Iran, Award n. ITL 24-49-2, pp. 
11-14, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 3, pp. 147 et seq.; Starrett Housing, p. 54.
170 Id; see also, Oscar Chinn, p. 86; G. C. Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International 
Law”, p. 311.
171  Id, pp. 166-167. Sea-Land moreover claimed the expropriated of its bank account in Bank Markazi: the 
Tribunal did not find any unlawful interference. It is particularly the use of the discrimen between lawful and 
unlawful interference, implicit in the previous part of the reasoning and lacking in other cases such as Foremost, 
that is significant: see also, see, Harza Engineering, p. 499.
172 Id, p. 168.
parties, one having enriched itself with no cause, and the other having suffered damage as a 
result of this process. Having an equitable foundation, the doctrine of unjust enrichment 
requires appraising all the circumstances of each specific situation and involves “a duty to 
compensate which is entirely reconcilable with the absence of any inherent unlawfulness of 
the act in question”.173 Accordingly, the tribunal illustrated the conditions for a successful 
claim of unjust enrichment––enrichment of one party to the detriment of the other, arising as a 
result of the same act or event; no justification for the enrichment; no contractual or other 
remedy available to the injured party––, as well as the factual criteria to be analyzed––level of 
the investment, period during which the foreign investor has been able to make a profit, 
benefit derived to the host country for its acquisition.174
In Sea-Land, whilst awarding compensation against the Respondent’s unjust 
enrichment, the tribunal established that this type of compensation “cannot encompass 
damages for loss of future profits”.175 Rather, compensation should cover the items and assets 
that the counterpart obtained the actual use and benefit of, during the relevant period, and that 
resulted in an effective enrichment.176 Judge Holtzmann dissented. He pointed out that the 
criterion of ‘actual use and benefit’ on which the award of compensation against unjust 
enrichment was founded not only was not sustained by any of the parties, but also it was not 
even established under customary international law.177  Judge Holtzmann argued that the 
Majority crafted a new theory concerning the calculation and award of damages, “without 
giving the Parties the opportunity to comment on it and to present evidence on it”.178 
Furthermore, Judge Holtzmann dissented with the general statements concerning the elements 
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173 Sea-Land Service, p. 169.
174 Id, p. 169; see, Landeau, UNRIAA, Vol. 1, 1922, p. 347.
175 Id p. 170.
176 [of either PSO or the Government]. Id, pp. 170-171.
177 Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann, Dissenting as to Award on the Claims and Concurring As to Dismissal of 
Counterclaims , to Sea-Land Service Inc, p. 177; See, Judge Holtzmann, Dissenting Opinion on Flexi-Van, pp. 
362 et seq.
178 Id,  p. 177: “It is unjust for the Majority to embrace a new theory of damages sua sponte without giving the 
Parties the opportunity to comment on it and to present evidence concerning it”.
of a claim for expropriation: he pointed out that the “critical question is the objective effect179 
of a government’s act, not its subjective intentions” 180 so that “acts by the government which 
have the effect of depriving an alien of his property are considered expropriatory in 
international law, whatever the government’s intentions [...]”.181
Judge Holtzmann’s dissenting opinion also highlighted that according to the Majority 
“Bank Markazi was invested with a certain margin of discretion in foreign exchange matters”. 
In compliance with Article 24(1) of the tribunal Rules, establishing that “each party shall bear 
the burden of proving the facts relied on to support his claim or defence”,182 Judge Holtzmann 
pointed out that
if ‘discretion’ was the Government’s defense, it was the Government’s 
burden to explain and justify it. In view of the Government’s failure to do 
so, the Majority ruling can only mean that it understands ‘discretion’ to 
mean ‘absolute freedom’. This understanding is at variance with 
international law.183
Relevant to the doctrine of unjust enrichment is also the case Benjamin R. Isaiah.184 The 
Iran-US tribunal was called upon to establish its jurisdiction and to consider Isaiah’s claim for 
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179 [Emphasis added].
180 [Emphasis added].
181 Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann, Dissenting as to Award on the Claims and Concurring As to Dismissal of 
Counterclaims , to Sea-Land Service, p. 207.
182  Id, p. 210. [emphasis in the original]. See also the decision of the arbitral tribunal in Vito G. Gallo v. 
Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 55798, Award (Redacted), 15 September 2011, para 277: “[a] claimant 
bears the burden of proving that he has standing and the tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claims submitted. 
[...]  But the principle actori incumbit probatio is a coin with two sides: the Claimant has to prove its case, and 
without evidence it will fail; but if the Respondent raises defences, of fraud or otherwise, the burden shifts, and 
the defences can only succeed if supported by evidence marshalled by the Respondent”.
183 Id, pp. 207-209. See Chapter VI” on “The Concept of Public Purpose” with regard to the scope of the police 
powers of the State and the burden to prove the regulatory foundation of the measure.
184 Benjamin R. Isaiah v Bank Mellat, Award n. 35-219-2, 30 March 1983, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 2, 1988 
(I), pp. 232-240. The claimant, a naturalized American citizen, contended that he owned checks for an amount of 
$380,000 and that they were dishonored by the Respondent for insufficient funds. More precisely, he asserted 
that the check remained unpaid as a consequence of the expropriation of the assets and properties of the Bank by 
the Government of Iran. Indeed, Bank Mellat was a state owned Bank, being therefore included within the term 
‘Iran’ as defined in Article VII of the Claims Settlement Declaration. The Bank, however, rejected the allegation 
arguing, among other defenses, that Isaiah lacked legal rights since he was not the payee of the check, and that 
the Tribunal failed to have jurisdiction on the case.
unjust enrichment.185  Isaiah maintained that he was the beneficial owner of some funds 
retained for its own benefit by the Bank to which they had been given and on this basis he 
alleged the unjust enrichment of the Bank.186
Deciding upon the merits, the tribunal accepted that “restitutionary theories such as 
unjust enrichment and enrichissement sans cause are found in the laws of many nations” 187 
and especially under Articles 301 and 303 of the Iranian Civil Code unjust enrichment is an 
important element of state responsibility.188 The tribunal applied a tortuous legal reasoning to 
justify the applicability of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Firstly it identified in the Iranian 
law the law applicable to the case, as the act causing the unjust enrichment took partially 
place in Iran, where also the enrichment occurred. Secondly, the tribunal departed from this 
conclusion finding that it is “unnecessarily restrictive”, provided that the “dishonored check 
was drawn on a New York bank and much of the underlying transaction occurred outside 
Iran”.189 Thirdly, the tribunal grounded its ‘flexibility’ on Article V of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration, which was interpreted as allowing the tribunal to freely apply general principles 
of law to the case. The tribunal included a caveat to its reasoning by concluding that “there is 
no reason to believe the result would be different if only Iranian law were applied”.190 This 
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185  Benjamin R. Isaiah, p. 233-235. Although the American nationality at the relevant time was proved by the 
claimant by submitting its certificate of naturalization dated 1972, the Tribunal found difficulties in deciding 
upon the question of the continuity of nationality. The named payee of the check was Mr. Farkash, and Israeli 
citizen who was described by the claimant as an “affiliate of his in the transaction with respect to which the 
check was issued”. Thus, at the time the check was dishonored, Isaiah was not a holder in due course and 
therefore he could not have directly pursed the claim; even the subsequent endorsement to Isaiah, following the 
date of the claim, could not satisfy the requirement of the Declaration for the continuity of nationality of the 
ownership of the claim. The tribunal denied jurisdiction “over a claim by Isaiah as an alleged holder in due 
course on the check itself”.
186 Id, pp. 235-236. More precisely, the claimant argued that the check was an exceptional one, namely a bank 
check, purchased by the Karayesh Co., the drawer of which was the predecessor of Bank Mellat. This implied 
that, in the event of dishonor and retention of the funds by the bank, “a claim may be made by the beneficial 
owner of the funds against the bank for unjust enrichment”. The tribunal asserted its jurisdiction over this claim, 
since the claim “arose prior to the date of the Algiers Declaration and was owned continuously thereafter by 
him”.
187 Id, p. 236.
188 Id, p. 237.
189 Id.
190 Id.
approach––and the tribunal’s search for justification and consistency––evokes the method 
employed in recent arbitral decisions with respect to the questions of the applicable law and 
the interplay between IIT’s rules on expropriation and the fair and equitable standard of 
treatment, which will be commented hereinafter.191
Lastly, unjust enrichment was advanced as a ground for compensation in Flexi-Van. The 
tribunal sketched a general overview of the doctrine and characterized it as a general principle 
of law applicable by international tribunals.192  The tribunal acknowledged the equitable 
foundation of the principle, which is based on justice and equity,193  and highlighted its 
inherent flexibility, since its “rationale is to re-establish a balance between two individuals, 
one of whom has enriched himself, with no cause, at the other’s expense”.194 The equitable 
foundation of the principle “makes it necessary to take into account all the circumstances of 
each specific situation”.195
In Flexi-Van the tribunal evaluated the effect of the lease agreement on the cause of 
action, in order to properly judge on the applicability of the doctrine. Accordingly, the tribunal 
established that a substitute right of action based on unjust enrichment cannot arise where a 
contract exists that is binding upon both parties. Under such conditions, the contractual rights 
and obligations of the parties must be first specifically determined.196 The tribunal found that 
Iran was a party to none of the contracts but it maintained that the existence of the agreements 
is not per se considered as an obstacle to a claim for unjust enrichment against the 
Government.197 In fact, the tribunal identified the core of the doctrine in the ‘beneficial gain’ 
resulting from the unjust enrichment, which serves as a precondition for the remedy (i. e., 
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191 See the following paragraph, ‘Other Tribunals’ and also Chapter VII.
192 See, Sea-Land Service, p. 168.
193 See, Shannon & Wilson, Inc v Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Award n. 207-217-2, para 17, 5 December 
1985, reprinted in Iran-USCTR, Vol. 9, 397, 402.
194 Flexi-Van, p. 353.
195 Id, quoting Sea-Land Service, p. 169.
196 Id; see, TCSB, Inc, p. 172.
197 Flexi-Van, p. 353.
compensation). Furthermore, the tribunal considered that when the principle is relied upon to 
establish a State’s international responsibility, the “damages should be measured in terms of 
the extent at which that State has been enriched”.198 In this regard, the tribunal specified that 
not only the Government should benefit of the property, but also make an actual use of it.199
IV. Other Tribunals
The UNCTAD Study mentioned in the opening of this Chapter offers an operational 
definition of indirect expropriation, that emanates from the analysis of State practice, doctrine 
and arbitral awards. The description identifies the elements that have to be cumulatively 
present in order for the taking to occur,200 and includes the degree of economic deprivation or 
loss of control that the action should cause, to be deemed indirectly expropriatory. As most 
difficulties arise in the practice with regard to the assessment of this element, arbitral tribunals 
have developed a number of ‘indicators’ to assist their findings of a measure’s indirect 
expropriatory nature.
This section examines the relevant arbitral pronouncements and the ‘indicators’ 
identified: as will be noted, most decisions are largely indebted to the jurisprudence of the 
Iran-US Claims tribunal.
The severity of the measure or the significance of its impact on the owner’s ability to 
use or enjoy his property is regarded as a fundamental criterion to identify an indirect 
taking.201 The focus of the jurisprudence is mainly on the effects of the measure202 concerned, 
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198 Flexi-Van, pp. 353-354.
199 Id, p. 354. The Tribunal considered insufficient the evidence produced by Flexi-Van and dismissed the claim.
200 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 12: “a) An act attributable to the State; (b) Interference with property rights or 
other protected legal interests; (c)  Of such degree that the relevant rights or interests lose all or most of their 
value or the owner is deprived of control over the investment; (d) Even though the owner retains the legal title or 
remains in physical possession”.
201 C. Schreuer, “The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT”, p. 145.
202 See also, Fireman’s Fund v Mexico, para. 176(f)  establishing that “[t]he effects of the host State’s measures 
are dispositive, not the underlying intent, for determining whether there is expropriation”. However, a trend 
against the ‘sole effects doctrine’ may be identified in recent BITs’ provisions. The UNCTAD Study mentions the 
Canada and United States Model BITs of 2004, Art. 6 of the Colombia-India BIT and Annex 2 of the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009. See, UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, pp. 73-74.
as the approach in Biloune v Ghana clearly shows. The tribunal, after having clarified that it 
doesn’t have to establish the motivations for the actions and omissions of Ghanaian 
governmental authorities to decide the case, stated that
What is clear is that the conjunction of the stop work order, the demolition, 
the summons, the arrest, the detention, the requirement of filing assets 
declaration forms, and the deportation of Mr Biloune without possibility of 
re-entry had the effect of causing the irreparable cessation of work on the 
project. Given the central role of Mr Biloune in promoting, financing and 
managing MDCL, his expulsion from the country effectively prevented 
MDCL from further pursuing the project. In the view of the tribunal, such 
prevention of MDCL from pursuing its approved project would constitute 
constructive expropriation of the value of Mr Biloune’s interest in MDCL, 
unless Respondents can establish by persuasive evidence sufficient 
justification for these events.203
The adverse effects relevant to a finding of indirect expropriation should be permanent 
and severe, such as to destroy completely or in part the economic value of the investment or 
to render the property rights useless.204 This general notion is confirmed in CME v Czech 
Republic, where a taking is described as “effectively neutraliz[ing] the benefit of the property 
for the foreign owner”,205  and it was followed also in Vivendi v Argentina,206  LG&E v 
Argentina207 and Sempra v Argentina.208 In light of these decisions, “the loss of benefits or 
expectations” 209 caused as a result of the measure seems insufficient to find a taking. Rather, 
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203 Biloune v Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, p. 209.
204  See, Starrett Housing, para 154; and, Tippetts, para 225: “While assumption of control over property by a 
government does not automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the 
government [...] such a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrates that the owner was deprived of 
fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral”. See also, Nations 
Energy Inc and ord v Panama, ICSID Case N. ARB/06/19, Award, 9 November 2010, para 684; Occidental v 
Ecuador, para 85; Marvin v Feldman, ICSID Case N. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 16 December 2002, paras 103-106; 
Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case N. ARB/07/23, Award, 29 
June 2012, paras 123, 152.
205  para 150. The CME Tribunal adopted the approach of Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, para 103, 
where it is established that “expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged 
takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal obligatory transfer of title in favor of the host host State, 
but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in 
whole or in significant part, or the use or reasonably-to-be expected economic benefit of property”. Along this 
line see also AIG Capital Partners,  Inc. and CJSC Tema Real Estate Company v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID 
Case N. ARB/01/6, Award, 7 October 2003, para 10.3.1; BG Group Plc v Republic of Argentina, (UNCITRAL), 
Final Award, 24 December 2007, para 260-267; El Paso Energy v. Argentine Republic, paras 233, 245, 256.
206 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija and Vivendi v Argentine Republic (Vivendi II), para 7.5.11.
207 LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, para 191.
208 The Tribunal maintained that the value of the investment had to be “virtually annihilated”. Award, para 285.
209 Waste Management v Mexico, para 159.
“the test is whether that interference is sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the 
property has been ‘taken’ from the owner”, bearing in mind that “under international law, 
expropriation requires a ‘substantial deprivation’ ”.210 This conclusion is confirmed in Telenor 
v Hungary,211 where the tribunal evaluated whether the value of the investment considered as 
a whole had been substantially eroded.212
The “radical deprivation of the economical use and enjoyment”213 of property is the 
core of the test applied by arbitral tribunals to decide a claim for indirect expropriation. In 
addition, attention is paid to the duration of the measure,214 which ought to be “irreversible 
and permanent”.215 In fact, to the extent that the governmental action “does not come close to 
creating a persistent or irreparable obstacle to the claimant’s use, enjoyment or disposal of its 
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210 Pope & Talbot Inc v Government of Canada, Interim Award, paras 96, 102; Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, 26 July 2007, para 120; In RosInvest UK Ltd v The Russian Federation, SCC 
Arbitration V, 079/2005, Final Award, 12 September 2010, para 623, expropriation is defined as having the 
“effect of a substantial deprivation of property forming all or a material part of the investment”, which is 
attributable to the State; Bosh International Inc and B&P Ltd Foreign Investments Enterprise v Ukraine, ICSID 
Case n. ARB/08/11, Award, 25 October 2012, para 218; See also, A. Newcombe, L. Paradell, Law and Practice 
of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, Kluwer Law International, 2009, p. 357.
211  Telenor Mobile Telecommuncations AS v Republic of Hungary, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, 13 
September 2006.
212  Id, para 67: “The tribunal considers that, in the present case at least, the investment must be viewed as a 
whole and that the test the Tribunal has to apply is whether, viewed as a whole, the investment has suffered 
substantial erosion of value.”; see also, National Grid Plc v The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 3 
November 2008, where the deprivation of the title to property is also considered as an essential element to 
expropriation. However, in the absence of the seizure of the title to ownership and failing the effects of the 
Argentine measures to be deemed as tantamount to expropriation, the Tribunal dismissed the claim for 
expropriation, either direct or indirect. At para 145, it is established: “No formal right of property has been 
transferred to the State or to other parties by the State. Deprivation of title to property is inherent in a direct 
expropriation and none has been adduced or proven in these proceedings”. Starting from the analysis of Article 5
(1) of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland-Argentina Treaty, the Tribunal investigated the requirements set 
forth for a compensated expropriation, either direct or indirect, and it focused on the fact that “the measure’s 
effect needs to be tantamount to an expropriation or nationalization”.
213 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, para 115.
214 In Cargill v Mexico, the arbitrators consider two “prongs to an assessment of the degree of interference with 
Claimant’s investment”, namely the severity of the economic impact and its duration.These criteria are 
considered them in turn before establishing that no expropriation is found within the scope of art. 1110 NAFTA. 
Cargill Inc v Mexico, ICSID Case N. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, 13 August 2009, paras 359, 378. See also, Gustav 
FV Hamester v Republic of Ghana,  para 309, which denied the occuring of a expropriation as a result of a 
temporary measure.
215 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, para 116. The approach is followed in Suez et al. v Argentina, Decision 
on Liability, para 129. See also, SD Myers v Canada, Partial Award, para 283, arguing that “an expropriation 
usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its economic rights although it 
may be that, in some contexts and circumstances, it would be appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to 
an expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary”.
investment” 216 the degree of interference is not reached, for the measure to be regarded as 
expropriatory.
The focus on the effects of the governmental measure recurs in Archer Daniels Midland 
v Mexico,217 where the claim for expropriation was based on Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.218
Having established that no definition of expropriation, nationalization or measure 
tantamount to expropriation is offered under the NAFTA, and that therefore the terms must be 
interpreted in light of the applicable rules of international law,219  the tribunal offered the 
following definitions. A “taking of property”, it held, “may be understood in a strict sense”, 
entailing a direct transfer of the property title; however, “it also applies just as obviously to 
indirect expropriation–– i.e., to State measure not directly aimed at the expropriation of the 
investment, but which have equivalent effect”.220 The tribunal clarified that “expropriation 
may take place through [....] taxation”  so that, although the owner is not deprived of the legal 
title to property, “the investor’s rights to use of the property are rendered nugatory, or lack the 
economic value they previously held”,221 as a consequence of the measure.
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216 Generation Ukraine Inc v Ukraine, para 20.32. The same approach is followed in, PSEG Global Inc v Turkey, 
paras 272 et seq. Similarly in Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets v Argentine Republic, paras 234 et seq., 
and Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA v Argentine Republic (Vivendi II), paras 7.5.1 et seq.; Consider, 
however, that in Wena Hotels v Egypt, para 9, the tribunal considered a not merely ephemeral and thus 
amounting to an expropriation, the seizure of two hotels for one year. And similarly concluded the Tribunal in 
Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v Arab Republic of Egypt, para 107. It should also be noted 
that in Consortium RFCC v Kingdom of Morocco, Award, 22 December 2003, para 68, the Tribunal established 
that measures of a temporary nature may amount to expropriation.
217 Archer Daniels v The United Mexican States.
218  Id, para 1. It is submitted that “On December 30, 2001, with effect from January 1, 2002, the Mexican 
Congress amended Articles 1, 2, 3 and 8 of the Ley del Impuesto Especial sobre Producción y Servicios”, (so-
called “IEPS Amendment”) “imposing a 20 percent excise tax on soft drinks and syrups and the same tax on 
services used to transfer and distribute soft drinks and syrups”. The Claimants alleged that an amendment by the 
Respondent of its tax legislation had breached Chapter 11 of the NAFTA thus entailing the international 
responsibility of the State.
219  Id, para 237. At paras 316-319, the Tribunal established that NAFTA Chapter 11 is to be regarded as a lex 
specialis to which “the customary law that the ILC Article codify do not apply”. However, the Tribunal found 
that customary international law continues to apply to all matters that are not specifically governed by the lex 
specialis.
220 Id, para 238.
221  Id, paras 238, 239-240. The ‘effect test’ endorsed by the Tribunal was the test applied by the Claimant to 
submit the discriminatory and expropriatory character of the governmental tax measures. The Claimant 
considered the discriminatory character of the taxation as an indicator of its expropriatory nature.
Relying on the “judicial practice”, the tribunal regarded the “severity of the economic 
impact”  as the “decisive criterion in deciding whether an indirect expropriation or a measure 
tantamount to expropriation has taken place”. It stated that for an expropriation to occur “the 
interference [should be] substantial and [should] deprive the investor of all or most of the 
benefits of the investment”, pointing out also the “broad consensus in academic writings”.222
The tribunal concluded that “only loss of control over the investment or substantial loss 
of its economic value may amount to an indirect expropriation” 223 and accordingly it found 
that no expropriation took place since the “Tax did not deprive the Claimants of fundamental 
rights of ownership or management of their investment”  and the claimants maintained control 
over production, sales and distribution of products.224  The economic impact of the 
governmental measure is considered not as a complementary tool to evaluate the nature of the 
measure, rather as an “alternative criterion regarding intensity”.225 Quoting Metalclad,226 the 
tribunal denied that “by enacting the Tax”  the State adopted a measure tantamount to 
expropriation, since the Tax did not frustrate the claimants’ “complete operation”  in 
Mexico.227
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222 Archer Daniels v The United Mexican States, para 240. At para 241 the Tribunal refers also to traditional case 
law and literature: Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims; Certain German Interests in the Polish Upper Silesia; G. C. 
Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law”, p. 311.
223 Id, paras 242, 245. In compliance with this criterion, the Tribunal evaluated the intensity of the measure and 
quoted LG&E v Argentina in order to establish the permanent character of the expropriatory actions. It also 
referred to the decision in Pope & Talbot v Canada to clarify the operationalization of the test. See, LG&E v 
Argentina, Decision on Liability, p. 58, para. 193 and Pope & Talbot v Canada, Interim Award, para 100.
224 Id, para 245.
225 Id, para 246.
226 Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, para 113.
227 Archer Daniels v The United Mexican States, para 247. As the Claimant failed to establish that the intensity of 
the measure was of such character as to amount to expropriation, the Tribunal considered that a further 
investigation on the duration of the governmental action is not necessary since no taking has occurred. 
Furthermore, the Tribunal identified other other factors that may be taken into account together with the effects 
of the measure––discriminatory nature of the measure, public purpose, respect of due process of law, 
interference with investment backed expectation. However, provided that the effects of the measure are not 
regarded as expropriatory, the Tribunal abstained from their analysis. Nevertheless, one should note that those 
‘factors’ are the customary international requirements for a lawful expropriation. The reasoning of the Tribunal 
apparently stems from the interpretation of the NAFTA as a lex specialis that does not incorporate customary 
international law on expropriation, but rather resort to it in order to decide cases that are unregulated under the 
Treaty.
Investment tribunals have also resorted to the criterion of the loss of control over the 
investment in order to decide whether the governmental measure could amount to a taking. 
This approach is strictly connected to the decisions of the Iran-US Claims tribunal in 
Sedco,228 ITT Industries229 and Starrett Housing.230 For instance, investment tribunals have 
established that “a finding of indirect expropriation would require [....] that the investor no 
longer be in control of its business operation [...]”,231  thus rejecting a number of claims for 
indirect expropriation in cases where this condition was not met.232 The decision in Pope & 
Talbot is especially significant. Here, the tribunal qualified as possible undue interferences 
with the control over a business measures such as
interference with the day-to-day operations of the investment, detention of 
employees or officers of the investment or supervision of their work, taking 
of the proceeds of company sales, interference with management or 
shareholders’ activities, preventing a company from paying dividends to its 
shareholders and interference with the appointment of directors or 
management of the company.233
In Nykomb Synergetics v Latvia, the tribunal also described “the degree of possession 
taking or control”  over an entity entailed by the governmental measure as the decisive factor 
to identify the expropriation.234
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228 Sedco, p. 275.
229 ITT Industries, pp. 351–352.
230 Starrett Housing, Interlocutory Award.
231 Sempra Energy v Argentina, para 285. See also, Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, 
Award, 7 December 2011, para 327: “Expropriation can be direct, that is, resulting from a deliberate formal act 
of taking, or indirect. Indirect expropriation may occur when measures “result in the effective loss of 
management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the value, of the assets of a foreign 
investor” (UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements, Taking of Property, 2000, p. 2)”.
232  Feldman v Mexico, Award on the Merits, para 42; CMS v Argentina, para 263; Methanex v USA; Azurix v 
Argentina, Award; LG&E v Argentina, Decision on Liability; AES v Hungary, paras 14.2.1-14.3.4.
233 Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, para 100 as quoted in UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 70.
234  “The decisive factor for drawing the border line towards expropriation must primarily be the degree of 
possession taking or control over the enterprise the disputed measures entail. In the present case, there is no 
possession taking of Windau or its assets, no interference with the shareholder’s rights or with the management’s 
control over and running of the enterprise – apart from ordinary regulatory provisions laid down in the 
production licence, the off-take agreement, etc”. Nykomb Synergetics v The Republic of Latvia, para 4.3.1. In 
Nykomb v Latvia, the Claimant alleged that “the non-payment of the double tariff constitutes violation of several 
of the provisions of Article 10 of the Treaty, and also amounts to expropriation, or having an effect equivalent to 
an expropriation”. More precisely, the Claimant contends that the non-payment constitutes an “indirect or 
creeping expropriation” that rendered its investment “worthless”.
Similarly, in Hamester v Ghana,235  where a dispute arouse out of a contractual 
relationship between the joint ventures partners Hamester and Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod) 
and regarded the claims for breaches of both the Joint Venture Agreement and the Germany-
Ghana BIT.236 The Claimant’s argument for expropriation was related to the deprivation of its 
management rights over West African Mills Company Limited (Wamco I). Wamco I was a 
company participating to the joint-venture to maximize the Ghana’s cocoa beans processing 
capacity.237
Although excluding that an expropriation in violation of the BIT had occurred, the 
tribunal  punctually analyzed the implications of the export ban enacted by the Ministry of 
Finance in 2003. More precisely, the tribunal examined whether this ban had implied a strong 
governmental involvement in the management of the enterprise, and whether the degree of 
such interference had impaired the investor’s substantive rights under the BIT, especially with 
regard to indirect expropriation.238 According to the tribunal, the export ban did not entail an 
overall assumption of control over Cocobod, rather it was “an act of protection of the joint-
venture”.239  Thus, by avoiding “sophisticated discussions on the contours of indirect 
expropriation”,240 the tribunal dismissed the claim. Furthermore, the tribunal pointed out that 
as “the ban was a temporary decision, which was only in force for six months”,241  it was 
“impossible for Hamester to base its expropriation claim on these temporary export 
restrictions”.242 In addition, the export ban is described as partial in nature, since a temporary 
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235 Gustav FV Hamester v Republic of Ghana.
236 Id, para 2.
237  Gustav FV  Hamester v Republic of Ghana, paras 23, 280, 296 et seq. To decide upon the claim for 
expropriation, the Tribunal considered at first the issue of attribution, to establish whether the actions performed 
by the Chairman of Wamco’s Board of Director and by different Ghanian authorities could all be viewed as 
actions of the Government of Ghana. Subsequently, the Tribunal investigated the legality of the acts attributed to 
the State in light of the BIT.
238 Id, para 307.
239 Id, para 309.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
agent “was allowed to market and export Wamco’s products”.243 Thus, although attributable to 
the Government, “the decision to impose a temporary and partial ban on the exports of 
Wamco [...] cannot be characterized as an act of expropriation in violation of Article 4(2) of 
the BIT”.244
The ‘control test’ is also applied in Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v Canada,245 where the 
tribunal coupled it with the substantial deprivation standard246 interpreted as the “appropriate 
measurement of the requisite degree of interference”.247 In light of the fact that the control of 
operations, offices and of both the management and shareholders activities had always resided 
on the investor, the tribunal evaluated whether Merrill would have obtained better profits in 
exporting logs to the international market as it would have done in the absence of the 
governmental measures.  In such a case, the measure would amount to “some form of taking 
of the proceeds of its sales”.248 As the governmental measures did not result in a loss for the 
investor compromising the value of the investment, the tribunal denied the occurrence of a 
taking.249 Furthermore, “as for the proceeds from the investor’s future sales”, these were 
conceived of as “potential future benefit that cannot be the subject of a taking because the 
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243 Gustav FV Hamester v Republic of Ghana, para 309.
244  Id, para 312-313 et seq., 325-350..Notwithstanding this conclusion, the award is interesting because of the 
method employed by the Tribunal. Indeed, the Tribunal proceeds to further analyze the international legality also 
of the acts non-attributable to the State. This ‘would-be reasoning’ helps to understand the flaws that would have 
undermined Hamester’s claims, in the event that the acts complained of were found attributable to the State. 
Furthermore, the analysis gives the Tribunal the chance to clarify the difference between contract claims and 
treaty claims and thus, apparently, to shield itself from possible criticism.
245  Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada, 31 March 2010. The claim for expropriation is 
interpreted by the Tribunal as an attempt of the Claimant to be granted the guarantee that “exports will be made 
at a certain price”. Indeed, the Tribunal does not consider Merrill’s rights to be related to an investment and 
therefore capable of being expropriated. It is accepted that intangible property rights may be expropriated under 
international law, however those claimed by the investor–i.e., “interest in realizing fair market value for its logs 
on the international market––are not considered as arising from “a contract directly related to the investment 
made”. Although apparently having decided in the negative the question concerning the existence of ‘protectable 
investment-related rights’, therefore, the Tribunal continues by “assuming that the Investor complains about the 
expropriation of a protected investment” and it examines “whether the degree of interference relied upon 
amounts to a taking of the rights concerned, either directly or indirectly”. (see, paras 140, 145)
246 Pope & Talbot, Interim Award.
247 Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada, para 145.
248 Id, para 148.
249 Id, paras 151-152.
Investor is not contractually entitled to them”.250 Conversely, if a specific contract had been 
concluded between the parties to regulate the sales and where this agreement to be “interfered 
with by the government to the requisite extent”, a claim for a taking of intangible property 
rights would be receivable.251
An indirect expropriation may also result from a series of governmental actions that, 
being cumulatively252 assessed, have an equivalent effect to dispossession or substantial loss 
of property rights.253 The phenomenon is also known as ‘creeping expropriation’254 and has 
been analyzed before various arbitral tribunals.255 The notion is best understood in light of the 
description provided by the arbitrator Keith Highet in his dissenting opinion to the case Waste 
Management.256 He pointed out that
a ‘creeping expropriation’ is comprised of a number of elements, none of 
which can––separately––constitute the international wrong. These 
constituent elements include non-payment, non-reimbursement, 
cancellation, denial of judicial access, actual practice to exclude, non-
conforming treatment, inconsistent legal blocks, and so forth. The 
‘measure’ at issue is the expropriation itself; it is not merely a sub-
component part of expropriation.
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250 Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada, para 149.
251 Id. On the taking of contractual rights see e.g. : LESI, SpA and Astaldi, SpA v People's Democratic Republic 
of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Award, 12 November 2008; Occidental Petroleum v The Republic of 
Ecuador.
252 [Emphasis added].
253 See, Enron v Argentina, para 244-245.
254 As Stern conceives it, a creeping expropriation constitutes a “composite act” or “a process extending in time 
and comprising a succession of measures that, taken separately, do not have the effect of dispossessing the 
investor but when taken together do lead to such a result”. The author quotes Article 15 of the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility. B. Stern, “In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 36.
255  LESI,  SpA and Astaldi, SpA v People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, para 131. The Tribunal quoted 
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ve Sanayi AS v Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 255, and A. Goetz v Burundi, 
para 124; see also, Link-Trading Joint Stock Company v Moldova, para 87, where the Tribunal held that the 
occurrence of a taking without prompt and adequate compensation is “the essence of any claim of 
expropriation”. However, the notion of taking under the Treaty is also extended as to include ‘creeping’ or 
‘indirect’ expropriations, namely substantial interferences with the investor business activities that are 
considered as ‘tantamount’ to an expropriation; See, Bosh International v Ukraine, para 218, where the Tribunal 
observed that “in order to amount to an expropriation, the Claimants must establish that the effect of the CRO’s 
[State entity’s] conduct was an interference that caused a substantial deprivation of the Claimants’ rights under 
the 2003 Contract”; Walter Bau v Thailand, UNCITRAL, Award, 1 July 2009, paras 10.4-10.11, 10.12, 10.16; 
Siemens AG v Republic of Argentina, para 263; Telenor Mobile Communications AS v Republic of Hungary, 
Award on Competence, para 63; Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v Arab Republic of Egypt, 
para 107; Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v Republic of Costa Rica, para 76; Tradex Hellas SA v 
Reoublic of Albania, ICSID Case n. ARB/94/2, Award, 29 April 1999, para 191; Biloune v Ghana.
256 Waste Management Inc v Mexico, para 17.
In light of this consideration, the assumption that indirect expropriation necessarily is a 
creeping expropriation seems incorrect, as a creeping expropriation would constitute but one 
of the modes to indirectly expropriate foreign property.257 Against this context, one shall 
recall the numerous decisions of the Iran-US Claims tribunal requiring the evaluation of the 
“cumulative effects” of the measure.
In RosInvest v Russia,258 the tribunal pursued a general evaluation aimed at balancing 
the “cumulative effect of the various strands of [the] Respondent’s actions”  in order to verify 
whether it “constituted a breach of the IPPA”. The tribunal considered that “the totality of 
[the] Respondent’s measures were structured in such a way as to remove Yukos’ assets from 
the control of the company and the individuals associated with Yukos”, and that these 
measures “must be seen as elements in the cumulative treatment of Yukos for what seems to 
have been the intended purpose”.259  The tribunal further stated that “they can only be 
understood as steps under a common denominator in a pattern to destroy Yukos and gain 
control over its assets”.260
Quoting RosInvest v Russia, the tribunal in Quasar de Valores v Russia261 also held that 
indirect expropriation “does not speak its name”  but “it must be deduced from a pattern of 
conduct, observing its conception, implementation, and effects as such, even if the intention 
to expropriate is disavowed at every step”. The tribunal further noted that
The fact that individual measures appear not to be well founded in law, or to 
be discriminatory, or otherwise to lack bona fides, may be important 
elements of a finding that there has been the equivalent of an indirect 
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257  Stern argues the same with regard to disguised expropriations, namely actions characterized by the 
“ostensible or hidden intention of gaining the property”. See, B. Stern, “In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect 
Expropriation”, p. 37; consider also, SAUR International SA v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
ICSID Case n. ARB/04/4, 6 June 2012, paras 369-374, where the Tribunal noted that the reference to ‘indirect’ 
expropriation expresses the intention of the BIT’s drafters to broadly define the modes for a prohibited 
expropriations.
258 RosInvest UK Ltd v The Russian Federation, 12 September 2010.
259 Id, para 621.
260 Id.
261 Quasar de Valores SICAV SA, Orgor de Valores SICAV SA, GBI 9000 SICAV  SA, ALOS 34 SICAV SL v The 
Russian Federation, Award, SCC, 20 July 2012.
expropriation, an expropriation by other means, even though there be no 
need to determine whether the expropriation was unlawful. [....].262
The tribunal qualifies ‘indirect expropriation’ as “an expropriation by other means”, 
highlighting that the analysis of the legality of the measure is not necessary. The tribunal 
seems to expunge any formal (and normative) differentiation between direct and indirect 
expropriation, identifying solely a practical distinction in the means or process that is applied 
to carry out the measure.
In Impregilo SpA v The Argentine Republic the tribunal defined indirect expropriatory 
measures as “borderline cases where restrictions on the use of property go so far as to leave 
the investor with only a nominal property right”,263  whereas creeping expropriations are 
described as “successive measures”  depriving the investor “of his rights to administer his 
property”  to the extent that “at some point the investor may be considered, as a combined 
effect of several acts, to have been deprived of the property”.264
Generally speaking, it stands clear from the analysis of arbitral decisions that the 
scrutiny of the effects of the governmental measure on the investors’ property rights is the 
deciding criterion applied by investment tribunals. The evaluation of the motives or intent of 
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262 Quasar de Valores v The Russian Federation,  para 45. The award was rendered after the Russian government 
seized the Yukos Oil Company in 2007, causing enormous losses to a group of Spanish investors; in Corn 
Products International Inc.  v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 
15 January 2008, para 90, the Tribunal held that “it is not the case that, because a measure which affects property 
rights is discriminatory, it is therefore an expropriation (or something tantamount to an expropriation). Rather, if 
a measure is established to be an expropriation (or something tantamount to), it cannot then be justified if it is 
discriminatory.”
263 Impregilo SpA v The Argentine Republic, para 270.
264 Id. On this case see further below.
the State is infrequent and subsidiary.265 For instance, the tribunal in Metalclad deemed it 
unnecessary “to decide or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the Ecological 
Decree” 266 in order to establish the violation of Article 1110 of the NAFTA. However, the 
tribunal in Sempra v Argentina267 noted that
while many damages can be inflicted unintentionally, and as such will be 
entitled to compensation if liability is found to exist, a transfer of property 
and ownership requires positive intent. This is not a question of formality, 
but rather one of establishing a causal link between the measure in question 
and the title to property.
In the recent case Oxy v Ecuador268 the tribunal relied on the good faith of the investor 
to evaluate the breach of the contract lamented by the Ecuadorian State. The tribunal observed 
that
The Claimants’ failure to seek ministerial authorization was a mistake, a serious 
mistake, but it was not done in bad faith. Should Paul MacInnes and his 
colleagues, during their visit with Minister Terán on 24 October 2000, have given 
him a copy of the Farmout Agreement and the Joint Operating Agreement so that 
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265 See also the decision of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Sea-Land and in Tippetts, where it is established that 
“the intent of the Government is less important than the effects of the measure on the owner”. See, Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, para 116, where the Tribunal finds that the State’s 
intention is less important than the effects of the measures on the owner of the asset; similarly in Compañía de 
Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal S.A.  v. Argentine Republic (Vivendi II), para 7.5.20, where the 
Tribunal recognized that “[t]here is extensive authority for the proposition that the state’s intent, or its subjective 
motives are at most a secondary consideration”; Siemens AG v Argentine Republic, para 270, where the Tribunal 
highlights that the Treaty “refers to measures that have the effects of expropriation” whereas “it does not refer to 
the intent of the State to expropriate”; Saipem SpA v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, para 133, where the 
Tribunal holds that “the most significant criterion to determine whether actions amount to indirect expropriation 
is the impact of the measure”; the “divergence of views as to whether the intentions or objectives of the 
government in introducing the measures may also be taken into account or whether the sole criterion is the effect 
of the government measures” is acknowledged in Telenor Mobile Communications AS v Republic of Hungary, 
para 70; Rumeli Telekom AS v Republic of Kazakhstan, para 700, where the Tribunal quoting Phillips Petroleum, 
para 97, established that “[t]he intention or purpose of the State organ is not mentioned in Article III of the BIT 
and the parties agree that the intent of the State is relevant to, but is not decisive of the question whether there 
has been an expropriation”; National Grid PLC v Argentina Republic, (UNCITRAL), Award, 3 November 2008, 
para 147, where it is established that “[i]t is clear from a reading of Article 5(1) that whether the party concerned 
had the intent to expropriate or to nationalize in taking measures equivalent to either is not a requirement”; 
Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, para 330, also quoting Phillips Petroleum, noted that “[t]he intention or purpose 
of the State is relevant but is not decisive of the question whether there has been an expropriation”; similarly, 
SAUR International SA v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, paras 366, 441, noted that there is no 
requirement to show intention.
266 Metaclad Corporation v United Mexican States, para 111; similarly, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v 
United Mexican States, para 176(f), holding that “the effects of the host State’s measures are dispositive, not the 
underlying intent, for determining whether there is expropriation”.
267 Sempra Energy v Argentine Republic, para 282.
268 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador.
his advisors could have formed their own opinion about the true nature of the 
transaction? As stated earlier, the tribunal has no hesitation in answering its own 
question in the affirmative. OEPC and AEC were negligent in not doing so. But 
again, the tribunal does not find that failure to do so amounted to bad faith. They 
may have been negligent but there was no intention on their part to mislead. They 
were simply convinced that they were right and acted accordingly without seeking 
to mislead the Ecuadorian government.269
The approach of the Oxy’s tribunal shows the substantive effects that a tribunal’s 
appraisal of both parties’ intent may have on the decision of the dispute. In addition, such a 
ruling seems to suggest that there could be room to fruitfully revitalize the role of intent as a 
relevant factor in investment arbitration. Intent may actually function as “the primary criterion 
for evaluating the international lawfulness of a measure that causes loss of private property 
rights”  and thereby “categorize a regulatory measure according to the legislative intent of the 
State”,270  but it could also serve as a touchstone to assess the conduct of the investor.
Recent arbitral awards show the recurring application of other relevant principles and/or 
factors that intervene in the decisions concerning indirect expropriation. Following the ruling 
in Metalclad,271 the concept of investment-backed expectations of the investor has almost 
regularly272 served––or it has been invoked to serve––as a benchmark for the tribunals to 
assess the expropriatory character of any governmental measure. The underlying rationale of 
the standard is the investor’s “reliance on a regulatory and business environment”  which is 
expected to be stable and not exposed to fundamental changes “during the course of the 
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269  Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador, para 380. The Tribunal reached this 
conclusion when assessing the Claimant’s duty to obtain the authorization for the transfer of rights under the 
participation contract, as established in Clause 16.1 of the contract, and the right of the corresponding right of 
the State to terminate the contract in case of breach of the provision, as established in Clause 21.1.2 of the 
contract.
270 K. A. Byrne, “Regulatory Expropriation and State Intent”, pp. 118-119; see also, C. H. Schreuer, “Protection 
Against Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures”, in C. A. Rogers, R. P. Alford (eds) The Future of Investment 
Arbitration, OUP, 2009, pp. 183-198.
271 Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, paras 103, 107.
272 See, Kuwait v Aminoil, Final Award, 24 March 1982, in ILM, Vol. 21, 976, 1034; Revere Copper and Brass 
Inc v Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Award, 24 August 1978, in ILM, Vol. 56, 258, 271; Antoine 
Goetz and Other v Republic of Burundi, para 124; Consortium RFCCv Kingdom of Morocco, para 69; Methanex 
Corporation v United States of America,  Part IV Chapter D, paras 7, 9, 10; Eureko BV v Republic of Poland, 
Partial Award, paras 242, 243; Azurix v Argentine Republic, paras 316-322; A. K. Hoffman, “Indirect 
Expropriation”, pp. 162-163. The author argues that “increasingly the expectation of economic benefit becomes 
one variable in the considerations that need to be taken into account when determining whether an expropriation 
has actually occurred”.
investment with the ultimate effect of jeopardizing the reasonable expectations of the 
investor”.273 Within the context of the NAFTA framework, the concept is described as relating
to a situation where a Contracting Party’s conduct creates reasonable and 
justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in 
reliance on said conduct, such that a failure by the NAFTA Party to honour 
those expectations could cause the investor (or investment) to suffer 
damages.274
The arbitral tribunal also clarified that “the threshold for legitimate expectations may 
vary depending on the nature of the violation alleged under the NAFTA and the circumstances 
of the case”.275
The major question concerning legitimate expectations is whether the protection is 
granted against specific commitments and undertakings that bind the host State or whether the 
existence of ‘legitimate’ assumptions of the investor is sufficient for the standard to operate.
Arbitral decisions are inconsistent in this respect. For instance, in Encana v Ecuador the 
tribunal established that “in the absence of specific commitments from the State, the foreign 
investor has neither the right nor any legitimate expectation that the tax regime will not 
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273 A. K. Hoffman, “Indirect Expropriation”, p. 162; see also, C. Schreuer, U. Kriebaum, “At What Time Must 
Legitimate Expectation Exists?”, pp. 265-276, available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/
downloads/TW-LiberAmicorum.pdf, (last accessed: 12 September 2012), where it is immediately emphasized 
that “not every expectation upon which a business decision is taken is protected by international investment 
law”; see also, C. Schreuer, “Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice”, in Journal of World Investment 
and Trade, Vol. 6, 2005, pp. 374-380; E. Snodgrass, “Protecting Investors’ Legitimate Expectations - 
Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle”, in ICSID Review, Vol. 21, 2006, p. 1; S. Fietta, “The 
Legitimate Expectation Principle under Article 1105 NAFTA-International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v 
The United Mexican States”, in Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 7, 2006, p. 423; A. Von Walter, 
“The Investor’s Expectations”, p. 173; C. Brown, “The Protection of Legitimate Expectations as a ‘General 
Principle of Law’”; I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard,  p. 163; J. Bonnitcha, “The Problem of 
Moral Hazard and Its Implications for the Protection of ‘Legitimate Expectations’ under the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard”, in Investment Treaty News, Vol. 1(3), April 2011, pp. 6-8. The author argues that “[e]
xtending legal protection to the basic expectations that underpin an investor’s business plan [...] is highly likely 
to introduce moral hazard”. Indeed, “it provides the investors with a degree of insurance against government 
actions that undermine the profitability of their investments, regardless of whether the government action is 
efficient. This is precisely the sort of legal rule that is likely to discourage investors from internalising the risk to 
their business plans posed by the future, efficiency-improving government conduct”.
274 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v Mexico, para 147.
275 Id.
change, perhaps to its disadvantage, during the period of the investment.” 276 On the other 
hand, in Azurix the tribunal held that legitimate expectations may also derive from “implicit 
assurances made by the State which the investor took into account in making the 
investment”.277
The importance of the investor’s legitimate expectations as a criterion to determine 
whether an indirect expropriation has been effected characterizes also the American domestic 
legal system. Following the decision in Penn Central,278 the US Supreme Court has adopted 
the ‘interference with investment-backed expectations’ as part of its three-step test in 
regulatory takings cases.279 The Supreme Court ruling in Penn Central is also regarded as the 
ground for the decision of the United States and Canada to revise their Model BITs in 2004. 
In the effort to provide guidance to tribunals, both the United States and Canada have added 
an interpretative Annex to their Model BITs, which subjects claims of indirect expropriation 
to 
a ‘case-by-case’, fact-specific inquiry that requires the balancing of at least 
three factors. The three factors that must be considered––the economic 
impact of the governmental measure, the extent to which the measure 
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276  Encana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, para 173. The same approach characterized the award in 
Methanex Corporation v United States of America, Part IV, Chapter D, para 7. See also, Metalpar SA and Buen 
Aire SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case n. ARB/03/5, Award, 6 June 2008, para 186, where the Tribunal found 
that the claimants could not avail themselves of the legitimate expectation standard since no “licence, permit or 
contract of any kind” have been concluded between the parties; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania, para 
344, where the Tribunal noted that “not every hope amounts to an expectation under international law” and that 
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277  Azurix v Argentine Republic,  para 318; See also, Duke Energy v Ecuador, para 340: “To be protected, the 
investor’s expectations must be legitimate and reasonable at the time when the investor makes the investment. 
The assessment of the reasonableness or legitimacy must take into account all circumstances, including not only 
the facts surrounding the investment, but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions 
prevailing in the host State. In addition, such expectations must arise from the conditions that the State offered 
the investor and the latter must have relied upon them when deciding to invest”.
278 Penn Central Transp Co v City of New York, 438 US 104, 123-125 (1978).
279  In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 US 164 (1979)  the Supreme Court introduced the concept of 
“reasonable” expectations. This approach was confirmed in Ruckelshaus v.  Monsanto, 467 US 986 (1984), para 
1006. The role played by this criterion in the reasoning of the Court has recently been confirmed in Lingle v 
Chevron USA Inc, 544 US 548 (2005), para 124. See, F. Costamagna, “Legitimate Regulation vs Regulatory 
Expropriation in Public Infrastructure Investments after Azurix: A Case Study”, in Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol. 4(2), 2007, p. 17. See supra Chapter I.
interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations and the 
character of the government measure––are drawn from a leading takings 
case decided by the US Supreme Court.280
At any rate, the question concerning the regulatory power of States is not easier to 
tackle at the domestic level. A commonality between the international investment realm and 
the domestic one is the fact that investors run a (economic) risk whose degree is associated to 
the type of investment they are pursuing.281 It is unreasonable to expect282  that this normal 
commercial risk could be eliminated283 or that the domestic legislation of the host State would 
not change.284
As the tribunal held in Saluka v Czech Republic, legitimate expectations can be 
protected to the extent that they “rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of 
the circumstances”.285 On the one hand, it is unreasonable for any investor to expect that “the 
circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally unchanged”; on the 
other, “the host State’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public 
interest”  must also be considered to determine “whether the frustration of the foreign 
investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable”.286 Accordingly, the tribunal shall weigh 
both the claimant’s legitimate reasonable expectations and the respondent’s legitimate 
279
280 S. A. Spears, “Making Way for the Public Interest in International Investment Agreements”, in C. Brown, K. 
Miles (eds)  Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, CUP, 2011, p. 278; United States Model BIT, 
2012, Annex B.
281  For instance, although recognizing that the Claimants lost their investment in the Slovak Republic, the 
Tribunal in Jan Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, 23 April 2012, para 
323. clarified that the losses “were part of the risk that the investors assumed when they acquired the shares of a 
heavily indebted company in need of substantial injection of capital”, and it further stated that “a BIT does not 
offer protection against this type of business risk”.
282 [Emphasis added].
283 See, Waste Management v Mexico, para 159.
284 See, Continental Casualty v. Argentina, para 258.
285 Saluka v Czech Republic, Partial Award, paras 304-308.
286 Id.
regulatory interests, considering that a foreign investor may in any case expect the host State 
to act in bona fide.287
Among the relevant principles applied by investment tribunals that are deemed to 
intervene in the decisions concerning indirect expropriation there is the fair and equitable 
standard of treatment (‘FET’). The FET is repeatedly invoked by investors, especially as a 
“fall-back alternative to indirect expropriation”.288 The alleged violation of the FET has been 
regarded as a “litigation strategy” 289 through which the FET itself has acquired an expansive 
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287  Saluka v Czech Republic, Partial Award, paras 304-308: “A foreign investor [...]  may in any case properly 
expect that the Czech Republic implements its policies bona fide by conduct that is, as far as it affects the 
investors’ investment, reasonably justifiable by public policies and that such conduct does not manifestly violate 
the requirements of consistency, transparency, even-handedness and nondiscrimination”.
288 L. Reed, D. Bray, “Fair and Equitable Treatment: Fairly and Equitable Applied in Lieu of Unlawful Indirect 
Expropriation”, in A. W. Rovine (ed) Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation, 2007, pp. 
13-27; See also, J. E. Alvarez, “The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment”, in 
Recueil des Cours, Vol. 344, 2009, p. 319: “Even though those who established the US BIT programme stressed 
the need for treaty protections against expropriation, the treaty based protection ensuring “fair and equitable 
treatment” (“FET”) is the most important and frequently adjudicated question in international investment law. 
FET is not only the most frequently invoked claim by investors, it is also the most successful on their behalf”; R. 
Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment; J. Stone, “Arbitrariness, the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, and 
the International Law of Investment”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 25(1), 2012, pp. 77-107. The 
author argues that arbitrariness is a legitimate basis for claim under the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
although the thresholds for demonstrating arbitrariness are high.
289  UNCTAD, “Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment”, in Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II, 2012, p. 10; See also, Iberdorla Energía SA v La República de Guatemala, para 320. The 
Tribunal acknowledged that the Claimant had changed its petitum in its “Réplica” and solicited “al Tribunal que 
declarara que las acciones de Guatemala constituyen, alternativamente, una expropiación o un incumplimiento 
de su obligación de otorgarle un tratamiento justo y equitativo a la inversión de Iberdrola; [....]  En ese Escrito 
Posterior a la Audiencia, la argumentación que parecía sustentar la reclamación que era principal – la 
expropiación – se convierte en una argumentación para lo que pareciera ser una nueva estrategia de la 
Demandante: centralizar sus reclamaciones en las alegadas violaciones de otros estándares diferentes al de 
expropiación, particularmente el estándar de trato justo y equitativo”. In fact, the Tribunal submitted that “[a]
unque la Demandante en su escrito inicial citó el Artículo 5 del Tratado relativo a la expropiación e invocó 
abundantes decisiones de tribunales arbitrales referentes a lo que debe entenderse por expropiación indirecta, el 
Tribunal no encontró ninguna concreción por parte de la Demandante de los actos de la República de Guatemala 
que, en derecho internacional, podrían constituir una expropiación bajo el Tratado”.
interpretation.290 In fact, investors regularly allege the respondent’s breach of the FET and this 
strategy has varying implications291 including on the standard of compensation applicable to 
the case.
A distinct rule regulates compensation against expropriatory and non-expropriatory 
treaty violations––such as the breach of the FET. Yet, the application of the FET standard 
often results in a tempered or equivocal approach to the rule, to the extent that by considering 
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290  UNCTAD, “Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment”, p. 10. See the interpretation in Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed v Mexico, para 154 which was then followed in CMS v Argentina, Enron v Argentina, 
and PSEG v Turkey. The Tribunal stated: “[T]o provide to international investments treatment that does not 
affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The 
foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and 
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative 
practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations [...] The foreign 
investor also expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any pre-existing decisions 
or permits issued by the state that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan 
and launch its commercial and business activities”; In Toto Costruzioni v Lebanon, “international and 
comparative standards of domestic public law” are deemed to constitute the benchmark against which the FET 
has to be interpreted. The tribunal also established that “[t]he investor is certainly entitled to expect that the host 
State will not act capriciously to violate the rights of the investors [...] However, Toto did not submit any proof 
that Lebanon acted in a discriminatory or capricious way, or that it did not comply with the applicable 
international minimum standards”. Toto Costruzioni Generali SpA v Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case N. ARB/
07/12, Award, 7 June 2012, para 183; see also, M K. Bronfman, “Fair and Equitable Treatment: An Evolving 
Standard”, in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 10, 2006, p. 677 where the FET is described as 
fundamental response to a new type of expropriation” that “consists of a certain treatment by the host state that 
would eventually impair the investor’s ability to develop the investment, thus affecting its property right in 
regard thereto”.
291 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), p. 15, para 128. The Court describes an arbitrary act as a “willful disregard 
of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety”; Genin and Others 
v Estonia,  para 367; Waste Management, Inc v United Mexican States, paras 98-99; Saluka Investments BV v 
The Czech Republic, Partial Award, para 309; Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, para 116; 
Siemens v Argentina, para 299.
the factual circumstances and interests of the case292 on the whole, arbitral tribunals fail to 
discriminate the grounds for the redress. On the one hand, such an approach may 
accommodate and give proper relevance both to the peculiarities of each case and to a sense 
of justice; on the other hand, however, it may result in an undue deviation from the treaty 
provisions through arbitral decisions.293
In Sempra Energy the FET is described as a “requirement of good faith that permeates 
the whole approach to the protection granted under treaties and contracts”.294 The tribunal 
clarified the interplay between the FET and expropriation, establishing that the FET “ensures 
that even where there is no clear justification for making a finding of expropriation, as in the 
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292 See for instance the holding of the Tribunal in National Grid Plc v The Argentine Republic, paras 167 et seq. 
The Tribunal found Argentina in breach of the FET standard from a number of perspectives: Argentina 
‘dismantled’ the Regulatory Framework on which the Claimant had relied for the investment; Argentina did not 
negotiate with the investor in the period between the implementation of the measures and the disposal of the 
investment; Argentina had required National Grid to renounce to its legal remedies as to the conditions for the 
renegotiation of the investment. However, the Tribunal considers that the FET standard is not absolute in time, 
and therefore the context and the timing in which the breach occurred must be taken into consideration, since 
“[w]hat would be unfair and inequitable in normal circumstances may not be so in a situation of an economic 
and social crisis”. As a consequence the Tribunal establishes that the relevant period coincides with the moment 
at which Argentina required National Grid to wave its legal remedies (25 June 2002), rather than with the 
issuance of the emergency measures (6 January 2002 (para 180); Swisslion DOO Skopje v Macedonia,  para 273. 
The Tribunal explains that it “deems it unnecessary to engage in an extensive discussion of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. However, it does subscribe to the view expressed by certain tribunals that the standard 
basically ensures that the foreign investor is not unjustly treated, with due regard to all surrounding 
circumstances, and that it is a means to guarantee justice to foreign investors”. The Tribunal quotes PSEG 
Global v Republic of Turkey, para 239: “Because the rule of fair and equitable treatment changes from case to 
case, it is sometimes not as precise as would be desirable. Yet, it clearly does allow for justice to be done in the 
absence of more traditional breaches of international standards.” and El Paso Energy v The Argentine Republic, 
para 373. See also, UNCTAD, “Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment”, p. 89; J. E. Alvarez, “The Public 
International Law Regime Governing International Investment”, in Recueil des Cours, Vol. 344, 2009, p. 339.
293  According to Vasciannie, a treatment is fair “when it is free from bias, fraud or injustice; equitable, 
legitimate ... not taking undue advantage; disposed to concede every reasonable claim”. S. Vasciannie, “The Fair 
and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice”, in British Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 70, 1999, pp. 99 et seq.  The interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment obligation 
as a self-contained standard is justified by Dolzer and Steven by reference to the fact that “parties to BIT’s have 
considered it necessary to stipulate this standard as an expressed obligation rather than rely on a reference to 
international law [...]”. See, OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, 
2004, p. 23; Gemplus SA v The United Mexican States, para 12.25 reference is made to Prof. Lowenfeld 
International Economic Law, 2003, “It is worth noting that the BITs set out the criteria for compensation only in 
respect to expropriation or measures tantamount to expropriation. No comparable criteria are set out in any of the 
treaties for breach of the obligation to accord national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, full protection 
and security, or fair and equitable treatment. Arbitral tribunals that have found a violation of one or more of these 
provisions have in effect borrowed from the provisions and precedents concerned with expropriations”
294 Sempra Energy v Argentina, para 299.
present case”, there is a standard “which serves the purpose of justice and can of itself redress 
damage that is unlawful295 and that would otherwise pass unattended”.296
The tribunal manifestly acknowledged that the breach of the FET signals the 
unlawfulness of a governmental conduct.297 Furthermore, it seems to understand the standard 
as a peripheral tool,298  to counterbalance injustice when the protection granted under a 
Treaty’s expropriation provision is not applicable.299  Indeed, “what counts”, states the 
tribunal, “is that in the end the stability of the law and the observance of legal obligations are 
assured, thereby safeguarding the very object and purpose of the protection sought by the 
treaty”.300 The tribunal reminded that “on occasion the line separating the breach of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard from an indirect expropriation can be very thin, particularly 
if the breach of the former standard is massive and long-lasting”.301 Under such circumstances 
“judicial prudence and deference to State functions are better served by opting for a 
determination in the light of the fair and equitable treatment standard”  and in light of this 
consideration the tribunal explained “why the compensation granted to redress the wrong 
done might not be too different on either side of the line”.302
The confusing nature characterizing the relationship between indirect expropriation and 
the FET is epitomized in the statement of the arbitral tribunal in Malicorp Ltd v Egypt303 
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295 [Emphasis added].
296 Sempra Energy v Argentina, para 300.
297 That the FET may “become a relevant factor for the determination of the lawfulness of an expropriation” is 
recognized also in R. Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment, p. 299 and footnote 1323, where the author quotes 
Link-Trading Joint Stock Co v Moldova, para 64.
298 Contra: Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America.
299 As noted by Yannaca-Small, the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard under the NAFTA 
describes it as a part of the minimum standard of customary international law. On the contrary, other BITs’ 
Tribunals interpret the standard as an autonomous provision, whose content should be understood beyond the 
international minimum standard. K. Yannaca-Small, “Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard”, in K. Yannaca-
Small (ed) Arbitration under International Investment Agreements, OUP, 2010, p. 410. See, for instance, the 
reasoning of the Tribunal in Cargill Inc v Mexico, para 267. It is important to note that in Cargill [para 271], it is 
stated that it is the “Tribunal confronted with the task of ascertaining custom”; thus, it is not the Claimant called 
to reconstruct and prove customary international law. See, Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America.
300 Sempra Energy v Argentina, para 300.
301 Id, para 301; see also, Gemplus SA, v The United Mexican States.
302 Id.
303 Malicorp Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt.
which, in contrast to the solution offered in Sempra Energy, stated that “[i]n order to rely on 
both provisions [on the FET and expropriation] the investor must be able to establish that it 
has also been the victim of other measures, different from expropriation”.304 Noteworthy, the 
tribunal had previously maintained that “when an investor bases its action principally on the 
fact that it has been the victim of an expropriation, that measure necessarily implies treatment 
that was, precisely, neither fair nor equitable”,305  conveying the idea of subsuming the 
violation of the FET under a claim for unlawful or indirect expropriation.
The meaning of the FET and its interplay with a claim for expropriation is examined 
also in the above mentioned case Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v Canada.306 The tribunal 
dismissed the allegation of a taking, but clarified that this conclusion does not indicate that 
“the regime is necessarily in compliance with the broader standard of fair and equitable 
treatment, which is a separate matter”.307
The statements of the tribunals in Sempra Energy, Malicorp Ltd v Egypt and Merrill & 
Ring Forestry LP v Canada epitomize the heterogeneous interpretations characterizing the 
relationship between the FET and indirect expropriation and the varying findings that could 
emanate from them. In fact, the tribunals’ understanding of the FET-indirect expropriation 
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304 Malicorp Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt, para 124. The Tribunal concluded that this requirement is 
not met in the present case, since the “sole and essential complaint concerns the rescission of the Contract”. At 
para 125 it is further explained that: “the Contract conferred on the Claimant the right to operate the airport to be 
built for 41 years, to use the 30 square kilometers of allocated lands around the construction, and benefit from 
the transfer, free of charge, of ownership of 300 square kilometers of land around the area under concession. By 
ending the Contract without just cause, the Defendant is consequently said to have breached Article 5 of the 
Agreement”.
305 Id.
306 Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada. The claim for expropriation is interpreted by the 
Tribunal as an attempt of the Claimant to be granted the guarantee that “exports will be made at a certain price”. 
Indeed, the Tribunal does not consider Merrill’s rights to be related to an investment and therefore capable of 
being expropriated. It is accepted that intangible property rights may be expropriated under international law, 
however those claimed by the investor–i.e., “interest in realizing fair market value for its logs on the 
international market––are not considered as arising from “a contract directly related to the investment made”. 
Although apparently having decided in the negative the question concerning the existence of ‘protectable 
investment-related rights’, therefore, the Tribunal continues by “assuming that the Investor complains about the 
expropriation of a protected investment” and it examines “whether the degree of interference relied upon 
amounts to a taking of the rights concerned, either directly or indirectly”. (see, paras 140, 145)
307 Id, para 153. [Emphasis added]
interplay may exert influence over the degree of protection afforded to investors (and 
investments) on both substantial and remedial––i.e., compensatory––grounds.
In Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v Canada, the arbitrators recognize that the law 
applicable to the FET standard is complex.308 Therefore, the arbitral panel had recourse to 
various sources of international law, including general principles of law309  and arbitral 
jurisprudence, to “identify the precise content of this standard”.310 The tribunal concluded 
that, irrespectively of the name assigned to the standard, it is important to be cognizant of its 
substance, which is aimed at “protect[ing] against all such acts or behaviors that might 
infringe a sense of fairness, equity and reasonableness”.311  The tribunal sketched two 
scenarios in order to determine whether a breach of the standard had occurred312: the first one 
in light of the investor’s interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105(1), according to which the 
“threshold to be applied to establish a breach is a comparatively low one”  so that “the log 
export regime’s interference with [the claimant’s] business could readily result”  in the 
violation of the Article; the second scenario considered that Article 1105(1) is violated as a 
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308 Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada, para 182.
309  Id, paras 183 et seq. The Tribunal refers to Mondev International Ltd v United States of America,  paras 
116-125, ADF Group Inc v United States, ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, 9 January 2009, paras 181-184, 
190, Waste Management Inc v Mexico (n.  2), Final Award, para 93 and GAMI Investments, Inc v Government of 
the United Mexican States, para 95.
310 Id, para 186.
311  Id, para 210. The Tribunal notes that the concept of fairness, equitableness and reasonableness are to be 
interpreted in light of the circumstances of each case. At para 213, moreover, the Tribunal establishes that 
todays’ minimum standard of treatment “provides for the fair and equitable treatment of alien investor within the 
confines of reasonableness” and that it “is broader than that defined in Neer case”.
312 The tribunal clarified that in both cases, “assuming breach be found, it is also necessary to determine whether 
the state’s conduct or measures have resulted in damages to the Investor”.
result of a “sufficiently serious”  governmental wrongful conduct or behavior, “readily 
distinguishable from an ordinary effect of otherwise acceptable regulatory measures”.313
The tribunal contented that “a finding of liability without a finding of damage would be 
difficult to explain in the context of investment law arbitration and would indeed be contrary 
to some of its fundamental tenets”.314 As a consequence, the investor’s sufficient discharge of 
its burden to prove the damages caused by the (alleged) wrongful conduct of the State is 
decided by the tribunal prior to determining whether the State has breached Article 1105(1) at 
all.315 Having failed to prove the damages “to the satisfaction of the tribunal”, the claim of the 
investor is dismissed and Canada is found not liable as damages and liability are “inextricably 
related”.316
The approach endorsed by the tribunal is focused on the effects (damage) of the 
governmental measure allegedly in breach of the FET, rather than on the qualification of the 
measure in itself. The tribunal dodges the problem of preliminary investigating the nature of 
Canada’s actions by firstly concentrating on the evidentiary burdens imposed on the claimant.
A similar approach, focusing on the effects of the governmental measure may be 
identified in Total SA v Argentina,317 where the claimant invoked both indirect expropriation 
and the breach of the FET obligation under Article 3 of the BIT. Total claimed that Argentina 
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313  Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Administered Case 
(NAFTA), Award, 31 March 2010, para 243. The tribunal quotes also Waste Management Inc v Mexico (n.  2), 
ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30 April 2004, para 98: “[T]he minimum standard of treatment of fair and 
equitable treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is 
arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial 
prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety — as might 
be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency 
and candour in an administrative process. In applying this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in breach of 
representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied on by the claimant.”
314 Id, para 245.
315 Id, para 244. The tribunal relied on the following statement to substantiate its reasoning: “[i]t is a principle of 
international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate 
form [....] Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention”.
316 Id, para 266. According to the tribunal, an international wrongful act is committed in international investment 
law “if there is an act in breach of an international legal obligation, attributable to the Respondent that also 
results in damages”.
317 Total SA v Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICISID Case N. ARB/04/1, 21 December 2010.
violated the FET by unilaterally changing the applicable legislation and regulation concerning 
the Gas Regulatory Framework, thus acting in breach of Total’s legitimate expectations with 
respect to the stability of the Framework.318 In addition, Total contended that the measures 
amounting to a breach of the FET “alternatively constitute an indirect expropriation as they 
substantially deprive [the investor] of the value and economic benefit of its investment 
[...]”.319
The tribunal rejected Total’s claim for indirect expropriation, arguing that the claimant 
failed to prove the negative economic impact of the Argentine measures on its investment.320 
It performed a proportionality analysis to determine whether the effects of the governmental 
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318  Total SA v Argentina, Decision on Liability, paras 90, 105. According to Total, the FET “includes the 
protection of the legitimate expectations of a foreign investor regarding the stability of the legal regime”; 
furthermore, “these expectations are legitimate and deserve protection under the BIT standard [..]  as far as (i) 
such stability has been promised (to the foreign investor), and (ii) the foreign investor has relied upon such 
promises in making its investment” (para 91).
319 Id, para 185. Total claimed also a partial expropriation as a consequence of the establishment of a trust fund, 
which was “financed by the surcharge on the tariffs paid by industrial users”. According to Total, this impaired 
its control on TGN, which may be characterized as a governmental “obliteration of the value of Total’s 
investment in TGN” (paras 186-187). More generally on the concept of ‘partial expropriation’ see U. Kriebaum, 
“Partial Expropriation”, in Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 8, 2007, pp. 69-84. Total claimed that 
“even if a severe loss of value was caused by a regulation of general application without any intent or effect of 
dispossession, this would not prevent a finding of indirect expropriation (regulatory taking)” and the State’s 
ensuing duty to pay compensation, to the extent that the enacted measure have contradicted “specific 
undertakings [that] Argentina gave to Total”. Argentina maintained that the loss of control in the investment is 
the criterion to be applied by the Tribunal in order to evaluate the claim for expropriation. Argentina relied on 
Pope and Talbot, Feldman,  CSM, Methanex, Azurix, LG&E, Enron and Sempra, and proposed to test the severity 
of the governmental measure and its degree of interference with the investor’s rights, in order to determine 
whether the measure “is substantial enough to constitute an indirect expropriation”. Considering the findings in 
Saluka, Argentina maintained that “bona-fide non-discriminatory regulatory measures within the police powers 
of the State do not require any compensation”, excluding thereby the compensability of any loss in the 
investment, either under the BIT and customary international law. See, Saluka para 255.
320 Id, paras 197-198. The Tribunal further argued that the “pesification and the freezing of the gas tariffs and the 
creation of the trust fund system to expand the TGN’s network” are as well qualified by the Tribunal as bona-fide 
regulatory measures, thus non-compensable.
measure were tantamount to a dispossession321 understood as the loss of material control over 
the investment,322  or had substantially deprived the investment of its economic value.323
As to the FET, the tribunal interpreted it as an autonomous principle, whose content is 
not predetermined.324 The tribunal looked “at general principles and public international law 
in a non-BIT context” 325 for the interpretation of the FET.326  Priority is given to the 
“combined sources of international law”  in defining the treatment to be accorded to the 
investment.327 The tribunal specifically held that “damages under the heading of indirect 
expropriation would not be different from damages due to breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard”, and accordingly “in no case could the tribunal award double recovery 
[...]”.328 This statement casts further doubts on the relationship between indirect expropriation 
and FET. In the words of the Total’s tribunal a breach of the FET seems to be equated to or 
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321 Total SA v Argentina, Decision on Liability, paras 192-193. The tribunal focused on customary international 
law and BIT’s provision on expropriation, interpreting Article 5(2) reference to “equivalent measures having a 
similar effect of dispossession [...]”. The Tribunal qualified ‘dispossession’ as a “precise legal concept”, which is 
“independent in part from legal property” and “may exist without or irrespective of a title”. The Tribunal noted 
that “property may derive from protracted undisturbed possession over a thing by a non-owner”, so that “the 
term dispossession therefore refers necessarily to the loss of the control which is characteristics of possession”.
322  Id, paras 193-194. According to the tribunal Total had not been deprived of its essential rights on the 
investment to the benefit of the public authority and therefore the ‘loss of material control’ had not occurred. See 
also, SAUR International SA v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ICSID Case n. ARB/04/4, 6 
June 2012, para 366, where the Tribunal described expropriation as based on the concept of ‘dispossession’, 
which implies that the investor suffers the loss of the use and enjoyment (and not necessarily ownership) of the 
investment.
323 Id, para 195. The tribunal required a “total loss of value of the property such as when the property affected is 
rendered worthless by the measure, as in case of direct expropriation, even if the formal title continues to be 
held”. The Tribunal quoted Sempra v Argentina, para 285. Furthermore, it referred also to Starrett Housing, pp. 
154-157; Tippetts,, p. 255; C. Leben, La liberté normative de l’État et la question de l’expropriation indirecte, in 
C. Leben, Le contentieux arbitral transnational relative à l’investissement, Anthemis, 2006, 163 et seq., p. 
173-175; and, R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, 2008, p. 96-101. See also, 
LG&E v Argentina, para 191; BG Group Plc v Argentina, paras 258-266; Enron Corporations and Ponderosa 
Assets, LP v Argentina, para 245; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, para 115; 
CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic, Partial Award, para 604; Goetz and others v Burundi, para 124.
324 Id, paras 107, 110.
325 Id, paras 127, 164.
326 Id, paras 126-127.
327 D. Carreau, P. Juillard, Droit international économique, 2nd Ed, Dalloz, 2005, para 1266 at p. 442.
328 Total SA v Argentina, Decision on Liability, para 198.
follow from the finding of an indirect expropriation.329 Whether one of the two claims is 
inclusive of the other330 is substantially significant with regard to the decision of the case. In 
addition, procedural aspects such as the concurring, subsidiary or alternative nature331 of a 
claim may also interfere with the finding of indirect expropriation by arbitral tribunals, by 
possibly altering the order according to which legal issues are decided.332
The conclusion of the tribunal with regard to ‘damages’ seems at odds with its 
interpretation of the FET as an autonomous and flexible standard. In light of such an 
interpretation of the FET, it remains unclear how a finding of either an indirect expropriation 
or a breach of the FET may entitle to damages of the same nature and of equivalent amount. 
The only way to reconcile this interpretation as upheld by the Total tribunal seems by 
considering the FET and indirect expropriation as sharing a common core of unlawfulness, 
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329  This approach seems followed in Waguih Elie Georg Siag v The Arab Republic of Egypt, paras 450, 453, 
where the Tribunal upheld the claimant’s allegation about the violation of the FET standard established under 
Article 2(2) of the BIT following its decision upon the specific claim for expropriation. More precisely, the 
findings on expropriation serve as a clue and indicator of the unfair treatment accorded to the investor. The 
conclusion of the Tribunal with regard to the violation of the FET standard revolves mainly around the breach of 
the due process of law. See also, Siemens v The Argentine Republic; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v The 
United Mexican States; Azurix Corp v. The Argentine Republic.
330  For instance, Kläger maintains that the “fair and equitable treatment is generally not considered to be 
congruent with protection against indirect expropriation”. See, R. Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment, p. 297.
331 As noted above, in Total SA v Argentina the claimant submits that “the same measures amounting to a breach 
of the fair and equitable treatment obligation, alternatively constitute an indirect expropriation”. Total SA v 
Argentina, Decision on Liability, para 185.
332 Reference is made to the event that the claim for indirect expropriation or concerning the breach of the FET 
may be framed as prevalent or concurring claims by the investor. This may have an implication on the order 
according to which the issues are decided by the Tribunal. In the case Swisslion Doo Skopje v Macedonia, para 
259 the Tribunal explained that “[t]he Claimant has alleged four breaches of the Treaty: (i) unlawful 
expropriation of Swisslion's Second Tranche of shares in Agroplod in breach of Article 5(1) of the Treaty; (ii)  a 
failure on the part of the Respondent to observe its commitments to Swisslion in breach of Article 12; (iii) the 
unreasonable impairment of the Claimant’s enjoyment of its investments in breach of Article 4(1); and (iv) a 
failure to accord fair and equitable treatment in breach of Article 4(2).” However, “[t]he Tribunal finds it 
convenient to deal with the fair and equitable treatment claim first and then address the expropriation claim 
followed by the alleged failure to observe commitments, and finally, the alleged unreasonable impairment of the 
Claimant’s enjoyment of its investments”.
which varies in terms of degree.333  The interaction between the FET and indirect 
expropriation would thus give rise to a layered and incremental safeguard for the investor: the 
two substantive provisions, autonomously framed334, are to be functionally employed by 
arbitrators in order to do justice in the treatment of inducted investments. This would also 
mean, in the end, that the category of indirect expropriation may be treated as a surplusage, or 
a derivative of the category of unlawful expropriation.
The arbitral panels’ tendency to “award equal compensation for breaches of either 
standard”  has been criticized in the literature. Reisman and Digón, for instance, discussing the 
differences in distinguishing between expropriation and the FET, have challenged this trend. 
They argue that expropriation is thus “eclipsed”, and that the fair and equitable treatment 
standard has not only “overlapped with the expropriation issue”  but at times “it has overtaken 
it”.335 The standard is undoubtedly “intricately tied to the facts of the specific case, and 
therefore, the abstract criteria can provide only rough guidelines”.336 Therefore, the FET has 
been correctly described as “an intentionally vague term, designed to give adjudicators a 
quasi-legislative authority, necessary to achieve the treaty’s object and purpose in particular 
disputes”.337
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333  Note that by referring to the CMS Tribunal, Yannaca-Small has argued that the obligations entailed in the 
expropriation clause and those of FET do not necessarily differ in terms of quality but they do in term of 
intensity. In addition, the author has also maintained that there is an increasing tendency in arbitral jurisprudence 
“to have recourse to another protection standard such as the violation of the fair and equitable standard, which 
represents a lower threshold. Wälde talks about legitimate expectations as a “self-standing subcategory and 
independent basis for a claim under the FET”. See, K. Yannaca-Small, “Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard”, 
p. 399; K. Yannaca-Small, “Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: How to Draw the Line?”, in K. 
Yannaca-Small (ed) Arbitration under International Investment Agreements, OUP, 2010, p. 476; International 
Thunderbird v Mexico, Separate Opinion (Dissent in Part) by Professor Thomas Wälde, 26 January 2006, para 
37.
334 The protection under the FET would concern unlawful non-expropriatory measures.
335 See, W. M. Reisman, R. Digón, “Eclipse of Expropriation?”, in A. W. Rovine (ed) Contemporary Issues in 
International Arbitration and Mediation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 37, 40.
336 UNCTAD, “Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment”, pp. 62-63.
337  Id, quoting C. N. Brower II, “Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA’ s Investment Chapter”, in Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 36, 2003, p. 66.
The interplay between the FET and IITs’ provisions on indirect expropriation seems in 
need of further clarification.338  The arbitral tribunals’ dedication to illustrate also the 
distinction between the FET and a lawful expropriation supports this assumption. An instance 
of this approach is the decision of the arbitral tribunal in Continental Casualty v Argentina.339 
Having clarified that the content of the FET is not predetermined, as “the concept of fairness 
[is] inherently related to keeping justice in variable factual contexts”,340 the tribunal held that 
While the requirements of a lawful expropriation focuses on the 
preservation of the value of the investment when the host State precludes its 
further operation for some public reasons, the fair and equitable standard is 
aimed at assuring that the normal law-abiding conduct of the business 
activity by the foreign investor is not hampered without good reasons by the 
host government and other authorities. However, in every case, it is first 
necessary to interpret the wording of the particular Fair and Equitable 
Treatment standard incorporated in the BIT at issue. It does not follow that, 
whatever that wording, the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard should 
always be the lower minimum standard under customary international 
law.341
Furthermore, the tribunal drew a parallelism between the allegations concerning 
expropriation and the violation of the FET and concluded that most of them “are substantially 
the same and are addressed to the same Measures impugned as breaches of the fair and 
equitable standard”.342
Having acquainted Argentina with a defense based on necessity, and “leading to the 
non-applicability of the various BIT’s substantive obligations”,343 the tribunal proceeded to a 
distinction between legitimate expropriations and regulations that entail “mostly inevitable 
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338 The Tribunal in Nations Energy Inc and ord v Panama, para 251, seems to support the autonomous treatment 
of the FET standard and indirect expropriation. It has noted that as the BIT distinguishes between the duty to 
accord a fair and equitable treatment (Article II.2) from the protection against expropriation (Article IV.1), a 
definition of expropriation should apply to the case that does conform to the distinction. See also, Occidental v 
Ecuador, paras 682-683; Gemplus SA v The United Mexican States, para 12.25, where the tribunal established 
that “the standard of compensation applicable to their expropriation claims under the two BITs applies equally to 
their claims relating to the Respondent’s breach of the FET standards in the BITs”.
339 Continental Casualty Company v Argentina, para 254. The Tribunal distinguished between expropriation and 
unfair and inequitable treatment as grounds for a claim under the BIT also in MTD Equity v Republic of Chile, 
para 214.
340 Id, para 255; Noble Ventures v Romania, para 181.
341 Id, para 254.
342 Id, para 275.
343 Id.
limitations imposed in order to ensure the rights of the others or of the general public (being 
ultimately beneficial also to the property affected)”.344  “These restrictions”, stated the 
tribunal, “do not impede the basic, typical use of a given asset and do not impose an 
unreasonable burden on the owner as compared with other similarly situated property 
owners”,345  and therefore “are not considered a form of expropriation and do not require 
indemnification [...]”.346
At paragraph 285, however, the tribunal considered that the defense of necessity was 
found as not covering some restructuring operations concerning CNA. In this respect, the 
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344 Continental Casualty Company v Argentina, para 276.
345 Id, para 276.
346  Id. More precisely, “[t]he fixing of an exchange rate and deciding the mechanism by which the national 
currency may be exchanged for foreign currency and its conditions, including the possibility of maintaining 
accounts and deposits denominated in a foreign currency within the country, pertain to the monetary sovereignty 
of each State. These policies fall under the second above-mentioned category (ii); they do not render the State 
liable for the burden or losses that may be suffered by those affected, provided there is no discrimination or 
unfairness in their application” (para 278). The conclusion is further substantiated by the reference to the 
Argentine domestic case law, according to which “in a situation of emergency there is no violation of 
fundamental property rights when for reasons of necessity a regulation is enacted that does not deprive 
individuals of their economic rights recognized by law nor denies their property, but restraints temporally the 
enjoyment of those benefits or the use that may be made of that property’” (para 282). The Tribunal refers to the 
pronouncements of the Argentine Supreme Court in the Peralta case of 1990, the Smith case of 2002, the San 
Luis case of 2003, and the Bustos decision of 2004. On this ground, the Tribunal rejected Continental’s claim for 
the breach of Article IV347, and specified that “[e]xpropriation, even indirect, requires a certain level of sacrifice 
of private property in order to be found. Minor losses that are an incidental consequence to a general regulation 
of the economy adopted in the public interest are not considered to be expropriation giving rise to 
indemnification as highlighted before” (paras 283-284).
tribunal found a breach of the FET and established the Claimant’s title to indemnification in 
the form of damages.347 
In AES v Hungary348  the Claimants alleged the respondent State’s violation of its 
obligations under the Energy Charter Treaty (‘ECT’) “by reintroducing administrative pricing 
through the issuance of the Price Decrees”.349 More precisely the alleged violations are the 
following
(a) breach of its obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment; (b) 
impairment of AES’ investment by unreasonable and discriminatory 
measures; c) breach of its obligation to provide national treatment; (d) 
breach of its obligation to provide most favoured nation treatment; (e) 
breach of its obligation to provide constant protection and security; and (f) 
expropriation.350
The tribunal’s decision to first examine the violation of the FET standard relies on the 
order of the allegations as chosen by the Claimants. The standard is treated, however, as an 
umbrella concept that encompasses the State’s duty to respect the due process of law, to act in 
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347 Continental Casualty Company v Argentina, para 285. Continental claimed that the operations constituted at 
the same time an expropriation and “asked indemnification under either provision of the BIT in an amount 
corresponding to the original dollar nominal value of those of LETEs”. The Tribunal, stating that the same issue 
was already decided under Article II(2)(a) BIT, maintained that it does not “need to pronounce further on the 
alternative claim of violation of Article IV submitted by the Claimant”. The Tribunal established that “it is first 
necessary to interpret the wording of the particular Fair and Equitable Treatment standard incorporated in the 
BIT at issue” and then, noting that “most of the allegations [....] are substantially the same and are addressed to 
the same measures impugned as breaches of the fair and equitable standard”, it concluded that it did not “need to 
pronounce further on the alternative claim of violation of Art. IV submitted by the Claimant”. Therefore, the 
FET standard and the provision on indirect expropriation, although recalled as two substantive obligations 
allegedly self-sustaining and autonomous, seem to mutually exclude each other when it comes to the 
determination of the damages. One could question what the outcome would have been, if the Continental’s 
tribunal had first decided the claim for expropriation: would the claim concerning the breach of the FET (as to 
the restructuring operations) the one not pronounced upon? This scenario is worrisome since it shows that the 
order according to which substantial issues are considered and decided upon by a tribunal may extensively alter 
the outcome of the award. If one considers, moreover, that the method applied to valuate the ‘indemnification’ in 
case of breach of the FET is not necessarily the same used when calculating the amount of compensation against 
expropriation, the possible economic repercussions of the Tribunal’s modus operandi are even more problematic. 
A procedural/methodological aspect turns into a substantial issue, that affects the outcome of the Tribunal’s 
decision and the scope of the redress granted to the damaged investor. This illustrates that a breach of both the 
BIT’s fair and equitable treatment standard and the expropriation clause may––or, should?––not coexist, 
irrespective of the alleged separate nature of the two obligations. Nevertheless, it remains unclear which of the 
two provisions is broad enough to encompass the other. See also, M. K. Bronfman, “Fair and Equitable 
Treatment: An Evolving Standard”, pp. 610-680.
348 AES Summit Generation v Republic of Hungary.
349 Id, para 5.1.
350 Id.
a non-discriminatory manner and in good-faith, to provide a stable legal and business 
framework, and to safeguard investors’ legitimate expectations.351 The tribunal considered 
whether a breach of the FET standard had occurred with regard to each of these specific 
aspects. Having however found that no violation of the relevant provisions occurred, the 
tribunal did not consider it explicitly as an obstacle to a finding of expropriation, nor did it 
consider it as an indicator (positive or negative) of the expropriatory nature of the 
governmental measure. Conversely, the tribunal clarified that “a State’s act that has a negative 
effect on an investment cannot automatically be considered an expropriation”;352 rather, an 
expropriation occurs when the investor “is deprived, in whole or in significant part, of the 
property in or effective control of its investment”, or when the investment is deprived “in 
whole or in significant part of its value”.353 From the perspective of the investor, ownership 
and effective control in the investment are analyzed; from the perspective of the investment 
itself, the criterion to be applied is the diminution in the relative economic value.
According to the tribunal, none of these elements was impaired by the reintroduction of 
the Price Decree decided by the Government, so that the effects of this measure are not 
qualified as amounting to an expropriation of the investment.354 The tribunal did not go as far 
as stating that the measure was regulatory in nature and therefore justified and non-
expropriatory. It merely dismissed the claims concerning both the breach of the FET standard 
and expropriation, although the nature of the governmental action was not investigated.355
A significant interpretation of the FET standard (Article 1105 NAFTA) and the notion of 
indirect expropriation as opposed to the concept of regulatory taking (Article 1110 NAFTA) is 
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351 With regard to legitimate expectations, the Tribunal observes that only legitimate expectations that are created 
at the moment of the investment are to be protected under the standard. The arbitral panel thus quotes Duke 
Energy v. Republic of Ecuador, para 340; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v The United Mexican States, para 
154 and LG&E Energy Corp v Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability.
352 AES Summit Generation v Republic of Hungary, para 14.3.1.
353 Id.
354 Id, para 14.3.4.
355 [Emphasis added].
offered in Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America.356  The tribunal reviewed a “State’s 
decision to restrict property rights as a means of protecting non-investment interests”  such as 
the Native American sacred sites, “against harm caused by open-pit mining operations”.357
The tribunal stipulated that expropriation under customary international law occurs, and 
entails the responsibility of the State, “when it subjects the property of another State Party’s 
investor to an action that is confiscatory or that ‘unreasonably interferes with, or unduly 
delays, effective enjoyment”  of the property’ ”.358 Conversely, “[a] State is not responsible, 
however, ‘for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage”  resulting from non-
discriminatory bona fide regulations.359 It follows a “readily apparent”  definition of direct 
expropriation, which is described as an “open, deliberate and acknowledged taking of 
property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host 
State....”,360  as opposed to indirect expropriation, where 
property is still ‘taken’ by the host government in that the economic value of 
the property interest is radically diminished, but such an expropriation does 
not occur through a formal action such as nationalization. Instead, in an 
indirect expropriation, some entitlements inherent in the property right are 
taken by the government or the public so as to render almost without value 
the rights remaining with the investor.361
The tribunal, going further, differentiated the category of actions tantamount to 
expropriation, that “do[es] not involve the direct transfer of title from the investor to the host 
State”.362 The tribunal clarified that “  “[t]antamount”  means equivalent and thus the concept 
should not encompass more than direct expropriation; it merely differs from direct 
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356 Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, para 606. More precisely, by noting that the parties disagreed as 
to the content of the fair and equitable treatment standard, the Tribunal specified that its task was not interpreting 
the standard, but rather “ascertaining which of the sources argued by the Claimant are properly available to 
instruct the Tribunal on the bounds of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ ”.
357  S. W. Schill, Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
104, 2010, p. 253.
358  Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, para 354. The Tribunal quotes R. Dolzer, “Expropriation and 
Nationalization”, in R. Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 4, 1995, p. 319.
359 Id. Reference is also made to Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, para 103.
360 Id, para 355.
361 Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, para 355.
362 Id.
expropriation which effects a physical taking of property in that no actual transfer of 
ownership rights occurs”.363
The tribunal considered that “this proceedings involve the particularly thorny issue of 
what is commonly known as a regulatory taking”,364  and it investigated the tests applied by 
other arbitral tribunals to qualify each governmental measure.365 Thus, the tribunal decided to 
“assess the impact of the complained of measures on the value of the Project”  and found that 
no indirect expropriation had occurred.366  The tribunal focused on the permanent and 
substantial impairment of the investor’s economic rights, excluding mere restrictions on 
property rights from the realm of expropriation.367
As to the violation of the FET, it has been observed that the analysis offered by the 
tribunal is problematic and conducted in an extremely “proceduralized fashion”.368  The 
tribunal linked the FET to the customary international minimum standard: the burden in order 
to prove the substantive content of the customary standard is imposed on the claimant, who 
has, in particular, to show whether the Neer test or an “evolved”  standard does apply.369 The 
tribunal admitted that a breach of the FET may occur in any case where the State has violated 
the expectations that it has contributed to create in the investor. More precisely, the breach of 
the standard takes place when the State’s behavior results in “a gross denial of justice, 
manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident 
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363 Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, para 355.  The Tribunal relies on SD Myers v Canada, Partial 
Award, paras 285-286; Feldman v Mexico, Award on Merits, para 101.
364 Id, para 356.
365 Id, paras 356-358.
366 Id, para 358.
367 S. W. Schill, American Journal of International Law, p. 255.
368  Id, p. 257; See also, S. W. Schwebel, “Is Neer Far from Fair and Equitable?”, in Arbitration International, 
Vol. 27(4), 2011, pp. 555-561.
369  Neer v Mexico, RIAA, Vol. 4, 15 October 1926, p. 60; Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, paras 
600-601.
discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons”.370 However, the claimant’s duty to “ascertain 
the custom”  (that is, the status of opinio juris and practice concerning the customary 
minimum standard), in order to establish whether the fair and equitable treatment standard has 
evolved and “move[d] beyond the minimum standard of treatment of aliens as defined in 
Neer”371 seems manifestly unbalanced.372
Commenting on this case, Schill correctly argues that significant leeway is granted “to 
domestic institutions to regulate in the public interest in the absence of an investor-State 
contract or specific assurances by the State that aim at inducting investment”.373 The author 
also maintains that
without a contractual or quasi contractual bond between investor and State, 
neither the prohibition of indirect expropriation without compensation nor 
the fair and equitable treatment standard offer protection against State 
measures that, in pursuing a legitimate government interest, merely make 
use, enjoyment, and exploitation of property more costly, but not 
impossible.374
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370 Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, para 627; See, Waste Management v Mexico (n. 2),  paras 93, 98; 
International Thunderbird v Mexico, para 194; Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, 
ICSID Case n. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 26 June 2003, para 132; Mondev International Ltd v United States of 
America, Award, 11 October 2002, para 115; GAMI Investments, Inc v Government of the United Mexican States, 
para 97; For a commentary see, S. W. Schill, American Journal of International Law, p. 258.
371 Id, paras 614, 616, 627. The Tribunal refuses to acknowledge that such an evolution has occurred, claiming 
that arbitral awards evidence a strict standard. See, International Thunderbird, Award, 26 January 2006, para 
194; SD Myers v Canada, Partial Award, para 263; Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, Award, 
11 October 2002, para 127.
372  Judge Schwebel, criticizing this award, finds the holding of the Mondev case Tribunal persuasive. Judge 
Schwebel quotes the following passages of the award: “A reasonable evolutionary interpretation of Article 1105
(1) is consistent both with the travaux, with normal principles of interpretation and with the fact that [...] the 
terms ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ had their origin in bilateral treaties in the 
postwar period. In these circumstances the content of the minimum standard today cannot be limited to the 
content of customary international law as recognized in the arbitral decisions of the 1920’s. [...]Moreover, [...] 
‘the term ‘customary international law’ refers to customary international law as it stood no earlier than the time 
when NAFTA came into force. It is not limited to the international law of the nineteenth century or even of the 
first half of the twentieth century [...]  In holding that Article 1101(1) refers to customary international law, the 
FTC interpretations incorporate current international law whose content is shaped by the conclusion of more 
than two thousand bilateral investment treaties”. See, Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, 
Award, 11 October 2002, paras 123, 125, as quoted in S. W. Schwebel, “Is Neer Far from Fair and Equitable?”, 
p. 560.
373 S. W. Schill, American Journal of International Law, p. 257. See also the Tribunal’s conclusion in Merrill & 
Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada, para 149.
374 Id, p. 257.
The underlying question concerns the linkage connecting the investor’s legitimate 
expectations and the finding of an indirect expropriation. Stabilization clauses included in 
investor-State contracts may satisfactorily be relied upon by investors alleging an indirect 
expropriation; however, it is open to debate whether other types of specific assurances given 
by the host State can have the effect of formally estopping it from undertaking conflicting 
claims or conducts.375
In light of these considerations, also the application of the FET standard may be 
conditioned upon the State’s having given specific assurances to the investors. In Parkerings-
Compagniet AS v Lithuania376  the FET claim was rejected lacking explicit or implicit 
assurances about the stability of the legal framework of the investment. By referring to this 
case, the tribunal in Impregilo SpA v Argentina377  drew a distinction between the intensity of 
the protection granted to investors through the FET and under a stabilization clause in the IIT. 
The tribunal explained how the standard has to be interpreted in accordance with the State’s 
sovereign power, and it established that the “fair and equitable treatment cannot be designed 
to ensure the immutability of the legal order, the economic world and the social universe and 
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375  See, for instance, Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, 6 
February 2008, para 120, where the Tribunal, quoting Fraport AG Frankfurt v Philippines, para 346, noted that 
“Principles of fairness should require a tribunal to hold a government estopped from raising violations of its own 
law as a jurisdictional defense when it knowingly overlooked them and endorsed an investment which was not in 
compliance with its law”. This comment applies a fortiori when the alleged problem is not violation of law, but 
merely - as here - the failure to accomplish a formality foreseen by law, and not even required by it except as a 
condition of obtaining benefits unconnected with those of the BIT itself”. See also, Fraport AG Frankfurt v 
Philippines, Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Bernardo M. Cremades, paras 28-30; however, in Occidental Exploration 
and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, 1 July 2004, para 196, 
the Tribunal found that “[t]he rights of the Claimant are therefore protected under the fair and equitable 
treatment standard required by the Treaty and enforced by the Tribunal, independently of any estoppel”; see also, 
See, Total SA v Argentina, Decision on Liability, paras 131-134, 145, 149.
376 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, paras 334–338.
377 Impregilo SpA v The Argentine Republic. In Impregilo SA v Argentina a distinction is also attempted between 
indirect and creeping expropriation, and the Tribunal focuses on the legality of the measure concerned. The 
dispute arouse with regard to a “concession of water and sewage services under a Concession Contract 
concluded on December 7, 1999 by Aguas del Gran Buenos Aires (AGBA), an Argentine company in which 
Impregilo had a dominating interest, and the Province of Buenos Aires, and terminated on July 11, 2006 by the 
Province”. Impregilo claimed, among the others things, to have suffered expropriation of its investment in 
AGBA and that the Government violated the fair and equitable standard of treatment.
play the role assumed by stabilization clauses specifically granted to foreign investors”  in 
IITs.378
The obligations imposed to the State under the FET standard are thus less stringent and 
specific than under a stabilization clause. The FET rule seems to provide a standard of 
reasonableness and appropriateness against which the conduct of the State is evaluated, 
whereas a stabilization clause imposes a definite and strict obligation upon governments. 
Limits to the State’s sovereign authority (to legislate) are claimable and enforceable only on 
the basis of a specific agreement, “in the form of a stabilization clause or otherwise” 
concluded to this end and binding upon the State. Thus, “there is nothing objectionable about 
the amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an investor made its 
investment”.379 However, in the case at hand, Argentina had failed to “restore a reasonable 
equilibrium”  with regard to the concession contract concluded between the parties, and thus 
had aggravated the situation to such extent as to constitute a breach of “its duty under the BIT 
to afford a fair and equitable treatment to Impregilo’s investment”.380
The tribunal apparently considered Argentina’s omissive conduct381 as a violation of the 
FET under the BIT. The question whether governmental liability may result from omissions 
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378 Impregilo SpA v The Argentine Republic, para 290.
379  Id, para 292, quoting Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, para 332: “It is each State’s 
undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative power. A State has the right to enact, modify 
or cancel a law at its own discretion. Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a stabilisation clause 
or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing 
at the time an investor made its investment”.
380 Id, paras 330-331.
381 [Emphasis added].
that affects the ownership interests of the investors has been widely disputed.382 In Olguin v 
Republic of Paraguay, such a possibility is denied by the tribunal, considering that 
“Expropriation therefore requires a teleologically driven action for it to occur; omissions, 
however egregious they may be, are not sufficient for it to take place”.383
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382 See, CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic, Partial Award, paras 616-618. The Tribunal, by quoting the 
decision of the in Factory at Chorzów para 47, held that “[t]he Respondent is obligated to “wipe out all the 
consequences” of the Media Council’s unlawful acts and omissions, which caused the destruction of the 
Claimant’s investment”. [Emphasis added]; in Gemplus,  SA v United Mexican States, Part XI, para 11.12 where 
the Tribunal clarifies that “Article 39 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility precludes full or any recovery, 
where, through the willful or negligent act or omission of the claimant state or person, that state or person has 
contributed to the injury for which reparation is sought from the respondent state. The ILC’s Commentary on 
Article 39 refers to like concepts in national laws referred to as “contributory negligence”, “comparative fault”, 
“faute de la victime” etc. The common feature of all these national legal concepts is, of course, a fault by the 
claimant which has caused or contributed to the injury which is the subject-matter of the claim; and such a fault 
is synonymous with a form of culpability and not any act or omission falling short of such culpability”; in 
Eureko BV v Republic of Poland, Partial Award, paras 116, 226-235, the Tribunal acknowledged that the term 
‘measures’ in a BIT provision encompasses both action and omissions by the Respondent State. Similarly, in 
Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic,  Partial Award, para 459, and Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd v.  Czech 
Republic, (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 12 November 2010, paras 223, 228, where the Tribunal held that There is 
little doubt that the term “measure” generally encompasses both actions and omissions of a state in international 
law”; AWG Group Ltd v Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, para 141, referring to Olguin v Paraguay, the 
Tribunal noted that a “measure,” which is not defined in any of the three BITs, is usually interpreted to mean an 
action taken to achieve a particular purpose. In this case, although Argentina refused to revise the tariff that 
action of refusal was not an omission but the result of a carefully considered decision formally communicated to 
AASA and that decision constitutes a measure within the meaning of all three treaties. The decision not to revise 
the tariff in response to AASA’s requests was certainly teleologically driven”; in Compañía de Aguas del 
Aconquija SA and Vivendi v. Argentine Republic (Vivendi II), paras 7.5.31-7.5.34, finding that “[i]t is well-
established under international law that even if a single act or omission by a government may not constitute a 
violation of an international obligation, several acts taken together can warrant finding that such obligation has 
been breached”; similarly, in Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, para 329, the Tribunal acknowledged that “[e]
xpropriation may occur in the absence of a single decisive act that implies a taking of property. It could result 
from a series of acts and/or omissions that, in sum, result in a deprivation of property rights”. Omission is also 
mentioned as a ground for the violation of the FET standard in Joseph C Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 21 January 2010, para 284. Similarly in AES Summit v 
Republic of Hungary, para 9.3.40; Walter Bau v Thailand, para 12.43; in Asian Agricultural Products LTD 
(AAPL) v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case N. ARB/87/3, Final Award, 27 June 1990, para 83, it is established 
that State’s inaction and omission can entail the violation of the due diligence obligation”; in Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed, paras 60-62, 66-68, 73, the Tribunal held that States’ conduct includes both actions 
and omissions; Fireman’s Fund, footnote 155, the Tribunal noted that “a failure to act (an “omission”) by a host 
State may also constitute a State measure tantamount to expropriation under particular circumstances, although 
those cases will be rare and seldom concern the omission alone”; Eastern Sugar BV v The Czech Republic, SCC 
No. 088/2004, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Robert Volterra, 27 March 2007, footnote 1, it is noted that States 
are internationally responsible for their omissions as they are for their acts; see also, Republic of Italy v.  Republic 
of Cuba, Dissenting Opinion of Attila Tanzi, para 5; and, Gustav F W Hamester v Republic of Ghana, para 173.
383  Olguin v Republic of Paraguay, para 84: “For an expropriation to occur, there must be actions that can be 
considered reasonably appropriate for producing the effect of depriving the affected party of the property it 
owns, in such a way that whoever performs those actions will acquire, directly or indirectly, control, or at least 
the fruits of the expropriated property. Expropriation therefore requires a teleologically driven action for it to 
occur; omissions, however egregious they may be, are not sufficient for it to take place”; See also, Sea-Land 
Service.
The omissive conduct of the Ukrainian Courts, that failed to enforce an ICC Award,384 is 
analyzed as a ground for claiming expropriation in GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v 
Ukraine.385 The tribunal rejected GEA’s claim on the basis of its previous finding that “the 
ICC Award did not constitute an investment”.386 The Claimant had relied on the finding in 
Saipem SpA v The People’s Republic of Bangladesh establishing that “non recognition of 
decisions rendered on grossly illegitimate grounds are tantamount to expropriation”.387 The 
tribunal in GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v Ukraine reinterpreted this conclusion and linked it 
to “the particularly egregious nature of the acts of the Bangladeshi courts”.388 Accordingly, 
the tribunal considered that the standard of Saipem was not applicable to the acts of the 
Ukrainian courts, further observing that “the Claimant has provided the tribunal with no 
reason to believe that the Courts of Ukraine were ‘applying a discriminatory law’, only that 
the Ukrainian courts came to a conclusion different to that which GEA had hoped”.389
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384 GEA Group Aktiengesellchaft v Ukraine, para 208.
385 Id. In this case the arbitral panel is also confronted with an allegation of expropriation concerning the State’s 
misappropriation of products. 
386 Id, para 231.
387 Saipem SpA v People’s Republic of Bangladesh, para 148; At paras 268 et seq., the Tribunal analyzes the FET 
standard. The analysis of this provision follows the decision on the claim of expropriation, and it revolves 
around the Claimant’s alleged legitimate expectations “to recover the amount Oriana owed to it during 
bankruptcy proceedings”, to have the “fundamental principles of due process and international law applicable to 
the enforcement and recognition of arbitration awards” respected by the Ukrainian courts. Accordingly, the 
Claimant submits “that Ukraine’s actions or omissions led to a denial of justice on two fronts, namely (i) the 
non-recognition of the ICC Award; and (ii) the legal proceedings relating to the bankruptcy proceedings initiated 
by Pryvatbank”. However, the Tribunal finds that “the Claimant was not subject to a denial of justice in the 
Ukrainian courts and, therefore, was not subject to unfair or inequitable treatment” and it “concludes that there 
are no grounds to hold Ukraine liable for violating its obligation to give the Claimant’s investment fair and 
equitable treatment in accordance with Article 2(1)  of the BIT, whether it be with respect to payment for the 
Products; GEA’s expectation to recover amounts owed by Oriana during the bankruptcy proceedings; or the 
enforcement of the ICC Award”. GEA Group Aktiengesellchaft v Ukraine, paras 268 et seq., 305-307, 323-324.
388 GEA Group Aktiengesellchaft v Ukraine, para 234.
389 Id, para 236.
In White Industries v India390 the setting aside of a valid foreign award is alleged to 
amounting to a taking under the BIT.391 In the case at hand, however, the tribunal found that 
no expropriation had occurred since the failure of Indian Courts––rather, their delay––“to 
dispose of either Coal India’s set aside application or White’s application for Enforcement of 
the Award”  had affected “neither the value of White’s investment [....] nor its rights under the 
Contract [....]”.392
The tribunal concluded that “[a]ll that has happened is that the determination of [the] 
validity [of the Award] has not yet occurred” and “this does not sound in expropriation”.393 It 
is clear from the reasoning of the tribunal that were the Courts to set aside a valid foreign 
award, a claim for expropriation would undoubtedly be deemed receivable.
It is also interesting with respect to the treatment of omissive conducts, to analyze the 
case Waguih Elie Georg Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Egypt.394 In this case it is the investor’s 
failure to honor its commitments that is alleged by the State as the ground to justify its 
decision to expropriate the investor’s property. Although the issue remains not fully dealt with 
in the award, the tribunal rejected this approach. Through an analysis under the due process 
principle, the tribunal pointed out that this is not a valid basis for the State to justify 
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390 White Industries v Republic of India.
391 Id, paras 12.3.1., 12.3.2; Contra: Swisslion DOO Skopje v Macedonia, ICSID Case N. ARB/0916, Award, 6 
July 2012, para 310 et seq. The claimant argued that the domestic courts’ decision to terminate the contract and 
the failure to award compensation amounted to an expropriation. The arbitral Tribunal rejected this claim  and 
established that “the courts’ determination of breach of the Share Sale Agreement and its consequential 
termination did not breach the Treaty and therefore was not unlawful. The internationally lawful termination of a 
contract between a State entity and an investor cannot be equated to an expropriation of contractual rights simply 
because the investor’s rights have been terminated; otherwise, a State could not exercise the ordinary right of a 
contractual party to allege that its counterpart breached the contract without the State’s being found to be in 
breach of its international obligations. Since there was no illegality on the part of the courts, the first element of 
the Claimant’s expropriation claim is not established”. As to the failure to grant compensation, the Tribunal also 
noted that the investor had not claimed compensation in the domestic court case (paras 319-320) and thus found 
that “the Claimant has not proven the juridical fact on which the second limb of its expropriation case is based, 
i.e., that it had a clear right to recover the purchase price in that proceeding such that the court’s failure to so 
order constituted an expropriation. (para 320) In the end, the Tribunal finds that no claim for expropriation has 
been made out under Article 6 of the Treaty and the claim is dismissed”. (para 321)
392 White Industries v Republic of India, para 12.3.6.
393 Id.
394 Waguih Elie Georg Siag v The Arab Republic of Egypt.
expropriatory measures.395 More precisely, the tribunal found a violation of due process, 
especially considering that Resolution n. 83, that firstly authorized the expropriatory measure, 
“was passed without prior notice to the Claimant”, which had therefore no opportunity “until 
after the fact, to be heard on the matter”.396
V. Summary
According to this review, in the decisions of the various courts and tribunals the 
standards applied to determine what constitutes a taking seem to converge. The focus is 
mainly on the effects of the governmental measure, at times balanced with other factors, 
especially the severity and the impact of the action on the investment. In deciding upon each 
case the modus operandi of each judicial forum/arbitral panel varies, and this leads to 
inconsistent outcomes. Indeed, it is the lack of an intelligible legal methodology that affects 
the reasoning of arbitral tribunals, expanding the decision-making power of arbitrators at the 
expenses of both the predictability and stability of international investment law and the 
interests’ of the parties to the dispute. The wide discretion left to arbitrators both in 
identifying the law applicable to indirect expropriatory claims and interpreting the application 
of other standards of review––such as the FET––leads to a “desire to do justice according to 
the particular circumstances of the case”.397  Although it has been maintained that “this 
conudrum cannot be resolved”  but “it can only be managed by the persuasive quality of 
discourse”,398 it seems that a rigorous and intelligible legal method would leastwise clarify the 
motivations and the interpretative approaches endorsed by arbitral tribunals.
The decisions of both the PCIJ and the ICJ have influenced the development of the 
concept of taking and the formation of the rules concerning its valuation. Especially, the issue 
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395 Waguih Elie Georg Siag v The Arab Republic of Egypt, para 441.
396 Id, para 442.
397 P. S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, p. 10.
398 T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 34 as quoted 
in A. R, Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration, p. 141.
concerning the protection to be afforded to foreign investors have been the object of 
discussion before the ICJ which commented upon relevant rules on diplomatic protection.399
The ECtHR has contributed to both the distinction between actions amounting to 
expropriation v regulatory activities of the State and the understanding of ‘taking’. The Court 
has acknowledged the protection afforded to aliens against unacceptable measures of the host 
State established under international law and has also clarified the actions falling into the 
category of ‘unacceptable measures’.400 De facto expropriations that impair the owner’s right 
to use, enjoy and dispose of his property to the extent that the effects of the governmental 
action can be assimilated to a dispossession are unacceptable and entitle the affected owner to 
compensation. The ECtHR has explained that the expropriatory character of the measure––
and the degree of its compensability––should be assessed through a fair balancing “between 
the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection 
of the individual’s fundamental rights”.401  In fact, measures pursuing legitimate public 
interests would require less than the full market value as standard for compensation. A 
“disproportionate interference”, in breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol ECHR, would 
result also from a taking of property “without payment of an amount reasonably related to its 
value”.402 Governmental actions that modify, rescind or challenge existing legal commitments 
between the State and the investor are also condemned by the ECtHR as a State’s violation of 
the duty to protect possessions as established in Article 1 Protocol I ECHR.
The decisions of the Iran-US tribunal clarify the concept of taking and the conditions 
that must be fulfilled for its finding. The tribunal dealt with cases of nationalization, physical 
seizure of property and direct expropriation, but many of its awards faced the issue of indirect 
expropriations resulting from the measures carried out by the Iranian government at the 
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399 Barcelona Traction, pp. 3, 47. See also, Diallo v Congo, para 61.
400 Sporrong & Lönnroth v Sweden. Also the cases Carbonara and Ventura v Italy, and Belvedere Alberghiera Srl 
v Italy may be considered as falling under the category of de facto expropriations.
401 Id, para 69 and para 147. See also Jahn and Others v Germany, para 93; Hutten-Czapska v Poland; J. A. Pye 
v UK, paras 53, 75; Bugajny and Others v Poland, para 67.
402 Id, para 147. On the issue of compensation see also Lithgow v United Kingdom.
relevant time. “Interferences by a State in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of its 
benefits, even when legal title to property is not affected”  are regarded as possibly causing the 
liability of the State.403  The general rule concerning the concept of indirect taking is 
established by the Iran-US tribunal in Tippetts,404 where a de facto taking of property that is 
compensable is deemed to occur when the owner is deprived of fundamental property rights 
in a non-ephemeral manner, as a result of the governmental action.405 The tribunal focuses on 
the effects and impact of the measure on the ownership to qualify the action as indirectly 
expropriatory. In addition, the sum effects of a series of regulatory measures may 
cumulatively engender a taking of property if they result in a substantial (economic) loss.406 
The Iran-US tribunal also considered the duration––i.e., temporary v permanent––of the 
deprivation caused by the governmental measure as well as the State’s subsequent conduct, as 
indicators of the expropriatory nature of the action.407
In light of these considerations, the appointment of managers, interferences with 
intangible property rights, denial of access to property, and forced transactions may give rise 
to a legitimate claim for (indirect) expropriation to the extent that such measures have the 
effect of rendering the fundamental rights of ownership so useless “that they must be deemed 
to have been expropriated even though the State does not purport to have expropriated them 
and the legal title to property remains with the original owner”.408
As noted above, the reasoning of the Iran-US tribunal mainly revolves around the 
effects of the governmental action on property rights and this approach is also at the core of 
the ‘effects doctrine’, regarded as the key standard applied by investment tribunals to decide 
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403 Tippets, p. 225.
404 A. Avanessian, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in Action, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, p. 32.
405 Tippetts, pp. 225-226.
406 Thomas Earl Payne, pp. 3-24.
407 Phelps Dodge Corp, pp. 129 et seq.
408 Starrett Housing, p. 154; see, inter alia, Dames and Moore, pp. 212, 223; Computer Science Corp, p. 233; 
Sola Tiles, p. 223; Foremost Tehran,  pp. 245-250; Flexi-Van, pp. 336-337, 339-342; Amoco International 
Finance, p. 220.
upon indirect expropriatory cases.409 The influence exerted by the case-law of the Iran-US 
tribunal on arbitral decisions is indisputable and may be identified especially with respect to 
the criteria of the governmental control over property rights,410  the severity of the 
governmental measure (including its intensity and duration)411 and the evaluation of the 
cumulative effects of the governmental measure on the investment,412  as indicators of the 
indirect expropriatory nature of a State’s measure.
An additional similarity may be identified between the approach of the Iran-US tribunal 
to the doctrine of unjust enrichment413 and the investment tribunals’ treatment of the FET 
standard. In both cases, the aim is to restore the equilibrium between the parties to the dispute 
and under each ‘standard’ the decision is animated by a sense of legal justice, whose scope is 
left to the discretion of the adjudicators. In addition, the applicability of both principles seems 
conditioned upon evidentiary gaps in the arguments of the claimant that affect the proof of the 
alleged expropriation before the tribunal.
The FET is frequently invoked by investors, especially as a “fall-back alternative to 
indirect expropriation”.414  The alleged violation of the FET functions as a “litigation 
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409 Currently, also the proportionality analysis is gathering momentum, especially in academic writings.
410 Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, para 100 as quoted in UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 70; Gustav FV Hamester 
v Republic of Ghana, paras 23, 280, 296 et seq.; Nykomb Synergetics v The Republic of Latvia, para 4.3.1; 
Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada.
411 See, inter alia, Biloune v Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, p. 209; Nations Energy Inc v Panama, 
para 684; Occidental v Ecuador, para 85; Marvin v Feldman, paras 103-106; Railroad Development Corporation 
(RDC) v Republic of Guatemala, paras 123, 152; Telenor Mobile v Republic of Hungary, para 67; Cargill Inc v 
Mexico, paras 359, 378. See also, Gustav FV Hamester v Republic of Ghana, para 309, which denied the 
occurring of a expropriation as a result of a temporary measure; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, para 116; 
Suez et al. v Argentina, Decision on Liability, para 129; SD Myers v Canada, Partial Award, para 283; 
Generation Ukraine Inc v Ukraine, para 20.32; PSEG Global Inc v Turkey, paras 272 et seq.; Enron Corporation 
and Ponderosa Assets LP v Argentine Republic, paras 234 et seq., and Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and 
Vivendi v Argentine Republic (Vivendi II), paras 7.5.1 et seq.; Consortium RFCC v Kingdom of Morocco, para 
68.
412 Waste Management (n. 2) v Mexico, para 17; RosInvest UK Ltd v The Russian Federation, para 621; Quasar 
de Valores v The Russian Federation, para 45; Impregilo SpA v The Argentine Republic, para 270.
413  Sea-Land Service, p. 164. The Tribunal, despite dismissing the claim based on the breach of contract, 
established that the evidence was “insufficient to justify a finding that any expropriation [of the rights] 
occurred”; Benjamin R. Isaiah, pp. 233-237; Flexi-Van, p. 353.
414 L. Reed, D. Bray, “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, pp. 13-27.
strategy” 415 which has varying implications,416  including on the standard of compensation 
applicable to the case.417  The standard has also been applied by arbitral tribunals as an 
indicator of the unlawfulness of the measure.418  However, its relationship with indirect 
expropriation is controversial and ought to be further investigated.
Also a State’s conduct in breach of specific assurances given to the investor, or violating 
the investor’s legitimate expectations has served as a benchmark to determine the non-
regulatory character of the governmental action. The arbitral practice is inconsistent in this 
respect save for the conclusion that it is unreasonable for the investor to expect that a normal 
commercial risk could be eliminated419 or that the domestic legislation of the host State would 
not change.420
Actions found in violation of either the FET, legitimate expectations or specific 
commitments existing between the State and the investor may be considered as parameters for 
the assessment of the illegitimate nature of the governmental measure. Issues related to the 
unlawfulness of a State’s measure will be considered in the following Chapter on the 
distinction between ‘Lawful versus Unlawful Expropriation’. The analysis will shed further 
light on the nature of indirect expropriation in international investment law.
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415 UNCTAD, “Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment”, p. 10; See also, Iberdorla Energía SA v La República 
de Guatemala, para 320.
416 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), para 128. The Court describes an arbitrary act as a “willful disregard of due 
process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety”; Genin and Others v 
Estonia, para 367; Waste Management (n. 2) v United Mexican States, paras 98-99; Saluka Investments BV  v The 
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417  Arbitral tribunals tend to award equal compensation for breaches of either standard. Such a tendency is 
criticizable. By overlooking the substantive distinction between the FET and indirect expropriation, the investors 
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418 Sempra Energy v The Argentine Republic, para 300.
419 See, Waste Management (n. 2) v Mexico, para 159.
420 See, Continental Casualty v. Argentina, para 258.
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Chapter VI
Lawful versus Unlawful Takings
“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of [governmental measures]  I understand to be embraced 
within that shorthand description [irregular]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I 
know it when I see it”.1
The question of the legality of an expropriation seems to be of less importance in 
investment arbitrations than the one regarding the different forms that an expropriation could 
take.2  One reason may be found in the proclivity of investment tribunals to apply the 
conditions for a lawful expropriation in order to verify whether the expropriation has 
occurred, thereby confusing the two levels of the analysis.
Under customary international law the requirements for a lawful expropriation are well-
established: a lawful expropriation should be effected in pursuance of a public purpose, in a 
non-discriminatory manner, through a the due process of law and against the payment of 
adequate compensation.3 These same requirements are generally accepted also in IITs.4
As to unlawful expropriation, customary international law is reflected in the full 
reparation principle as stated in the PCIJ Chorzów Factory case5  and in the Articles on 
international responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.6 IITs, on the contrary, 
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1 Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184 (1964). Mr Justice Stewart Concurring Opinion. See, L. Yves Fortier, S. L. 
Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment”, p. 294.
2 A. Reinisch, “Legality of Expropriations”, in A. Reinisch (ed) Standards of Investment Protection, OUP, 2008, 
p. 172; see also, C. McLachlan QC, L. Shore, M. Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration, p. 331; As 
mentioned, during the writing of this work the following paper was published H. Dalhuisen, A. T. Guzman, 
“Expropriatory and Non-Expropriatory Takings Under International Investment Law”, forthcoming. The authors 
argues that “there remains, however, a sense that the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriations is 
minor. The most important distinction is between takings that are expropriatory and those that are not”. 
Therefore, the authors focus on the (expropriatory) effects of a measure as the main criterion to be applied. 
However, the authors also point to the role of the FET standard, which is described as an “obligation of central 
importance and drives the inquiry toward matters of non-discrimination, proportionality and due process and 
probably also special governmental undertakings”. Accordingly, the author maintain that “there are unlawful 
non-expropriatory takings which are compensable for that reason”.
3 CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic, para 497; T. Wälde, B. Sabahi, Compensation and Damages in 
International Investment Law, Report to the ILA Committee on International Law on Foreign Investment, p. 21, 
supports the view that in case of lawful expropriation the investor is entitled to full compensation.
4 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 28.
5 Factory at Chórzow.
6 See further paragraph I of the present chapter.
generally fail to stipulate specific provisions regulating unlawful takings of property. As a 
consequence, arbitrators may resort to customary international law, general principles of law 
or endorse a deferential standard of review.7
This section revises the most relevant cases that deal with the legality of expropriation 
“both under international law and according to applicable [investment] treaty standards”.8 The 
analysis points out the substantial and remedial consequences that arise from the failure to 
distinguish between lawful and unlawful expropriation in the practice, and significantly the 
denial of legal protection to the investor and the failure to grant full reparation––as opposed to 
compensation alone.
In addition, the distinction is useful to both reconceptualize indirect expropriation and 
highlight the role of the regulatory foundation (i.e., public purpose) in excluding the 
expropriatory nature of the governmental action.
I. The Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice
The Chorzów Factory9  standard is the yardstick or locus classicus for founding the 
distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation and the principle of full reparation.10 
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7 See, J. Paulsson and Z. Douglas, “Indirect Expropriation in Investment Arbitration”, p. 146. Arguing that the 
test for indirect expropriation “must be flexible enough to keep a pace with the new realities [..]  but it is also 
imperative that states be in a position to make rational and informed decisions in the public interest concerning 
measures that might have an impact on foreign investment activity and their ability to do so would be severely 
undermined if the circumstances giving rise to expropriation defied any generalization”; see also, C. Lévesque, 
“Les fondements de la distinction”, pp. 84-85: “La ligne de démarcation entre l’expropriation et la 
réglementation est fine et difficile à tracer. Il faut, dans chaque cas, appliquer avec soin les éléments de réponse 
appropriés pour trancher la question. Cette méthode au cas par cas, qui nie l’existence de règles absolues, 
n’empêche toutefois pas la recherche d’outils conceptuels susceptibles de fournir des paramètres nécessaires à la 
prise de décisions en cette matière”.
8 A. Reinisch, “Legality of Expropriations”, p. 172.
9 Factory at Chórzow.
10 See, B. Sabahi, Compensation and Restitution in Investor-State Arbitration, OUP, 2011, pp. 47 et seq.
The arbitral jurisprudence has variously resorted to it, pointing at its considerable implications 
in terms of damages available to the expropriated party.11
The case involved the unlawful seizure of a nitrate factory located in Chorzów, Upper 
Silesia, which was part of Germany when it was built in 1915.12  Regaining its independence, 
Poland was awarded parts of Upper Silesia, including Chorzów. Germany and Poland 
concluded an Agreement, regulating also Poland’s right to expropriate certain German assets 
in Upper Silesia.
According to Article 7 of the Agreement, the following conditions had to be met by 
Poland to lawfully  expropriate: the measure had to be indispensable to guarantee, in the 
interests of all parties, the continuity of the economic life in Upper Silesia, and Poland had to 
correspond equitable compensation to the expropriated owner, valuing the property as of the 
date of expropriation.13
Poland unilaterally transferred the possession and management of the factory to a polish 
national in 1922. Therefore, Germany on behalf of its nationals, filed a claim against Poland 
before the PCIJ. The Court established that Poland had committed a wrongful act, (an 
unlawful expropriation) under international law and was thus in charge of the full reparation. 
According to the Court,
reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if that is 
not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a 
restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in 
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the Principle of Full Reparation in International Investment Law”, in A. J. Van den Berg (ed by), 50 Years of the 
New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference, ICCA Congress Series 14, Kluwer 
Arbitration, 2009, p. 241; contra, A. Sheppard, “The Distinction between Lawful and Unlawful Expropriation”, 
in C. Ribeiro (ed by), Investment Arbitration and The Energy Charter Treaty, JurisNet, 2006, p. 172.
12 Id, p. 233; see also, A. Sheppard, “The Distinction between Lawful and Unlawful Expropriation”, pp. 177 et 
seq.
13 Id, p. 233.
place of it – such are the principles which should serve to determine the 
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.14
Indeed, the Court explained the “guiding principles according to which the amount of 
compensation due may be determined”, and clarified that
the action of Poland [....] is not an expropriation––to render which lawful 
only the payment of fair compensation would have been wanting; it is a 
seizure of property, rights and interests which could not be expropriated 
even against compensation, save under the exceptional conditions fixed by 
Article 7 of the said Convention. As the Court has expressly declared in 
Judgment n. 8, reparation is in this case the consequence not of the 
application of Article 6 to 22 [....] but of acts contrary to those articles.15
The decision of the Court underlined the distinction between lawful and unlawful 
expropriation by pointing to the deterrent effect of indemnification,16 which was intended to 
“eliminate any perceived advantage or incentive for the expropriating State to act 
unlawfully”.17 As noted by Rabel, 
it is in fact obvious that the expropriator’s responsibility must be increased 
by the fact that his action is unlawful. Nevertheless, it is in my opinion also 
obvious that the unlawful character of his action can never place the 
expropriator in a more favourable position, nor the expropriated Party in a 
more unfavourable position, either by reducing the indemnity due or by 
increasing the burden of proof resting upon the Applicant. This point of 
view, with which the Court in its judgement has not thought fit expressly to 
deal, appears to me to be in accordance with the general principles of law 
[....].18
These principles are also reflected in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts,19 and especially in Articles 31 and 34-36.
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15 Factory at Chórzow, p. 46.
16  P. Bienvenu, M. J. Valasek, “Compensation for Unlawful Expropriation”, p. 237; W. M. Reisman, R. D. 
Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation”, p. 133.
17 Id. See, Factory at Chórzow, pp. 47-48, footnote 1.
18 Id, p. 238, quoting Observation by Mr. Rabel, Factory at Chórzow, pp. 66-67.
19 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International 
Law Commission (‘ILC’), 2001.
II. The European Court of Human Rights
The judicial practice of the ECtHR deals both with the consequences resulting from the 
failure to characterize a governmental measure, and the complexities associated with the 
determination of the applicable standard of compensation/redress.
The case Beyeler v Italy20  is instructive on the substantial level, as it shows how the 
failure to characterize the governmental measure may deprive the applicant of protection. The 
case dealt with the purchase by a Swiss national of a Van Gogh painting in 1977 through an 
intermediary. The painting had been classified as a work of historical and artistic interest 
under Italian laws, which entitled the Italian Ministry of Cultural Heritage with a right of pre-
emption, to be exercised within a two-moths time limit. The obligatory declaration of sale did 
not mention the final purchaser (Mr. Beyeler), thus only in 1983 the Italian Ministry learnt 
who the real purchaser was. In 1988 Italy exercised the right of pre-emption, purchasing the 
painting at the 1977 sales price. Mr Beyeler brought the case before Italian Courts which, 
although classifying the measure as expropriatory, did not award any remedy (i.e., adjustment 
of the sum paid). The ECtHR avoided to classify the case as amounting to either 
expropriation, control of use or other interference and it examined the case under the general 
principles set forth in Article 1 of the Protocol, first sentence. It stated: 
the Court does not consider it necessary to rule on whether the second 
sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 applies in this case. The 
complexity of the factual and legal position prevents its being classified in a 
precise category. [...] Nor does the Court need to rule on the issue whether 
under Italian law the applicant should be considered the real owner of the 
painting [...]. Moreover, the situation envisaged in the second sentence of 
the first paragraph of Article 1 is only a particular instance of interference 
with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property as guaranteed by the 
general rule set forth in the first sentence (...). The Court therefore considers 
that it should examine the situation complained of in the light of that general 
rule.21
According to the ECtHR, “the Court deprived Beyeler, a foreigner, of the protection 
granted to foreign nationals by the norm on expropriation”, although in terms of the 
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20 Beyeler v Italy.
21 Id, para 106.
compensation received this approach did not result in any specific disadvantage.22 As noted by 
Kriebaum, the “decision whether the interference was an expropriation or not could have 
made a big difference in a case where a foreigner was targeted by the interference if the 
reference to general principles of international law had been applied correctly”.23 
Furthermore, Kriebaum highlighted the essential role played by the qualification of the 
measure as (non)expropriatory in cases involving foreign property.24 The author observed that 
“[a] non liquet, and as a consequence, a sidestep to the general catch all clause in such 
situations should therefore be avoided”.25
According to the case-law of the ECtHR, a
fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest of 
the community and the requirements of protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights. The search for this balance is inherent in the whole of 
the Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article 1.26
In this light, the ECtHR seems to reject the possibility of a total denial of 
compensation,27  for the interference with property rights to be lawful. “The terms of 
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22  U. Kriebaum, “Nationality and the Protection of Property”, pp. 12-13. See also, Sovtransavto Holding v 
Ukraine, Appl. N. 48553/99, Judgement, 25 July 2002, ECHR 2002-VII., para 93.
23 Id, p. 15.
24 Id, p. 23.
25 Id. The author continued: “It is unlikely that the Court would have reached the same result in the Gasus-case, 
had it considered the interference to be an expropriation”. Reference is made to ECommHR, Gasus 
Fördertechnik GmbH v The Netherlands, Article 31 Report, 21 October 1993 printed in ECHR, Gasus 
Fördertechnik GmbH v The Netherlands. In this case the Commission found that the expropriation was in the 
public interest, lawful and justified. Furthermore, at para 63 the Commission stated that “[i]t is true that in the 
present case the property right at issue was that of a foreign company. Nevertheless, the deprivation of property 
which occurred cannot be compared to those measures of confiscation, nationalisation or expropriation in regard 
to which international law provides special protection to foreign citizens and companies”. This approach has 
been criticized. 
26 Sporrong & Lönnroth v Sweden, p. 26; H. R. Fabri, “The Approach Taken by The European Court of Human 
Rights”, p. 163; C. Tomuschat, “The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection”, p. 652. 
Apparently the principle of proportionality is applied by the European Court of Human Rights both to determine 
whether there has been an expropriation and to estimate the amount of compensation due.
27 See, Jahn and Others v Germany, paras 116-117.
compensation”  are in fact “an important factor in assessing whether an interference imposed a 
disproportionate burden on the applicant”.28
In Papamichalopoulos v Greece,29 the ECtHR distinguished between the compensation 
to be paid against a lawful expropriation and the reparation to be offered in case of unlawful 
dispossession. The ECtHR referred to the Chorzów Factory case, and established that 
reparation should not be limited to the payment of the value of the expropriated properties on 
the day of their taking but should amount to the payment of the “current value of the land, 
increased by the appreciation brought about by  the existence of the buildings and the 
construction cost of the latter”.30 The ECtHR submitted that
[t]he unlawfulness of such a dispossession inevitably affects the criteria to 
be used for determining the reparation owed by the respondent State, since 
the pecuniary consequences of a lawful expropriation cannot be assimilated 
to those of an unlawful dispossession.31
Indeed, “[f]or purposes of compensation”, the ECtHR “distinguishes between inherent 
illegality of a taking, for example a taking that is not in the public interest”, and “illegality 
due to the non-payment of compensation”. The ECtHR considers that “[o]nly inherently 
illegal expropriations trigger automatic application of a tougher compensation standard”.32
315
28  U. Kriebaum, “Nationality and the Protection”, p. 7. In James and Others v UK, para. 54, the ECtHR 
established “that under the legal systems of the Contracting States, the taking of property in the public interest 
without payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in exceptional circumstances [....]. As far as 
Article 1 (P1-1) is concerned, the protection of the right of property it affords would be largely illusory and 
ineffective in the absence of any equivalent principle. Clearly, compensation terms are material to the assessment 
whether the contested legislation respects a fair balance between the various interests at stake and, notably, 
whether it does not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicants”; see also, H. R. Fabri, “The Approach 
Taken by The European Court of Human Rights”, p. 164.
29 Papamichalopoulos and Others v Greece.
30 Id, para 39; P. Bienvenu, M. J. Valasek, “Compensation for Unlawful Expropriation”, p. 249.
31 Id, para 36.
32 Former King of Greece v Greece, para 78; Yagtzilar and others v Greece, Judgment, 15 January 2004, para 25; 
Scordino v Italy (N. 1), Judgement, 29 March 2006, para 255. S. Ripinsky, K. Williams, Damages in 
International Investment Law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008, pp. 67; see also, M. 
Mohebi, The International Law Character of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Kluwer Law International, 
1999, p. 289.
In Former King of Greece v Greece, the ECtHR further argued that “[a]s the lack of any 
compensation, rather the inherent illegality of the taking, was the basis of the violation found, 
the compensation need not necessarily reflect the full value of the properties”.33
Thus, as noted by Ripinsky and Williams, “in the practice of the European Court, even 
though the non-payment of compensation is wrongful, it does not trigger the same 
consequences that follow from an ‘inherently illegal’ taking”.34  In cases of lawful 
expropriation, the Court seems to deem it sufficient an amount of compensation that is 
“reasonably related”35 to the fair market value of the property, or not “manifestly below”  this 
value, thus allowing to States more discretion, for instance to cope with reforms in social and/
or economic values.36
Furthermore, the ECtHR has relied on the national legal systems of the Contracting 
States to determine the appropriate standard of compensation.37 It has established that “under 
the legal systems of the Contracting States, the taking of property in the public interest 
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33 Former King of Greece v Greece, para 78.
34 S. Ripinsky, K. Williams, Damages, p. 67. The authors suggest also that “the requirement of good faith should 
be given an important role in deciding on the lawfulness of expropriation”. Furthermore, they argue that “cases 
of indirect expropriation would, almost by definition, fall within the scenario of unlawful expropriation, because 
the expropriating State does not usually acknowledge the very fact of expropriation, and consequently does not 
provide for payment of any compensation”.
35 See e.g.: James and Others v United Kingdom, para 54; Lithgow v. United Kingdom, para. 121; The Holy 
Monasteries v Greece, Judgment, 9 December 1994, Series A, n. 301-A, para 71; Pressos Compania Naviera SA 
and Others v Belgium, Judgment, 20 November 1995, Series A, n. 332, para 38; The Former King of Greece and 
Others v Greece, para 89; Lallement v France, para 18; Motais de Narbonne v France, Appl. n. 48161/99, 
Judgment, 2 July 2002, para 19; Pincová and Pinc v Czech Republic, Judgment, 5 November 2002, ECHR 2002-
VIII, para 53; Broniowski v Poland, para 176; Jahn and Others v Germany, para 94; Stra!n and Others v 
Rumania, Appl. no. 57001/00, Judgment, 21 July 2005, para 52; Draon v France, Appl. n. 1513/03, Judgment, 6 
October 2005, para 79, as quoted also in U. Kriebaum, “Nationality and the Protection of Property Under”, p. 8, 
footnote 25.
36 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 117. However, one has also to consider that “[r]egulatory takings may come 
about because of overzealous governments or even covert attempts to sabotage foreign investments, and these 
sorts of behaviors should be discouraged”. See, T. W. Merrill, “Incomplete Compensation for Takings”, in New 
York University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, 2002-2003, p. 137.
37 U. Kriebaum, “Nationality and the Protection of Property”, p. 8; see also, C. Tomuschat, “The European Court 
of Human Rights and Investment Protection”, p. 648. The author quotes Dangeville v France, Appl. N. 
36677/97, 16 April 2002, para 58; Former King of Greece v Greece, para 79; Malama v Greece, Appl. N. 
43622/98, 1 March 2001, para 43; Brownioski v Poland, para 147; Jahn and Others v Germany, para 93; Hutten-
Czapska v Poland, para 163; Ukraine-Tyumen v Ukraine, Appl. N. 22603/02, 22 November 2007, para 49, and 
he argues that “the ECtHR has consistently observed that any interference with property rights must have a 
foundation in domestic law”.
without payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in exceptional 
circumstances”.38 The ECtHR has further explained that 
as far as Article 1 (P1-1) is concerned, the protection of the right of property 
it affords would be largely illusory and ineffective in the absence of any 
equivalent principle. Clearly, compensation terms are material to the 
assessment whether the contested legislation respects a fair balance between 
the various interests at stake and, notably, whether it does not impose a 
disproportionate burden on the applicants.39
Accordingly, the standard of compensation follows the lawful or unlawful nature of the 
governmental measure concerned.
In Kozacioglu v Turkey,40 after having noted “that the Chamber’s conclusion that there 
had been a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 
of Protocol 1 was not disputed”, the Court analysed “whether the deprivation of possessions 
was justified”.41 The Court  verified “whether the measure has been lawfully carried out, in 
compliance with the requirements established under the law”. The test for lawfulness42 is the 
key step in the ECtHR’s reasoning, which follows the determination that the dispossession 
has taken place.
The Court stated that  the measure was carried out in compliance with the conditions 
provided for by the law, and that it pursued a legitimate public purpose. In this regard, the 
protection of cultural heritage is included among the “legitimate aim[s] capable of justifying 
the expropriation by the State of a building listed as ‘cultural property’ ”.43 Nonetheless, the 
Court pointed at the architectural and historical features, as well as the rarity, of the 
expropriated property  as the key elements to be considered when calculating the amount of 
compensation.44  More precisely, with regard to the “the requisite fair balance” the Court 
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38 James and Others v United Kingdom, para 50.
39 Id.
40 Case of Kozaciouglu v Turkey, paras 47 et seq.
41 Id, paras 51-55.
42 This is openly stated at para 65. The Court referred to the measure as lawful and non-arbitrary.
43 Case of Kozaciouglu v Turkey, para 53; see also, V. S. Vadi, “Cultural Heritage and International Investment 
Law: A Stormy Relationship”, in International Journal of Cultural Property, Vol. 15(1), 2008.
44 Id, para 56.
reiterated that an “interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions must 
achieve a ‘fair balance’ between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights”  and that this concern is 
reflected in the structure of Article 1 of Protocol 1.45
A proportionate relationship must exist “between the means employed and the aims 
sought to be realized by any measures applied by the State, including measures depriving a 
person of his possession”.46 Accordingly, “the taking of property without payment of an 
amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate 
interference”.47 However, legitimate objectives of public interests are regarded by the Court 
as entitling to “  less reimbursement of the full market value of the expropriated property”:48 
protection of historical and cultural heritage is one of them, according to the Court. The lack 
of full compensation, therefore, “does not make the taking of the applicant’s property eo ipso 
wrongful” 49 in this case. The Court further continued by assessing whether “in deciding the 
criteria and arrangements for compensation of the applicant in this case, the domestic 
authorities upset the requisite fair balance and whether the applicant had to bear a 
disproportionate and excessive burden”.50
The Court acknowledged the Government’s failure to take into consideration the rarity 
and the architectural and the historical features of the expropriated property. It noted that it is 
the value system devised under the Turkish law that sets the limits on such valuation, and it 
denounced the unfairness of the mechanism which had culminated in placing “the State at a 
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45 Case of Kozaciouglu v Turkey, para 63.
46 Id. The Court quotes: Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v.  Belgium, para 38; The former King of 
Greece and Others v. Greece, paras 89-90; Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, para 73; Beyeler v Italy, para 107.
47 Id, para 64.
48 Id. See also Scordino v Italy, Brownioski v Poland.
49 Id, para 65.
50 Id, para 65.
distinct advantage”.51 It is from this perspective, that the Court ascertained the violation of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1.52
III. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
The distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation enjoys a limited role before 
the Iran-US Claims tribunal. It has been argued, indeed, that the tribunal mainly interprets the 
consequences of this distinction in terms of remedies available to the claimant––i.e., 
restitution in addition to compensation. In fact, compensation alone upon nationalizations or 
expropriation does not require a proof of the (un)lawfulness of the measure.53
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51 Case of Kozaciouglu v Turkey, para 70.
52  Id, para 73. The Court mentions also that “the option of taking into account the specific features of the 
properties in question when ascertaining appropriate compensation is not categorically ruled out” in other States 
member of the Council of Europe, thereby pointing at general principles of law that inspires the community of 
the State.
53  V. Heiskanen, “The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 229; contra see above, Concurring Opinion of 
George H. Aldrich, ITT Industries, p. 355. However, see D. P. Stewart, “Compensable and Valuation Issues”, in 
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Its Contribution to the Law of the State Responsibility, R. B. Lillich, D. 
B. Magraw (eds), 1998, pp. 351-352: in terms of compensation, this means that the Tribunal “has clearly and 
consistently endorsed the principle that full compensation should be awarded whether or not the taking was 
lawful [..]”. Exceptional is the Ebrahimi award, according to the author, where it is argued that “the final amount 
of compensation must be adjusted as to be ‘appropriate to reflect the pertinent facts and circumstances of each 
case’, including the distinction between lawful and unlawful actions”. See also, Amoco International Finance, 
para 192.
In Phillips Petroleum54 the tribunal established
the lawful/unlawful taking distinction, which in customary international law 
flows largely from the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów55  is 
relevant only to two possible issues: whether restitution of the property can 
be awarded and whether compensation can be awarded for any increase in 
the value of the property between the date of the taking and the date of the 
judicial or arbitral decision awarding compensation. The Chorzów decision 
provides no basis for any assertion that a lawful taking requires less 
compensation than that which is equal to the value of the property on the 
date of taking. In the present case, neither restitution nor compensation for 
any value other than that on the date of taking is sought by the Claimant, so 
the tribunal need not determine whether such remedies would be available 
with respect to a taking to which the Treaty of Amity applies.56
Heiskanen noted that the tribunal “in limiting the relevance of the lawful/unlawful 
distinction to the availability of remedies”, confirmed “by implication”  its position that the 
determination of legality in a finding of a taking is not necessary.57 Moreover, as the claimant 
was not seeking restitution, the issue of legality became irrelevant.58
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54 Phillips Petroleum Company, pp. 79. It has to be noted that Phillips Petroleum, together with Mobil Oil Iran, 
Partial Award, p. 3, and Amoco International Finance, Partial Award, p. 189, are regarded as the three petroleum 
cases, concerning the de facto nationalization of the petroleum industry. In Phillips, the Tribunal received a 
claim for expropriation, and observed the contractual––and therefore, intangible––nature of the interests of 
which the claimants were deprived. The case involved the alleged taking of the claimant’s interest in a 1965 
Joint Structure Agreement (“JSA”) with NIOC for the exploration and exploitation of offshore petroleum 
reserves in the Persian Gulf. According to the JSA, NIOC and the Second Party companies agreed to constitute 
an equally owned non-profit joint stock company (IMINICO) to carry out the operations under the JSA. The 
Revolution affected the activity of IMINICO, which ceased its production in December 1978. The production 
was then resumed in March 1979, but the Second Party companies were not permitted to lift their share of 
IMINICO’s oil. Moreover, in May 1979, NIOC appointed seven new supervisors, and in August a new four-man 
subcommittee, to specifically “terminate the existing contracts with the Second Parties”.13 The subcommittee 
informed in September the Second Party companies that the JSA should be regarded as terminated, and in 
August 1980 the claimant was notified that the Special Commission had declared the JSA null and void under the 
Single Article Act. See, Phillips Petroleum Company,  p. 96 as quoted in C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 426; M. Pellonpää, “Compensable Claims before the Tribunal”, p. 192. 
With regard to the nature of the interests concerned, Pellonpää further observes that an additional limits is set by 
the Tribunal, according to which “the owner of property (or his home State)  may recover in international 
proceedings only on the basis of the loss of his own property”. Referring to the Petrolane case, indeed, the 
author observes that the Tribunal states that it was “aware of no precedent in international law permitting a bailee 
to recover the value of expropriated property. Compensation for such property is owed to the owner of such 
property of the State of which he is a national”.
55 Factory at Chórzow.
56 Phillips Petroleum Company, p. 122.
57 V. Heiskanen, “The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 225; M. Pellonpää, “Compensable Claims before 
the Tribunal”, p. 217: the author observes that “the Tribunal has discussed the question of lawfulness mainly in 
cases involving nationalization”; D. P. Stewart, “Compensable and Valuation Issues”, p. 351.
58 Id, p. 225.
In Emanuel Too,59 after endorsing the police power doctrine60 the tribunal dismissed the 
claim for expropriation establishing that the claimant had failed to provide sufficient evidence 
and finding the State not responsible for bona fide general taxation.61 More precisely, the 
tribunal clarified that the action of the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) resulted 
from “the Claimant’s failure to pay taxes withheld by him on his employees’ salaries”.62 As 
“nowhere”  did “the claimant suggest that this tax levy was imposed against him because he 
was an Iranian national”  nor had he “proved that the IRS deliberately intended to cause him to 
abandon the property to the State or to sell it at a distress price [...]”, the tribunal rejected the 
allegation.63
Heiskanen observed that this reasoning may be regarded as in contradiction with 
Phillips unless one accepts that the tribunal ‘presumed the unlawfulness of property 
deprivations during the Iran Revolution’.64  And indeed, in those cases “where the alleged 
deprivation did not occur, the tribunal did engage in a legality analysis”.65  As this 
presumption cannot be verified in practice, one may acknowledge in the approach of the 
tribunal a tendency to always consider irrelevant the assessment of legality of a governmental 
321
59 Emanuel Too, pp. 378 et seq., para 56.
60 The Tribunal established: “a state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantages 
resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is commonly accepted as within the police 
power of States, provided that it is not discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the 
property to State or to sell it at a distress price. [...]”. On the police power doctrine see Chapter VII.
61 Id: “This claim is dismissed because the Claimant has failed to show that the IRS’ action was anything other 
than a lawful levy for overdue taxes, for which there is no State responsibility”.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 V. Heiskanen, “The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 225. [Emphasis added]; see also American Bell 
International, p. 214. [Emphasis added]
65 Id, pp. 222-223; See for instance, Phelps Dodge, pp. 129 et seq.,  where the defensive arguments concerning 
the legality of the taking under Iranian Law and the regulatory reasons underlying its execution (i.e., economic 
and social objectives)  was rejected by the Tribunal. It established that the public reasons for the measure “cannot 
relieve the Respondent of the obligation to compensate Phelps Dodge for its loss” since the Government had 
apparently taken control of the enterprise and was running it for its own benefits, without any temporary 
constraint. By relying on the conduct of the Government and the permanent nature of the deprivation suffered by 
the claimant, the Tribunal established the compensable nature of the taking (irrespectively of its public 
foundation). See, G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?”, p. 590; Weston noted 
that “the burden of policy proof should be on those who maintained that the measures involved do not give rise 
to compensatory liability (i.e.: host state)”. See, B. H. Weston, “Constructive Takings under International Law”, 
p. 170.
measure for a finding of a taking. The tribunal seems to determine whether or not an indirect 
expropriation has occurred by relying solely on the effect analysis.66 
As noted, the ‘effects analysis’ has been applied by many other international tribunals,67 
giving rise to what has been described as the ‘orthodox approach’.68 A number of lessons have 
been learned from the analysis of the Iran-US Claims tribunal’s case-law69 and, among them, 
Heiskanen has outlined the most operationally useful ones. However, the author fails to pull 
his reasoning to its ultimate step.
Reviewing the case-law of the tribunal, Heiskanen reached the conclusion that a 
regulatory measure entailing a deprivation of property may amount to an indirect 
expropriation if it results in a direct economic benefit to the State (disguised direct 
expropriation), whereas a de facto taking attributable to the State may amount “to a direct 
expropriation if it results in appropriation”  (direct economic benefit to the State). 
Furthermore, “an administrative or another de facto governmental measure that deprives the 
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66 V. Heiskanen, “The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 226; Dolzer talks about the ‘sole effect doctrine’: 
R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?”, pp. 86-90. See also, R. Dolzer, “Indirect 
Expropriation of Alien Property”, p. 41; R. Dolzer, “New Foundations”, p. 553; R. Dolzer, F. Bloch, “Indirect 
Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments”, p. 155; see also above, Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, 
ITT Industries, p. 355, were the Iranian Revolution is explicitly not considered wrongful.
67  See, for instance, CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentine Republic, paras 252-265; Metalclad v United 
Mexican States, para 103; Compaña de Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A v Costa Rica, para 77; Biloune v Ghana, 
pp. 207-210. The influence of the jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal seems to have been reached also 
domestic cases. On the website of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal it is available a list of domestic cases 
in which some pronouncement of the Tribunal have been quoted. This is significant to corroborate the view that, 
despite its peculiar setting, the degree of influence exercised by the Iran-US Tribunal on subsequent 
pronouncements is indisputable. See, http://www.iusct.org/publications.pdf, (last visited: 1 July 2011). The list is 
apparently updated to 2/3/2010. Indeed, some scholars considers that the peculiar circumstances under which the 
Tribunal was established and discharged its duties preclude the Iran-US Claims Tribunal’s case-law from being 
of general application. See, above and also P. Malanczuk, “The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in The Hague 
- Some Reflections on a Unique Institution of International Dispute Settlement Moving Towards the End of Its 
Work”, in V. Götz, P. Selmer, R. Wolfrum (eds), Liber Amicorum Günther Jaenicke – Zum 85. Geburtstag, 
Springer, 1998, p. 226 et seq.; K. Byrne, “Regulatory Expropriation and State Intent”, pp. 346, 350-351, 369, 
383.
68  A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation”, pp. 9-11, 16. Noteworthy, Newcombe 
maintained that the “orthodox approach is not consistent with the early international judicial arbitral decisions 
relied upon to support the approach”; see also, Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann, Dissenting as to Award on the 
Claims and Concurring As to Dismissal of Counterclaims , to Sea-Land Service, p. 177.
69 See, for instance, the conclusions drawn by Judge Aldrich in G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable 
Taking of Property?”, pp. 609-610: liability does not require transfer of title, liability is not affected by intent, 
liability is not affected by fact that the state has acted for legitimate economic and social reasons and in 
accordance with laws, etc..
foreign investor of a property right but does not result in a direct economic benefit to the 
State, may amount to an indirect expropriation” if it fails any regulatory foundation.70
In light of this consideration and relying on its argument, one may draw the conclusion 
that indirect expropriation would qualify as an instance of unlawful expropriation––as it fails 
to have a regulatory foundation.71 According to this assumption indirect expropriation would 
amount to a de facto unlawful expropriation. The governmental measure would be significant 
(i.e., compensable) and justiciable to the extent that it is unlawful (and de facto carried out). 
Differently, an action regarded as a de facto non-compensable taking would be a legitimate 
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70 V. Heiskanen, “The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 230. [Emphasis added]
71 Contra to Heiskanen, then, “a de facto taking such as a physical seizure or confiscation of property that is 
attributable to the State” and that results in appropriation, would not be considered as a direct form of 
expropriation, lacking its necessary formal features.
regulation.72 In light of this consideration, the regulatory foundation of the governmental 
measure––i.e., the public purpose requirement––would exert a decisive influence on the 
qualification of the measure by arbitral tribunals.73 Respondent States are thereby called upon 
324
72 Proposing a “balanced approach” to distinguish indirect expropriation from regulatory actions of the State, 
Olynyk recognizes the limits of his analysis and the risk to confuse the ‘legality test’ with the ‘purpose test’. He 
argues that “[t]he distinction between these two concepts [regulatory measure and indirect expropriation] is that 
even if a regulatory measure does amount to indirect expropriation, the host State may not be required to 
compensate an investor if this expropriation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of a lawful 
expropriation”. Thus, this seems to reinforce the assumption that for an indirect expropriation to be a relevant 
case of compensable taking is has to amount to a de facto unlawful taking. This conceptualization would also 
avoid confusion and reconcile the ‘legality test’ and the ‘purpose test’. In addition, the approach chosen by 
Olynyk has to be considered in light of the argument advanced by Newcombe, and according to which “the role 
of international expropriation law is to provide a minimum standard of protection to foreign investors against 
expropriatory measures”  and that “it need not, and should not, attempt to find the optimal balance between state 
interests and property protection”. A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation”, p. 6; see also, 
C. Lévesque, “Les fondements de la distinction”, pp. 84-85: “La ligne de démarcation entre l’expropriation et la 
réglementation est fine et difficile à tracer. Il faut, dans chaque cas, appliquer avec soin les éléments de réponse 
appropriés pour trancher la question. Cette méthode au cas par cas, qui nie l’existence de règles absolues, 
n’empêche toutefois pas la recherche d’outils conceptuels susceptibles de fournir des paramètres nécessaires à la 
prise de décisions en cette matière”. S. Olynyk, “A Balanced Approach to Distinguishing Between Legitimate 
Regulation and Indirect Expropriation in Investor-State Arbitration”, in international Trade and Business Law 
Review, Vol. 15, 2012, p. 293; see also, W. M. Reisman, R. D. Sloane, “Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation”, 
p. 137, where the authors recognize that “creeping expropriations [..] by definition, they seldom, if ever, will be 
lawful”. Furthermore, at footnote 104, reference is made to Judge Brower concurring opinion in Sedco, arguing 
that “While a government conceivably might acknowledge the expropriatory effect of its regulatory acts and 
omissions at some point and pay an investor compensation as required by international law, in practice, 
governments that expropriate an investment serially, by regulation or other cumulative acts that depreciate its 
value, rarely, if ever, acknowledge that such acts comprise an expropriation. Most frequently, they will claim that 
the acts represent a valid exercise of their police powers, a response to a contractual breach by the investor or, 
perhaps, that the investor ‘assumed the risk’ of the effect such acts would have on its investment and cannot now 
expect the government to pay compensation for losses incurred in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, it 
is difficult to see how an expropriation accomplished furtively, by a series of ostensibly valid measures that 
collectively deprive an investor of its property rights, could be deemed to comport with the due process 
requirements for a lawful expropriation under most BITs. Hence, creeping expropriations, in practice if not by 
definition, almost without exception prove to be unlawful”. See also, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, 5th Ed., 1998, pp. 514, 520. Brownlie states that “Expropriation of particular items of 
property is unlawful unless there is provision for the payment of effective compensation”; During the writing of 
this research, the following paper was published H. Dalhuisen, A. T. Guzman, “Expropriatory and Non-
Expropriatory Takings Under International Investment Law”, forthcoming. The authors clearly argue in favour of 
a new conceptualization and qualification of the notion of taking in international investment law. A distinction is 
drawn between expropriatory v non-expropriatory takings and it is suggested that the question concerning the 
legality of the action “must be answered separately” from those concerning the expropriatory or non-
expropriatory nature of the measure. It is explained that “[w]hen a taking is expropriatory, we must [still] inquire 
into its lawfulness under international law”, as to further signify the two-step normative approach to the issue of 
takings in international investment law.
73 In this regard see Judge Aldrich Concurring Opinion on ITT Industries, p. 355.
to provide sufficient evidence in order to support the action’s public rationale and be 
exempted from the payment of redress.74
This conceptualization further highlights the importance of assessing the (un)lawfulness 
of the expropriatory measure as an obligatory step in the arbitrators’ legal analysis and 
reasoning. Expropriation would still have to be distinguished from the legitimate and lawful 
exercise of governmental regulatory powers; however, the issue of indirect expropriation will 
be subsumed within the category of the unlawful (execution or foundation of a de facto) 
expropriatory operation.75 If drawing the line between the two is likely to remain a case-
specific inquiry, still the appropriate characterization of the indirect taking phenomenon as a 
mode to unlawfully perform de facto expropriatory measures should lead to the application of 
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74 See also, Vito G.  Gallo v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 55798, Award (Redacted), 15 September 
2011, para 277: “[a] claimant bears the burden of proving that he has standing and the tribunal has jurisdiction to 
hear the claims submitted. [...] But the principle actori incumbit probatio is a coin with two sides: the Claimant 
has to prove its case, and without evidence it will fail; but if the Respondent raises defences, of fraud or 
otherwise, the burden shifts, and the defences can only succeed if supported by evidence marshalled by the 
Respondent”. Consider also, Jan Oostergetel v The Slovak Republic, para 320, where the Tribunal rejected the 
claim for expropriation on the grounds that “the Claimants have not discharged the burden of allegation of a 
treaty breach involving expropriation”. It held that “the random ‘sprinkling’ throughout the pleadings of a strong 
term with a well defined legal meaning such as ‘expropriation’ or ‘creeping expropriation’ does not transform 
that term by itself into an allegation of facts founding a treaty violations”. The mere characterization of the facts 
as ‘undue delay’, ‘unfair trial’, discriminatory treatment’, ‘denial of justice’ does not imply technically an 
expropriation, unless those acts are technically rationalized. To support its conclusion, the Tribunal quoted the 
decision in Link-Trading Joint Stock Company v Moldova, para 91, where the Claimant’s failure to meet the 
burden of proof causes the dismissal of its claim for expropriation. The Tribunal held “[....]  To prove 
expropriation the Claimant must show that as a direct consequence of the measure complained of Claimant was 
deprived of its investment”.
75  Already Newcombe referred to the lack of “guidance on how to distinguish between expropriation and 
regulation”, including the “new types of expropriation claims being made in Ethyl and Methanex”. This may be 
read as implying a characterization of indirect expropriation as a species of the genre expropriation; yet, its 
further qualification as a type of unlawful expropriation may narrow down the number of legal concepts that 
overwhelm judges and arbitrators, and clarify they legal function. See, A. Newcombe, “The Boundaries of 
Regulatory Expropriation”, p. 3. See further Chapter VII and Conclusions with regard to other non-expropriatory 
interferences with property rights.
a more stable interpretative framework and intelligible method by adjudicators. Needless to 
say, the standard of compensation should be applied accordingly.76
Although not qualifying indirect expropriation as a de facto unlawful expropriation, the 
UNCTAD Study seems to agree with the opportunity of a legal method that “first characterize
[s] the measure” 77 and then includes as a fundamental step the analysis of “the matters of [the 
expropriation’s] lawfulness or unlawfulness and the question of compensation or 
reparation”.78
In some cases, however, the Iran-US Claims tribunal have linked the non-payment of an 
adequate compensation to the unlawfulness of the governmental measure.79  The case 
American Bell supports this contention. Not only the tribunal took for granted the 
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76 The UNCTAD Study observes that in the practice, IIAs require the payment of the fair market value of an 
investment even in cases of lawful expropriations. Therefore, the amount of compensation for lawful 
expropriations may be equal to reparation for unlawful expropriations. UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 116. One 
could contend, however, that the major problem lies in answering the question of the law governing the 
dispute––i.e., the Treaty as lex specialis, or customary international law. As the UNCTAD Study points out, IIAs 
tend not to include specific provisions concerning the reparation against unlawful expropriation and the standard 
of valuation to be applied, leaving this issue to customary international law and, thereby, to the discretion of 
arbitrators. To the extent that indirect expropriation may be regarded as an unlawful expropriation, States may 
find it as an incentive to negotiate specific provisions in their BITs or IIAs. As the UNCTAD Study shows, many 
States has already included more detailed definition of indirect expropriation “to set out criteria for finding an 
indirect taking” (see: Annex 10-C to the 2006 Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
‘CAFTA-DR’; Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreement (2006); Japanese-Philippines Free Trade Agreement 
(2008). It seems reasonable to expect that they would also adopt provisions concerning reparation against 
unlawful expropriation, especially being the issue of the redress a crucial interests to both host States and foreign 
investors.
77 Id, p. 45.
78 Id, p. 108. Reinisch argued that “having determined that an expropriation took place, investment tribunals 
regularly scrutinize the lawfulness of an expropriation according to the applicable IIA standards or standards of 
general international law. In arbitral practice, both standards appear to converge largely with the traditional 
legality requirements standard. A close analysis of the relevant arbitration decisions also demonstrates that 
tribunals are in fact willing to engage in a genuine investigation of whether the legality requirements are 
fulfilled.[...] Investment tribunals refuse to take ‘public purpose’ invocations by States at face value”. This 
argument is partly criticized here since the attention of arbitral tribunals to the distinction between lawful and 
unlawful expropriations and the underlying regulatory purpose of any governmental measure seems to be 
inconsistent and erratic, especially regarding the decision of indirect expropriatory claims. For instance, in 
Patrick Mitchell v Congo, the Tribunal noted “a practice of the arbitrators––at present a majority of them––in 
international investment disputes” is to have “reference only to the effect of the measure for the investor, without 
taking into account the purpose sought by the expropriating authority”. See, A. Reinisch, “Legality of 
Expropriations”, p. 204; Patrick Mitchell v Congo (Annulment), para 53.
79 C. N. Brower, J. D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, p. 499. The authors observed that in a 
number of its awards, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal “recognize the payment of prompt and adequate 
compensation to be a consideration relevant to the lawfulness of a taking under customary international law”.
convergence between international and domestic law concerning the right to be compensated 
in case of expropriation; but, most importantly, it associated the compensation to the 
wrongfulness of the action, explicitly focusing on the respondent’s failure to provide 
justification for the seizure.80 The tribunal especially relied on the purpose and effects of the 
measure arguing that they were aimed “totally to deprive one of funds without one’s 
voluntarily given consent”  and therefore it concluded that “the finding of compensable taking 
or appropriation under any applicable law––international or domestic––is inevitable, unless 
there is clear justification for the seizure”.81
Therefore, the case where an expropriatory measure fails to meet (at least) one 
substantial customary requirement for legality, such as the public purpose, should be 
distinguished from a situation where only the payment of the compensation is lacking, in 
order to qualify the expropriation as unlawful. The relevant (il)legality of the expropriation 
ought to have an inherent rather than a remedial character,82 so that compensation must follow 
a qualification of the measure as expropriatory. To the extent that the measure qualifies also as 
unlawfully expropriatory, compensation/reparation would sanction the responsible State, 
rather then being a “consequence of the legal exercise of a recognized sovereign right”.83
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80 American Bell International, pp. 214-215.
81 Id, p. 214.
82 See for instance, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th Ed, OUP, 2008, p. 538.
83 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 46. Contra: Antoine Goetz v Burundi, para 244: “Aux termes du paragraphe 
premier de l’article 4 du TPI, une telle mesure est internationalement licite dès lors que certaines conditions 
fixées au texte sont réunies. Le Tribunal observe que ces conditions sont cumulatives. En d’autres termes, si 
l’une quelconque d’entre elles n’est pas remplie, la mesure prise est contraire à l’article 4. En l’espèce, il n’est 
pas contesté qu’aucune indemnité n’a été versée aux Demandeurs à la suite de la suspension du certificat 
d’entreprise franche et de la fermeture de la banque. La condition fixée à l’article 4(1)(c) n’est donc pas remplie 
et les décisions prises sont internationalement illicites”.
The decision of the Iran-US tribunal in Amoco84  is regarded as the locus classicus 
founding the argument that the standard of compensation against unlawful expropriations 
includes lucrum cessans, and therefore higher monetary damages to the prejudiced party.85
The tribunal established that the “lawfulness of the expropriation must be decided by 
reference to international law”.86 The Treaty of Amity was regarded as effective between the 
parties and its provision recognizing the right to nationalize was not overlooked by the 
tribunal; however, the tribunal clarified that the right to nationalize established in the Treaty 
does not imply that all nationalizations are lawful.87  The tribunal discussed the interplay 
between the Treaty and customary international law in the field of expropriation and found a 
“leading expression of these rules”  in the Case Concerning Certain German Interests in 
Polish Upper Silesia,88 where “expropriation for reasons of public utility, judicial liquidation 
and similar measures”  is described as the exception to the principle of respect for vested 
rights.89 The tribunal recognized that “the right of States to nationalize foreign property for a 
public purpose” 90 is now unanimously accepted and clarified that “an expropriation which is 
justified by a public purpose may be lawful, [and this is] precisely the rule of customary 
international law”. Furthermore, the tribunal identified a condition for the lawfulness of 
expropriation under customary international law in “the prompt payment of just 
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84 Amoco International Finance.
85  Id, para 228: “[...] tho this element of damnum emergens, a complementary one is added where the 
expropriation is unlawful: the value of the revenues that the owner would have earned if the expropriation had 
not occurred, i.e., lucrum cessans”. S. Ripinsky, K. Williams, Damages,  p. 87. The Tribunal in Amoco 
considered that lost profits must be compensated only in case of unlawful expropriation since in cases of lawful 
expropriation this would amount to granting of restitution (a remedy that is available only against unlawful 
expropriation). See contra, A. Sheppard, “The Distinction between Lawful and Unlawful Expropriation”, pp. 
181-182.
86 Amoco International Finance, p. 214.
87 Id, p. 220.
88 Case Concerning Certain German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia, p. 5 et seq.
89 Id, para 22.
90 Amoco International Finance, p. 222.
compensation”, and it submitted that this rule is confirmed in the GA Resolutions on the 
PSNR.91
The tribunal considered also the definition of public purpose and pointed out that no 
consensus on the definition exists. Rather, the term is described as broadly interpreted, leaving 
to the States “extensive discretion”.92 Nevertheless, the tribunal relied on the evaluation of the 
practice and established that the decision to nationalize foreign properties “to obtain a greater 
share [..] of the revenues drawn from the exploitation of a national natural resource”  in an 
effort to promote the development of the country, should not be regarded as either unlawful or 
illegitimate.93 Accordingly, the tribunal found that the claimant’s interests in the Khemco 
Agreement had been lawfully expropriated.94
The tribunal’s broad interpretation of a public concern (i.e., the development of a 
country) is the main criterion applied to establish the lawfulness of the governmental measure. 
Its scope, however, is left to the discretion of the tribunal, which seems to endorse a domestic-
oriented definition of (un)lawfulness, far from the customary requirements for the legality of 
an expropriation.
The problem of the standard of valuation in light of the distinction between lawful and 
unlawful expropriation is also considered by Judge Aldrich in his Concurring opinion to the 
case ITT Industries v Iran.95 The Opinion pointed out that holding a State responsible for an 
329
91 See, Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources; Amoco 
International Finance, p. 223.
92 Id, p. 233.
93 Id. The requirement of promoting the development of the country is nowadays a criterion to assess the notion 
of investment, not to evaluate the nature of the governmental expropriatory action.
94  To the contrary, in his concurring opinion Judge Brower observed that the Tribunal’s finding about the 
effective date of expropriation, established in the last act in the expropriation process, has allowed it to avoid 
“the necessity of holding the Respondents’ expropriation unlawful”. Furthermore, according to Brower, the 
misguided evaluation of the stabilization clause contributed to the result of qualifying the expropriation as 
lawful. Judge Brower underlined that in Sedco it was “the date of the first definitive interference with rights that 
was considered as the date of the taking”. See, Concurring Opinion of Judge Brower in Amoco International 
Finance, pp. 290-291, 294.
95 Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, ITT Industries, p. 353.
international wrong is different from requesting it to compensate a lawful taking of foreign 
property.
In order to determine the applicable standard, Judge Aldrich recalled the decision of the 
ICJ on the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,96 and maintained that 
“whether the Treaty [of Amity] applied or not, a taking of property must be accompanied by 
the prompt payment of just compensation which is effective and adequate to compensate fully 
for the value of the property taken”.97
Judge Aldrich further specified that as “the risk of a revolution is normally assumed by 
investors in Iran, as in any country”  [...] “any reduction in value of investment as a result of 
revolution cannot be ignored by the tribunal”. However, Judge Aldrich underlined also that 
“the Islamic Revolution in Iran was not a ‘wrong’ for which the investors are entitled to 
compensation under international law”.98 In light of this consideration, the scope and content 
of ‘necessity’ as a legitimate State justification and exemption against claims for 
compensation is interpreted as including “the risk of a revolution”.
IV. Other Tribunals
As Heiskanen has observed, in the doctrine of expropriation “the difficulty is not in the 
identification or definition of the relevant standards [....] the difficulty lies in their 
application”.99 The conceptual pattern proposed above requires a consistent endorsement 
within the international investment system. Indeed the inconsistent outcomes of several recent 
arbitral awards concerning indirect expropriation confirm that a clear conceptualization of the 
variables at stake and an intelligible legal methodology are needed. Recent awards seem 
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96 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran), 
Judgment 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports, p. 3 et seq.
97 Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, ITT Industries, pp. 353-354; Judge Aldrich relied on the definition 
endorsed by the PCIJ in the Chorzow Factory Case, where the proper compensation for expropriation is defined 
as “the value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession plus interest to the day of payment”.
98 Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, ITT Industries, p. 355.
99 V. Heiskanen, “The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 231.
indeed to call for an orderly legal method.100 Arbitral tribunals are increasingly perceiving the 
need for “steps to assess” 101 indirect expropriatory claims, which include also a specific 
scrutiny of the lawfulness of the governmental measure as a distinct (and subsequent) process 
to the finding of the expropriation in itself.
A deviation from this approach is shown in the decisions in Methanex102  and Saluka.103 
The two awards applied the legality test to determine whether an expropriation had occurred 
and this method led to the dismissal of the investors’ expropriatory claim.104 The Methanex 
tribunal acknowledged as a matter of general international law that non-discriminatory 
regulations pursuing a public purpose and in accordance with due process are not deemed 
expropriatory and compensable, although they may affect a foreign investor (or investment). 
An exception to this principle is the existence of specific commitments given by the host State 
to the “then putative foreign investor contemplating investment”  that “the government would 
refrain from such regulation”.105 Accordingly, the Californian measure was considered as a 
lawful regulation106 and the tribunal dismissed the claim for expropriation on substantial 
grounds.
Similarly, in Saluka, the tribunal endorsed the police power doctrine107  as part of 
customary international law and, with reference to Methanex, it dismissed the investor’s claim 
by establishing that that “[i]t is a principle of customary international law that, where 
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100 See Chapter VII. C. McLachlan, “Investment Treaties and General International Law”, p. 136. See also the 
section on Public Purpose. [Emphasis added]
101 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 107
102 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America.
103 Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award.
104 C. Knahr, “Indirect Expropriation in Recent Investment Arbitration”, p. 12.
105 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Part IV D, para 7.
106 Id, Part IV D, para 15. “[...] the Californian ban was made for a public purpose, was non-discriminatory, and 
was accomplished by due process. Hence, Methanex’s central claim under Article 1110(1) of expropriation under 
one of the three forms of action in that provision fails. From the standpoint of international law, it was a lawful 
regulation and not an expropriation.”
107 “[i]t is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay compensation to a foreign investor 
when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt in a non- discriminatory manner bona fide 
regulations that are aimed at the general welfare”. Saluka Investments BV  v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 
para 255.
economic injury results from a bona fide regulation within the police powers of a State, 
compensation is not required”.108
To the contrary, the “two step”  approach109  requiring firstly the finding of the 
expropriation and then the analysis of its legality, is endorsed and called for in more recent 
decisions. In Parkerings v. Lithuania110, the tribunal established that “the expropriation is 
legitimate if done for public interest and under domestic legal procedures; if not 
discriminatory; and if done against compensation”.111 Accordingly, the tribunal declared that 
it “will first determine if an indirect expropriation occurred”  and “[i]f the answer is positive, it 
will analyse if the expropriation is legitimate.” 112
Similarly, in Vivendi v Argentina113 the tribunal maintained that under the applicable 
Treaty it is required “first to consider whether the challenged measures are expropriatory, and 
only then to ask whether they can comply with certain conditions, i.e., public purpose, non-
discriminatory, specific commitments, et cetera.”114
In Nations Energy Inc v Panama,115 the arbitral tribunal clearly envisaged the risk to 
confuse the requirements for establishing the lawfulness of the expropriation with those 
concerning the finding of an expropriation. Confronted with the question whether the 
prohibition to transfer tax credits to a third party by means of the issuance of bonds or through 
the sale of a company’s shares could amount to an indirect expropriation of the investment, 
the tribunal explained that the definition of expropriation ought not to be confused with the 
requirements for its lawfulness, since “[e]sos requisitos sólo entran en juego si se ha 
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108 Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, para 262.
109 C. Knahr, “Indirect Expropriation in Recent Investment Arbitration”, p. 14.
110 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania.
111 Id, paras 441-442, 456.
112 Id.
113 Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi v Argentine Republic (Vivendi II).
114 Id, para 7.5.21. [Emphasis added].
115 Nations Energy Inc v Panama.
concluido que hubo una expropiación o una medida equivalente a una expropiación, pero la 
ausencia de uno o mas de ellos no indica de por sí una expropiación”.116
Having recognized the governing law of the dispute in the BIT, the tribunal applied a 
systematic interpretation, considering both the aim and the object of the BIT.117 The lack of a 
public reason, or the discriminatory nature of the measure do not suffice in order for an action 
to amount to expropriation.118 The tribunal noted that the BIT distinguished between the duty 
to accord a fair and equitable treatment (Article II.2) from the protection against expropriation 
(Article IV.1), so that in this case, a definition of expropriation should apply that conforms to 
the distinction.119
In RosInvest v Russia,120 the Claimant characterized the host State’s alleged exercise of 
police powers as “an unconvincing pretext for an unlawful expropriation”.121 To establish 
“whether alleged expropriatory acts were confiscatory”,122  and thus unlawful, the tribunal 
considered both the effects and the purpose of the governmental measure, in an apparently 
balanced approach.
As to the effects, the tribunal concluded that “it is undisputed that Respondent’s 
measures resulted in the deprivation of Yukos’s assets”. The tribunal also recognized that “it is 
also undisputed [....] that States have a wide latitude in imposing and enforcing taxation laws 
even if resulting in substantial deprivation”.123  The tribunal clarified that, in order to be 
justified, the measures shall fall within the host State’s latitude of discretion, and it concluded 
that this is not the case for Russia.124 As to the purpose, it further considered that “the totality 
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116 Nations Energy Inc v Panama, para 251. See also, Occidental v Ecuador, para 681: “those requirements only 
come into play when it has been established that an expropriation or a measure equivalent to it has been effected, 
although the lack of one or more of them does not per se qualify the action as expropriatory”. [Author’s 
translation].
117 Id, para 251. See also, Occidental v Ecuador, para 679.
118 Id. See also, Occidental v Ecuador, para 681.
119 Id. See also, Occidental v Ecuador, paras 682-683.
120 RosInvest UK Ltd v The Russian Federation.
121 Id, para 2 (Claimant Reply of 21 September 2009, C-II, paras 1-11).
122 Id, para 569.
123 Id, para 574.
124 Id.
of Respondent’ measures were structured in such a way to remove Yukos’ assets from the 
control of the company and the individuals associated with Yukos”; and that these [measures] 
“must be seen as elements in the cumulative treatment of Yukos for what seems to have been 
the intended purpose”.125
Specifically, the tribunal explained that “if it is an expropriation, it is lawful if the 
requirements set forth in Article 5 IPPA are complied with”. Thus, to answer this question, the 
method applied by the tribunal involved a balancing of the cumulative effects and the purpose 
of the governmental measure.126 By relying on this ‘general evaluation’ of the measure, the 
tribunal failed to analyze each and every requirement of a lawful expropriation to assess 
whether the host States breached the IPPA127 provision on Expropriation.128
The conditions for a lawful expropriation, conversely, are specifically discussed in 
SAUR v Argentina.129  The tribunal focused on the role played by the payment of the 
compensation and the requirement that the governmental conduct is not contrary to a specific 
commitment. It is held:
Pero aun si se estimara que la actuación de la Provincia se puede reconducir 
a un legítimo uso de sus poderes de policía (quod non) no por ello quedaría 
la Demandada exonerada de su obligación de compensar a Sauri por la 
expropiación sufrida. [...] el art. 5.2. del APRI prohíbe a los Poderes 
públicos, como regla general, que adopten medidas expropiatorias, 
nacionalizadoras o equivalentes, pero a continuación crea una excepción; 
considera como legítimas aquellas expropiaciones que cumplan 
cumulativamente cuatro requisitos: -Que tengan por causa la utilidad 
pública, -Que no sean discriminatorias, -Que no sean contrarias a un 
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125 RosInvest UK Ltd v The Russian Federation, para 621.
126 Id, para 624: “the Tribunal should evaluate the net effect of the measure”, and especially whether “it is the 
same as an outright expropriation”.
127  Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Ussr for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed in London on April 6, 1989.
128 RosInvest UK Ltd v The Russian Federation, para 612.
129 SAUR International SA v República Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, paras 406-413.
“compromiso particular”; -Y que den lugar al pago de una “compensación 
pronta y adecuada.130
According to the tribunal the four requirements have to be cumulatively respected. As 
the State had failed to comply with the third and fourth one, including also the lack of a 
‘prompt and adequate compensation’, the expropriatory action should be regarded as 
unlawful. Thus the tribunal established:
es indiscutido que un Estado soberano, por causa de utilidad pública y 
actuando en defensa de lo que estima es el interés general, puede decidir en 
cualquier momento la nacionalización de un servicio público esencial como 
es el suministro de agua potable y de saneamiento. Pero una vez ejecutada la 
expropiación de la inversión perteneciente a un inversor extranjero 
protegido por el APRI, de lo que el Estado no puede escapar es de su 
obligación internacional, plasmada en el propio APRI, de indemnizarle por 
el valor real de los activos de los que ha sido privado – muy especialmente 
cuando la expropiación ha venido precedida por un claro incumplimiento de 
los compromisos asumidos por la Provincia frente al inversor.131
The tribunal concluded that the governmental measures (i.e., the administrative 
intervention, the termination and transfer of a concession to a new operator) cannot be 
regarded as acts iure imperii but constitute a direct expropriation or nationalization.132
The possible overlapping of the requirements for a finding of an expropriation and those 
established to evaluate the lawfulness of the measure is acknowledged in Quasar de Valores v 
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130 SAUR International SA v República Argentina,  Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability,  para 406. [“But even if 
it were accepted that the action of the Province may be regarded as a legitimate use of police powers (quod non) 
would therefore not exempt the Respondent from its obligation to compensate for the expropriation suffered by 
Saur. [...] Art. 5.2 of the APRI prohibits the public authorities, as a rule, to take expropriatory measures, 
nationalizations or equivalent actions, but then it creates an exception; it regards as legitimate those 
expropriations that cumulatively meet four requirements: -have a public interest; -are non-discriminatory; -do no 
breach any “special commitment”; and, that entail the payment of a “prompt and adequate compensation”]. 
[Author’s translation].
131 Id, para 413. [“It is undisputed that a sovereign state, for a public purpose and acting in defense of what he 
believes is the public interest, may decide at any time to nationalize essential public services such as water 
supply and sanitation. But after executing the expropriation of investment owned by a foreign investor protected 
by APRI, what the state cannot escape is its international obligation, as epitomized in its own APRI, to 
compensate for the actual value of the private - especially, when the expropriation has been preceded by a clear 
breach of the commitments assumed by the Province to the investor”]. See also, LG&E Energy v Argentine 
Republic, Decision on Liability, para 186: “A State may, at its discretion, under Article IV of the Bilateral Treaty 
and in accordance with general principles of international law, make use of its sovereign power to expropriate 
private property with the purpose of satisfying a public interest. However, expropriation in any of its modalities 
requires due process and compensation under international law”: similarly, Waguih Elie George Siag v Arab 
Republic of Egypt, para 428.
132 SAUR International SA v República Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, para 392.
Russia.133  The tribunal explained that this “may appear to be a distinction without a 
difference”  as “the different analytical frameworks seem unlikely to yield appreciably 
different results”.134  However, the tribunal established that the conceptual approach is 
different in the two cases so that “a critical examination of whether the appearance of a non-
expropriatory measure in fact covers an expropriatory effect is not the same thing as deciding 
whether an expropriation is unlawful per se”.135
As mentioned, the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation entails 
consequences not only on a substantive level but also on a remedial one. The standard of 
compensation to be applied is the major remedial issue connected to the unlawfulness of the 
measure. A number of awards have accepted that different standards of compensation apply to 
lawful and unlawful expropriation.
In SD Myers136  the NAFTA tribunal firstly accepted that the measure of the 
compensation to be granted to the investor may be influenced by the lawful or unlawful 
character of the action.137 The need for a distinction between the standard applicable in cases 
of lawful and unlawful expropriation is further reinforced in ADC v Hungary.138 The tribunal 
acknowledged the lex specialis nature of BIT’s provisions, which prevail over customary 
rules. It noted, however, that no rule in the BIT regulated the “damages payable in the case of 
an unlawful expropriation”, as only the standard of compensation operating in cases of lawful 
expropriations was established. The tribunal clarified that such a provision “cannot be used to 
determine the issue of damages payable in the case of an unlawful expropriation since this 
would be to conflate compensation for a lawful expropriation with damages for an unlawful 
expropriation”. More precisely, “this would have been possible [only] if the BIT expressly 
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133 Quasar de Valores v The Russian Federation.
134 Id, para 45.
135 Id.
136 SD Myers v Government of Canada, Partial Award.
137  Id, para 308: “The standard of compensation that an arbitral tribunal should apply may in some cases be 
influenced by the distinction between compensating for a lawful, as opposed to an unlawful, act. Fixing the fair 
market value of an asset that is diminished in value may not fairly address the harm done to the investor”
138 ADC Affiliate v Republic of Hungary.
provided for such a position [...]”.139 As a consequence, the tribunal resorted to “the default 
standard contained in customary international law” as established in in the decision of the 
PCIJ in the Chorzów Factory case.140
The tribunal in Siemens v Argentina141  clarified the “key difference between 
compensation under the Draft Articles and the Factory at Chorzów case formula, and Article 
4(2) of the [Investment] Treaty”. It stated that under the former, compensation must take into 
account “all financially assessable damage”  or “wipe out all the consequences of the illegal 
act”, whereas under the Treaty compensation is the “equivalent to the value of the 
expropriated investment”.142 Accordingly, in compliance with the customary international law 
standard, Siemens is entitled to the value of its enterprise as of the date of expropriation [May 
18, 2001], and “to any greater value that enterprise has gained up to the date of this Award, 
plus any consequential damages”.143
The tribunal found that the standard of compensation for unlawful expropriation 
consists in the full reparation and the payment of consequential losses in Biwater v 
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139 ADC Affiliate v Republic of Hungary, para 481. The UNCTAD Study considers this case “exceptional because 
the value of the property rarely increases after the expropriation”. See, UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 118.
140  Id, paras 481-485: “Since the BIT does not contain any lex specialis rules that govern the issue of the 
standard for assessing damages in the case of an unlawful expropriation, the Tribunal is required to apply the 
default standard contained in customary international law in the present case. The customary international law 
standard for the assessment of damages resulting from an unlawful act is set out in the decision of the PCIJ in the 
Chorzów Factory case at page 47 of the Judgment which reads: “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all 
the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if 
that act had not been committed”. In the same case at page 21, the PCIJ also pointed out that “reparation 
therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention.” Moreover, the PCIJ considered 
that the principles to determine the amount of compensation for an act contrary to international law are: 
“Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in 
kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution 
in kind or payment in place of it.” (Page 47 of the Judgment)”. See also, See also, Saipem SpA v The People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh, para 201: “Article 5(1)(3) of the BIT which describes the just compensation due in case 
of an expropriation refers to “the real market value of the investment [...] according to internationally 
acknowledged evaluation standards”. This provision is not applicable to determine the amount of compensation 
in the present instance because it sets out the measure of compensation for lawful expropriation which this one is 
not. Hence, the Tribunal will resort to the relevant principles of customary international law and in particular to 
the principle set out by the Permanent Court of Justice in the Chorzów Factory case [...]”.
141 Siemens AG v Argentine Republic.
142  Id, para 352. The conclusion in favor of a “higher rate of recovery than that prescribed [...] for lawful 
expropriations” was confirmed in Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi v Argentine Republic 
(Vivendi II), paras 8.2.2-8.2.5.
143 Id.
Tanzania.144According to the tribunal “full reparation entitles the unlawfully expropriated 
investor to restitutionary damages which include, but are not limited to, the fair market value 
of the unlawfully expropriated investment as determined by the application of an appropriate 
valuation methodology”. In addition, the investor is entitled “to damages for the consequential 
losses suffered as a result of the unlawful expropriation. Such losses ordinarily include an 
entitlement to loss of profits suffered by the investor between the date of the expropriation 
and the award”.145
In the case Waguih Elie Georg Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Egypt146  the tribunal 
recognized that the rules set forth in Article 5 of the Italy-Egypt BIT on compensation were 
not applicable in case of illegal expropriation.147  Having established whether the 
governmental measure was adopted in compliance with the customary international law 
requirements (as reflected in the Article 5 of the Italy-Egypt BIT), the tribunal found that the 
Claimant’s investment had been directly and unlawfully expropriated. The tribunal examined 
all the legality conditions and especially focused on the “public purpose in the national 
interest of the State”.148  It concluded by rejecting (in the case at hand) the practical 
significance of the distinction between compensation for a lawful expropriation and 
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144  Biwater Gauff v United Republic of Tanzania, para 775. “The standard of compensation for unlawful 
expropriation (being the relevant claim here), includes full reparation for, and consequential losses suffered as a 
result of, the unlawful expropriation”.
145  Id,  para 775. A substantial factual basis to corroborate the higher recovery to the investor is required in 
Kardassopoulos v Georgia. The tribunal observed that “[as may be seen from the cases above in which a higher 
recovery has been permitted under the customary international law standard of compensation, there must be a 
factual basis on which to award such higher recovery. Any such recovery must, furthermore, measure the 
damage sustained and not impose punitive damages on the Respondent State”. Ioannis Kardassopoulos v 
Georgia, para 513. Similarly: Ron Fuchs v Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/15, Award, 3 March 2010, para 
513.
146 Waguih Elie Georg Siag v The Arab Republic of Egypt.
147 Id, para 428: “[...] the Tribunal is satisfied that the compensation provisions within Article 5 of the BIT are 
not applicable for present purposes except as to the guidance it may provide on the appropriate interest rate. 
Reading Article 5 of the BIT as a whole, it is plain that subclause (iii) is concerned with lawful expropriation, 
which is to say expropriation permitted in terms of subclause (ii). Pursuant to Article 5(ii), investments may not 
be nationalised or expropriated except on the specific terms stated. Those terms include that the expropriation 
must be “... for a public purpose in the national interest of [the] State, for adequate and fair compensation ... and 
in accordance with due process of law.” For the reasons given in paragraphs 427 to 443 above, the Tribunal is 
strongly of the view that the expropriation in this case did not satisfy those conditions, and that accordingly it 
was not a lawful expropriation to which Article 5 of the BIT applied”.
148 Id, paras 428, 432.
compensation for an unlawful expropriation. While “in the Vivendi case, the difference was 
relevant because it went to the question of whether the Claimants were entitled to recover for 
lost profits”, the tribunal noted the in the instant case, “the Claimants’ do not advance a loss of 
profits claim per se”.149
This approach seems shared by the reasoning of the tribunal in Reinhard Unglaube v 
Costa Rica and Marion Unglaube v Costa Rica.150 Whilst acknowledging that “international 
legal opinion and case law are ‘not perfectly clear’ ”  with respect to “the use of a broader 
customary law standard where an expropriation is found to be wrongful” 151, the tribunal 
decided to “concur with the Claimant’s position that the measure of compensation set out in 
Article 4(2) is binding only with respect to a lawful taking of property”.152  Indeed, the 
tribunal does not accept that “for purposes of determining the amount of compensation due, 
the provisions of Article 4(2) alone must govern”, when an illegal expropriation takes place. 
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149 Waguih Elie Georg Siag v The Arab Republic of Egypt, para 541. The tribunal continued: “The recourse to a 
discounted cash flow analysis for expected future revenue/profit of the project is aimed at ascertaining a present 
market value for the Property and Project in 1996, and the calculation produces a result not materially different 
from the alternative basis upon which compensation was calculated, namely an assessment of the market value 
of the land at the time of the expropriation”. See also, referring to Waguih v Egypt, Joseph Charles Lemire v 
Ukraine, ICSID Case N. ARB/06/18, Award, 28 March 2011, paras 332-333. “Claimants did not seek an award 
on punitive damages, but submitted that Egypt’s conduct entitled claimants to enhanced damages and so urged 
the Tribunal to impose a measure of damages which would afford full reparation by indulging all reasonable 
inference in favour of Claimants. In a dictum the tribunal made a clear distinction between two issues: one is the 
question whether punitive damages are available; another is whether recovery for an unlawful expropriation 
should proceed on a more generous basis than that for a lawful expropriation. On the first question, the award 
stated that punitive damages were, by their very nature, not compensatory and that the prevailing view of 
tribunals is that, in international law, they are generally not available except in extreme cases of egregious 
behaviour. On the second question, the tribunal was not prepared to draw any inferences other than those 
justified by evidence”. Therefore the Tribunal concluded: “[t]he conclusion which can be drawn from the above 
case law is that, as a general rule, moral damages are not available to a party injured by the wrongful acts of a 
State, but that moral damages can be awarded in exceptional cases, provided that - the State‟s actions imply 
physical threat, illegal detention or other analogous situations in which the ill-treatment contravenes the norms 
according to which civilized nations are expected to act; - the State‟s actions cause a deterioration of health, 
stress, anxiety, other mental suffering such as humiliation, shame and degradation, or loss of reputation, credit 
and social position; and, -both cause and effect are grave or substantial”.
150 Reinhard Unglaube v Costa Rica and Marion Unglaube v Costa Rica, ICSID Case n. ARB/08/1 and n. ARB/
09/20, Award, 16 May 2012.
151  Id, para 306. Reference is made to Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and others v Republic of Zimbabwe, 
ICSID Case N. ARB/05/6, Award, 22 April 2009, para 110.
152 Id, paras 305-306. However, the Tribunal rejected the Claimant’s argument that the BIT does not establish the 
principles to be applied in assessing damages for an illegal expropriation “where what makes the expropriation 
illegal is the failure in the duty to pay compensation”. 
However, as concluded in Waguih Elie Georg Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Egypt, the arbitral 
panel established that “this is not a matter of great consequence regarding the case before us”, 
as “generally, where an unlawful expropriation is found to have occurred, treaty-based 
compensation will often provide the same result as compensation based on customary 
international law”.153 Indeed, according to the tribunal under both approaches
where property has been wrongfully expropriated, the aggrieved party may 
recover (1) the higher value that an investment may have acquired up to the 
date of the award and (2) incidental expenses. Illegality of expropriation 
may also influence other discretionary choices made by arbitrators in the 
assessment of compensation.154
In addition the tribunal attempted a distinguishing between this statement and the results 
achieved in previous awards such as SD Myers,155  Metalclad156 and Petrobart,157 to provide a 
consistent approach. More specifically, it argued that such awards “refer extensively to the 
Chorzów Factory standard”  since they are confronted with “a context of profit-generating 
enterprises which had been expropriated by the respondent State”, whereas in the case at hand 
“the affected property is not ‘a going business concern’ but, instead, a plot of ocean-front 
beach property”.158
The failure in the IITs’ provisions to address the standard of compensation applicable in 
cases of unlawful expropriation is recognized also in Gemplus v Mexico.159  The tribunal 
established that only compensation against lawful expropriation was regulated under the BITs 
provisions, observing that compensation for unlawful expropriation is not specifically 
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153 Unglaube v Costa Rica, para 307.
154 Id.
155 SD Myers v Government of Canada, Partial Award, para 311.
156 Metalclad v United Mexican, para 122.
157 Petrobart Limited v The Kyrgyz Republic, pp. 77-78.
158 Unglaube v Costa Rica, para 308.
159 Gemplus v United Mexican States.
addressed. Furthermore, the tribunal found that “any separate measure of compensation in 
respect of breach of the BITs’ FET standards” is also stipulated in the BITs.160
The PCIJ in Factory at Chorzów seems to suggest that the mere failure to pay 
compensation is sufficient to render an expropriation unlawful. On the other hand, the tribunal 
in the case Siemens v Argentina mentioned above, required the failure to pay compensation to 
be unjustified, in order for the measure to be deemed unlawful.161  In light of this 
consideration, establishing under what circumstances a State may legitimately expropriate and 
avoid the payment of compensation without incurring into responsibility for a wrongful act 
cannot but be controversial.162
Bienvenu and Valasek have argued that 
one may nevertheless venture that there would be consensus on the 
following two propositions: - the outright refusal by a State to pay 
compensation without even attempting to justify its position would be 
considered in bad faith and render the expropriation unlawful; - the payment 
of compensation based on the State’s substantiated evaluation of the 
property, even if the amount of the payment is less than the investor’s claim, 
would render the expropriation lawful (as long as the other conditions for a 
lawful expropriation are satisfied).163
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160  Gemplus v United Mexican States, Part XII, para 3: “These measures of indemnification relate, under both 
BITs, to lawful expropriation and do not expressly address compensation for unlawful expropriation by the 
Respondent [....] Neither BIT provides expressly for any separate measure of compensation in respect of breach 
of the BITs’ FET standards, as decided by the Tribunal in Part VII above”.
161 Siemens AG v The Argentine Republic, paras 273, 352; see also, Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija SA and 
Vivendi v Argentine Republic (Vivendi II), paras 8.2.3–8.2.6.
162  See, National Grid v The Argentine Republic, paras 145, 147, 150, 155. the Tribunal considered the 
deprivation of the title to property an essential element of expropriation. However, in the absence of the seizure 
of the title to ownership and failing the effects of the Argentine measures to be deemed as tantamount to 
expropriation, the Tribunal dismissed the claim for expropriation, either direct or indirect. Furthermore, the 
Tribunal observes that “the issue is where to draw a line” to distinguish between measures that are taken “in the 
exercise of a Contracting Party regulatory power” and measures that are “equivalent to” a taking. The Tribunal 
seems to rely on previous arbitral decisions to adjudicate whether the conduct contested “crosses the line that 
separates valid regulatory activity from expropriation”; yet, it states that “the number of combinations of 
possible measures which may produce such effect is large and defies definition”. Therefore, support for the 
conclusion that the investment was not indirectly expropriated by the host State is found on “the findings on 
indirect expropriation of other tribunals which have so far decided claims arising out of the Argentine crisis”. 
Especially the Tribunal seems to rely on Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, Partial Award, paras 263-264. 
The Tribunal refers also to Czech Republic BV v.  Czech Republic, Partial Award, para 367; Ronald S. Lauder v. 
The Czech Republic, para 200; Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
para 368; Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v. Republic of Costa Rica, paras 78, 81, 83; Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed v United Mexican States, para 115; Pope & Talbot v Government of Canada, Interim 
Award, paras 100, 102.
163 P. Bienvenu, M. J. Valasek, “Compensation for Unlawful Expropriation”, p. 258.
One may agree with this conclusion that, to be in good faith, the refusal to pay 
compensation has to be followed by a regulatory justification from the State. However, as the 
practice shows: “a pursuit of public purpose is required but not sufficient for lawfulness”.164 
IITs do not distinguish between compensation against lawful and unlawful expropriation and 
arbitral tribunals acknowledge that “the same result as compensation based on customary 
international law”  is granted “where an unlawful expropriation is found to have occurred”.165 
This tendency in international investment law recalls the American compensation law, whose 
“most striking feature [...] is that just compensation means incomplete compensation”.166 As 
Merrill has explained, 
[c]ompensation is strictly limited to what in contract law would be called 
‘general damages’––the fair market value of the property taken. Other 
consequential damages incurred by the property owner are ignored. 
Similarly, any increment in value that reflects a gain to the taker, which 
might be recoverable between private parties in an action for restitution or 
unjust enrichment, is ignored.167
Such elements ought to be considered in future treaty-making. States might be 
encouraged to negotiate upon the inclusion in BITs of an appropriate rule concerning the 
treatment of unlawful expropriation in order to avoid unpredictable decisions by arbitrators. 
Indeed, claims for indirect expropriations or violations of the fair and equitable standard of 
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164  J. Coe Jr, N. Rubins, “Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context and Contributions”, in T. 
Weiler (ed), International Investment Law and Arbitration, Cameron May, 2005, p. 638.
165  Unglaube v Costa Rica, para 307. See also, A. Sheppard, “The Distinction between Lawful and Unlawful 
Expropriation”, p. 195. The author explains that “[g]iven the overwhelming practice of international tribunals 
constituted under the Treaty of Amity, BITs and NAFTA, it is submitted that the standard of compensation 
payable by ECT Contracting Parties that expropriate qualifying investments is no different, whether the 
expropriation is provisionally lawful or unlawful”.
166 T. W. Merrill, “Incomplete Compensation for Takings”, p. 111.
167 Id.
treatment are commonplace and, to a certain extent, also part of a “litigation strategy”.168 One 
the one hand, States may be willing to control the law applicable to the dispute and avoid 
decisions ex aequo by arbitral tribunals. On the other, investments might be attracted to a 
specific environment, to the extent that unlawful governmental conducts are followed by the 
awarding of damages to the aggrieved party.
V. Summary
The practice of arbitral tribunals shows that a limited role is assigned to the distinction 
between lawful and unlawful expropriation, although both substantive and remedial 
consequences169 could emanate from it. On the one hand, by applying the legality test to 
determine whether an expropriation has taken place, the tribunal may dismiss the claim for a 
compensable expropriation, thereby depriving the investor from legitimate protection.170 On 
the other, the failure to qualify a measure as an unlawful taking of property could in principle 
deprive the investor of the damages payable by the State as a consequence of its wrongful 
action.
The landmark decision establishing the distinction between lawful and unlawful 
expropriation and the principle of full reparation is the PCIJ Chorzów Factory case.171 The 
judgement concluded that  reparation should remedy to unlawful actions of the expropriating 
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168 UNCTAD, “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, p. 10. It has also to be considered that “[f]irst [...] the standards of 
compensation and valuation techniques used for expropriation are not, as such, legally barred in cases of non-
expropriatory breaches of international investment law. Secondly, the criteria to determine whether or not to 
borrow the standards and techniques used in case of expropriation are, as suggested by the Argentine awards, of 
a factual nature, namely the type of asset or of damage which is at stake and the intensity of the interference with 
the economic position of the investor. Thirdly, the valuation techniques that may be deployed to assess 
specifically what is required by a given standard of compensation are not as such imposed by international 
investment law. Therefore, a tribunal can decide, for instance, whether or not to use the DCF method to assess 
the fair market value of a given asset”. P. Y. Tschanz, J. E. Viñuales, “Compensation for Non-Expropriatory 
Breaches of International Investment Law - The Contribution of the Argentine Awards”, in Journal of 
International Arbitration, Vol. 26(5), 2009, p. 738.
169 Customary international law expressly establishes different remedies in case of unlawful actions of the State. 
See supra para I of the present chapter.
170  See, Methanex Corporation v. United States of America and Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic, 
Partial Award,
171 Factory at Chórzow.
State by eliminating all the consequences of the illegal act and, where possible, by re-
establishing the status quo ante. Accordingly, the responsibility of the State is increased when 
its action is unlawful.
The principle set out in the PCIJ Chorzów Factory case lies also at the basis of 
Papamichalopoulos and Others v Greece,172 where the ECtHR distinguished the pecuniary 
consequences emanating from a lawful and an unlawful dispossession.173  The ECtHR “for 
purposes of compensation”  distinguished between the inherent illegality that characterizes a 
taking that lacks a fundamental requirement such as the public interest, and the illegality due 
to the non-payment of compensation. According to the Court, only in the former case a 
stricter compensation standard does apply. The Court considered that a taking is not eo ipso 
wrongful as a result of the lack of compensation. A fair balance should instead be struck, 
assessing the general interest of the community against the requirements for the protection of 
individual’s right, in the effort to avoid disproportionate interferences and burdens on the 
owner.174
The Iran-US Claims tribunal mainly  interprets the distinction between lawful and 
unlawful expropriation in terms of additional remedies available to the claimant. The 
assessment of the legality of a governmental measure for a finding of a taking is considered 
irrelevant so that the tribunal determines whether or not an indirect expropriation has occurred 
by relying solely on the effect analysis.175 The prompt payment of a just compensation is 
deemed to constitute a condition for the lawfulness of expropriation (under customary 
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172 Papamichalopoulos and Others v Greece.
173 Id, para 36.
174 Case of Kozaciouglu v Turkey, para 63.
175 V. Heiskanen, “The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation”, p. 226; Dolzer talks about the ‘sole effect doctrine’: 
R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?”, pp. 86-90. See also, R. Dolzer, “Indirect 
Expropriation of Alien Property”, p. 41; R. Dolzer, “New Foundations”, p. 553; R. Dolzer, F. Bloch, “Indirect 
Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments”, p. 155; see also above, Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, 
ITT Industries,  p. 355, were the Iranian Revolution is explicitly not considered wrongful; See, however, 
American Bell International, pp. 214-215, where the unlawfulness of the governmental measure is linked to the 
non-payment of adequate compensation.
international law): in this regard, the practice of the Iran-US Claims tribunal seems to confirm 
the ECtHR’s distinction between inherent illegality  and illegality  due to the non payment of 
compensation. In the former case, the State would be held responsible for an international 
wrong which it has the obligation to redress; in the latter, the State would bear the 
consequence of the legal exercise of a recognized sovereign right.176
The minimal implication of the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation is 
confirmed also in current arbitral practice, especially  the post-ADC177  awards. The 
appropriateness of the distinction is recognized in principle; however, it is argued that as it 
would not make practical differences in terms of compensation accorded to the investor, it is 
not applied in the practice.178 The failure to endorse a methodologically intelligible approach 
in the analysis of indirect expropriatory claims is partly responsible for this tendency. Also the 
ambiguities in the choice of the law governing a case of unlawful expropriation significantly 
affect the outcome of each arbitral decision.
On the one hand, the need to adopt a stepped procedure that first qualifies the measure 
and then assesses its lawful or unlawful nature is stated also in the recent UNCTAD Study 
quoted above.179  Arbitrators shall engage in the investigation of whether the legality 
requirements are fulfilled throughout an autonomous stage of their legal reasoning. In fact, the 
erratic application of the test for the legality of the governmental measures, often confused 
with the test for the occurrence of the expropriation, affects the findings of investment 
tribunals. The (inherent)180  illegality of the governmental action is thereby overlooked, 
depriving the investor of either substantial or remedial protection.
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176 See, Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich, ITT Industries, p. 353.
177 ADC Affiliate.
178 B. Sabahi, Compensation and Restitution, pp. 101-102.
179 See para III of the present chapter. See generally, UNCTAD, “Expropriation”.
180  The term refers to the illegality resulting from the lack of a constitutive element of a lawful expropriation, 
interpreting compensation as a remedial consequence of the State’s legal exercise of a sovereign act.
On the other, the key issue to be solved181 in order to effectively employ the distinction 
between lawful and unlawful expropriation in the settlement of investment disputes lies in the 
discretion arbitral tribunals seems endowed with, regarding ‘choice of law’ matters. Their 
decisions concerning whether to apply customary international law, treaty-based law or resort 
to domestic notions/policies to draw the principles governing the unlawfulness of a measure 
are not always intelligible. This aspect leads also to consider to what extent it is appropriate 
the adoption of a deferential standard of review that accords a degree of deference to States 
when adopting public interest regulations.182
Both the ECtHR and the Iran-US Claims tribunal have apparently referred to a 
domestic-oriented definition of unlawfulness, calling into question the regulatory foundation 
of the governmental measure under scrutiny. Accordingly, once the arbitral tribunal has 
qualified the action as expropriatory, the Respondent State may be required to fully 
substantiate its regulatory defence. In light of this consideration, domestic legislations and 
policies may earn significance and serve as a prima facie proof of the good faith and goodwill 
of the State in implementing the measure.
In light of the aforementioned, the regulatory foundation of the measure seems decisive 
also to the qualification of a measure as indirect expropriatory––as opposed to regulatory. 
Through the analysis of the case law of the Iran-US Claims tribunal, the lack of a regulatory 
foundation for the governmental action has come to the fore among the indicators of the 
unlawfulness of de facto governmental measures resulting in the investor’s deprivation of 
property. Against this framework, a reconceptualization of indirect expropriation as an 
instance of unlawful expropriation has been attempted that consider significant (i. e., 
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181 An appropriate revision of BITs and IIAs is advocated.
182 R. Moloo, J. Jacinto, “Standards of Review and Reviewing Standards”; see also, W. W. Burke-White, A. Von 
Staden, “Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times”, pp. 307-410; S. W. Schill, “Deference in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration”, pp. 577-607.
compensable)183 and justiciable only those de facto deprivations of property rights that are 
unlawfully carried out by the State. Indirect expropriation would be compensable to the extent 
that the measure lacks a regulatory foundation. Other de facto interferences with ownership 
are deemed regulatory and thus non-compensable, to the extent that the public purpose 
defence is substantiated by the Respondent.184
The following Chapter is devoted to the analysis of the concept of public purpose and 
will shed further light on the implications of the notion on the finding of indirect 
expropriation.
347
183  The unlawful nature of the measure should entitle the investor to full reparation according to customary 
international law. It is for the States to decide whether to stipulate specific provisions in IITs concerning 
unlawful expropriation and the applicable remedies.
184 See further Chapter VII and Conclusions.
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Chapter VII
The Concept of Public Purpose
“It seems perfectly logical to require that nationalization be in the public interest. The question is, of course, 
whose public interest, as determined by whom”.1
The concept of public purpose is a constitutive element of a lawful expropriation, as 
noted in Chapter II. The concept is fluid and takes various forms in the practice so that its 
legal definition is problematic. Given its blurred nature, the harshest litigation develops over 
the scope and meaning of public purpose, as the public character of a measure foundations 
may be easily called into question by an investor.
The doctrine of police powers is a variation of the concept of public purpose which is 
applied to the exercise of legitimate regulatory powers by the State and whose origins are 
traceable both to the North-American scholarship and practice, and general international law.2 
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1 H. W. Baade, “ Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources”, p. 23.
2 J. E. Viñuales, “Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: An Ambiguous Relationship”, 
in Centre for International Environmental Studies, Research Paper n. 2, 2010, pp. 57-58. The author highlights 
the extent to which North-American sources have influenced the jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal which, in turn, constitutes the basis for the recent decisions on indirect expropriation and especially 
NAFTA decisions under Chapter 11. The author quotes: S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, 
Stevens, London, 1953, p. 51; American Law Institute (ALI), Restatement (Second) of the Law of Foreign 
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Relations of the United States, 1986, section 712, commentary, letter (g); L. B. Sohn, R. R. Baxter, ‘Draft 
Convention on the International Legal Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens’ in American Journal of 
International Law, Vol 55, 1961, p. 545 (Harvard Draft 1961) art 10(5); and, G. H. Aldrich, ‘What Constitutes a 
Compensable Taking of Property?”, p. 585, referring to the following cases: Emanuel Too, p. 378, Sedco, p. 248; 
see, also Sea-Land, p. 149; M. Kinnear, A. K. Bjorklund, J. F. G. Hannaford, Investment Disputes under NAFTA. 
An Annotated Guide to NAFTA Chapter 11, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2006, commentary ad Article 
1110, 49-55, referring to the following cases: Pope & Talbot v.  Canada, Interim Merits Award, para 99; S.D. 
Myers v Canada, Partial Award, paras 287-288; Feldman v. Mexico, paras 101-105, 110-114; Methanex v. United 
States, Part. IV, D, para 7; International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v.  Mexico, para 127; Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance Company v.  Mexico, para 176(j). As to ‘general international law’, the author refers to: G. C. Christie, 
‘What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law’, in British Yearbook of International Law, Vol 
38, 1962, pp. 307 et seq.; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 535-536; A Newcombe, ‘The 
Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation”, p. 1.
Under the doctrine of police powers,3  a taking may be justified to the extent that the 
governmental expropriatory measure is deemed regulatory and in pursuance of a legitimate 
public interest. The concept of public purpose has a wide scope and may cover the most 
disparate objectives and areas: from societal to environmental issues, the proof of the public 
rationale of a measure is always exposed to debate and subjected to interpretation. Moreover, 
as the needs of a society are changing, the course of a State’s ‘regulatory’ power is necessarily 
mutable and no decision on the justifiability of the measure is clear-cut. Land use regulation is 
but one of the modern concerns that may interfere with the enjoyment of property rights.4
In 2003, examining indirect expropriation and the legitimate regulatory measures, 
Weiner argued that “a key factor in assessing regulatory measures is the specific welfare 
purpose served by a challenged regulation”.5  “Seek[ing] to promote public welfare”,6  
however, is not considered a sufficient benchmark to evaluate a regulation. The author pointed 
out the need for “guidelines that elaborate which particular classes or categories of public 
welfare purposes are accepted [....] as purposes in furtherance of which States may regulate 
without having to compensate property owners for resulting losses”.7
Though offering in his essay a “cursory review of the complex body of law governing 
indirect expropriation”8––complemented by a exiguous reference to international leading 
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3 The doctrine of police power finds its positive, customary formula in section 712 of the Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), where public purpose is expressly established as a 
requirement for the lawfulness of governmental actions. The rule is confirmed by the words of the Harvard Draft 
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens. See, Draft Convention on 
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, Art. 10(3)(a), in L. B. Sohn, R. R. Baxter, 
“Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens”, American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 55, 1961, p. 553; Restatement of the Law (Third), Vol. 2, 1987, section 712.
4 A. S. Weiner, “Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy”, p. 168. See the recent case, Unglaube v 
Costa Rica, para 166, where the Tribunal noted that it “is not empowered, nor does it have any intention, to 
question or weaken the appropriate use of this authority [to expropriate land]  by the government––an authority 
which has long been established and recognized by international law”:
5 Id, p. 167.
6 Id.
7 Id, p. 167. Emphasis added.
8 Special reference is made to the NAFTA.
cases––, the author concluded by highlighting a significant gap in the study of indirect 
expropriation:
[f]urther scholarship in the field of indirect expropriations should examine state 
practice and judicial decisions (both international and national) to develop clearer 
guidelines on the question of which classes or categories of regulatory purposes 
are accepted by both developed and developing states as requiring property 
owners to bear the resulting economic costs, and which require the state to 
provide compensation.
This argument is especially relevant to this research, since it endorses the 
appropriateness of the inductive approach to detect legitimate public purposes. Moreover, it 
emphasized that any assessment of the public purpose pursued through an alleged regulatory 
measure depends on the degree of international acceptance9 of the measure itself. Account of 
this acceptance may only be gathered from the analysis of “state practice and judicial 
decisions (both international and national)”:10  both this section on public purpose and this 
whole research revolve around such a rationale.
The requirement of public purpose serves a twofold role as a constitutive element of 
expropriation and as a test for its legality. Especially in cases of indirect expropriation, a 
broader analysis of the concept of public purpose, also in combination with other factors,11  
may assist the adjudicators in qualifying the measure concerned as expropriatory, and thus 
compensable, or regulatory, and thus non-compensable.12
Adjudicating bodies traditionally grant a high degree of deference to States on this 
issue, as States are regarded as the best judges of their national needs.13  The regulatory 
conduct of States must carry presumption of validity14 and accordingly the lack of a public 
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9 Emphasis added.
10 A. S. Weiner, “Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy”, p. 175.
11 Such as the nature, severity and effects of the governmental measure.
12 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 32. A direct expropriation would require compensation to be lawful. In a case 
of indirect expropriation, the decision on compensability follows the qualification of the measure as 
expropriatory.
13 Id, p. 33.
14 Id,  p. 83. For instance, “compliance with domestic law may provide additional evidence of validity. As the law 
of expropriation has essentially grown out of, and mirrored, parallel domestic laws, “it appears plausible that 
measures that are, under the rules of the main domestic laws, normally considered regulatory without amounting 
to expropriation, will not require compensation under international law” 
purpose foundation is one of the indicators of the expropriatory nature of a purported 
regulatory measure.15  Conversely, subjective elements, such as a State’s motives or its 
intention to expropriate are seldom considered by arbitral tribunals.
The following paragraphs will examine what public purposes are accepted in the 
practice and what guidelines might be inferred from the judicial approach to the interpretation 
of public purpose in indirect expropriatory claims. Notably, it is still open to question whether 
the concept of public purpose shall be interpreted in compliance with international treaty law, 
customary international law or domestic law.16  In fact, some national public interests have 
also an international dimension. In this regard, adjudicators requested to establish the 
regulatory or expropriatory  character of a State measure may  be called upon to appraise 
internationally significant public concerns against the opportunity to protect foreign 
investments. In order to decide how (and whether) to prioritize the public value over the 
private one, they have to interpret the concept of public purpose, which is exposed to a 
domestic, customary or treaty-based interpretation.
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15 UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, pp. 97 et seq. According to the UNCTAD Study indicators of the expropriatory 
nature of a measure are also the lack of due process, proportionality, fair and equitable treatment, discrimination, 
abuse of rights and the direct benefit to the State.
16 Id, pp. 30-31. The UNCTAD Study refers to a number of IITs that clarifies how the concept of public purpose 
should be interpreted. In the Singapore-Peru FTA (2008), public purpose is interpreted with reference to “a 
concept in customary international law”; similarly in the Canada-Colombia FTA (2008). Reference, however, is 
also made to domestic law in the Belgium/Luxembourg/Colombia BIT (2009), See, in addition A. Kulick, 
Global Public Interest.  The author explains that “limiting the public interest to the domestic sphere is myopic as 
regards the progressing internationalization or globalization of regulatory issues. [....] investment disputes can be 
described as (Global) Public Law disputes that display features of Global Administrative as well as 
Constitutional character. Particularly if the domestic measure has an international pedigree, e.g. Is based on 
legislation that simply transforms obligations undertaken under public international law into domestic law, it is 
difficult to grasp why the public interest pursued should be considered to be merely domestic” (pp. 248-249). 
Furthermore, at p. 266, the author argues that “limiting public interest considerations to the domestic realm [....] 
blatantly misrepresents the Global Public Law features international investment law in general displays”.
I. The Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice 
The concept of public purpose was regarded as a requirement for expropriation in the 
case German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case.17  The Court considered the right of 
Poland to expropriate German property pursuant to Article 6 of the Geneva Convention 
Concerning Upper Silesia as a “derogation from the rules generally applied in regard to the 
treatment of foreigners and the principle of respect of vested rights”.18 Reinisch has observed 
that the PCIJ, by referring to ‘general international law’, established that “expropriations for 
reasons of public utility, judicial liquidation and similar measures”  were permitted under the 
Geneva Convention. Thus, the author argued that “one may conclude that ‘public utility’ was 
regarded by the PCIJ to constitute one of the legality requirements for an expropriation”.19
The ICJ has contributed to the potential development of a broad concept of public 
purpose. The Gab!íkovo-Nagymaros case20 gave the ICJ the opportunity to examine a claim 
based on the state of necessity.21 The Court, for the first time, addressed the application of the 
necessity defence to the protection of environmental interests, holding that:
the concerns expressed by Hungary for its natural environment in the region 
affected by the Gab!íkovo-Nagymaros Project related to an ‘essential interest’ of 
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17 Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia.
18 Id, p. 22; The PCIJ in the Serbian Loans case held also that “The economic dislocation caused by the war did 
not release the debtor State [from the payment of bonds], although they may present equities which doubteless 
will receive appropriate consideration in the negotiations and–if resorted to– the arbitral determination for which 
Article II of the Special Agreements provides”. On this basis, the Claimant in National Grid advanced the 
argument that “if government was not excused from economic dislocations caused by war, then, a fortiori, it 
should be clear that the economic and social upheaval experienced by the Argentine Republic in 2001 and 2002 
does not excuse the Respondent from complying with its international obligations”. National Grid v Argentine 
Republic,  para 222; Case concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans in France, PCIJ, Series C, N. 16 
(III).
19 A. Reinisch, “Legality of Expropriation”, p. 180.
20 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project.
21 I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment, p. 224.
that State, within the meaning given to that expression in Article 33 of the Draft of 
the International Law Commission.22
This holding by the Court paved the way to recent debates on the compensability of 
expropriations resulting from the enactment of environmental legislations. The Court, 
however, rejected Hungary’s claim by strictly interpreting the ‘only way’ requirement 
enshrined in Article 25 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts.23 The criterion according to which the plea for necessity is excluded if other 
lawful means are available to safeguard the governmental interest was relied upon specifically 
in CMS v Argentina.24
II. The European Court of Human Rights
Traditionally, States are entitled to decide for themselves what they consider useful to 
the public good. The ECtHR has endowed States with a wide margin of appreciation,25  in 
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22  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, para 53. J. E. Viñuales, “Foreign Investment and the Environment in 
International Law”, p. 64. On question concerning the interplay between national interest and the interest of the 
international community see, K. Dicke, “National Interest v the Interest of the International Community - A 
Critical Review of Recent UN Security Practice”, in J. Delbrück (ed) New Trends in International Law Making - 
International ‘Legislation’ in the Public Interest, Dunker & Humblot, 2006, pp. 146 et seq.;  see also, J. I. 
Chatney, “The International Law Making - Article 38 of the ICJ Statute Reconsidered”, in J. Delbrück (ed) New 
Trends in International Law Making - International ‘Legislation’ in the Public Interest, Dunker & Humblot, 
2006, pp. 171 et seq., arguing that there is a need “for norms of international law designed to serve international 
community as a whole”. In fact, the authors maintains that “while international sovereignty and autonomy 
continue to serve as important foundations of the international legal system, the powerful interrelationship and 
interdependencies of states have driven the international community towards and increasingly cooperative 
international law structure”. See also, G. Singh Nijar, “Public Interest Litigation: A Matter of Justice An Asian 
Perspective”, in ASEAN Law Association, 9th General Assembly (2006), available at http://
www.aseanlawassociation.org/9GAdocs/Malaysia.pdf, (Last visited on 9 August 2012); see also, A. S. Weiner, 
“Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy”, p. 174.
23 I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment, p. 224.
24  Award, 20 April 2005, para 324. See, M. Agius, “The Invocation of Necessity in International Law”, in 
Netherlands International Law Review, 2009, p. 104.
25  In the literature, two concepts of the margin of appreciation are identified. A substantive concept which 
addresses the relationship between individual freedoms and collective goals; and, a structural concept which 
addresses the limits or intensity of the review of the ECtHR as international forum. See, G. Letsas, “Two 
Concept of the Margin of Appreciation”, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26(4), 2006, p. 706. The author 
criticizes the inconsistency in the ECtHR’s approach to the doctrine and explains that “the doctrine is described 
as ‘the other side of the principle of proportionality’ by some and as enabling ‘the Court to balance the 
sovereignty of Contracting Parties with their obligations under the Convention’ by others”; see also, M. R. 
Hutchinson, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European COurt of Human Rights”, in International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 48(3), 1999, pp. 638-650.
light of which they may evaluate whether a public need exists, that outweighs the individual 
right to ownership.26 Indeed, the ECtHR has explained that it
cannot disregard those legal and factual features which characterise the life of the 
society in the State which, as a Contracting Party, has to answer for the measure in 
dispute. In so doing it cannot assume the role of the competent national 
authorities, for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the 
international machinery of collective enforcement established by the Convention. 
The national authorities remain free to choose the measures which they consider 
appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention. Review by 
the Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with the requirements 
of the Convention.27
The ECtHR further submitted that the “margin of appreciation available to the 
legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one”  and finding 
this conclusion “natural”, it declared that it “will respect the legislature’s judgment as to what 
is ‘in the public interest’ unless that judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation.” 28
The Court has clarified that the measure must be proportionate to the aim pursued and 
compensation has to be paid for the measure to be justifiable.29  However, no definition of 
public purpose is offered either in the ECHR or in the related judicial practice Rather, the 
Court has qualified as “extensive”  the notion of public interest.30 As Ruiz Fabri has pointed 
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26  UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 33; R. A. Salgado, “Protection of Nationals’ Rights to Property Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights: Lithgow v United Kingdom”, in Virginia Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 27(4), 1986-1987, p. 899; Lithgow v United Kingdom, p. 100.
27  Belgian Linguistics Case, Application No 1474/62, Series A No 6, 23 July 1968, para I.B.10; see also, 
Connors v United Kingdom, Application N. 66746/01, Judgement, 27 May 2004, pp. 24-25: “[A] margin of 
appreciation must, inevitably, be left to the national authorities, who by reason of their direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces of their countries are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate 
local needs and conditions. This margin will vary according to the nature of the Convention right in issue, its 
importance for the individual and the nature of the activities restricted, as well as the nature of the aim pursued 
by the restrictions. The margin will tend to be narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s 
effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights”.
28 James and others v UK, para 46. See also, Pressos Compania Naviera SA and others v Belgium, para 37. The 
States have a broad authority especially in issuing legislation concerning the “protection of morals” and “ 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”. The ECtHR has in fact acknowledged that no 
uniform European conception of morals may be found in the domestic law of the contracting States. See, 
Handyside v United Kingdom, para 47. See, G. Bongiovanni et al, Reasonableness and the Law, pp. 435-436; 
generally, on the principle of reasonableness see, A. Adinolfi, “The Principle of Reasonableness in European 
Law”, in G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor, C. Valentini (eds), Reasonableness and the Law, Springer, 2009, pp. 
385-406.
29 Y. Winisdoerffer, “Margin of Appreciation and Article 1 Protocol N. 1”, in Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 
19, 1998, p. 18.
30 Hentrich v Finance, Series A, n. 3, 1994, p. 19.
out, the ECtHR “has recognized that it is for national authorities to make the initial 
assessment of the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures that result in 
a deprivation of property”.31 Accordingly, “the state margin of appreciation is justified by the 
idea that national authorities have better knowledge of their society and its needs, and are 
therefore “better placed than [an] international [court] to appreciate what is ‘in the public 
interest’” ”.32
This conclusion is justified also in light of the decision in Turgut v Turkey,33 where the 
ECtHR clarified that “economic imperatives and even some fundamental rights, such as the 
right to property, should not be accorded primacy against considerations of environmental 
protection”.34
The notion of public purpose is indeed interpreted as covering also measures oriented at 
the implementation of public policies in the interest of the community.35  As the Court 
explained in James v United Kingdom:
[t]he taking of property in pursuance of a policy calculated to enhance social 
justice within the community can properly be described as being ‘in the public 
interest’. In particular, the fairness of a system of law governing the contractual or 
property rights of private parties is a matter of public concern and therefore 
legislative measures intended to bring about such fairness are capable of being ‘in 
the public interest’, even if they involve the compulsory transfer of property from 
one individual to another.36
This principle ought to be read in light of Article 1 para 2, Protocol I ECHR which 
establishes that a State has the right “to enforce such laws as it deems necessary [...] to secure 
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties”. Thus, fiscal matters are included in 
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31 H. Ruiz Fabri, “The Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights”, p. 158.
32 Id.
33  Turgut v Turkey, Application No. 1411/03, Judgment – Merits, 8 July 2008. The case dealt with the 
reclassification of certain lands as State forests. See a commentary in J. E. Viñuales, “The Environmental 
Regulation of Foreign Investment Schemes under International Law”, in P. M. Dupuy and J. E. Viñuales (eds.), 
Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives and Safeguards, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2012, Chapter 11.
34 Id, para 90.
35 H. Ruiz Fabri, “The Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights”, p. 159; Chassagnou and 
Others v France (Grand Chamber), 29 April 1999, para 75.
36 Id, quoting James and others v UK, para 31.
the public policies implemented in the interest of the community, and the exception to the 
general rule seems to grant the State with unfettered powers in taxation matters. The ECtHR 
has “asserted its power of review in early decisions, with respect to ‘arbitrary confiscation’”.37 
Therefore, the ECtHR has required the observance of Article 1 also with regard to taxation 
measures, as they qualify as interferences with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
guaranteed under Article 1.38
More precisely, the issue of taxation has been the object of a number of cases in which 
the States’ evaluation of the general interest was scrutinized by the ECtHR.39 The case law of 
the ECtHR suggests that “as to the general principles of control, taxation is treated as any 
other interference with property rights”, although a wider margin of appreciation is granted to 
States in fiscal matters, as they concern the implementation of both economic and social 
policies.40 According to the Court, the intent to promote the public interest may be inferred 
from the legal foundation of the measure. The ECtHR tends to “follow the national 
assessment performed at national level unless that assessment ‘is manifestly without 
reasonable foundation’”.41
The rulings and interpretations of the ECtHR exert their influence beyond the case 
under scrutiny.42 Indeed, the Court has influenced “national policy and legislation with an 
increasing directness”,43  apparently fostering the creation in the practice of an European 
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37 R. Ergec, “Taxation and Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights”, in INTERTAX, 
Vol. 39(1), 2011, p. 3. See also, C. Tomuschat, “The European Court of Human Rights and Investment 
Protection”, p. 648.
38 Id, p. 3.
39  Id, p. 5. See, SA Dangeville v France, para 56; Cabinet Ciot and Gras Savoye v France, Application N. 
49217/99 and 49218/99, 22 July 2003.
40 Id, p. 11.
41 C. Tomuschat, “The European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection”, p. 649. See also, James 
and others v UK, para 46; Pressos Compania Naviera SA and others v Belgium, para 37; Immobiliare Saffi v 
Italy, Application N. 22774/93, 28 July 1999, para 49; Zwolsk! and Zwolskà v Czech Republic, Application N. 
46129/99, 12 November 2002, para 67; Jahn and Others v Germany, para 91; Hutten-Czapska v Poland, para 
166; J. A. Pye v United Kingdom, para 49.
42 J. Gerards, “Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine”, in European Law Journal, Vol. 
17(1), 2011, p. 103.
43 Id.
conception or public order.44 To the contrary, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has 
been criticized as it “does not significantly diminish the essential difficulties of judging the 
acts of derogation or deciding in concreto when the margin has been overstepped”.45 As a 
consequence, the application of the margin of appreciation is deemed “an announcement of 
deference, and not coherent jurisprudential principle”.46  And, as a result of the margin of 
appreciation, the Court’s decision-making processes is deemed “more opaque than is 
necessary”.47
III. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
The Iran-US Claims tribunal considered the doctrine of police powers48 in the cases 
Sedco v Iranian Oil Company49 and Emanuel Too v United States.50 In Sedco v Iranian Oil 
Company, the tribunal accepted as a principle of international law that a State is not 
responsible for bona fide regulation that falls within the scope of a generally recognized 
police power.51 The tribunal referred to the ‘lawful regulation exception’ in the following 
terms:
When an action, as is the case with the application of Clause C, results in an 
outright transfer of title rather than incidental economic injury, [....] a taking must 
be presumed to have occurred. The one exception to this rule, forfeiture for crime, 
is distinguishable because in such cases the person(s) affected do not rightfully 
possess title to the property in question.52
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44 R. A. Salgado, “Protection of Nationals’ Rights to Property”, p. 875.
45  M. R. Hutchinson, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine”, p. 649, quoting M. O’Boyle, “The Margin of 
Appreciation and Derogation under Article 15: Ritual Incantation or Principle?”, in Human Rights Law Journal, 
1998, p. 29.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48  The two cases are also mentioned as the first tow awards where the Tribunal did apply the police power 
doctrine in V. Heiskanen, “The Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation”, pp. 222-223.
49 Sedco.
50 Emanuel Too, para 56.
51 J. Coe Jr, N. Rubins, “Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case”, p. 635.
52 Sedco, p. 275
The principle was recognized in Emanuel Too v United States, “the only award in which 
an allegation of taking was rejected on the grounds of police powers regulations”.53 The claim 
for compensation stemmed from the seizure by the United States Internal Revenue Service 
(‘IRS’) of the Plaintiff’s liquor licence. The tribunal established that “the Respondent has 
conceded that the IRS did, in fact, seize the Claimant's California general eating place liquor 
license in order to satisfy over U.S. $ 70,000 worth of overdue withholding taxes”;54 
Nevertheless, the tribunal considered that 
a State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantages 
resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is commonly 
accepted as within the police power of States, provided that it is not 
discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to 
State or to sell it at a distress price.55
The approach of the Iran-US Claims tribunal has undoubtedly influenced the reasoning 
of recent arbitrators with respect to the application of the police power doctrine56. As noticed 
in the following section, bona fide regulations and ordinary taxation laws are traditionally 
regarded as instances of a State’s exercise of its regulatory power that amount to non-
compensable takings. However, investment tribunals are often confronted with cases of 
‘disguised expropriations’ or expropriatory measures camouflaged as bona fide, ordinary 
taxation.57
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53 G. H. Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?”, p. 605; see also, G.C. Christie, “What 
Constitute a Taking of Property in International Law”, pp. 335, 338.
54 Emanuel Too, para 56.
55 Id, para 56.
56 Commenting upon the jurisprudence of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Aldrich concludes that “Liability does 
not arise from actions that are nondiscriminatory and are within the commonly accepted taxation and police 
powers of states”, and this is a principle that continues guiding current investment arbitrations. See, G. H. 
Aldrich, “What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?”, p. 609.
57 Investment tribunals are called to qualify the measure and discriminate between expropriation and regulation. 
In the specific area of taxation laws, the issue of the party charged with the burden of proof may be especially 
significant, given that the failure to provide sufficient evidence in favor of the the bona fide and legitimate nature 
of the action constitutes in itself the decision of the case.
IV. Other Tribunals
Investment tribunals have variously considered the concept of public interest58 when 
deciding upon a claim for indirect expropriation to the extent that a distinction may be drawn 
between a ‘radical’ or a ‘moderate’ police powers doctrine.59  It seems, however, generally 
accepted that the public purpose requirement is considered with reference to the time when 
the measure was carried out60 and that
a treaty requirement for ‘public interest’ requires some genuine interest of the 
public. If mere reference to ‘public interest’ can magically put such interest into 
existence and therefore satisfy this requirement, then this requirement would be 
rendered meaningless since the Tribunal can imagine no situation where this 
requirement would not have been met.61
The awards in Methanex62 and Saluka63 are instances of a radical interpretation of the 
police power doctrine: to the extent that the interference serves a legitimate purpose and no 
specific commitments bind the State, no expropriation can be found and thus no compensation 
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58 For instance, consider AIG Capital Partners v Republic of Kazakhstan, para 10.4.1, where the requirement of 
public purpose is considered by the Tribunal as “only a reiteration of the State sovereignty viz the right to take 
by compulsory acquisition private property for public purposes”.
59 U. Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State”, in World Investment 
and Trade, Vol. 8(5), 2007, pp. 725-729. Kriebaum argues that the right approach to achieve a balance between 
the interests of the States and the investors is to be found in the criterion of proportionality to regulate the 
amount of damages. Contra: A. K. Hoffman, “Indirect Expropriation”, p. 169. See also, S. W. Schill, B. 
Kingsbury, “Public Law Concepts”, pp. 75-104.
60 Consider for instance the case Waguih Elie Georh Siag and Vecchi v Egypt. In Waguih Elie Georh Siag and 
Vecchi v Egypt, the Egyptian authorities expropriated the land owned by the claimants on grounds of delays in 
the construction of a tourist project. The measure did not contain an explicitly stated public policy objective. Six 
years after the date of the taking, the property was transferred to a public gas company for the construction of a 
pipeline. For the tribunal, the fact that the land was later used in a public-interest project was irrelevant: “The 
Tribunal does not accept that because an investment was eventually put to public use, the expropriation of that 
investment must necessarily be said to have been ‘for’ a public purpose. See, Waguih Elie Georh Siag and Vecchi 
v Egypt, para 432, as quoted in UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 32.
61 ADC v Hungary, para 432; See also, Waguih Elie Georg Siag v The Arab Republic of Egypt, paras 430-431, 
where the Tribunal states that “[...] [t]he Tribunal accepts the assurance of Mr Newman, counsel for Egypt (in 
response to direct questioning) that Al Sharq is a publicly owned company. That assurance is not sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of Article 5 of the BIT that the expropriation is “for a public purpose”. The wording of 
Article 5 requires that the public purpose was the reason the investment was expropriated. The Tribunal does not 
consider such to be the case”.
62 Methanex Corp v Usa, Part IV, Chapter D, p. 4, para 7.
63 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, Partial Award.
is due to the investor.64 The focus on the needs of the State, as well as on the public welfare 
objectives that the action pursues, excludes the expropriatory nature of the measure, 
irrespectively of its severity. Only to the extent that “specific commitments had been given by 
the regulating government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that 
the government would refrain from such regulation”,65  the action may be deemed 
expropriatory. The public goal sought remains unvaried, yet only the assurances given to the 
investor during the negotiation phase modify the outcome of the interpretation. The degree of 
leverage is maximum, given that “specific commitments”  may reverse the result of the 
qualification process and therefore of the tribunal’s decision concerning the occurrence of an 
expropriation.
The core of the problem seems much more related to the occurrence per se of the 
expropriation rather than to the analysis of its lawfulness, and it is to this end that the 
traditional notions of ‘public interest’, ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘due process’ are employed.66 
In this sense, Kriebaum has argued that if
the approach of the Methanex and Saluka tribunals were to be followed, this 
would lead to a considerable gap in international investment protection: any non 
discriminatory measure, taken in the public interest that interferes with property 
rights will no longer be an expropriation regardless of its consequences.67
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64 U. Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings”, p. 726; S. A. Spears, “Making Way for the Public Interest”, pp. 277-278, 
where it is explained that in Methanex the NAFTA Tribunal found that “in determining whether a regulation had 
resulted in an indirect expropriation, the primary issue was whether the measure concerned was legitimate and 
served a public purpose”. The Tribunal supported the customary international law police-powers concept and 
held that “as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is 
enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not 
deemed expropriatory and compensable”. The author notes that the Tribunal failed to consider the measure’s 
economic impact or its degree of interference with the investor’s legitimate expectations.
65 Methanex Corp v United States, Part IV, Chapter D, p. 4, para 7.
66 U. Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings”, p. 726.
67 Id, pp. 726-727. Reference is made to the case Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal v 
Argentine Republic (Vivendi II), where the Tribunal found an expropriation and rejected this approach at para 
7.5.21; see also, C. Lévesque, “Les fondements de la distinction”, p. 68. Analyzing the regulatory expropriation, 
Lévesque maintains that the risk is to interpret the concept of police powers in a (too) broad manner, so that it 
will include all the measures deemed in a public interest. Observing that public purpose is also a condition for 
the legality of the expropriation, Lévesque further submits that: “Or, si l’on qualifie d’exercice du pouvoir de 
police, grâce à une définition excessivement large de cette notion, toutes les mesures prises dans l’intérêt public, 
l’expropriation n’est plus possible, faute d’espace conceptuel”.
The risk envisaged is that the finding of a compensable expropriation as a result of a 
governmental regulatory measure may become highly unlikely and that, consequently, “the 
concept of indirect expropriation will lose most of its meaning”.68 Bearing in mind that the 
value and helpfulness of the category ‘indirect expropriation’ has been repeatedly 
questioned,69 this option does not necessarily appear as a negative result. To the contrary, the 
possibility to wipe out the adjective ‘indirect’ from the list of those applicable to the term 
‘expropriation’ might even be beneficial to the clarity and predictability of the law in this 
field.70  To a certain extent, it might be argued that indirect expropriation is a borderline 
category that applies to outlying cases and that it oftentimes clashes––or is intertwined––with 
the application of other widespread investment standards, such as the FET.71 Arbitral tribunals 
do not consistently apply a method72 to decide upon (indirect) expropriatory claims and a 
more ‘formalistic’ approach might also be advantageous to the parties and their understanding 
of the proceedings.
The ‘moderate’ police powers doctrine combines the analysis of both the purpose and 
the effects of the interference in order to determine whether the measure has an expropriatory 
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68 U. Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings”, p. 727; C. Lévesque, “Les fondements de la distinction”, p. 68.
69  See, V. Been, “Does an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine Make Sense?”, in New York 
Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, 2002, pp. 50, 56-57, 142; V. Been, J. C. Beauvais, “The Global Fifth 
Amendment?”, p. 95.
70 As noted, “the coexistence of custom and treaty law has enriched the expropriation lexicon, but not to any 
apparent design”. See, J. Coe Jr, N. Rubins, “Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case”, p. 604; During the 
writing of this work, the following paper was published J. H. Dalhuisen, A. T. Guzman, “Expropriatory and Non-
Expropriatory Takings Under International Investment Law”. The authors clearly state that the distinction 
between direct/indirect expropriation is problematic and creates confusion. They hold that “the legal system 
governing expropriation would be more straightforward, however, if the direct/indirect distinction were 
discarded”. They also suggest that “if an indirect expropriation has ‘an effect equivalent to direct expropriation’, 
why should the law treat them differently?”.
71 In Enron Corp v Argentina Republic, para 363: the Tribunal noted: “the line separating indirect expropriation 
from the breach of fair and equitable treatment can be rather thin and in those circumstances the standard of 
compensation can also be similar on one or the other side of the line”. One should also consider, however, that 
the FET standard is as well used as a fallback alternative to findings of indirect expropriation. See, L. Reed, D. 
Bray, “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, pp. 13-27.
72 J. Coe Jr, N. Rubins, “Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case”, p. 620, at 89. The authors quote Amco 
Asia Corp v Republic of Indonesia, Annulment, 1993, para 158, where the Tribunal mentioned “the extensive 
literature and multiplicity of approaches relying on ‘differences in motives, object, extent, form/and or 
purpose’”; consider for instance the lack of precision and appropriateness of the methodology applied for 
quantifying damages in both the regulatory context and the violation of the FET. See what it is argued in L. 
Reed, D. Bray, “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, pp. 13-27.
character. Arbitral tribunals have endorsed this approach in cases such as SD Myers,73 
Feldman74 and Tecmed.75 However, only in Tecmed the tribunal has explained the method 
employed to assess the claim of expropriation.76 More precisely, the tribunal has clarified that 
“regulatory actions and measures will not initially be excluded from the definition of 
expropriatory acts”;77 rather, the analysis of the “negative financial impact of such actions” 78 
will be complemented by a test aimed at assessing the proportionality of the measure to the 
public interest pursued as well as to the protection to be granted to the investment.79
As noted, according to Schill and Kingsbury the development of the proportionality 
analysis as a method for legal interpretation is traceable to domestic legal traditions such as 
the German, the American (and the English) ones. Especially German administrative and 
constitutional law is regarded as the source of the ‘proportionality balancing’ that to date 
characterizes also the approach of the ECtHR.80 The standard applied in Tecmed, however, 
shows a very close relationship not only with the ECtHR but also with the US Supreme Court 
judicial practice, which requires a “deprivation of all economic benefit of the property”  for a 
regulatory expropriation to be found, excluding that a taking may be compensable when there 
are “some other use available for the property”.81
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73 S.D. Myers v Canada, Partial Award.
74 Feldman v. Mexico.
75 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v United Mexican States.
76 U. Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings”, p. 728.
77 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v United Mexican States, para 122.
78 Id.
79 Id; S. W. Schill, B. Kingsbury, “Public Law Concepts”, p. 92, where it is clarified that in Tecmed “the Tribunal 
posited that the BIT requires only that the effects of a specific state measure on private property have to be 
proportional to the exercise of the state’s police power. In essence, the tribunal therefore considered property to 
be inherently bound and restricted by the police powers of the state even though the wording of the Treaty did 
not explicitly mention a police power exception”.
80 Id, pp. 75-104. Although acknowledging that the proportionality analysis is open to criticism since it “confers 
powers on arbitrators to take policy-driven decisions about the proper balance between conflicting rights and 
interests” and it “encourages a focus on principles above rules”, the authors assert that it “is more robust than 
some of the alternative methods for dealing with the difficult assessments that currently are made in international 
investment law”.
81 Lucas v SC Coastal, 505 US 1003, 1992. Indeed, to determine whether the non-renewal of the landfill permit 
amounted to an indirect expropriation, the Tecmed tribunal required the investor to have been “radically deprived 
of the economical use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related therein - such as the income or 
benefits related to the [investment] or to its exploitation - had ceased to exist”. Tecmed, para 115.
Therefore, the tribunal’s interpretation of expropriation covers non-formal actions that 
may subsequently be regarded as regulatory measures. The examination of the effects of the 
action prevails over the analysis of its nature,82  orienting the reasoning of arbitrators. As 
Kriebaum noted,83  the Tecmed arbitral panel weighed the State’s interest to intervene against 
the economic deprivation caused to the investor and, having found that no emergency could 
be identified, it determined that the interference amounted to an expropriation.84
As far as the proportionality test is concerned,85 the influence of the judicial practice of 
the ECtHR86 is self-evident in Tecmed. It is surprising that the characterization of the State’s 
interest, and thus the employment of the tribunal’s conception of proportionality87 takes place 
through the application of the highest and strictest threshold, namely the existence of a 
“urgent situation, crisis or social emergency”. This approach casts doubts on the distinction 
between a State’s right to act for the furtherance of a legitimate public purpose––i.e., its 
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82  See also, RosInvest UK Ltd v The Russian Federation, para 624, establishing that “the Tribunal should 
evaluate the net effect of the measure”.
83 U. Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings”, p. 728.
84 Coe and Rubins observes that Tecmed illustrates the “fact-dependent and evolving nature of expropriation law 
as it relates to regulation”. J. Coe Jr, N. Rubins, “Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case”, p. 597.
85 This approach was followed by the Tribunals in Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic, paras 311, 312, 322; and, 
LG&E Energy v Argentine Republic, paras 189, 194, 195; Coe and Rubins argue that “[d]isputants in investment 
treaty arbitration have occasionally invoked European Commission Reports and decisions of the ECHR 
regarding Article 1, resulting in a measure of cross-pollination evident in certain investor-state awards”. The 
Tecmed case’s adoption of the proportionality test is quoted as an instance of this assumption. See, J. Coe Jr, N. 
Rubins, “Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context and Contributions”, in T. Weiler (ed), 
International Investment Law and Arbitration, Cameron May, 2005, p. 610.
86 Matos e Silva, Lda, and Others v Portugal, para 85, which requires the proof of the “total destruction of 
economic benefit” for administrative measure to be deemed expropriatory; Mellacher and Others v Austria, para 
48; Pressos Compañía Naviera SA & Others v Belgium, para 38; Yukos (Hulley Enterprises) v Russian 
Federation, PCA Case N. 226, UNCITRAL, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 
2009.
87 The Tribunal explains in a dicta how its conception of proportionality is applied. At para 139.
regulatory power88––and a State’s right to adopt emergency measures to cope with “grave and 
imminent peril” and aimed at safeguarding an “essential interest”.89
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88 Viñuales argues that scholars attempted to circumscribe the doctrine of regulatory powers by identifying three 
“more specific formulations”, namely the police powers doctrine, the margin of appreciation doctrine and 
emergency and necessity clause. Viñuales also maintains that, to a limited extent, the regulatory powers doctrine 
may function as a conflict rule, when it “shields certain measures taken by the State from being considered as a 
breach of investment protection”. J. E. Viñuales, “Foreign Investment and the Environment in International 
Law”, pp. 56-57.
89 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83, 2001, Art. 25. 
See also the Perù-Singapore FTA (2008), specifying with regard to the public purpose requirement that “For 
greater certainty, for the purposes of this Article, public purpose refers to a concept in customary international 
law. Without prejudice to its definition under customary international law, public purpose may be similar or 
approximate to concepts under domestic law, for example, the concept of ‘public necessity’. ” (Article 10.10, 
footnote 10-9), and along the same line see, Canada-Colombia FTA (2008), Art. 811, footnote 7. See, UNCTAD, 
“Expropriation”, pp. 30-31.
Considering the Argentine cases,90 indeed, one could appraise the difficulties that the 
issue of ‘necessity’91 has raised. Such difficulties resulted in contrasting arbitral responses to 
the governmental recourse to this defence/excuse92/justification.93
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90 The economic crisis affecting Argentina in 2002-2003 triggered a number of arbitral cases. Argentina invoked 
public emergency clauses and the necessity defence to resist the claims of the investors. See, Continental 
Casualty v Argentine Republic; Metalpar v Argentine Republic; Sempra Energy v Argentine Republic, Decision 
on Annulment; Enron and Ponderosa Assets v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Annulment; LG&E v. Argentine 
Republic, Decision on liability; CMS v. Argentina; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, 
Decision on Annulment. These awards have been discussed in C. Leben, “L’état de nécessité dans le droit 
international de l’investissement”, in Les Cahiers de l’arbitrage, Vol. 3, 2005, p. 47; J. E. Viñuales, “State of 
Necessity and Peremptory Norms in International Investment Law”, in NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the 
Americas, Vol. 14, 2008, p. 79; J. Fouret, “CMS c/ LG&E ou l’état de nécessité en question”, in Revue de 
l’arbitrage, 2007, p. 249; A. Reinisch, “Necessity in International Investment Arbitration: An Unnecessary Split 
of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases?”, in Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 8(2), 2007, p. 191. See also, 
Total SA v Argentina, Decision on Liability; Suez and others v Argentina, Decision on Liability; Impregilo SpA v 
Argentine Republic.
91 On the concept of necessity see, M. Agius, “The Invocation of Necessity in International Law”, pp. 95-135; C. 
Binder, A. Reinisch, “Economic Emergency Powers: A Comparative Law Perspective”, in . W. Schill (ed) 
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, OUP, 2010, pp. 503-540; and, D. A. Desierto, 
Necessity and National Emergency Clauses - Sovereignty in Modern Treaty Interpretation, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012, p. 144, the author explains that there is a definitional gap in the treaty regimes of international 
investment law and international trade. No clear consensus in fact exists on the “definitions of security 
emergency and economic emergency” and this lead to inconsistent interpretation of necessity clauses; Roth M., 
Reith C., “A Continuing Trend Towards Emergency Rules”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 9(4), 
2012.
92 A. Kent, A. R. Harrington, “The Plea of Necessity under Customary International Law: A Critical Review in 
Light of the Argentine Crisis”, in C. Brown, K. Miles (eds)  Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, 
CUP, 2011, pp. 246-270. At pp. 262-263, it is maintained the “an important question [....] is whether necessity 
indeed precludes wrongfulness of actions or only excuses actions which are considered as wrong.” The authors 
quote Prof. Lowe who describes the first option as ‘defence’ and the second as an ‘excuse’. According to Prof. 
Lowe, furthermore, the distinction may be found in the fact that “there is a behavior that is right; and there is a 
behavior that, though wrong, is understandable and excusable”. Kent and Harrington thus maintain that 
“interpreting the doctrine of necessity as a ‘defence’, therefore, means that the action is not counted as wrongful 
by nature, and, thus, it could be argued, should not lead to compensation. [....] Under the ‘excuse interpretation’, 
on the other hand, the actions taken by a State are considered wrongful, but under the circumstances are excused. 
Under this interpretation, compensation may be justified, as once the ‘state of necessity’ is over, the ‘excuse’ is 
no longer valid and no real reason for avoiding compensation is left”. See, V. Lowe, “Precluding Wrongfulness 
or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses”, in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10(2), 1999, pp. 405-; 
see also, C. Tomuschat, “International Responsibility and Liability”, in Recueil des cours, Vol. 281, 1999, pp. 
268-303. Especially at p. 288 it is established that “necessity ought to be seen as an excuse ex post facto or a 
mitigating circumstance explaining, rather than authorizing, the indisputably wrongful conduct”.
93 Desierto argues that “given the drafting context of international investment agreements, and the interlaced 
objects and purposes of their different provision [....] it should be clear to law-appliers that the classical usage of 
necessity as justification appears demonstrably absent from the expressed intent of States that enter into such 
treaties”. Conversely, “it is more consistent with the policy objectives of States entering into these particular 
types of treaties to treat necessity clauses [....]  instead as a specific kind of “flexibility mechanism” within the 
treaty regime that permits the invoking State to temporarily suspend compliance with its treaty obligation during 
the situation of necessity”. D. A. Desierto, National Emergency Clauses, pp. 197-198.
For instance, in CMS94  and LG&E95  the arbitral tribunals were confronted with the 
evaluation of restrictive measures adopted by Argentina against the economic crises started in 
the country in 1999. By issuing legislation regulating foreign exchange and tariffs and 
establishing the suspension of tariffs’ adjustments, the Government had undoubtedly affected 
the economic interests of foreign investors, that initiated arbitrations to have their investment 
protected. It is arguable that the rationale founding the measures could well be considered 
legitimate, to the extent that an economic crisis is regarded as covered by a necessity defence. 
Such a view was eventually shared by the arbitral tribunal in LG&E, which justified the 
measures adopted by Argentina upon the onset of the crisis; to the contrary, the arbitrators in 
CMS rejected the Argentine government argument.96
These results lead us to question what the appropriate scope of necessity97  in 
international investment law is and at what point it may preclude the responsibility of the 
State. Furthermore, we could question under what circumstances a governmental interest 
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94  CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, Award and Decision of the ad hoc Annulment 
Committee of 25 September 2007.
95 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc V Argentine Republic.
96 For a commentary, see also: A. Reinisch, “Necessity in International Investment Arbitration: An Unnecessary 
Split”, pp. 191 et seq.; M. Waibel, “Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CSM and LG&E”, in Leiden 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 20(3), 2007, pp. 637-648; A. Reinisch, “Necessity in Investment Arbitration”, 
in Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 42, 2010, pp. 137-158; S. W. Schill, “International 
Investment Law and the Host State’s Power to Handle Economic Crises: Comment on the ICSID Decision in 
LG&E v Argentina”, in Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 24(3), 2007, pp. 265 et seq. Reasons for the 
contrasting results may be identified in the Tribunal’s evaluation of the applicable law and the time at which the 
governmental measures were taken. Consider also the CMS Annulment decision as quoted in the Enron 
Annulment decision (para 353a), where Argentina maintained that Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT is 
significantly different from the “state of necessity” under customary international law, and that Article XI is a 
“provision that delimits the scope of application of the Treaty such that if it applies the substantive obligations 
under the BIT do not apply, while the state of necessity is only relevant once it has been decided that there has 
otherwise been a breach of substantive obligations under the BIT”. CMS Gas Transmission Company v The 
Argentine Republic, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application of Annulment; A. Kent, A. R. 
Harrington, “The Plea of Necessity under Customary International Law”, pp. 246-270. The authors seem to 
conclude that “the more accepted position regarding necessity is that it constitutes a defence” (at p. 263); L. 
Engan, “In Search of Necessity: Congruence, Proportionality, and the Least-Restrictive Means in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement”, in Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, 2012, pp. 495-521.
97 On the contribution of Tribunals and Committees to the application of the doctrine of necessity in international 
investment law see, A. Martin, “Investment Disputes after Argentina’s Economic Crisis: Interpreting BIT Non-
precluded Measures and the Doctrine of Necessity under Customary International Law”, in Journal of 
International Arbitration, Vol. 29(1), 2012, pp. 49-70; W. Burke-White, A. Von Staden, “Investment Protection 
in Extraordinary Times”, pp. 307-410.
becomes ‘essential’, and what degree of hazardousness is required for a situation to amount to 
a ‘grave and imminent peril’ and dispense the State with its obligations towards foreign 
investors. Indeed, until the Argentine crisis, only a few non-economic and treaty-based 
assertions of the necessity defence appeared in arbitral jurisprudence.98  Conversely, 
“investment arbitrations arising from the 2001-2002 Argentine financial crises reintroduced 
economic emergencies through the necessity defence”.99
In CMS, necessity is firstly discussed under customary international law (Article 25 ILC 
Articles) and secondly under Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT.100 To the contrary, in LG&E 
the tribunal focused firstly on the BIT provision and subsequently referred to customary 
international law. More precisely, in LG&E the tribunal clarified that customary international 
law on necessity applies with the purpose to corroborate the decision reached according to the 
BIT.101
Undoubtedly, the two approaches have substantive implications with regard to the 
arbitrators’ findings on the necessity defence: as explained, “[r]elying on either the BIT 
provision or customary international law first has an essential impact on the determination 
that a State can be held liable for a treaty breach”, and this “would generate potentially 
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98 D. A. Desierto, Necessity and National Emergency Clauses, pp. 171, 179. See, Asian Agricultural Products 
Ltd v Sri Lanka, Award on Merits and Damages; American Manifacturing & Trading Inc v. Zaire, Award and 
Separate Opinion; Consortium RFCC v Morocco, paras 79-80; Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter & ors v 
Zimbabwe, paras 102-107; Patrick Mitchell v Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Application for 
Annulment, paras 51-56; . The author argues that until the Argentine crisis the “necessity defence arose from 
standard treaty clauses providing compensation to the investor, in accordance with national treatment and/or the 
most favored nation (MFN) standard, for losses due to armed conflict, revolution, national emergency, or 
international disorder”.
99  Id, p. 172. The author considers also the effect of the revival of the economic necessity defence on the 
repayment of international debts. See also, A. H Qureshi, “The Economic Emergency Defence in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: A Development Perspective”, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, S. Wittich (eds), 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford Scholarship Online Monograph, 2009, pp. 631 et 
seq.; see also, EDF International SA,  SAUR International SA and Leon Partecipaciones Argentinas SA v 
Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case n. ARB/03/23, para 1004-1005 where the Tribunal established that the 
the “evolution of the prevalent economic and social conditions” influence the delineation of the contours of the 
FET standard. Therefore, an economic crisis is relevant to the interpretation of the FET standard.
100 CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, paras 357-358.
101 LG&E Energy, Decision on liability, paras 245, 258.
different outcomes”.102 In CMS, indeed, the tribunal decided the claim applying the full test of 
Article 25 of the ILC Articles, reviewing the measures under requirements that were not 
explicitly included in Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT.103  Conversely, the tribunal in 
LG&E decided the issue in light of Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT.104
As to the substantial meaning of ‘essential interest’, the LG&E decision is isolated in 
accepting that “what qualifies as an ‘essential’ interest is not limited to those interests 
referring to the State’s existence”  but it includes economic and financial interests “related to 
the protection of the State against any danger seriously compromising its internal or external 
situation”.105 Indeed, the tribunals in CMS, Sempra and Enron rejected the idea that an 
economic crisis could affect an essential interest of a State;106 only the LG&E tribunal found 
that the requirement of a “grave and imminent peril”  was met, since Argentina had “faced an 
extremely serious threat to its existence, its political and economic survival, to the possibility 
of maintaining its essential services in operation, and to the preservation of its internal 
peace”.107
This stance was opposed in CMS, Sempra and Enron,108 where the tribunal deemed it 
“non convincing”  that “the economic crisis could compromise the very existence of the State 
and its independence”.109 In Sempra, the tribunal maintained that as “the constitutional order 
was not on the verge of collapse”, the State could not avail itself of liability exemptions.110
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102 A. Martin, “Investment Disputes after Argentina’s Economic Crisis”, 2012, p. 55.
103  CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, paras 383 et seq. Noteworthy, this approach was 
condemned by the ad hoc Annulment committee. Decision of the ad hoc Annulment Committee of 25 September 
2007, paras 131-132; as noted by Martin, the reasoning of the Annulment Committes in CMS, Enron, Sempra, 
LG&E is apparently supporting the view that “states should be left with a certain autonomy–or margin of 
appreciation–in deciding whether necessity should be invoked”. A. Martin, “Investment Disputes after 
Argentina’s Economic Crisis: Interpreting BIT Non-precluded Measures and the Doctrine of Necessity under 
Customary International Law”, in Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 29(1), 2012, p. 52.
104 LG&E Energy Corp. Decision on liability.
105 Id, paras 238, 251, as quoted in A. Martin, “Investment Disputes after Argentina’s Economic Crisis”, p. 60.
106 A. Martin, “Investment Disputes after Argentina’s Economic Crisis”, p. 61.
107 LG&E Energy, Decision on liability, para 257.
108 CMS Gas Transmission v Argentina, paras 322,354–356; Sempra Energy v Argentina, paras 348-349; Enron 
Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation)v Argentine Republic, para 306.
109 A. Martin, “Investment Disputes after Argentina’s Economic Crisis”, p. 62.
110 Id, quoting Sempra Energy v Argentina, para 332.
Apparently, a preliminary clarification concerning the law applicable to the case and the 
interplay among various sources of the law would have been appropriate to conduct a 
methodologically accurate legal analysis.111  This would have prevented analogous cases, 
regulated under the same BIT, from being treated differently and in accordance to opposite 
standards. Although in CMS the tribunal correctly pointed out that an “essential security 
interest”  may include severe economic crisis, it failed to examine the specific circumstances 
of the case in order to reach its decision.112 This led to the annulment of the decisions in CMS, 
Sempra and Enron.113
Viñuales has resorted to the relation between necessity and peremptory norms in order 
to investigate the issue of ‘necessity in international investment law’ from the point of view of 
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111  The Annulment Committees therefore had to clarify the issues related to the interplay between customary 
international law and the BIT’s provision, the applicability of the requirements of Article 25 on State 
Responsibility to the necessity under the BIT provision, and the implications on liability determination when the 
state of necessity is established under the treaty or customary international law. See, A. Martin, “Investment 
Disputes after Argentina’s Economic Crisis”, pp. 67-70; furthermore, Reinisch observed that “[a]fter some initial 
uncertainty about the proper relationship between such treaty-based emergency defences and Article 25, the 
approach of the CMS annulment committee appears to have become the prevailing standard. Thus, investment 
tribunals are required to look first at treaty clauses which may permit certain emergency measures, implying that 
a State acting in accordance with such clauses does not violate its BIT obligations. Only where such treaty 
clauses are not available or a State’s action amounts to a breach of such clauses and/or the investment law 
obligations more generally, the secondary rules of State responsibility including Article 25 will come into play. 
In other words, a state of necessity is primarily seen as a justification for behaviour that would otherwise be 
unlawful. Necessity belongs to the secondary rules of international law and it precludes the wrongfulness of 
wrongful behaviour, mostly in the form of BIT obligations”. A. Reinisch, “Necessity in Investment Arbitration”, 
p. 156; B. Sabahi, Compensation and Restitution, pp. 181-182; See, CMS Gas Transmission Company v 
Argentina, Decision on Application for Annulment; Sempra Energy International v Argentina, Decision on 
Argentina Application for Annulment; Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation) 
and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case n. ARB/01/3, Decision on the Application for the 
Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 30 July 2010.
112 J. E. Viñuales, “State of Necessity and Peremptory Norms in International Investment Law”, November 2007, 
Available at http://works.bepress.com/jorge_vinuales/1, last accessed on: 20 June 2012, p. 6; Laird argues that a 
central issue discussed in CMS v Argentina regards the possible “intersection between fair and equitable 
treatment and the emergency type exception”. In addition, one should note that the author’s discussion of the 
CMS award starts with a reference to the United States’ national security exception in domestic investment. See, 
I. Laird, “The Emerging Exception and the State of Necessity”, in F. Ortino, L. Liberti, A. Sheppard and H. 
Warner (eds), Investment Treaty Law - Current Issues II, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
2007, p. 237.
113 CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina, Decision on the Application for Annulment, para 130, where 
the Annulment Committee qualified the tribunal’s approach as a manifest error of law; Sempra Energy 
International v Argentina, Decision on Argentina Application for Annulment, paras 207, 218, 223, where the 
Annulment Committee held that the tribunal had failed to correctly apply the applicable law (Art. 25 ILC) and 
therefore this was an annullable manifest excess of power; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LP v 
Argentina, Decision on the Application for Annulment, para 405.
the “essential interest”  requirement under Article 25 ILC.114  He has suggested “that 
acknowledging the excusing effect of peremptory norms as part of the Necessity defence may 
in fact considerably influence the way in which academics and practitioners understand and 
apply Necessity”.115 Viñuales has argued that the values enshrined in peremptory norms, as 
well as their preservation, correspond to the “essential interests”  required ex Article 25 of the 
ILC Articles and under customary international law. The author, however, has further 
explained that the two categories of “essential interests”  and “peremptory norms”  do not 
necessarily overlap, as a number of other values may amount to “essential interest”  for the 
purposes of the necessity defence.116 It is therefore highlighted that “interests considered 
essential to many States are not necessarily mirrored in peremptory norms” 117, failing to 
observe how they may also be not necessarily essential to all the States.118
Viñuales seems to sketch a hierarchy of possible ‘essential interests’, where only the 
superior category of peremptory norms holds an unquestioned primacy. It is here submitted 
that by identifying this hierarchy of values without clarifying that the identification of other 
non-peremptory, essential values hinges upon the provisions of the various IITs, the additional 
power to determine the scope of application of the necessity clause is (unreasonably) shifted 
upon arbitrators.  To the extent that either IITs do not include specific stipulations establishing 
viable ‘essential interests’, or IITs are not duly relied upon by arbitrators as the law governing 
the dispute, arbitrators would have a wide range of discretion in identifying the relevant 
interests.
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114 J. E. Viñuales, “State of Necessity and Peremptory Norms”, p. 19.
115 Id.
116 Id, p. 8.
117 Id, p. 10. The International Court of Justice has contributed to clarify the category of peremptory norms. Yet, 
no absolute consensus exists as to the status as peremptory norms of specific obligations: for instance it is 
unclear whether the right of peoples to self-determination is to be qualified as also a jus cogens norm or merely 
as a erga omnes obligation. Barcelona Traction, para 34; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 
para 88; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, para 190; East Timor, Judgment, 30 June 
1995 (Portugal v. Australia), para 29; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 
July 1996, para 79.
118 [Emphasis added].
IITs should play a fundamental role in the context of investment dispute settlement, as 
they establish and enshrine the States’ intention to be bound and to what extent.119 Therefore, 
although being well accepted that peremptory norms protect values that are essential per se to 
the international community, the decision concerning the nature of other interests, not 
irrefutably accepted as ‘peremptory’, ought to be taken in light of the legal framework 
regulating the relevant relationship, i.e., IITs. As Desierto has argued with regard to the 
Argentine cases, “standard treaty interpretation under the framework of Articles 31-33 of the 
VCLT simply could not support Argentina’s claim of BIT inapplicability as a result of 
necessity, especially in view of the plain text of Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT”.120
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119 Viñuales, however, in a different paper carefully examines the importance of the choice of the applicable law 
in those investment cases where environmental interests are at stake. J. E. Viñuales, “Foreign Investment and the 
Environment in International Law”, pp. 17-18.
120  D. A. Desierto, “Necessity and Supplementary Means of Interpretation of Non-Precluded Measures in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties”, in University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, 2010; D. A. 
Desierto, National Emergency Clauses, p. 174. The author also maintains that Argentina could not have satisfied 
the requirements of Art. 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility; see also, C. Binder, “Changed 
Circumstances in Investment Law: Interferences between the Law of Treaties and the Law of State 
Responsibility with a Special Focus on the Argentine Crisis”, in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, S. Wittich 
(eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century, Oxford Scholarship Online Monograph, 2009, pp. 
608-630: the author highlight that in “CMS, Enron and Sempra, the tribunal’s interpretation approach de facto 
results in a replacement of the treaty-based emergency exception (Article XI of the Argentine-US BIT) by the 
narrower customary law standard (Article 25 of the ILC Article). Conversely, the ‘legitimization’ approach and 
the ‘separation/two-step approach’ take the treaty standard as the primary basis of reference”; Martin also argues 
that “the argument that CIL [customary international law] should prevail over the treaty provision in establishing 
necessity is problematic”. More precisely, the author identifies two main reasons: “on the one hand, it ignores 
that the protection of the investments at stake was not organized under the public international law regime or 
CIL but under specific investment treaties acting as the applicable law should any problem arise. [....] On the 
other hand, relegating investment treaties to a subsidiary source of law would be misguiding because it suggests 
that NPM clauses are a redundant treaty form of the doctrine of necessity, which they are not. Again, the lex 
specialis is not a second-class source of law but a set of rules specifically applicable to investment disputes, 
beyond the influence of customary law. In other words, while all states would benefit from responsibility 
exemption under public international law anyway,26 treaty NPM clauses constitute an extra guarantee 
specifically negotiated by the parties to apply on top of traditional CIL rules and which should therefore be 
considered prior to the CIL necessity doctrine.” A. Martin, “Investment Disputes after Argentina’s Economic 
Crisis”, pp. 54-55.
By disregarding this assumption, two possible scenarios would arise. On the one hand, 
the power to ‘rule’ will be deferred to arbitrators,121  thus voiding IITs of one of their main 
rationales and expanding the room for inconsistencies in arbitral awards. On the other, the 
unintentional result of further reducing the scope of application of the necessity provision 
may be reached, since appointed arbitrators may refrain from applying the standard to the 
extent that the character of the value at stake is controversial. Such an attitude is not 
uncommon in arbitral practice: indeed, arbitrators facing a dubious case of expropriation may 
resort to the substantive protection granted under the FET standard to avoid complexities.122
The question of the ‘essential interest’ that entitles the State to act under the necessity 
clause––and possibly also exempts it from being charged with responsibility for wrongful 
acts––implies that the action concerned is not conceived of as regulatory in nature. Indeed, 
under the ‘necessity’ clause the wrongfulness of the measure is excused, which means that 
failing the imminent peril the same conduct would amount to an unlawful behavior. As a 
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121  G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, Oxford Monographs in International Law, 
2007, p. 121 et seq., arguing that “the authority of arbitrators under investment treaties is wide ranging and that it 
goes to the heart of public law”; M. Sornarajah, “The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration”, in C. A. Rogers, R. P. Alford (eds) The Future of Investment Arbitration, OUP, 2009, pp. 273-296. 
Sornarajah explains that “[n]ot only are arbitrators––who are conscious of the fact that this specialized areas 
involves such commercial considerations and issues of public law and sovereignty––more aware of the 
implications of creating doctrines that negate fundamental notions of sovereignty, they are also conscious of the 
fact that they lack the mandate to create adventurous and foolhardy norms that extend beyond the consent that is 
to be found in the treaties that create substantive remedies for investors. The waving of a magic wand to convert 
innocuous words in a treaty into an architecture of investment protection has created an illusion that will not 
remain for long, and there will soon be a return to sanity in the area when the bargains involved in the 
investment treaties are more clearly struck with a variety of defenses and exclusions of liability to provide for 
circumstances where it is necessary to exercise the state’s regulatory power”.
122 As a consequence, investors on numerous occasions prefer to advance claims based on violations of the FET 
standard that is more easily received by tribunals. A. Asteriti, “Metalclad, Methanex and Chemtura: 10 Years of 
Environmental Issues in NAFTA Investment Arbitrations”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 9(3), 
2012, p. 4.  The author argues that “Functionally, the FET standard is developing as the counterpart of the 
expropriation clause to cover all those cases short of an expropriation, in which the investor claims to have 
suffered harm”. However, the FET standard is covered under Article 1105 on the Minimum standard of treatment 
under the NAFTA. See also, PSEG Global Inc v Republic of Turkey, para 238. A useful distinction between 
regulatory expropriation and unfair and inequitable treatment is attempted in Tecmed. See, J. Coe Jr, N. Rubins, 
“Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case”, p. 665; on the interplay between the FET standard and the 
circumstances of the host State see, N. Gallus, “The ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ Standard and the 
Circumstances of the Host State”, in in C. Brown, K. Miles (eds)  Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and 
Arbitration, CUP, 2011, pp. 223-245; on the FET standard as fallback alternative to findings of indirect 
expropriation see,  L. Reed, D. Bray, “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, pp. 13-27.
consequence, this approach does not solve the problem posed by the distinction between 
indirect expropriation and the exercise of regulatory powers, since a regulation is such in and 
for itself. The necessity clause does not alter the character of the conduct/measure. It seems, 
therefore, that the inquiry into the nature of the measure, the analysis of the intent of the State 
and the public rationale supporting its action should in any case represent a prerequisite to the 
decision of the case. As held by the arbitral tribunal in EDF v Argentina,123 “[n]ecessity  must 
be construed strictly  and objectively, not as an easy escape hatch for host States wishing to 
avoid treaty obligations which prove difficult”.124
The situation would be different, if States were to merely argue “the bare effect of 
necessity as justification for the customary international law norm, independent of the 
stringent textual thresholds of requirements and conditions of Article 25 of ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility”.125 In this regard, one may consider for instance the health and safety 
reasons advanced by United States in the Methanex case.126
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123 EDF International SA, SAUR International v Argentine Republic.
124 Id, para 1171.
125 D. A. Desierto, National Emergency Clauses, p. 182. [Emphasis in the original]; Reinisch also points out that 
“the overview of the existing case law has demonstrated that the rules governing state of necessity as codified in 
Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility may not be regarded as fully adequate for dealing with all 
practical problems arising in international investment arbitration. Some of the preconditions for the application 
of the necessity defence, like the ‘only means’ requirement or the absence of any contribution to the state of 
necessity, appear to be overly restrictive as formulated in Article 25. However, investment tribunals have shown 
their willingness to apply the rules on necessity in a way that makes them practically useful”. A. Reinisch, 
“Necessity in Investment Arbitration”, pp. 156-157.
126 Methanex, Amended Statement, para 409-411. Prof. Brownlie lists the “loss caused indirectly by health and 
planning legislation and the concomitant restrictions on the use of property” as an exception to the payment of 
compensation. See, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 511-512. Furthermore, as Christie 
explained, “The conclusion that a particular interference is an expropriation might also be avoided if the State 
whose actions are the subject of complaint had a purpose in mind which is recognized in international law as 
justifying even severe, although by no means complete, restrictions on the use of property. Thus, the operations 
of a State’s tax laws, changes in the value of the currency, actions in the interest of the public health and 
morality, will all serve to justify actions which because of their severity would not otherwise be justifiable; 
subject to the provisio, of course, the action in question is not what would be ‘commonly’ called discriminatory”. 
G.C. Christie, “What Constitute a Taking of Property in International Law”, p. 331-332; C. Lévesque, “Les 
fondements de la distinction”, pp. 66 et seq.
The necessity defence was also invoked in Continental Casualty v Argentina,127 where 
the tribunal relied on Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT. After having explained that Article 
XI excludes the existence of a breach and operates as a safeguard,128 the tribunal interpreted 
the provision in light of international trade law, altering the conditions for the applicability of 
the emergency clause.129 It stated:
This leads the tribunal to the conclusion that invocation of Art[icle] XI under this 
BIT, as a specific provision limiting the general investment protection obligations 
(of a ‘primary’ nature) bilaterally agreed by the Contracting Parties, is not 
necessarily subject to the same conditions of application as the plea of necessity 
under general international law.130
Such an approach has a clear impact on the outcome of such cases. Customary 
international law regulating necessity is subject to temporal limitations. As established in 
LG&E, the necessity defence “is appropriate only in emergency situations; and once the 
situation has been overcome [...] the State is no longer exempted from responsibility for any 
violation of its obligations under the international law and shall reassume them 
immediately.” 131
Furthermore, the customary international law defence (of necessity) operates only as an 
excuse from wrongfulness,132 leaving it unaltered the nature of the action. To the contrary, the 
decision in Continental Casualty draws a line between Article XI under the Argentina-US 
BIT and customary international law. The tribunal interpreted the bilateral provision as a 
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127  Continental Casualty v Argentina, para 162. The approach of Continental Casualty is followed in Sempra 
Energy International v Argentine Republic, Decision on the Application for Annulment.
128  Id, para 164. See also the comment in J. E. Viñuales,”Foreign Investment and the Environment in 
International Law: An Ambiguous Relationship”, in Centre for International Environmental Studies, Research 
Paper n. 2, 2010, p. 66; J. E. Alvarez and T. Brink, “Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty v 
Argentina”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 9(3), 2012, where it is noted that subsequent annulment 
decisions of the ICISID Committee have not resolved the inconsistencies concerning the relationship between 
Article XI of the Argentine BIT and the customary international law defense of necessity; N. Bernasconi-
Osterwalder, L. Johnson, (eds), International Investment Law and Sustainable Development: Key cases from 
2000-2010, IISD 2011, pp. 54  et seq.,  available at http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1469, (Last 
accessed on: 1 August 2012); D. A. Desierto, National Emergency Clauses, pp. 175 et seq.
129 J. E. Viñuales,”Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law”, p. 66.
130 Continental Casualty v Argentina, para 167.
131 LG&E Energy, para 261.
132 J. E. Alvarez and T. Brink, “Revisiting the Necessity Defense”, p. 330.
completely distinct defence, and this led to a solution that, by borrowing WTO law and 
applying it to the investment treaty context, entailed “greater [consequences] than the 
consequences of borrowing other trade jurisprudence”.133  As Alvarez and Brink have 
maintained, “the different interpretations of ‘necessity’ at stake in Continental” have 
“radically alter[ed] the standards as well as the scope of review in the context of a provision 
that, depending on whether trade or customary law is deemed the relevant comparator, is or is 
not exculpatory”.134 The authors have thus submitted that “for this reason alone, decision to 
apply one standard over the other require careful consideration and justification”.135
The interpretation of Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT as not corresponding to 
customary international law on defence had a bearing on the whole decision on the merits of 
the award.136 Alvarez and Khamsi have contended that the interpretation was erroneous and 
that the Article,
read in good faith and in light of its plain meaning and object and purpose, ought 
to be interpreted, consistent with the injunction to read treated in light of all 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties, 
as conforming to and not as a derogation from the customary defenses of force 
majeure, necessity and distress.137
Structural differences in fact characterize investment and WTO law, especially 
considering the role that BITs grant to foreign investors. Foreign investors “activate the BIT 
claims process, choose what claim to bring and what argument to present”  and, thereby, “they 
can effectively control the arbitral agenda and indirectly but effectively help to develop 
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133 J. E. Alvarez and T. Brink, “Revisiting the Necessity Defense”, p. 332.
134 Id, p. 333.
135 Id.
136  Desierto points out that the Continental Casualty award “suffers from various points of internal 
inconsistencies”  and that “these [internal inconsistencies] put to question the reasonableness or fairness of the 
expansive reading of Article XI’s necessity clause”. It is therefore asserted that “both Continental Casualty and 
the Annulment Decision in Sempra concretely illustrate how this interpretation can be problematic in both 
substantive and methodological aspects”. D. A. Desierto, National Emergency Clauses, p. 176.
137 J. E. Alvarez and K. Khamsi, “The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the 
Investment Regime”, in K. P. Sauvant ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009, 
New York, OUP, 2009, pp. 427-435; in RSM Production Corporation v Grenada, para 390, the Tribunal indeed 
explains that “Where the text of a treaty is clear, the meaning of this text must be applied; and further subjective 
and teleological interpretation is not necessary”.
international investment law”.138  Exit and voice in the investment regime are furthermore 
favored, given the difficulties in enforcing investor-State arbitral awards.139 In contrast, the 
trade regime is more State-centric and it operates as an interstate140  dispute settlement 
mechanism.141 Consequently, it is questionable the tribunal’s decision to resort to the WTO 
jurisprudence on necessity under GATT Article XX.
Questions of appropriateness have indeed been advanced that challenge the Continental 
proportionality testing of private rights v public interests. Particularly, it has been noted that 
the Continental tribunal abstained from analyzing the interplay between the FET and 
Argentina’s necessity defence, thereby leaving unexplored a number of substantive claims by 
the investors, including those alleging the expropriatory nature of Argentine measures under 
Article IV of the BIT.142 It is arguable that by using the proportionality balancing in the 
interpretation of the FET, both consistency and uniformity in the arbitral jurisprudence may 
be improved. More precisely, “how143 measures taken in the midst of an Argentina-type crisis 
might affect the interpretation of a BIT’s substantive guarantee, including fair and equitable 
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138 J. E. Alvarez and T. Brink, “Revisiting the Necessity Defense”, p. 349.
139 Id, p. 351.
140 [Emphasis added].
141 J. E. Alvarez and T. Brink, “Revisiting the Necessity Defense”, p. 349.
142 Id, pp. 353-354. See, Continental Casualty v Argentina, paras 275, 283. The authors argue that in National 
Grid v Argentina, although rejecting the necessity defence, the Tribunal considered the economic crisis relevant 
to the interpretation of the FET as a treaty guarantee for the investor. More precisely, the Tribunal found the 
breach of the FET and it qualified this determination by considering the context in which the State decided to act. 
Therefore, the governmental actions aimed to cope with the crisis (those taken on January 6, 2002) were not 
deemed unfair or inequitable; however, the State’s decision to renounce the specific remedies that it had offered 
to the investor was judged unlawful. See, National Grid v Argentina, paras 167-180. See also, A. Stone Sweet, 
“Investor-State Arbitration”, pp. 47-76.
143 [Emphasis added].
treatment” 144 ought to be studied since, “how proportionality balancing is applied, and to 
which part of an investment treaty, matters”.145
How an economic crisis may affect the interpretation of the FET, is discussed in EDF v 
Argentina.146 The tribunal held that it “is mindful that the economic crisis is relevant to the 
interpretation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard”.147  Furthermore, the tribunal 
stated that
The investor’s expectations must be balanced against the host state’s need to take 
action in the public interest at a time of crisis. By the same token, an integral part 
of fairness and equity must be constituted by respect for fundamental 
representations of a concession after a state of emergency has passed and 
economic equilibrium can be restored.148
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144 A. Stone Sweet, “Investor-State Arbitration”, p. 63-64; J. E. Alvarez and T. Brink, “Revisiting the Necessity 
Defense”, p. 355.
145  J. E. Alvarez and T. Brink, “Revisiting the Necessity Defense”, pp. 355-356. From this perspective, the 
approach to the proportionality balancing endorsed under the US constitutional jurisprudence or applied by the 
ECtHR are suggested as points of reference. The author describes the US approach as a rational basis/strict 
scrutiny; Viñuales clarifies the main difference between the ‘police powers doctrine’ and the ‘margin of 
appreciation doctrine’ as it is applied in the investment context. He argues that in a case where a measure has 
been adopted for environmental reasons, the police powers doctrine would favor the host State since it would 
exempt it from liability. Conversely, through the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Tribunal 
may be enabled “to defer to the environmental assessment conducted by the State authorities while considering 
that the measures taken on that basis were not proportional”. Therefore, Viñuales reaches the conclusion that 
“under the margin of appreciation doctrine, the link between deference and exemption of liability is mediated by 
the concept of proportionality whereas, under the police powers doctrine, proportionality plays a part only with 
respect to whether the doctrine is applicable or not. Once applied, the police powers doctrine excludes liability. 
This difference has also some bearing in connection with issues of compensation [...]”. J. E. Viñuales, “Foreign 
Investment and the Environment in International Law”, pp. 62-64, commenting on Tecmed v Mexico, paras 
119-122. Contra the applicability of the margin of appreciation doctrine see Chemtura v Canada, Award, para 
123, in S. V. Vadi, “Overlapping Regulatory Spaces”, p. 589, where it is argued that the Tribunal in Chemtura 
stated that “it would not apply an abstract level of deference when scrutinising the conduct of states, but that it 
would weigh all the circumstances including ‘the fact that certain agencies manage highly specialized domains 
involving scientific and public policy determinations”. However, commenting on Chemtura also Vadi noted that 
“a more extensive reasoning regarding the margin of appreciation” or concerning the “type of review conducted 
by arbitral tribunals”  would have been desirable; on the interpretation of the margin of appreciation doctrine see 
also, Quasar de Valores v The Russian Federation, paras 178 et seq.
146 EDF International SA, SAUR International SA v Argentine Republic.
147 Id, para 1005.
148 Id.
According to the tribunal, the “failure to abide by express commitments without re-
establishing economic balance in a reasonable period of time constitutes inequitable 
conduct”.149
The holding of the arbitral tribunal in Ulysseas v Ecuador clarifies that “the idea that 
legitimate expectations, and therefore FET [fair and equitable treatment], imply the stability 
of the legal and business framework”  may be correct to the extent that it is not “stated in an 
overly-broad and unqualified formulation”.150 In such a case the FET would “mean the virtual 
freezing of the legal regulation of economic activities, in contrast with the State’s normal 
regulatory power and the evolutionary character of economic life”.151 The tribunal pointed out 
that in the absence of specific promises or representations made by the State to the investor, 
“the [investor] may not rely on a bilateral investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy 
against the risk of any changes in the host State’s legal and economic framework. Such 
expectation would be neither legitimate nor reasonable”.152
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149 EDF International SA, SAUR International SA v Argentine Republic, para 999. More precisely, the Tribunal 
stated that it “need not decide whether Article 3 establishes an autonomous and independent standard of fairness 
or simply coincides with customary international minimum standard”.
150 Ulysseas, Inc v Ecuador, paras 248-249, quoting EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, para 217.
151 Id.
152 Id. The Tribunal further observes that a “violation of the [FET] standard cannot be determined in the abstract, 
what is fair and reasonable depending on a confrontation of the objective expectations of the investor and the 
regulatory power of the State in the light of the circumstances of the case”. In addition, the license contract 
concluded between the State and the investor contained a provision that established compensatory rights in the 
case the State’s laws prejudiced the investors and its economic and financial stability. The Tribunal interpretes 
this provision as an acknowledgement by the investor of the possibility that regulations could change. It further 
submits that the claimant’s failure to seek compensation under the contract (and the decision to pursue a BIT 
claim) had “waived” the contractual right.
Environmental and tax issues are also contentious with respect to the definition of viable 
governmental public purposes.153 The implementation of taxation laws is generally regarded 
as an exercise of a State’s regulatory power for which no rule of international law imposes 
specific limits.154 Nevertheless, the degree of substantial deprivation that a taxation law may 
legitimately cause may be impugned before investment tribunals, since “  ‘excessive and 
repetitive’ tax measures have a confiscatory effect and could amount to indirect 
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153 BITs tend to avoid express reference to environmental issues. Nevertheless, recent model BITs consider the 
relationship between investments and environment. E.g., Canada’s 2004 Model BIT, artt. 10, 11; United States’ 
2004 Model BIT, preamble, artt. 8, 12, 32, and Annex B (expropriation); Belgium/Luxembourg’s Model BIT, 
preamble; Finland’s 2004 Model BIT, art 5; The Netherlands’ 2004 Model BIT, preamble; Sweden’s 2003 Model 
BIT, preamble. See, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Investment 
Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovation, 2008, pp. 141 et seq. The study reviews 269 investment 
and free-trade agreements (FTAs); See also, S. A. Spears, “Making Way for the Public Interest in International 
Investment Agreements”, in C. Brown, K. Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, CUP, 
2011, pp. 271-297, highlighting that “several awards have been criticized as encroaching too far on States’ rights 
under customary international law to exercise their police powers by failing to consider the purpose of a 
challenged measure when determining whether it constituted an indirect expropriation”.
154 M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, pp. 393, 405. See also, Emanuel Too v United 
States, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Vol. 23, 1989, p. 378. In this case a cancellation of a licence for liquor was 
revoked due to tax reasons; the Tribunal held: “a state is not responsible for loss of property or for other 
economic disadvantage resulting from general taxation or any other action that is commonly accepted as within 
the police power, provided that it is not discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the 
property to the state or sell it at a distress price”.
expropriation”.155 Only ordinary taxation laws may thus be regarded as a non-compensable 
taking.156
In RosInvest v Russia,157 the tribunal considered “whether alleged expropriatory acts 
were confiscatory”.158 It established that “it is undisputed that Respondent’s measures resulted 
in the deprivation of Yukos’s assets”.159 Nevertheless, it recognized that “it is also undisputed 
[....] that States have a wide latitude in imposing and enforcing taxation laws even if resulting 
in substantial deprivation”  and that, in order to be justified, the measures should fall within 
the host State’s latitude of discretion.160
Similarly, in Link-Trading v Moldova161  the tribunal considered that “fiscal measures 
only become expropriatory when they are found to be an abusive taking”, namely
where it is demonstrated that the State has acted unfairly or inequitably towards 
the investment, where it has adopted measures that are arbitrary or discriminatory 
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155 M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, p. 405. The author explains that the confiscatory 
effect is found mainly “where a foreign investment is singled out and subjected to heavy taxation”. It is also 
clarified that many investment treaties include a specific mechanism that requires consultation between the 
parties, when “allegations of unfair taxation law” are advanced. At p. 399, the author notes: “It is clear that 
taxation is emerging as the most obvious instance of a regulatory taking. Many recent treaties call for separate 
procedures to be invoked where taxation is involved. These involve some consultative procedure between the 
state parties. Recourse to arbitration is permitted only if there is disagreement between the parties. There is now 
a build-up of awards which justify the differential treatment of tax measures. Unless the tax measure is 
exorbitant and is clearly a disguise for an expropriation or it is discriminatory, it would be difficult to 
characterize a tax measure as a compensable taking. In EnCana, the tribunal stated that taxation ‘in itself is not a 
taking of property; if it were, a universal state prerogative would be denied by a guarantee against expropriation 
which cannot be the case’ ”. See also, Marvin v Feldman, p. 318; EnCana Corporation v Ecuador; Link-Trading 
Joint Stock Company v Moldova,where taxation was regarded as abusive (see para 65); Archer Daniels Midland 
v The United Mexican States, para 240.
156 Id, p. 374; this is confirmed in EnCana Corporation v Ecuador, LCIA Case N. UN3481, Award, February 3, 
2006, para 177: “Only if a tax law is extraordinary, punitive in amount or arbitrary in its incidence would issues 
of indirect expropriation be raised. In the present case, in any event, the denial of VAT refunds in the amount of 
10% of transactions associated with oil production and export did not deny EnCana ‘in whole or significant part’ 
the benefits of its investment”; Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company 
v Government of Mongolia, (UNCITRAL), Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 April 2011, para 333. The 
Tribunal found that the measure was not to be regarded as tantamount to expropriation as it failed to meet the 
EnCana test.
157  RosInvest UK Ltd v The Russian Federation. For a careful analysis of the factual basis of the “Yukos 
litigation” see, P. B. Stephan, “Taxation and Expropriation - The Destruction of the Yukos Oil Empire”, in 
Houston Journal of International Law, Vol. 35(1), 2012, forthcoming.
158 Id, para 569.
159 Id, para 574.
160  Id. The Tribunal found that this was not the case and qualified Russia’s action as confiscatory; See also, 
Quasar de Valores v The Russian Federation, paras 125-128.
161 Link-Trading Joint Stock Company v Moldova.
in character or in their manner of implementation, or where the measures taken 
violate an obligation undertaken by the State in regard to the investment.162
Furthermore, the tribunal held that “tax measures may become expropriatory [....] when 
their application violate a specific obligation that the State has previously undertaken in favor 
of a particular person or class of persons, such as an investor”.163 However, the tribunal found 
that no specific obligation “to maintain unchanged the customs and tax regimes applicable to 
the Claimant’s customers” 164 existed between the parties, and therefore it denied the 
expropriatory nature of the tax measure.165  The tribunal first analyzed the nature of the 
governmental tax measure in order to exclude its expropriatory character, and this method 
apparently proves the assumption that a regulatory action may amount to a disguised and 
unlawful expropriation to the extent that it exceeds the regulatory powers normally attributed 
to a State. The tribunal conducts its analysis against the FET standard and it verifies the public 
nature of the purpose pursued, the fair and equitable implementation of the measure and its 
non-discriminatory nature, to establish the lawfulness of the action under scrutiny. The claim 
for expropriation is not dismissed, rather the taking issue is autonomously investigated by the 
tribunal. It found that “while one might suppose that the new tax measure contributed to 
Claimant’s losses, that is not enough to constitute expropriation. Otherwise, the concept 
would be unlimited, since most tax measures have a cost impact on taxpayers”.166
In light of these considerations, the tribunal in Link-Trading v Moldova seems to adopt a 
particularly appropriate and intelligible legal method to decide cases that oppose host States’ 
exercise of regulatory powers to claims for indirect expropriation.
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162  Link-Trading Joint Stock Company v Moldova, para 64; see also, Tza Yap Shum v The Republic of Peru, 
ICSID Case n. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Compentence, 19 June 2009.
163 Id, para 86.
164 Id.
165 Apparently the expropriatory character of the tax measure is distinguished from the expropriatory nature or 
character of the consequences of the tax measure. When assessing the claim for expropriation, the tribunal 
focuses on the effects of the measure and it is specifically the lack of sufficient evidence showing the causal link 
between the fiscal measure and the economic losses suffered by the investor that apparently prevents the finding 
of an expropriation. It is not expressly stated that the dismissal of the claim for expropriation results from having 
excluded the expropriatory character of the tax measure.
166 Id, para 91.
The approach is clarified in Quasar de Valores et al v Russia167 where, after drawing a 
comparison with RosInvest v Russia, the tribunal established that
the notion that states have a considerable margin of discretion in enacting and 
enforcing tax laws should not lead to any confused idea that they have a discretion 
as to whether or not comply with an international treaty [....] there is a world of 
difference between incidental detriment, even of a substantial nature, and 
purposeful dispossession. It is no answer for a state to say that its courts have used 
the word ‘taxation‘  - any more than the word ‘bankruptcy’ - in describing 
judgements by which  they effect the dispossession of foreign investors. If that 
were enough, investment protection through international law would likely 
become an illusion, as states would quickly learn to avoid responsibility by 
dressing up all adverse measures, perhaps expropriation first of all, as taxation. 
When agreeing to the jurisdiction of international tribunals, states perforce accept 
that those jurisdictions will exercise their judgments, and not be stumped by the 
use of labels.168
Consequently, the tribunal found that the Russian government had issued illegitimate 
tax bills and placed Yukos’ assets under State control by means of enforcement actions and 
eventual bankruptcy. It concluded that “Yukos’ tax delinquency was indeed a pretext for 
seizing Yukos assets and transferring them to Rosneft. [...] [T]his finding supports the 
Claimants’ contention that the Russian Federation’s real goal was to expropriate Yukos, and 
not to legitimately collect taxes.” 169
In Oxy v Ecuador,170 the tribunal examined the Ecuadorian Law 42 to establish whether 
it could lower Occidental’s future profits and whether compensation should be awarded. The 
tribunal firstly “characterized the legislation” 171 to establish whether it amounted to “a tax, a 
royalty, a levy or, more generally, a “matter of taxation under the Treaty, or “something 
else” 172 for jurisdictional reasons.173  Having excluded that the legislation could be 
characterized as a “matter of taxation”,174  the tribunal considered whether, as argued by the 
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167 Quasar de Valores v The Russian Federation. The award was rendered after the Russian government seized 
the Yukos Oil Company in 2007, causing enormous losses to a group of Spanish investors.
168 Id, para 179.
169 Id, para 177.
170 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador.
171 Id, para 487.
172 Id.
173 Id, para 488. By claiming that Law 42 “was a matter of taxation”, the Respondent argued that “the question of 
Law 42 is excluded from the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction in accordance with Article 10 of [the] Treaty”.
174 Id, paras 499-500.
claimant, Law 42 imposed indeed a windfall tax that violated the FET under the US-Ecuador 
BIT. The arbitral panel held that
[t]he considerable investments made by OEPC in Ecuador after the execution of 
the Participation Contract were based upon the explicit representations made by 
the Respondent during the negotiation of the Participation Contract which were 
then crystallized in the participation agreed by the parties.175
According to the tribunal, the investor “was justified in expecting that this contractual 
framework would be respected and certainly not modified unilaterally by the Respondent”  and 
therefore it concluded that the legislation was “in breach of the Participation Contract and 
flouts the Claimants’ legitimate expectations”, being, as a result, also “in breach of the 
Respondent’s [...] obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment to the Claimants’ 
investment”. The tribunal further specified that it did not”need not rule on whether Law 42 is 
in breach of other provisions of the Treaty”.176 More precisely, the tribunal reviewed the 
legality of the measure. It highlighted that, by entering into a BIT, a State becomes bound by 
it and has to honor the investment-protection obligations that the BIT establishes, rather than 
resorting to the “argument of the State’s right to regulate”  in order to ignore them.177 The 
tribunal recognized the “indisputable sovereign authority to enact laws in order to raise 
revenue for the public welfare”, however it also emphasized that “the exercise of such right is 
not unlimited and must have its boundaries” ”.178
Accordingly, the tribunal “mindful of the well-known international law principle 
summarized very clearly by the Saluka tribunal [...]” 179 established that “where the State is 
bound by the terms of a contract which it has entered into with the investor” such a “contract 
384
175 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador, paras 526-527.
176 Id.
177 The tribunal quoted ADC Affiliate v. Republic of Hungary, para 423.
178 Occidental Petroleum Corporation, paras 529-530.
179 See, Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic, Partial Award, para 255: “It is now established in international 
law that States are not liable to pay compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their 
regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed at the general 
welfare.”
fetters the State’s exercise of its regulatory powers”.180 The role of specific commitments or 
State-investors contracts as a means to regulate the exercise of police powers and accord a 
specific degree of protection to the foreign investment is thereby highlighted.
As to the debate over a State’s power to implement environmental measures that affects 
foreign investments, it commenced with Metalclad, the first arbitration under NAFTA that 
successfully received a claim for expropriation.181 The case triggered the concern for the 
scope of a State’s regulatory power and it was followed by other cases, such as Ethyl, Pope & 
Talbot, the above-mentioned S.D. Myers and the ICSID case Santa Elena.182
The US corporation Metalclad acquired a locally incorporated company COTERIN 
through its own subsidiary ECONSA, with the aim of opening a waste disposal facility in 
Guadalcazar. COTERIN in fact owned the federal permit for the activity; conversely, no 
municipal permit for the facility had been granted to the company on the assumption that the 
federal authority had the power to authorize this kind of activity. Metalclad encountered a 
number of obstacles at the local level, receiving different information concerning the need of 
a local permit and how to obtain it. Eventually, the city of Guadalcazar rejected Metalclad’s 
request for a permit and, in January 1997, an Ecological Decree was issued that affected the 
area of the proposed facility.183
Although Mexico maintained that environmental interests are covered by the NAFTA 
and should therefore be considered when interpreting the obligations of a State towards 
investors, the tribunal rejected the argument. It pointed out that the action of the Municipality 
was characterized by “procedural and substantive deficiencies”  and it therefore clarified that 
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180 Occidental Petroleum Corporation, para 530, footnote 65. [Emphasis added]. See, Saluka Investments BV  v 
Czech Republic, Partial Award, para 255.
181  Metalclad v United Mexican States, A. Asteriti, “Metalclad, Methanex and Chemtura: 10 Years of 
Environmental Issues in NAFTA Investment Arbitrations”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 9(3), 
2012, p. 6.
182  For a review of the key cases from 2000 to 2010 see, N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, L. Johnson, (eds), 
International Investment Law and Sustainable Development: Key cases.
183  See, A. Asteriti, “Metalclad, Methanex and Chemtura”, pp. 5-6; Z. Douglas, The International Law of 
Investment Claims, pp. 117-118. 
although the substantive protection granted under NAFTA “permits a Party to ensure that 
investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns”,184 in that 
case the investor’s project was not incompatible with that purpose.185 Further, with regard to 
indirect expropriation, the tribunal stated that it “need not decide or consider the motivation or 
intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree”  as “a finding of expropriation on the basis of 
the Ecological Decree is not essential to the Tribunal’s finding of a violation of NAFTA 
Article 1110”.186 It concluded stating that “the implementation of the Ecological Decree 
would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropriation”.187
The tribunal’s finding of an indirect expropriation in violation of NAFTA Article 1110 is 
not dependent upon the qualification of the measure as expropriatory under the domestic 
legislation (Ecological Decree). The States’ motivations or intent at the basis of the decision 
to adopt the Decree are not considered by the tribunal to decide whether a taking had been 
effected.
In Santa Elena,188  “a case not of environmental measures having the effect of an 
expropriation, but rather of expropriation motivated by environmental policy”,189 the tribunal 
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184 Metalclad v United Mexican States, paras 97-98.
185 A. Asteriti, “Metalclad, Methanex and Chemtura”, p. 7.
186 Metalclad v United Mexican States, paras 103, 111. See also, Azurix Corp v Argentina, para 310, the Tribunal 
established that the issue was “not so much whether the measure concerned is legitimate and serves a public 
purpose, but whether it is a measure that, being legitimate and serving a public purpose, should give rise to a 
compensation claim.”; as to cases in which investors have challenged environmental and social regulation see 
also: Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd and ors v United States, ICSID Case n. ARB/10/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 20 July 2006; Glamis Gold v United States of America.
187 Id.
188 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v Republic of Costa Rica, paras 71-72: “While an expropriation or 
taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, 
the fact that the Property was taken for this reason does not affect either the nature of the measure of the 
compensation to be paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property 
was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation myst be paid. The 
international source of the obligation to protect the environment makes no difference. Expropriatory 
environmental measures––no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole––are, in this respect, 
similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its policies: where 
property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s 
obligation to pay compensation remains”.
189 A. Asteriti, “Metalclad, Methanex and Chemtura”, p. 8.
specified that a lawful expropriation implies the duty to pay compensation, irrespectively of 
the policy that motivated the State.190 The tribunal clarified that:
[...] the purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was taken 
does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation 
must be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the environment 
makes no difference. Expropriatory environmental measures––no matter how 
laudable and beneficial to society as a whole––are, in this respect, similar to any 
other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its 
policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, 
whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation 
remains.191
The use of environmental regulation “as a sort of ‘Trojan horse’ to allow [governments] 
to selectively chip away at the value of foreign investments in their country for the purpose of 
benefiting domestic competitors, or appeasing anti-foreigner populist sentiment”  is a not only 
a risk.192  As Kolo and Waelde have explained, “concerns over the environment provide a 
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190  The ‘environmental policy’ of the investor was at the basis of the dispute in Nykomb. The investor had 
constructed an environmental-friendly co-generator power plant which was clashing with the “environmental-
unfriendly strategies of the ex Soviet State electricity monopoly”. Nykomb Synergetics v Latvia, para 4.3.1; See, 
T. Wälde, K. Hobér, “The First Energy Charter Treaty Arbitral Award”, in Transnational Dispute Management, 
Vol.4, 2004, p. 18.
191 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v Republic of Costa Rica, paras 71-72. In this case, moreover, the 
same legal question was regulated by both domestic and international law. The Tribunal highlighted the 
corrective role of international law, establishing at paras 64-65 that: “To the extent that there may be any 
inconsistency between the two bodies of law, the rules of public international law must prevail. Were this not so 
in relation to takings of property, the protection of international law would be denied to the foreign investor and 
the purpose of the ICSID Convention would, in this respect, be frustrated”. Viñuales noted that this conclusion 
suggests that “an act of expropriation for environmental purposes is subject to the rules of compensation arising 
from international investment law, irrespective of whether domestic valuation and environmental law would lead 
to a different result”. See, J. E. Viñuales,”Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law”, p. 56. 
Contra: Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, paras 65-71. The approach followed in Santa Elena  is 
reproved by a number of authors, who believe that this decision constitute an “anathema which require an 
immediate change in international law”. See, L. Goodshall, Note, “In the Cold Shadow of Metalclad: The 
Potential for Change to NAFTA’S Chapter Eleven”, in New York University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, 
2002, pp. 264-315; H. Mann, K. von Moltke, “Working Paper: NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment - 
Addressing the Impact of the Investor-State Process on the Environment”, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 1999, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf (Last accessed on: 2 August 2012); M- 
Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment; See, J. R. Marlles, “Public Purpose, Private Losses: 
Regulatory Expropriation and Environmental Regulation in International Investment Law,” in Journal of 
Transnational Law and Policy, Vol. 16(2), 2006-2007, p. 331; However, it is clear that a “blanket exception for 
regulatory measures would create a gaping loophole in international protection against expropriation”. See, J. 
Coe Jr, N. Rubins, “Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case”, p. 633. Feldman v Mexico, Award, para 
110; Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, para 99.
192 J. R. Marlles, “Public Purpose, Private Losses”, p. 332; the same may be argued with regard to the principle 
of the investment’s benefit to the host State, to the extent that it allows the government to change its views about 
the what is beneficial to the country and thus affect the investor. See, F. Ortino, L. Liberti, A. Sheppard and H. 
Warner (eds), Investment Treaty Law - Current Issues II, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
2007, pp. 248-249.
convenient platform for even the most unlikely bedfellows to challenge emerging institutions 
of the global community under environmental, human rights, protectionist, nationalist and 
sovereignty-based, statist and communitarian headings”.193
Marlles has noted that this argument is “fully proven”  in the Metalclad award.194 The 
author especially refers to the decision of the governor of the Mexican State of San Luis 
Potensi to create a “Natural Area for the Protection of rare cactus”  which, “just happened to 
encompass the Metalclad site”.195
In S. D. Myers, the distinction between expropriation and regulation is further analyzed. 
The tribunal clarified that “[t]he general body of precedent does not treat regulatory action as 
amounting to expropriation”. It underlined that “[r]egulatory conduct by public authorities is 
unlikely to be the subject of legitimate complaint under Article 1110 [expropriation] of the 
NAFTA, although the Tribunal does not rule out that possibility”. According to the tribunal, in 
fact, “[e]xpropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights; regulations a lesser 
interference”  and as a consequence it established that “the distinction between expropriation 
and regulation screens out most potential cases of complaints concerning economic 
intervention by a state and reduces the risk that governments will be subject to claims as they 
go about their business of managing public affairs”.196
Such a distinction was confirmed in Methanex v United States,197 where in a obiter 
dictum the arbitral tribunal emphasized the importance of specific commitments given by the 
State to the investor. The tribunal held:
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193 T. Wälde, A. Kolo, “Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’”, p. 812, as 
quoted in J. R. Marlles, “Public Purpose, Private Losses”, p. 332; C. Lévesque, “Les fondements de la 
distinction”, p. 68.
194 Metalclad v United Mexican States, paras 59, 109.
195 J. R. Marlles, “Public Purpose, Private Losses”, p. 332.
196  SD Myers v Government of Canada, paras 281-282. This general rule endorse the assumption that “an 
investor is expected to sustain some regulatory intervention without compensation”. In Feldman, indeed, it is 
maintained at para 112 that “not all regulatory activity that makes the investment uneconomical is an 
expropriation”. J. Coe Jr, N. Rubins, “Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case”, p. 634.
197 Methanex v United States of America.
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory 
and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that 
the government would refrain from such regulation.198
The clearest formulation of police powers is offered in the Chemtura award,199  where 
the tribunal considered the measures challenged by the claimant as an expression of the police 
powers doctrine. As the measures were taken within the mandate, in a non-discriminatory 
manner and were “motivated by the increasing awareness of the dangers presented by lindane 
for human health and the environment”, the tribunal considered them as “a valid exercise of 
the State’s police powers” that does “not constitute an expropriation”.200
It proceeds from the analysis conducted above that “specific assurances”  given by the 
host State to investors (i.e., assurances not to change a relevant legislation) may play––and 
are attributed by investment arbitrators––a discriminating role between compensable 
expropriation and non-compensable regulation. Specific commitments and reassurances are 
indeed crucial not only to a tribunal’s finding of an expropriation or a breach of FET/
legitimate expectations,201 but also to a tribunal analysis of the necessity defence.202 However, 
beyond what point the peril/emergency is so severe to overrule a specific (treaty) commitment 
between the parties is still a grey zone.
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198 Methanex v United States of America, Part IV, Chapter D, para 7. See also, Saluka Investment BV v The Czech 
Republic, Partial Award, para 262, that endorsed the Methanex opinion and Chemtura Corporation v 
Government of Canada, para 266, also referring to para 262 of Saluka.
199 J. E. Viñuales, “Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law”, p. 58.
200 Chemtura Corporation v Government of Canada, para 266.
201  For instance, in Occidental (OPEC) v Ecuador, paras 183, 186, in CMS Gas Transmission Company v 
Argentina,  para 274, in LG&E Energy v Argentina, Decision on Liability, para 124, in Enron v Argentina, paras 
257-258, and in Sempra v Argentina, para 300, the stability of the legal and business framework is regarded as an 
essential element of the fair and equitable standard of treatment. As to legitimate expectations principle, it is 
argued that it “became a recurrent, independent basis for a claim under the fair and equitable treatment 
standard”. Relying on Wälde’s Separate Opinion in the Thunderbird case, this is “possibly related to the fact that 
it provides a more supple way of providing a remedy appropriate to the particular situation as compared to the 
more drastic determination and remedy inherent in the concept of regulatory expropriation”. See, K. Yannaca-
Small, “Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard”, pp. 398-399, where the author concludes that “obligations 
entailed in the expropriation clause and those of fair and equitable treatment do not necessarily differ in quality, 
but just in intensity”.
202  See the Tribunal’s reasoning in Total, and especially its conclusion at para 345. See, Total SA v Argentina, 
Decision on Liability, ICSID Case N. ARB/04/1, 21 December 2010, para 345.
In Waste Management v Mexico203 it was considered essential to a finding of a violation 
of Article 1105 NAFTA that the treatment accorded to the investor was in breach of 
representations made by the State and relied upon by the investor. Similarly, in MTD v 
Chile204 arbitrators found a breach of the FET relying on the inconsistent behavior of host 
State’s authorities. The tribunal considered the assurances given by the Chilean Foreign 
Investment Commission (‘FIC’) and it decided that the regulatory risk was to be imposed 
upon the governmental authority.205
More recently, in Encana Corporation v Ecuador, the tribunal held
In the absence of a specific commitment from the State, foreign investor has 
neither the right nor any legitimate expectation that the tax regime will not 
change, perhaps to its disadvantage, during the period of the investment. Of its 
nature all taxation reduces the economic benefits an enterprise would otherwise 
derive from the investment; it will only be in extreme case that a tax which is 
general in its incidence could be judged as equivalent in its effect to an 
expropriation of the enterprise which is taxed.206
The extent to which the proof of similar guarantees may enable investment protection 
clauses to prevail over domestic environmental or social concerns is yet to be determined.207 
Striking the balance between the protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations and 
national public interests is anything but obvious. The parameter of ‘reasonableness’ is fluid 
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203 Waste Management Inc. v. Mexico (n. 2), para 98.
204 MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v. Republic of Chile, paras 164-165.
205 Id.
206 Encana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, para 173. See also, Sergei Paushok v Government of Mongolia, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, para 333. The Tribunal refused to qualify the measure as ‘tantamount to 
expropriation’. It explained that the measure had not met the standard set out in EnCana v Ecuador, according to 
which “only if a tax law is extraordinary punitive in amount or arbitrary in its incidence would issues of indirect 
expropriation be raised”. The Tribunal further continued: “It is clear that the Encana Tribunal did not conclude 
that, if a measure showed the characteristics it mentioned, this would automatically constitute ‘an unlawful 
deprivation’, as alleged by Claimants. It might or it might not, depending on the circumstances of the case”.
207 Note however the reference to a “domestic public purpose” that recurs in recent BITs and which “is meant to 
enable a tribunal to incorporate into its analysis the understanding of the relevant concept in domestic law”. See, 
UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 31, quoting the 2009 Belgium/Luxembourg-Colombia BIT, Art. IX(2): “It is 
understood that the criterion ‘utilidad pública o interés social’ contained in Article 58 of the Constitución Política 
de Colombia (1991) is compatible with the term ‘public purpose’ used in this Article”.
and it may give rise to a number of interpretative obstacles. Furthermore, the proof of the 
specific commitments and reassurances received (or given) is also problematic.208
Here, stabilization clauses must be considered. In fact, stabilization clauses209 may have 
an impact upon a State’s exercise of regulatory powers, contributing to cast doubts on whether 
a State that acts in violation of a stabilization clause, but in pursuance of a public purpose or 
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208  In Total SA v Argentina the arbitral Tribunal states that “under international law, unilateral acts, statements 
and conduct by States may be the source of legal obligations which the intended beneficiaries or addresses, or 
possibly any member of the international community, can invoke. The legal basis of that binding character 
appears to be only in part related to the concept of legitimate expectations––being rather akin to the principle of 
‘estoppel’. [....] According to the International Court of Justice, only unilateral acts that are unconditional, 
definitive and ‘very specific’ have binding force, which derives from the principle of good faith”. The Tribunal 
further recalls the Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal 
obligations, formulated in 2006 by the International Law Commission. Despite noting that the Guidelines does 
not deal with “domestic normative acts relied upon by a foreign private investor”, the Tribunal applies the 
conditions required under the Guidelines to evaluate the existence of specific legal commitments for the issuing 
party (i.e., factual circumstances, relevance of content and intent, non-arbitrariness in case of revocation, 
restrictive interpretation of unilateral acts). Accordingly, the Tribunal found that “the provisions according to 
which the gas tariffs were to be calculated in US dollars and adjusted in line with the US PPI cannot be properly 
constructed as ‘promises’ upon which Total could rely, since they were not addressed directly or indirectly to 
Total”; in addition, “no assurances about such stability [....] had been given by Argentina’s authorities to Total 
when Total was considering the investment or was carrying out the transactions. Moreover such assurances had 
not been sought by Total”. See, Total SA v Argentina, Decision on Liability, paras 131-134, 145, 149.
209 Stabilization clauses are included into foreign investment contracts or concessions concluded between a State 
and an investor. They grant further protection to investments given that BITs contain umbrella clauses that 
usually oblige contacting State to abide by contractual commitments under investment agreements. The aim of a 
‘stabilization clause’ is to ‘stabilize’ the relationship between the parties, in the effort to secure the results of the 
investment in a specific field, context and at a specific time, so to manage the investment’s risk. Thus, they result 
from the negotiation process and the mutual influence of the parties, being devised differently to meet their 
needs. Generally, however, the effect of stabilization clauses is to force the host State not to alter the regulatory 
framework under which the investment was made, unless in compliance with specific circumstances. See, A. Al 
Faruque, “Typology, Efficacy and Political Economy of Stabilisation Clauses”, pp. ; L. Cotula, “Regulatory 
Takings, Stabilization Clauses”, pp. 5-6. The author mentions ‘intangibility stabilization clauses’ that required 
the host State not to nationalise property and required the consent of both contracting parties for contract 
modifications; ‘freezing clauses’ identifies the applicable domestic law in the one into force at the time the 
contract was concluded; ‘consistency clauses’ according to which the domestic law of the host State applies to a 
particular project only to the extent that it is consistent with the investment contract; ‘economic equilibrium 
clauses’ that requires a renegotiation of the contract against any alteration of the terms of the contract itself or, 
the payment of a compensation. See also, R. Howse, “Freezing Government Policy: Stabilization Clauses in 
Investment Contracts”, in Investment Treaty News, Vol. 1(3), April 2011, pp. 4-5; P. Weil, “Les Clauses de 
Stabilisation ou d’Intangibilité Insérées dans les Accords de Développement Economique”, in A. Pedone ed, 
Mélanges Offerts à Charles Rousseau, 1974, pp. 307-308; E. J. De Aréchaga, “State Responsibility for the 
Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property”, in New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 
Vol. 11(2), 1978, pp. 191 et seq.; F. V. Garcia-Amador, “State Responsibility in Case of ‘Stabilization’ Clauses”, 
in Florida State University of Transnational Law & Policy, Vol. 2(1), 1993, pp. 23-50. As to the early arbitral 
decisions involving stabilization clauses see, Lena Goldfields, Ltd v USSR, 1930; Sapphire v National Iranian 
Oil Company, p. 136 et seq.; see also, AGIP Co v Popular Republic of the Congo.
under emergency, is inevitably requested to pay compensation to the investor.210 It is unclear 
either whether a stabilization clause is effectively capable to predetermine the limits within 
which a State should act211 and, whether the infringement by the State of a stabilization clause 
amounts per se to an unfair and inequitable treatment. These questions may influence on the 
one hand the findings of the arbitral tribunal and on the other the parties’ choice concerning 
the legal tools available in order to prevent future disputes.
Legitimate expectations of an investor, therefore, may find an additional, substantive 
protection through stabilization clauses.212 A positive effect of the conclusion of such clauses 
may be expressed in terms of clarity and predictability of both the legal framework applicable 
and the legal constraints operating both sides. Nevertheless, it seems that emergency 
situations, as cases in which the State’s police powers are legitimate to function, continue to 
occur outside the scope and legal framework of the investment treaty and contracts and thus 
irrespectively of the inclusion of stabilization clauses. Therefore, stabilization clauses as tools 
to control the regulatory power of the State seem to effectively operate only to the extent that 
a deliberate governmental misconduct is to be reproved. Yet, as it is open to interpretation the 
normative meaning of such clauses, it might be fruitful for both the State and the investor to 
avail themselves of stabilization clauses.
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210 The legality and binding nature of stabilization clauses were upheld in Texaco v Libya, paras 59-63; Kuwait v 
Aminoil, AGIP v Congo, Revere Copper v OPIC, Methanex v United States,  Part IV, Chapter D, para 7, CMS Gas 
Transmission v Argentina, paras 296-303. See for a general overview, B. Stern, “in Search of the Frontiers of 
Indirect Expropriation”, in A. W. Rovine (ed)  Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation, 
2007, pp. 29-51.
211 Reference is made to the ‘changing of circumstances’ that may be predetermined only to a limited extent. 
212 M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, p. 282. As Sornarajah argues, “The stabilization 
clause is intended to immunise the foreign investment contract from a range of matters, such as taxation, 
environmental controls and other regulations as well as to prevent the destruction of the contract itself before the 
contract expires”. However, “Doubts have been raised as to whether a contractual clause can achieve the effect 
of fettering the legislative sovereignty of a state for a lengthy period of time. The state, in theory, must act in the 
public good as it perceives it to be at any given time. It may not be possible, as a matter of constitutional theory, 
for a state to bind itself by a contract made with a private party, particularly a foreign party, to fetter its 
legislative power. It is trite law that a legislature is not bound by its own legislation and has the power to change 
it. That being so, it cannot be bound by a provision in a simple contract. As a matter of constitutional theory, the 
stabilisation clause may not be able to achieve what it sets out to do.” See also the decision of the arbitral 
tribunal in Occidental Petroleum Corporation, para 530, footnote 65.
V. Summary
The concept of public purpose is both a requirement for a lawful expropriation213 and an 
indicator of the regulatory (non-compensable) nature of a governmental measure.
The regulatory activity of the State that is not subjected to compensation is 
encompassed under the so-called police powers doctrine. Traditionally, actions undertaken to 
counteract a state of necessity,214 or expropriations ensuing from forfeiture or fine to punish a 
crime, a seizure of property by way of taxation215  or expropriations resulting from the 
enactment of legislations protecting the environment, safety or health of nationals fall within 
the scope of the doctrine. However, there is no agreed definition of the police powers doctrine 
and a radical and a moderate approach to it may be identified.
The awards in Methanex and Saluka216 are instances of a radical application of the 
police power doctrine, which excludes the expropriatory nature of a measure insofar as it 
pursues a legitimate public purpose, and no specific assurances have been given to the 
investor. A wide margin of appreciation217 is apparently left to States in terms of self-judging 
their essential security interests and determine the appropriate measures to protect them.218
As to the moderate police powers doctrine, it combines the analysis of both the purpose 
and the effects of the interference in order to establish its expropriatory character. The 
landmark decision in this regard is the Tecmed case,219  where the tribunal tested the 
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213 See, C. Lévesque, “Les fondements de la distinction”, p. 68. The author envisages the risk to confer to the 
doctrine of police powers such a broad scope as to include all the measures undertaken in light of a public 
interest. Lévesque submits that “Or, si l’on qualifie d’exercice du pouvoir de police, grâce à une définition 
excessivement large de cette notion, toutes les mesures prises dans l’intérêt public, l’expropriation n’est plus 
possible, faute d’espace conceptuel”.
214 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project.
215 Sedco; Emanuel Too, para 56.
216 Methanex Corp v United States, Part IV, Chapter D, p. 4, para 7; Saluka Investments BV  v Czech Republic, 
Partial Award.
217 “There are very, very few mandatory rules of international law which impose limitations upon the freedom of 
States to enter into binding obligations of their own choosing. [....]  that leaves immense scope for States to reach 
agreements setting out the rules of conduct that will bind them. In this sense, international law is 
overwhelmingly consensual, contractual, in nature”. V. Lowe, “Private Disputes and the Public Interest in 
International Law”, in D. French, M. Saul, N. D. White (eds), International Law and Dispute Settlement - New 
Problems and Techniques, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 13.
218 I. A. Laird, “The Emergency Exception and the State of Necessity”, p. 244.
219 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v United Mexican States, p. 134.
proportionality of the measure against the public interest pursued and the degree of protection 
accorded to the investment.
As both the conceptualization and the application by arbitral tribunals of the concept of 
public purpose––for the purpose of the doctrine of police powers––are problematic, this 
Chapter has attempted to identify some classes of public purposes that are currently accepted 
and recognized as legitimate in international investment law.220
Considering the ‘essential interest’ in need of protection, arbitral tribunals have 
regarded it as a key requirement for admitting necessity, although the content of such an 
interest is controversial.221 Accordingly, economic crises that fall short of a constitutional 
collapse of the State are not automatically regarded as amounting to ‘essential interests’ that 
allow for finding a preclusion of wrongfulness.
Bona fide regulations in the public interest are generally accepted as legitimate public 
purposes,222  although their scope and boundaries may be subjected to disagreement. The 
notion includes ordinary bona fide tax legislations.223 In principle, also health and safety 
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220 In the words of the arbitral tribunal in CMS Gas Transmission v Argentina, para 320: “situations of this kind 
are not given in black and white but in many shades of grey”.
221 A. Martin, “Investment Disputes after Argentina’s Economic Crisis”, p. 60.
222 See also, Total SA v Argentina, Decision on Liability, para 188; Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, 
para 354. Reference is also made to Metalclad v United Mexican States, para 103; Unglaube v Costa Rica, paras 
203-205, and especially where the Tribunal holds that “while there can be no question concerning the right of the 
government of Costa Rica to expropriate property for a bona fide public purpose, pursuant to law, and in a 
manner which is neither arbitrary or discriminatory, the expropriatory measure must be accompanied by 
compensation for the fair market value of the investment”.
223 With regard to bona fide taxation laws the presumption is that they do not amount to compensable takings. 
See, Quasar de Valores v The Russian Federation, para 181: “The preceding observations are not meant to 
suggest that international tribunals should quickly reach the conclusion that ostensible tax measures are in fact 
compensable takings. To the contrary, the presumption must be that measures are bona fide, unless there is 
convincing evidence that, upon a true characterisation, they constitute a taking”; Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation, paras 499 et seq.; see also, Encana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, para 173, where the 
Tribunal notes that “it will be only in extreme cases that a tax which is general in its incidence could be judged 
as equivalent in its effect to an expropriation of the enterprise which is taxed”. However, in Compañía de Aguas 
del Aconquija SA and Vivendi (Vivendi II) v Argentine Republic, para 7.5.20, the Tribunal held that the 
“Respondent’s proposition that an act of state must be presumed to be regulatory, absent proof of bad faith, this 
is incorrect”; see also, El Paso Energy International Company v Argentine Republic, paras 236-241, 243, where 
a general regulation whose object is not the the taking of property (as in a direct taking) is presumed not to 
amount to an indirect expropriation, unless it is regarded as unreasonable, i.e., arbitrary, discriminatory, 
disproportionate or otherwise unfair.
reasons224 and ‘measures that a State deems essential for its national security’225 dispense the 
State with its duty to pay compensation. However, especially with regard to public health 
issues, the regulatory character of governmental measures has been recently challenged by 
claims alleging unlawful expropriations as a result of national tobacco control policies.226
The status of environmental concerns is also unclear. Although the ICJ has 
acknowledged the ‘essential interest’ quality of environmental matters,227  the opinions of 
arbitrators are contrasting. The need to avoid manipulations of the claim both from the side of 
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224  The Tribunal in Tza Yap Shum v Republic of Peru, paras 146-148 established that “Las fuentes de derecho 
internacional han concluido frecuentemente que no ha lugar la responsabilidad del Estado cuando actúa en 
ejercicio de su poder de policía y de forma razonable y necesaria para la protección de la salud, la seguridad, la 
moral o el bienestar público. [....]  Pero esta deferencia no es ilimitada. Aun cuando se tomen medidas en virtud 
de un interés público legítimo, los Estados no están exentos de responsabilidad y de la obligación de pagar 
compensación si su proceder es arbitrario o discriminatorio”. [it has been frequently recognized that no State 
responsibility occurs when there is an exercise of police powers, executed in a form which is deemed reasonable 
and necessary for the protection of health, security, moral and public welfare. [....] However, the deference is not 
unlimited and the State will be held responsible to the extent that the exercise is arbitrary and discriminatory. 
Ndr]; Prof. Brownlie lists the “loss caused indirectly by health and planning legislation and the concomitant 
restrictions on the use of property” as an exception to the payment of compensation. See, I. Brownlie, Principles 
of Public International Law, pp. 511-512.
225  See, M. E. Plotkin, D. N. Fagen, “The Revised National Security Review Process for FDI in the US”, in 
Columbia FDI Perspectives N. 2, 2009, available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/
2009/january2009/fdi_perspr2, (last accessed: 3 July 2012): The issue of public purpose and emergency could 
also be framed to include “essential security interests of the host State”. Following the 9/11 events, indeed, a 
trend might be identified in the review process of recent BITs, where the non-reviewable nature of a State’s 
invocation of “essential security” during investor-State dispute settlement is determined. 
226 Recent cases involving the tobacco industries, however, show that governmental measures for the protection 
of health may prompt a “clash between trademark protection and tobacco control”. Such a clash has given rise to 
claims against unlawful expropriation, as the investors have alleged that the public policy infringes with 
intellectual property rights. In addition, a violation of the FET standard may also be advanced by investors. It is 
argued that “arbitrators should adopt a holistic approach, taking human rights treaties, public health treaties and 
relevant customary law into account when they interpret relevant investment treaty provisions. Before discussing 
the investment law-legality of any tobacco control measure, it may first be necessary to consider whether and 
why the value of public health would not necessarily be of greater importance than that of investment protection 
and should therefore be given priority when serious health risks arising from smoking have been widely 
reconfirmed”. However, as the ground for the claims of tobacco industries is to be found in the broad investment 
provisions contained in BITs, the opportunity to stipulate “ad hoc safeguards” or exceptions for public health 
reasons concerning tobacco products is envisaged. See, V. S. Vadi, “Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: 
Trademark Protection v Tobacco Control in International Investment Law”, in Standford Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 48, 2012, pp. 93-130; Philip Morris Norway AS v. Norway, EFTA Court, Case E-16/10, available at 
http://www.eftacourt.int/images/uploads/16_10_Judgment_EN.pdf, (last accessed: 12 September 2012); FTR 
Holding S.A. (Switz.), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switz.) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v. Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/I0/7, Request for Arbitration, 19 February 2010, p. 1 para 7. See 
also, Vadi S. V., “Trade Mark Protection, Public Health and International Investment Law: Strains and 
Paradoxes”, in European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 20(3), 2009, pp. 773-803; P. Acconci, Tutela della 
salute e diritto internazionale, Cedam, 2011, especially at pp. 411 et seq.
227 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project.
States228 and investors to their benefit strikes arbitral tribunals that are called to find a 
balanced result.
Apparently, environmental issues allow for a search of an overarching concept or 
superior value in general international law.229 Given the lack of international consensus on the 
‘peremptory’ or ‘erga omnes’230 nature of norms devoted to the protection of the environment, 
such an approach remains tentative and open to criticism.
The analysis conducted above shows the crucial significance of the choice of law with 
respect to the notion of public interest. To the extent that general international law is––or is 
not––deemed to prevail over the IITs provisions in regulating the State-investor relationship, 
remarkable consequences may unfold with respect to finding a regulatory expropriation.
It has been argued that “given the nature of international law”, the way for the 
international legal system adequately to protect the public interest is to ensure that the State 
“remains bound by [its international] obligations before one seeks to enforce them”.231 In fact, 
“the political duties and responsibilities of governments are owed to their internal electorates, 
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228 I. e., environmental concerns should not become a pretext for domestic protectionism.
229 See, supra note 16. Reference is made to a number of recent BITs that interpret public purpose as referring to 
customary international law, to customary international law in compliance with international law (as enshrined in 
the IIT), or to domestic law.
230 Agius notes: “An intriguing notion is however, the idea that necessity could be invoked to safeguard interests 
and values associated with international obligations erga omnes, when these contrast with the bilateral 
obligations of a state. Although it may not appear fully realistic that states would act in such a manner at this 
stage, it is submitted that it is in situations such as these that necessity may prove to be most beneficial. It would 
then provide states with a legal opportunity to act in accordance with a balance of interests of a global nature – 
one that is otherwise often not on the agenda”. See, M. Agius, “The Invocation of Necessity in International 
Law”, p. 135. See also, M. Fitzmaurice, “The International Court of Justice and Environmental Disputes”, in D. 
French, M. Saul, N. D. White (eds), International Law and Dispute Settlement - New Problems and Techniques, 
Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 17-56, who argues: “In the view of this author, the discussion concerning the 
suitability of the ICJ as a forum for settlement of environmental disputes should not be focused any more on 
whether it is in principle suitable to decide environmental cases but rather on the extent of its contribution to the 
development and crystallization of the body of norms of international environmental law and their integration 
within the body of general international law”.
231 V. Lowe, “Private Disputes and the Public Interest”, pp. 14-16. See also note 152.
and not to some hypothesised ‘international community’ ”.232 Accordingly, a State’s capacity 
to invoke regulatory expropriation is widened insofar as customary international law is 
regarded as the law governing the relationship.
Therefore, it is apparent that assigning the role of ‘governing law’ of the dispute either 
to customary international law or to the IIT provisions is not trivial. Rather, the choice entails 
substantial implications on the reasoning and finding of tribunals, altering the outcome of 
their decisions. Disregarding the consensual nature of international law and the preeminent 
role of IITs as instances of States’ contractual autonomy in regulating international 
investments is the source of most inconsistencies––and errors233––in arbitral awards.
As the ICJ recently noted, 
in contemporary international law, the protection of the rights of companies and 
the rights of their shareholders, and the settlement of the associated disputes, are 
essentially governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements [....] In that context, 
the role of diplomatic protection somewhat faded [....].234
Thus, as IITs are replacing the traditional mechanism of diplomatic protection with 
regard to the treatment of aliens,235  one cannot avoid acknowledging that “the lex specialis is 
so prevalent that it can now be considered the general rule”.236 This assumption, of course, 
has to be read in light of the fact that a BIT is not a self-contained regime but has to be 
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232 Id, p. 16; see also, K. Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance, p. 275. The author notes: 
“The expansion of the institution of investment protection to the point where it may interfere with public policy 
development has not only taken the environmental regulators unawares, it has also shocked the general public, 
who expect their governments to be accountable to them rather than to foreign corporations and enigmatic 
tribunals. Traditionally, in international law and international relations states are considered the loci of power 
and authority. The protection of foreign investment through international, regional and bilateral agreements and 
through foreign investment contracts shifts some of this power and authority to arbitral tribunals”.
233 McLachlan notes that “[i]t was taking the customary doctrine first, and then conflating its test with that of the 
Treaty, without close consideration of the differences, which contributed to the errors of the CMS Tribunal, and 
those which followed it”. C. McLachlan, “Investment Treaties and General International Law”, p. 136.
234 Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Preliminary Objections, para 88.
235  According to the UNCTAD Report, by the end of 2009, nearly 2750 BITS and 295 other international 
economic agreement with investment provisions could be counted. See, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
2010, 2010, p. 81.
236  CMS Gas Transmission Co v Republic of Argentina, Jurisdiction, p. 504, as quoted in C. McLachlan, 
“Investment Treaties and General International Law”, p. 106; see also, Z. Douglas, “The Hybrid Foundations of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration”, p. 151, which investigates the relationship between custom and treaty with a 
focus on international investment law procedure.
considered “within a wider juridical context”.237 International law must be incorporated into 
the analysis of any claim under an IIT by means of the rules of treaty interpretation, as 
provided by Articles 31and 32 VCLT.238 Accordingly, by properly approaching the issue “as 
one of treaty interpretation”, an orderly method of legal reasoning239 would arise that places 
the Treaty text at the core of the enquiry and that resorts to general international law only to 
assist the interpretation of that text.240
This orderly method of legal reasoning entails that general international law in 
investment treaty cases is applied to perform its primary role, that is to shed light on the 
parties’ intentions, as expressed in the IIT; or, to regulate issues that are not expressly 
addressed in the Treaty in a different way.241
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237  Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (‘AAPL’) v Republic of Sri Lanka, para 265-266, Rule D; see also, M. 
Koskenniemi, Report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law finalized by M. 
Koskenniemi, U.N. Doc. A./CN.4/L.682, 2006; ILC, Report on the Work of Its Fifty-Eight Session, A/61/10, 
Chapter XII, paras. 237-251, both available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/1_9.htm, (last accessed on: 28 June 
2011).
238  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. C. McLachlan, “Investment 
Treaties and General International Law”, p. 115.
239 Emphasis added.
240 C. McLachlan, “Investment Treaties and General International Law”, p. 136; See also, R. Moolo, J. Jacinto, 
“Standards of Review and Reviewing Standards”, forthcoming.
241 Id; As correctly pointed out by Spears, there are a number of questions that arise with regard to the role of 
arbitrators in dealing with public interest issues, such as “what legitimacy will international arbitrators be able to 
claim for performing a balancing exercise that can be equated with the administration of global administrative or 
constitutional law? What weight should arbitrators give to competing policy objectives and what degree of 
deference should they show to sovereign regulatory decisions? What types of evidence and what sources of law 
will be relevant to the adjudicative exercise?”. Thus, by relying on an “orderly method of legal reasoning”, 
legitimacy may be restored to investment arbitration, constraining the unbridled power of its adjudicators. S. A. 
Spears, “Making Way for the Public Interest”, p. 296; see also, W. W. Burke-White, A. Von Staden, “Investment 
Protection in Extraordinary Times”, pp. 401-410, supporting an interpretation of the Non-Precluded Measures 
Provisions (‘NPM’)  that is grounded on the Vienna Convention and also recognizes the intent of States parties in 
entering into the bilateral investment treaty. It is argued “[r]eliance on interpretive short-cuts or inappropriate 
invocation of legal doctrines from other areas of international law is dangerous and may further erode the 
legitimacy of an already fragile investor-state arbitral system. Whatever the treaty clause in question, even ad 
hoc tribunals must undertake the diligent process of treaty interpretation called for by the Vienna Convention and 
deserved by investors and states alike”.
By reconciling the treaty language with general international law in light of the rules of 
treaty interpretation,242  the scope of the FET may also be adequately determined. The 
substantial meaning of regulatory expropriation is distinguished from the general principle of 
due process which lays the foundations of the FET standard, thus “accommodat[ing] the 
conflicting interests involved”.243 The FET ought to be interpreted neither as “simply an 
application of ex aequo et bono decision making, nor [as] an opportunity for arbitrators to 
apply broad, subjective discretion”.244 Rather, the FET is a rule of law, whose core element is 
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242  C. McLachlan, “Investment Treaties and General International Law”, p. 128; see also, M. Paparinskis, 
“Investment Treaty Interpretation and Customary Investment Law: Preliminary Remarks”, in C. Brown, K. 
Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration,  CUP, 2011, pp. 65-95; J. Bonnitcha, “Outline of 
a Normative Framework for Evaluating Interpretations of Investment Treaty Protections”, in C. Brown, K. Miles 
(eds)  Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, CUP, 2011, pp. 117-144; F. Berman KCMG QC, 
“Evolution or Revolution?”, in C. Brown, K. Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, 
CUP, 2011, pp. 658-672. At p. 667, the author explains “we should not underestimate the huge benefit we enjoy 
in having under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties a universally recognised ‘golden rule’ of 
interpretation surrounded by other rules expressed in terms that have a good correspondence with the experience 
of international life. [...]  The rules of interpretation are not there to provide the answer to a particular question of 
interpretation; they give you the techniques by which you find the answer to your question.”; T. Wälde, 
“Interpreting Investment Treaties”, pp. 724-780: the author argues that “the best approach is a resolutely 
technical and professional approach, that is, an approach that employs increasingly detailed drafting techniques 
in treaty-making, but also predominantly textual approach linked to identifiable common elements of modern 
practice in interpretation”. Furthermore, the author calls for a “gradual and cautious evolution which draws its 
legitimacy from a style of interpretation that is and appears to be reasonable faithful to the authoritative text”; J. 
R. Weeramantry, Treaty Interpretation.
243  R. Jennings, A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th Ed.,1996, p. 933. C. McLachlan, “Investment 
Treaties and General International Law”, pp. 126-128. The author refers also to the Saluka, para 306, where it is 
maintained that the process of balancing between the protection to be accorded to the investor and the legitimate 
public interest of the State involves a “weighing of the [investor’s]  legitimate and reasonable expectations on the 
one hand and the [host State’s] legitimate regulatory interests on the other”; see also, J. Coe Jr, N. Rubins, 
“Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case”, p. 665, where it is pointed out that the Tribunal in Tecmed 
attempted to separated the concepts of regulatory expropriation and FET. 
244 M. Kinnear, “The Continuing Development of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard”, in A. Bjorklund, I. 
A. Laird, S. Ripinsky (eds)  Investment Treaty Law - Current Issues III, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2009, pp. 225-226.
the protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations.245 In this regard, an intersection may 
be identified between the protection of legitimate expectations and the requirement that no 
specific assurances246 (to the contrary) have been given from the State to the investor for a 
measure to be deemed regulatory in nature.
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245 M. Kinnear, “The Continuing Development of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard”, pp. 225-226; see 
also, S. W. Schill, “Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of 
Law”, in Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper, 2006/6; H. Haeri, “A Tale of Two 
Standards: ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ and the Minimum Standard in International Law”, in Arbitration 
International, Vol. 27(1), 2011, pp. 27-45; J. E. Alvarez, “The Public International Law Regime Governing 
International Investment”, p. 326. Alvarez questions: “[...]  is FET a de facto delegation to investor-State 
arbitrators to apply equitable rules or even to decide a dispute ex aqueo et bono, that is, on the basis of equity? If 
so, does it authorize an arbitrator to consider the equities on both sides, that is the rights of host States being sued 
as well as those of investors? If that is the case, application of FET might entitle arbitrators to consider the 
particular circumstances of a host State, including its available resources or its actual capacity to extend the 
protections of the national rule of law, in the course of determining the level of FET protection that an investor 
might reasonably expect. This interpretation of FET might go some way towards achieving the re-calibration or 
re-balancing of State/investor rights that some would urge”; see also, J. Stone, “Arbitrariness, the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard, and the International Law of Investment”, in Leiden Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 25(1), 2012, pp. 77-107. The author attempts a definition of the FET’s meaning. He identifies “at least 
seven obligations”, namely: “good faith, non-discrimination, provision of justice, protection of legitimate 
expectations, transparency, freedom from coercion and harassment, and non-arbitrary conduct”. The author 
further observes that “[b]ecause they share the objective of ensuring fair and equitable treatment, these 
obligations are similar and may have overlapping characteristics” (pp. 84-85); A. H. Ali, K. Tallent, “The Effect 
of BITs on the International Body of Investment Law: The Significance of Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Provisions”, in C. A. Rogers, R. P. Alford (eds)  The Future of Investment Arbitration, OUP, 2009, p. 221; J. 
Bonnitcha, “The Problem of Moral Hazard and Its Implications for the Protection of ‘Legitimate Expectations’ 
under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard”, in Investment Treaty News, Vol. 1(3), April 2011, pp. 6-8.
246 U. Kriebaum, “Regulatory Takings”, p. 727: it is observed that “expropriation clauses [....] will, in effect, only 
cover formal or discriminatory expropriation or cases where an explicit commitment has been made”.
In fact, legitimate expectations of the investor are such when they stem from 
“conditions prevailing in the host State at the time of the investment”.247 Therefore, to the 
extent that a State has previously bound itself to specific commitments, a breach of the FET 
standard may be easily inferred. From a practical point of view, this suggests also that 
endowing an investment contract with a stabilization clause would prove beneficial to the 
investor, for the clause may be interpreted as a plain signal248 of the commitment of the State 
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247  Enron Corporations and Ponderosa Assets v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, para 262; M. 
Kinnear, “The Continuing Development”, pp. 226 et seq.: Kinnear explains that legitimate expectations also 
imply the specificity of the offer, the reliance on the offer, the host state’s obligation to maintain a stable business 
environment. Furthermore, it is clarified that investor’s expectation should be reasonable, namely assessed 
according to an objective standard; see, Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania, para 333, explaining that an the 
investor’s right to have its legitimate expectations protected depends upon their reasonableness and the due 
diligence exercise by the investor; see also, R. Dolzer, “Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in 
Investment Treaties”, in International Lawyer, Vol. 39, 2005, p. 103: “The pre-investment legal order forms the 
framework for the positive reach of the expectation which will be protected and also the scope of considerations 
upon which the host state is entitled to rely when it defends against subsequent claims of the foreign investor. 
Here it becomes clear that the standard of fair and equitable treatment centres, to a considerable degree, on 
expectations of the foreign investor and that in the individual case the legitimacy of these expectations will 
largely depend upon the objective state of the law as it stands at the time when the investor acquires the 
investment”; see also, G. Sacerdoti, “The Admission and Treatment of Foreign Investment under Recent 
Bilateral and Regional Treaties”, in Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 1, 2000, p. 121, arguing that 
“general principles of fairness, equality and balancing of interest that are neither immutable nor universal”; with 
regard to the question whether the FET standard has had any impact on the content of the minimum standard of 
treatment (‘MST’)  see, traditionally, LFH Neer & Pauline Neer v Mexico, UNRIAA, Vol. 4, 15 October 1926, 
pp. 61-62, and recently, (arguing in favor of this solution): Mondev International Ltd v United States, Award, 
paras 116, 125; ADF Group Inc v United States, Award; Waste Management Inc v Mexico (n. 2), para 98; 
Occidental v Ecuador, paras 188-190; Azurix Corp v Argentina; Merrill & Ring v Canada,  para 213; Chemtura 
Corporation v Canada, para 215; and, (arguing contra) Glamis Gold v United States, para 627.
248  See also, A. Crockett, “Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development: Drafting for the Future”, in C. 
Brown, K. Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, CUP, 2011, pp. 516-538. The author 
notes that “by including a stabilization clause in their contracts, investors and States signal their intention that the 
agreement shall have a long life. Failing to make provision for the evolution of environmental and social 
standards is inconsistent with this intention.”; In his 2008 report, Ruggie highlights that concerns about 
regulatory opportunism (as opposed to regulatory uncertainty) may effectively be addressed through limited 
stabilization clauses. J. Ruggie, Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights, International Finance Corporation, 
May 2008, available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/
p_StabilizationClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf, (last accessed: 24 September 2012). 
However, it has also been noted that “the transaction costs of contracting could be considered to be higher in the 
presence of a stabilization clause”. Nevertheless, “[o]bligations such as the requirement of compensation for 
expropriation and of fair and equitable treatment have, admittedly, been read by some tribunals as providing 
some sort of guarantee against regulatory changes that are harmful to the investor. Nevertheless, there readings 
are the exception rather than the rule. The norms on expropriation and fair and equitable treatment do address 
concerns about regulatory opportunism that are often cited as rationales for stabilization clauses, but because of 
the considerable uncertainty as to whether a tribunal will order compensation for regulatory change in the 
absence either of a formal taking or evidence of arbitrary and/or discriminatory behavior of the regulator, 
investment treaties do not facilitate regulatory capture by the firm in the way stabilization clauses do (of course 
depending on how they are drafted). R. Howse, “Freezing Government Policy”, pp. 4-5.
and thus induce arbitral tribunals to accept a breach of the stabilization clause as evidence of a 
violation of the FET.249
This by no means obliterates the problems associated with the lack of a general legal 
framework for the consideration of the notion of public interest before investment treaty 
tribunals.250 Arbitral tribunals have insufficiently investigated the public purpose of a given 
regulation and, as noted above, the furtherance of a public purpose is not in and on itself a 
defense against a claim of expropriation.251 The gist of the problem resides in the applicable 
law, “which generally excludes a substantive consideration of the public interest as defined by 
individual States and which provides no international definition of public interest grounded in 
treaty, custom or general principles of law.” 252 Accordingly, as the concept of public 
purpose253  is under-regulated in IITs and in the absence of a value system capable to 
hierarchically order public concerns at the international level, arbitrators fail to have any 
guidance when willing to take into account public interests of a broader nature that arise in 
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249 See, Ulysseas, Inc v Ecuador, paras 248-249, quoting EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, para 217.
250  C. H. Brower II, “Obstacles and Pathways to Considerations of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty 
Disputes”, in K. P. Sauvant (ed) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009, OUP, 2009, 
pp. 377-378; According to UNCTAD research paper on Expropriation, one ought to consider the decisions in 
Siemens v Argentina where “the tribunal seems to have ignored the degree of deference to States that 
adjudicating bodies customarily have on this issue”. It is quoted para 273 of the decision, where the Tribunal 
establishes that “...there is no evidence of a public purpose in the measures prior to the issuance of Decree 
669/01. It was an exercise of public authority to reduce the costs to Argentina of the Contract recently awarded 
through public competitive bidding, and as part of a change of policy by a new Administration eager to distance 
itself from its predecessor.” (Emphasis added.)  “... while the public purpose of the 2000 Emergency Law is 
evident, its application through Decree 669/01 to the specific case of Siemens’ investment and the public purpose 
of same are questionable. See, UNCTAD, “Expropriation”, p. 35, quoting Siemens v Argentina, Award, 6 
February 2007, para 273.
251 J. Coe Jr, N. Rubins, “Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case”, footnote 163. This argument is also 
quoted in V. S. Vadi, “Cultural Heritage and International Investment Law”, p. 4. The author further states: 
“Theoretically, the fact that a state enacted regulation in good faith should help establishing the boundary that 
separates unreasonable interference from acceptable exercises of police powers”. [Emphasis on the original]
252 C. H. Brower II, “Obstacles and Pathways to Considerations”, p. 378.
253 Or the doctrine of police powers, or public interest exceptions are under-regulated in IITs.
deciding a case.254 In fact, as the analysis of the relevant judicial practice has demonstrated, 
arbitrators may have an almost unfettered power to take the policy-driven decision that they 
deem as the most appropriate. This is, however, the result of the (general and vague) state of 
the applicable law and, in this regard, arbitrators’ discretion only endeavors to achieve a 
balanced settlement of the investor-State dispute.
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254 C. H. Brower II, “Obstacles and Pathways to Considerations”, p. 378.; see also C. Henckels, “Proportionality 
and the Standard of Review in Fair and Equitable Treatment Claims: Balancing Stability and Consistency with 
the Public Interest”, Working Paper n. 2012/27, Society of International Economic Law, who also argues that 
“the law should accommodate greater scope for host states to regulate and take other actions in the public 
interest. Yet despite this promising developments, the current state of arbitral awards lacks both a coherent 
methodology and, in many cases, an appropriate standard of review”. Further, Henckels suggests: “Investment 
tribunals should apply a standard of review in proportionality analysis that reflects their role as international 
adjudicators of disputes engaging matters of public law and should, cognizant of rationales for deference at 
varying stages of proportionality analysis, be deferential in their assessment of matters which are more 
appropriately the province of host state authorities. Such an approach would provide greater space for host states 
to enact new laws and take other actions in the public interest, which may assuage concerns about the overreach 
of fair and equitable treatment into host state policy space.”; S. W. Schill, “The Public Law Challenge: Killing or 
Rethinking International Investment Law?”, in Columbia FDI Perspectives,Vale Columbia Center on 
Sustainable International Investment, N. 58, 30 January 2012, argues that “Unless international investment law 
and investment arbitration allow public law values to thrive, the present system may succumb to the public law 
challenge. That is why international investment law should tackle this challenge by enculturating public law 
thinking”. Schill defines the “public law challenge” as follows: “one-off appointed arbitrators, instead of 
standing courts, review government acts and reach far into the sphere of domestic public law by crafting and 
refining the standards governing investor-state relations”. To cope with this “challenge”, he suggests that “we 
[should thus]  explore how public law can help rethink than kill investment arbitration, namely by expanding 
public law thinking into international investment law”. Reasons for this approach is found on the fact that 
“investment arbitration” is “about implementing principles of good governance and the rule of law for 
international investment relations”. Schill thus advises that “[w]hat is needed is not so much institutional change 
of the present system nor a return to domestic law, but a change in the mindset of those active in the field. 
Arbitrators, to start with, should draw more extensively on comparative public law concepts when applying and 
refining investment treaty standards and should reconsider their own role, and their responsibilities, as public law 
adjudicators who have an impact not only on the dispute before them but on the entire system of international 
investment protection”; S. Wilske, M. Raible, “The Arbitrator as Guardian of International Public Policy?”, pp. 
249-272. The authors pinpoints that “there is no clear-cut rule where to draw the line between permissible policy 
considerations and impermissible moralism or policy-making”. They advise that “the legal standard to be applied 
will very often remain general and vague, leaving the arbitrator to an open-ended balancing test, comparing and 
weighing competing interests. Such a standard naturally leaves the arbitrator with quite a wide range of 
discretion to exercise according to his or her own background and convictions, bearing the risk of ‘making things 
up’. However, discretion must not be equated with arbitrariness. Arbitrators––like judges––can only be as good 
as the law they apply”; see also, J. E. Viñuales, “The Environmental Regulation of Foreign Investment 
Schemes”, Chapter 11, where it is argued that “a change of mindset [of the investment tribunals] rather than a 
change of law is required for a progressive approach to gain increasing acceptance”. The “progressive approach” 
maintains that it is possible for investment tribunals to apply “international environmental law to all extent 
relevant for the resolution of an investment dispute”.
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Conclusion
This research has studied the nature of and the legal framework regulating indirect 
expropriation in international investment law. The concept has been examined in light of the 
state of international law and of the judicial and arbitral practice on takings by endorsing an 
inductive methodology. Re-constructing the international doctrine of indirect expropriation 
from the arbitral and judicial practice on takings has presented an understanding of the real 
stage of its development and of the current problems associated to it. Judicial and arbitral 
decisions ratify the evolution of existing rule(s) of international investment law and affect 
their interpretation and application. In addition, the analysis of the international practice on 
takings has uncovered the strategies adopted by the parties and thereby explained the 
interaction between indirect expropriation and other substantive standards for investment 
protection.
On the one hand, the research has firstly accounted for the lack of a universally agreed 
definition of indirect expropriation in international law.1 More precisely, the study has pointed 
out that IITs provide a defective legal framework for indirect expropriation, paralleled to that 
of expropriation tout court and that customary international law only defines ‘expropriation’ 
and identifies the requirements for its lawfulness. On the other hand, the study has confirmed 
that the decisions of arbitral tribunals qualify a measure as indirectly expropriatory to the 
extent that it produces expropriatory effects on the (economic) value of property. Therefore, 
the effects of both expropriation tout court and indirect expropriation are equated not only in 
the applicable law but also (and coherently) in the arbitral tribunals’ analysis of a claim. 
Arbitral panels apply common doctrines to decide (indirect) expropriatory cases––i.e., the 
character of the governmental measure, its severity and economic impact, the interference 
with investment-backed expectations of the investor or, the assessment of the proportionality 
405
1 See Chapter II, Part I.
between means and ends pursued by the State action.2 Such doctrines are mirrored in the 
wording of nearly all investment treaty provisions on expropriation; they provide for a 
descriptive analysis of the manner through which direct or indirect expropriation are usually 
carried out, to determine the scope of application of compensatory rights/duties.
Relying on the state of the law on expropriation and on the analysis of the judicial 
practice on takings, this study has called into question the rationale for a normative distinction 
between  expropriation and indirect expropriation or for the tendency to normatively insulate 
the concept of indirect expropriation. IITs as the lex specialis drafted by the parties to govern 
investment disputes fail to offer a substantive differentiation between the two categories, even 
in terms of legal remedies. In compliance with the autonomous will of the contracting parties 
as enshrined in the applicable IIT, the two concepts seems normatively identical and only 
analytically differentiated from each other on the basis of the formal way of their execution.
It is argued that the contracting parties’ choice to endorse ‘expropriation’ as the 
appropriate paradigm to assess and qualify indirect expropriation (analogical reasoning) holds 
a specific legal value which ought to be considered in addressing the question of the status of 
indirect expropriation in international investment law. Noticeably, the aim pursued through 
the creation of the concept of ‘indirect expropriation’ is to increase the number of measures 
that may be characterized as expropriatory in nature but should be distinguished from the 
State’s legitimate exercise of regulatory powers.
Accordingly, and in compliance with the will of the contracting parties as enshrined in 
IITs, this research has argued that (compensable) expropriation has to be distinguished from 
(non-compensable) regulation. This intelligible classification would disencumber the field 
from the many ‘labels’ that are used in the practice to refer to governmental measures that 
although not affecting the legal title to property carry expropriatory effects––e.g.: indirect, 
regulatory, creeping, constructive, disguised, camouflaged.
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2 See, Chapter III, Part II.
In light of these considerations, Part II of this research has examined the constitutive 
elements of ‘expropriation’ intended as the paradigm against which to understand indirect 
expropriation. This has been carried out in accordance with the state of the applicable law and 
the judicial and arbitral practice on takings. The result of this investigation has shown the 
appropriateness of applying the customary international law definition of expropriation and its 
requirements as a key tool to interpret the phenomenon of indirect expropriation as it occurs 
in the practice. In fact, such an approach reconciles the will of the contracting parties as 
enshrined in IITs with the practice on takings and simplifies the analysis of expropriatory 
claims by abandoning vague, descriptive ‘labels’.
A possible interpretative framework has thus been devised, which revitalizes the 
operational function of the customary international law definition of expropriation in 
adherence to its leading role in IITs and arbitral practice.
Having identified the variables at stake in (compensable) expropriation vis-à-vis (non-
compensable) regulation, the proposed interpretative framework suggests simplifying the 
approach to indirectly expropriatory issues by differentiating between de iure and de facto 
expropriation.3 The former category would include governmental expropriatory measures that 
affect the owner’s legal title to property; whereas, the latter would encompass ‘all the other 
governmental actions’.
The customary requirements for the lawfulness of the measure would be employed to 
address the crux of the matter and operate the distinction between (compensable) 
expropriation and (non-compensable) regulation.
Indeed, ‘all the other governmental actions’ may amount either to a (compensable) de 
facto expropriation or to a (non-compensable) governmental regulatory measure. The public 
foundation of the action, to be adequately substantiated by the Respondent State alleging it, 
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3 The distinction between de jure and de facto measures is a traditional legal classification. This is to prove that it 
is unnecessary to devise new labels to understand indirect expropriation in international (investment) law.
would play a pivotal role in the decision. This confirms why, as mentioned in the opening 
chapters, 1) procedural aspects such as the party charged with the burden of proof (and the 
rule governing its shifting) and, 2) ancillary or subsidiary elements, such as intent to 
expropriate or bona fide/omissive conducts, may be of help in assessing the nature of the 
action as expropriatory (and thus compensable) or regulatory (and thus non-compensable). 
Arbitral tribunals may also consider other secondary factors such as the legislations or 
reforms implemented domestically by the host State to corroborate their findings concerning 
the character of the measure. Differently, special attention should be given to stabilization 
clauses incorporated in investment contracts, to other agreements concluded between the host 
State and the investor, or to specific commitments given by the host State to the investor. 
Clearly such an assessment has to be performed within the framework of the applicable law 
chosen by the parties to the IIT. Therefore, specific provisions would be appropriate and are 
here advocated, that establish what measures are ‘presumed’ regulatory or may generally 
dispense the host State with its obligation to compensate.
To the extent that the tribunal is not satisfied with the proof of the regulatory foundation 
of a governmental measure, the action would be deemed unlawful, lacking the public purpose 
requirement established by the customary international law definition of expropriation (as 
mirrored also in IITs). The measure would also be a de facto measure, not having affected the 
legal title to property of the owner.
At this stage, a fact-specific inquiry on the effects of the governmental measure would 
prove fundamental to determine the measure’s impact on the investor’s property rights. To the 
extent that the tribunal finds those effects to be expropriatory, the State would be required to 
pay appropriate redress to the deprived investor. In this regard, the research has pointed out 
the advisability of differentiating between compensation against lawful expropriations and 
compensation against unlawful expropriations, as envisaged also in customary international 
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law.4  In the former case the State would bear the consequence of the legal exercise of a 
recognized sovereign right (i.e., compensation); in the latter, the State would be required to 
remedy to an international wrong (i.e., damages or restitutio in integrum).
Current treaty-based law and arbitral practice are inclined not to differentiate between 
the two cases. Here it  is advocated that  the States’ decision to stipulate investment provisions 
in IITs that include such a distinction may  be conducive to attract foreign investors in the 
country, as a more predictable legal framework will be at their disposal.5
Were tribunals to establish the non-expropriatory character of the effects of the 
governmental measure, other substantive standards traditionally incorporated in IITs would 
still operate to grant an adequate, yet distinct and autonomous, protection to investors. Among 
such standards, the FET is deemed the most important one. Again, the standard of 
compensation due would be determined in compliance with the applicable law and, 
supposedly, the amount of such compensation would be distinguished from that applied to 
expropriatory cases. This approach would serve as a counter-limit to investors’ tactical 
pleadings and litigation strategies alleging the violations of the FET as a “fall-back alternative 
to indirect  expropriation”.6  Indeed, it  would at least regulate and clarify the nature of the 
interplay  between indirect expropriation and FET––which is fuzzy and varying in current 
arbitral practice––by establishing the autonomous character of the two allegations and by 
distinguishing their remedies.
Against this context, the so-called indirect expropriation is here described as a de facto 
unlawful expropriation. The interpretative framework advanced in this research aims at 
coping with the ‘international doctrine of indirect expropriation’ in the effort to prevent it 
from being stumped by  the use of (equivocal) labels. It endorses and elaborates upon well-
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4 See, Chapter VI, Part II.
5 Investors may be attracted also by the more economically favorable legal framework, to the extent that IITs 
include a provision establishing a different remedy in cases of unlawful expropriation.
6 L. Reed, D. Bray, “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, pp. 13-27.
accepted customary international law categories and interpretative doctrines traditionally 
applied by arbitral tribunals, acknowledging that a dividing line between (compensable) 
expropriation and (non-compensable) regulation may only be drawn case-by-case. Especially 
in view of the fact-specific nature of the arbitral analysis, this proposal considers it advisable 
taking into account the changing economic, social and cultural environment in the host State. 
More precisely, it  is here underlined that national public interests such as environmental or 
health-related issues have also a global (or international) dimension. In this regard, 
adjudicators requested to establish the regulatory or expropriatory character of a State 
measure may be called upon to appraise internationally  significant public concerns against the 
opportunity to protect foreign investments. The question how (and whether) to prioritize the 
public value over the private one is an arduous task for international arbitrators as it is for 
national judges in their home jurisdictions. National adjudicators, however, can count on a 
constitutionally  protected (set of) values and such a ‘hierarchy’ may provide some guidance to 
their reasoning and evaluation. This is not the case for international law, where constitutional 
safeguards are either absent or more tenuously framed. Especially in view of the absence of a 
multilateral or global international investment agreement to function as a ‘positive 
Constitution’, it is hardly possible for arbitrators to draw from the law applicable to an 
investment dispute constitutional or supra-legislative guidance––therefore, it is hardly 
possible for the system to effectively limit arbitrators’ ‘creativity’.
The study of the constitutional (and administrative) examples of the German and the 
American domestic practice on takings epitomizes these considerations. It has corroborated 
the assumption that the function attributed to ‘property’ has a bearing on the finding of a 
taking. More precisely, the study of the German and the American practice on takings has 
drawn attention on a crucial dichotomy between the preservation of the substance/essence of 
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property as such (Bestandsgarantie)7  and a ‘dulde et liquidere’ approach that focuses on 
property’s economic value, fostering its ‘exploitability’ and widening the scope of 
compensatory rights/obligations. Complementary to the Bestandsgarantie is the German 
constitutional doctrine of Normgeprägtheit.8 According to this doctrine, the State establishes 
“the overall scope and limits of the right ‘according to the needs and resources of the 
community and of individuals’”  so that “public interest considerations and their balance with 
individual rights form an integral part of what defines the right to property in its very core”.9 
Thus, the intertwined relationship characterizing property and taking is thereby not only 
confirmed but also highlighted in its relevance. To the extent that “public interest 
considerations”  are a constituent part of the right to property, any restriction of it aimed at 
satisfying a public need would not qualify as a deprivation but rather as a community-oriented 
component of the right itself.
It is advisable to consider such an approach as a viable path to inquire the spirit and aim 
of existing international (investment) stipulations and duly draft new ones, in order to 
accommodate ‘public interests considerations’ whilst reducing arbitrators’ discretion in 
policy-driven decisions. In fact, as noted, in international law the question concerning the 
‘(social) function of property’ is still pending. International law establishes a fragmented 
protection of ‘property rights’, which is accorded within each international regime. A right to 
property with an overall scope and limits is thus far not available. Differently, only 
‘international theories’ or ‘discourses’ regarding property are emerging at the international 
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7  As mentioned in Chapter I, a Bestandsgarantie would in abstracto be preferable and more suitable to 
international needs, as it is focused on the substance of property. Such an approach would accommodate private 
interests for the protection of investments with the pursuit of both domestic and international policy goals, 
entitling the host State to prioritize public concerns over the protection of foreign investment, under specific 
circumstances. See, A. A. Ghouri, “Positing for Balancing”, pp. 97-119; K. P. Sauvant, “Introduction”, in K. P. 
Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009, OUP, xxiv, queries “what 
constitutes the appropriate balance between the rights and responsibilities of investors and those of 
governments.”
8 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest, p. 265.
9  Id. The author refers to the Tecmed Tribunal and argues that it “acknowledged that public interest 
considerations lie at the very core of the expropriation clause in Article 5 of the Spain-Mexico BIT”.
level and they cannot to date accommodate any normative overarching determination. 
Therefore, it is here suggested to arbitrators the choice to endorse the Bestandsgarantie v the 
‘dulde et liquidere’ approach as the main interpretative criterion to understand the function of 
property rights in international investment law and international law against the specific 
circumstances of the case. In addition, the study of the two approaches is also be deemed a 
valuable track to purse in future research, in light of the interrelatedness between the notion of 
property and taking. Besides, the insights on indirect expropriations resulted from the analysis 
of the German and the American practice on takings are a further proof of the appropriateness 
of endorsing a comparative analysis to shed light on the ‘international takings doctrine’, its 
flaws and drawbacks.
This research has attempted to flesh out the controversial factors in the indirect 
expropriation doctrine. It has also provided a functional interpretative framework for indirect 
expropriation that proposes to re-conceptualize the matter and focus on existing categories 
(i.e., de iure v de facto) and the constitutive elements of expropriation to decide claims for 
indirect expropriation.
The proposal to re-conceptualize the issue, and thus consistently endorse the 
international expropriation paradigm, mirrors to-date treaty-making choices of State parties 
and their increasing regulatory concerns. Such a proposition is aimed at providing guidance to 
arbitrators and predictability to the parties. Arbitrators, in particular, are called to primarily 
seek in the applicable law the normative answers to expropriatory v regulatory allegations of 
the parties and to endorse an intelligible stepped legal method in their analysis.
In addition, this study has identified both methodological and procedural (concerning 
evidence and burden of proof) weaknesses in investment arbitration that appears to have 
substantive implications on the decisions concerning the expropriatory or regulatory character 
of a measure. As in international (investment) law “one and the same body must fulfill the 
functions of a ‘Court of first instance and as a court of last resort”, international courts and 
412
tribunal “must most attentively consider”  the appropriateness and “the implications of their 
procedural decisions including their normative dimensions as well as their practical 
outcomes”.10
The unpredictable nature of the doctrine of indirect expropriation has been highlighted 
in the opening chapters. It has also been pointed out that the search for a legal framework for 
something we are not capable to define is undoubtedly challenging,11  as already asserted by 
the article written by Fortier and Drymer.12 It is here argued that the fact itself of posing the 
correct questions is part of the answer that is sought. It is with this awareness that, through 
this research “I have endeavored rather to show exactly what is the meaning of the question 
and what difficulties must be faced in answering it, than to prove that any particular answers 
are true”.13 Future research on both substantial and procedural aspects highlighted across this 
study would complete the ‘puzzle of questions’ that result from my analysis and contribute to 
guide arbitrators, investors and contracting parties through the difficulties posed by indirect 
expropriation.
As noted in the introduction, the study of indirect expropriation is particularly engaging, 
given its both academic and practical implications. Having explained the practical 
413
10 C. E. Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle, p. 348, quoting S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of 
the International Court, 1920-2005, 4th ed, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, p. 1340.
11 Plato, Meno, sections 80d and 81d, “How can you look for something if you don’t know what it is? How on 
earth are you going to set up something you don’t know as the object of your search?”. Chapter II.
12 L. Yves Fortier, S. L. Drymer, “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment”, pp. 79-110. 
“So, where does this leave the foreign investor wishing to understand the state of the law with respect to 
protection from expropriation? How can a foreign investor know whether and which conduct by the host State 
that affects an investment is compensable? Given that the law is, truly, in a state of flux, the best answer to the 
question ‘when, how, or at what point does otherwise valid regulation become, in fact and effect, an 
expropriation?’ maybe: ‘I know it when I see it’. However, even then the answer in many instances will not be 
crystal clear, as so much depends on the context. The law can provide a basis for answering the question; the 
circumstances in which the question arises, however, remain critical to the determination. Certain governmental 
measures, in certain instances, will almost always give rise to a finding of indirect expropriation, and hence to 
compensation. Certain others will not. In between lies a ‘rough and sketchy’ area of ‘large lacunae’ in the law. 
When it comes to understanding precisely when and how State conduct that interferes with an investment will be 
found to comprise an expropriation, the foreign investor would be wise to heed the credo: Caveat investor”.
13 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, CUP, 1903, para 134.
implications of the outcomes of this research, now one may turn to some academic 
considerations.
The challenge of this study on the doctrine of indirect expropriation has been to deal 
with a twofold inquiry, concerning both “what the law on a particular subject is” 14 and 
whether “the law on a particular subject matter is desirable or just”.15 Such twofold inquiry 
has been a challenge since any critical examination of the doctrine of indirect expropriation 
calls for a rapprochement of two perspectives: as the doctrine of (indirect) expropriation 
combines a national and an international dimension, a public and a private interest, both the 
questions concerning the applicable law and the (idea of) fairness and justice appear as having 
a twofold character and answer under the investment regime. Indeed, arbitration has proved to 
serve a private, “retrospective function of [a] judgement in settling the dispute between the 
parties”  as well as “a public, prospective function in articulating legal principles applicable in 
the future”.16 The public character of one of the party involved, indeed, is crucial to the State-
to-State circulation of models. Therefore, how a dispute is decided is extremely relevant and 
the parties “are likely to have a considerable interest not only in whether they win or lose a 
particular case, but also in how they win or lose it––in the rule that emerges from the decision 
in the case”.17
As to the state of the law, one shall recall what Van Harten has argued with respect to 
arbitration. According to Van Harten, arbitration is inconsistent with the rule of law since 
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14 J. Bonnitcha, “Outline of a Normative Framework”, p. 117.
15 Id,  the author quotes also H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd Ed, OUP, 1994; see also, D. Butt, “‘Victors’ 
justice’? Historic Injustice and the Legitimacy of International Law”, in L. H. Meyer (ed)  Legitimacy, Justice 
and Public International Law, CUP, 2012, p. 176, arguing that “it is unrealistic to expect a system of law to 
coincide perfectly with the requirements of justice - the question is whether the system is sufficiently just both to 
allow its coercive imposition by institutional actors and to give rise to a correlative obligation to obey its 
commands”.
16  V. Lowe, “The Function of Litigation in International Society”, in International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 61(1), 2012, p. 213.
17 Id. The author further argues that “[a] decision in one court denying a claim to immunity, or an award to 
compensate a foreign investor for losses upon withdrawal of a government subsidy, will be likely to have 
repercussions in many other cases”.
“there can be no rule of law without an independent judiciary”.18  Although investment 
arbitration lacks a (strictly and formally) independent judiciary, its foundations lie in 
international law and therefore its (applicable) ‘law’ is required to be “prospective, accessible 
and clear”, applicable also to “the sovereign and instruments of the State”  and capable to 
“offer[ing] equal protection without prejudicial discrimination”.19 The (applicable) law should 
thus be “of general application and consistent implementation”, it “should be capable of being 
obeyed” 20 and the search for these attributes are giving rise to a substantive rule of law (as 
opposed to a formal one). Nevertheless, “in the absence of some overarching legal regime that 
allocates cases between tribunals and sets out principles for dealing with such conflicts, no 
case-by-case approach is likely to resolve the problem” 21 of the correctness of decisions. 
Thus, to the extent that the international taking issue touches upon “honour and vital interest 
of a State”––such as those addressed under the police powers exception––the lack in the 
international legal system of a “hierarchy of standing courts and [of] the corrective power of 
the legislature which exist in municipal legal systems” 22  is obviously given further 
prominence.
The State’s duty to afford protection to foreign investments coexists with its obligation 
to protect and pursue national public interests. Only a well-defined duty, commitment or 
exception established in the (international investment) law may set the priority or hierarchy 
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18 G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, p. 174; see also, at p. 121 et seq., where it is 
argued that “the authority of arbitrators under investment treaties is wide ranging and [that] it goes to the heart of 
public law”.
19 S. Chesterman, “Rule of Law”, in R. Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
OUP, 2008-, online edition, [www.mpepil.com], (last accessed on: 5 October 2012).
20 Id.
21 V. Lowe, “The Function of Litigation”, p. 217.
22  Id, p. 220; see also, G. Biehler, Procedures in International Law, Springer, 2008, p. 312, quoting also Y. 
Shany, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations between National and International Courts, OUP, 2007, p. 7, 
suggesting a hierarchical approach between international and domestic courts. The author states: “[L]ike 
dualism, vertical hierarchy downplays the relevance of the other set of proceedings and offers courts a clear and 
simple method to resolve potential jurisdictional conflicts. This approach, however, neither provides a method 
for the pragmatic resolution of incompatible claims of judicial supremacy nor offers the parties to a conflict a 
way out of such institutional ‘locking of horns’. It is therefore not surprising that some commentators emphasize 
some of the horizontal features that characterize relations between national and international proceedings, and 
advocate inter-institutional deference and improved coordination between the involved courts”.
between the two categories in case of a dispute: investment litigation, therefore, demands a 
prudential process of treaty-negotiation, where “the Rule of Law”  is interpreted as “a standard 
or standards (perhaps self-imposed by the parties to a dispute) against which conduct can be 
measured”.23 Indeed, especially in the area of arbitration, conflicts between the jurisdiction of 
international and national courts
raise issues of priority as between claims based on international investment 
protection treaties which provide for the settlement of disputes in an international 
judicial context and claims based in private law which fall to be resolved before 
domestic courts, tribunals or arbitration panels.24
These cases indicates “the growing interaction between national and international 
courts”; in addition, they “demonstrate the level of doctrinal and practical confusion 
surrounding attempts to regulate the complicated relations woven between parallel procedures 
involving formerly different, yet substantially similar applicable laws”.25
The domestic dimension of the taking doctrine and its complexities have been studied in 
the American and the German legal and judicial practice. As the analysis of the American and 
the German national experiences has proved, a core aspect regards the legal understanding of 
property and how it influences the notion of taking. The same assumption is mirrored at the 
international level. Accordingly, the present shift in the international investment field from an 
investor-centered approach to a public-apt concern seems to account for a new socially 
oriented interpretation of the notion of protectable property/investment. Therefore, as the 
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23 V. Lowe, “The Function of Litigation”, p. 221; C. H. Brower II, “Reflections on the Road Ahead: Living with 
Decentralization in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in C. A. Rogers, R. P. Alford (ed) The Future of Investment 
Arbitration, OUP, 2009, p. 355: “Tribunals may avoid needless perception of inconsistencies through greater 
attention to analysis of the specific text and context of individual treaties, examination of similar cases, synthesis 
of trends, and explanations for any differences in outcome”. See Saipem SpA v Republic of Bangladesh, Decision 
on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, para 67: “duty to contribute to the harmonious 
development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and 
investors towards certainty of the rule of law”.
24 G. Biehler, Procedures in International Law, p. 320.
25  Id, quoting Y. Shany, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations, p. 63; F. Francioni, “International Law as a 
Common Language for National Courts”, in Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 36, 2001, p. 588: the author 
noted that “[t]oday international law pervades areas traditionally reserved to the domestic jurisdiction of states 
such as the human rights of nationals, criminal law, trade and use of natural resources, the management and 
conservation of the environment, and even the conservation of cultural heritage”.
investment regime is gradually adjusting to a public-oriented approach, the notion of property 
and investment ought to be interpreted accordingly. A social dimension devised for 
investments and property impacts upon the normative determination of (the scope of) taking: 
to the extent that public interest considerations lie at the core of an expropriation clause,26  
arbitral tribunals are called to consider them in their evaluation of the nature of the measure; 
the scope of States’ regulatory powers is also re-framed,27  being shielded under specific 
clauses or exceptions.
How the applicable law is drafted holds a prominent role as it determines how a dispute 
is won or lost, what rule emerges from the case. As noted, IITs should be drafted in a specific 
and prudential manner that intelligibly conveys the will of the contracting parties, in the effort 
to reduce to the minimum the room for ambiguous interpretation and judicial law-making.28 
Although a deferential approach in regulatory matters is advocated, guidance to the balancing 
test pursued by arbitrators shall be sought in the applicable law as the touchstone to 
reconstruct the contracting parties’ will and aim. As a consequence, deficiencies or 
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26 See, e.g., Art. 5 Spain-Mexico BIT, Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v United Mexican States; A. Kulick, 
Global Public Interest, p. 266.
27 Sornarajah argues that the “resistance to [the] erosion [of state sovereignty] is rising”. He contends that “[a]
rbitrators who are conscious of the fact that this specialised area of the law involves [....] issues of public law and 
sovereignty are also more aware of the implications of creating doctrines that negate fundamental notions of 
sovereignty”. Thus, he concludes that “we need to return to a situation in which the bargain involved in 
international investment treaties is more clearly struck, to allow for a variety of defenses and exclusions of 
liability to provide for circumstances in which it is necessary to exercise the regulatory power of the state”. M. 
Sornarajah, “Towards Normlessness”, p. 642.
28 C. H. Brower II, “Reflections on the Road Ahead”, p. 355 argues also that “a strong community of arbitrators, 
scholars, and practitioners [may provide the] guarantee[s] sufficient to overcome the difficulties of articulating a 
coherent jurisprudence”. The author refers also to F. Orrego Vicuña, “Foreign Investment Law: How Customary 
is Custom?”, in Estudios Internacionales, Vol. 38, N. 148, 2005, p. 85. In addition to the strength of the 
community of arbitrators, scholars and practitioners, it seems that a strong commitment towards coherence and 
transparency is required, also to the contracting parties that drafts the law to be interpreted and applied; S. Puig, 
“The Role of Procedure in the Development of Investment Law: The Case of Section B of Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA”, in C. Brown, K. Miles, Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, CUP, 2011, pp. 340 et 
seq. The author argues that “the difficulties in achieving coherence in investment law can be associated with the 
three features that define the process to resolve investment disputes: scope, standing and structure”. Correctly, it 
is highlighted that “States are generally reluctant to pursue theories inconsistent with the type of protections they 
are willing to provide themselves”. Furthermore, the author concludes that “Various provisions in Chapter 11 [of 
NAFTA]  show the importance of the active participation of States in maintaining coherence in international 
investment law”.
‘normlessness’ in the formulation of IITs result in an almost unfettered judicial power,29  
which is however the sole viable rejoinder to the lacunae in the law. A fully-fledged legal 
system for investment arbitration starts with an apposite legal framework applicable to 
investment issues. Such a framework fails to be achieved to the extent that lax standards30 are 
applied that, by avoiding definite legal obligations, dodge also clear-cut rights’ limitation.31
418
29 V. Lowe, “The Function of Litigation”, p. 218: “Frankly, I doubt that there are many cases in which the precise 
formulation of the clause (or of its translation into English) was deliberately crafted by the parties with a view to 
achieving such dramatically different results. But what can any particular tribunal do except interpret the precise 
language in the treaty with which it has to deal?”.
30 See for instance the decision in Occidental Petroleum Corporation, para 499. The Tribunal recognized the 
broad exception in the treaty and reached the conclusion that Law 42 did not constitute a “matter of taxation”. In 
that case, the Tribunal would have enjoyed less autonomy in deciding whether such a measure breached the US-
Ecuador BIT. It is submitted that “[t]he Tribunal is of the view that Law 42, even if it was characterized as a 
“matter of taxation”, would be captured by the “exception to the exception” of Article X.2(c)  of the Treaty”. 
Contra: Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case N. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 
January 2010. The Tribunal was operating under the same treaty and held that Law 42 was a “matter of 
taxation”. See also the Decision on Liability, 14 December 2012.
31  In any event, the cross-reference among international tribunals may be symptomatic of the progressive 
crystallization of a ‘jurisprudence constante’, with regard to recurring standards employed in takings’ decisions. 
This means that, while acknowledging the inconsistencies in the judicial outcomes, a tendency of international 
adjudicators to adopt the same substantive guiding principles and doctrines may be discerned. This conveys an 
embryonic consensus at least on the need to have judicial recourse to a common legal method and standards of 
interpretation. Lévesque poses the questions concerning the value that, for instance, a NAFTA Tribunal should 
accord to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), or decisions of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), or else pronouncements of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, or concerning Libyan 
nationalizations, and so on. See, C. Lévesque, “Les fondements de la distinction”, p. 51. On the progressive 
crystallization of a ‘jurisprudence constante’, consider: AES Corporation v Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, para 33, describing ICSID decisions as a contribution “to the development of a common legal 
opinion or jurisprudence constante”; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines, 
para 97. The Tribunal noted that “resolution of the difficult legal questions” may be resolved “in the longer term 
[by] a common legal opinion or jurisprudence constante”; Scholars also refer to the concept of “arbitral common 
law”. See, T. Carbonneau, Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, pp. 16-17; A. Stone Sweet, “The New Lex 
Mercatoria”, pp. 642-643; A. Stone Sweet, “Investor-State Arbitration”, pp. 57, 60; See, T. Wälde, A. Kolo, 
“Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’”, p. 847 argue that “[t]he direct 
investor-State litigation rights are a step towards good governance in international economic relations”; K. 
Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance,  pp. 142 et seq.  It is argued that “[t]he role of 
arbitration in the institution of investment protection is particularly significant because [...] the regulative norms 
and rules of investment protection are often vague and imprecise, requiring a significant amount of 
interpretation”. Thus, “investment arbitration is best thought of as a form of transnational governance”; S. W. 
Schill, “Crafting the International Economic Order”, p. 406, 429: Schill maintains that investment treaty 
arbitration has a public function “that goes beyond the private functions of settling a specific dispute”. More 
precisely, he argues that “investment treaty arbitration contributes to the creation of a treaty-overarching system 
of governance in international investment relations because their jurisprudence generates communicative 
authority that frames the discourse and arguments of later litigants and arbitrators and constitutes the focal points 
towards which the expectations of the parties are directed”. Still, whether this ‘treaty-overarching system of 
governance’ may operate in, and contribute to, the entire regime of international law or only within the 
investment branch, has to be clarified; S. W. Schill, “System-Building”, pp. 1084-1110; S. Wilske, M. Raible, 
“The Arbitrator as Guardian of International Public Policy?”, pp. 249-272; S. A. Alexandrov, “On the Perceived 
Inconsistency”, p. 69.
The second perspective mentioned above points to ‘the law which is desirable or just’ in 
(indirect) expropriatory matters, and thereby to the prospects for future developments in this 
field. Once more, the analysis of the takings doctrine in Germany and the United States has 
fleshed out a crucial dichotomy that may engross international investment law and be 
conducive to an answer to Dolzer’s dilemma concerning whether there is “any specific point 
[...] at which and beyond which compensation is required regardless of the objective and the 
nature of the governmental measure,”  or the governmental measure is justified regardless of 
the impact on the investment.32
The contrast, as mentioned, is between the preservation of the substance/essence of 
property as such (Bestandsgarantie) and a ‘dulde et liquidere’ approach. A Bestandsgarantie 
seems to favor public concerns, reducing the protection of the right to property to its essence; 
conversely, a ‘dulde et liquidere’ approach supports a private conceptualization of property, 
that stresses its economic interpretation. Current practice in international investment law 
seems to lean towards a public-oriented approach, showing the contracting States’ increasing 
interest for the protection of their regulatory powers and objectives in IITs. Such a trend or 
‘reactive approach’ may signal the emersion of an international public order, which covers at 
the minimum some ‘global public interests’33 that responds to the needs of the community and 
individuals.
Reconciling this dichotomy within the context of an ‘international property law’ is a 
prospect for future research, although a “movement for reform” has already been 
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32 R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriations: New Developments”, p. 80.
33 See, T. M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, pp. 173 et seq; I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, M. A. 
Stern (eds), Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century,  New York and Oxford, OUP, 
1999; W. D. Nordhaus, “Global Public Goods”, in W. Krull (ed), Debates on Issues of Our Common Future, 
Weilerswist, Velbrück, 2000, pp. 143-154; P. Koller, “International Law and Global Justice”, in L. H. Meyer (ed) 
Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law, CUP, 2012, p. 186-206; Contra: Lowe explains that “the idea 
of an international community based upon shared global values is a myth”. He argues that “the purpose of 
international law is not to express, let alone to enforce, a homogenous set of universal values. The structure of 
international law allows States to be different: indeed, some of its most fundamental principles––sovereignty and 
self-determination, for instance––serve to secure the right of a State to be different from its neighbours. 
International law deals in polyphony, not plainsong”. V. Lowe, “The Function of Litigation”, p. 221.
acknowledged in the investment practice.34 Appropriate and balanced decisions are especially 
needed in a regime, such as investment arbitration, where on the one hand “private actors, 
vested with international legal rights but not responsibilities, are able to directly initiate 
arbitration against sovereign States”; and, on the other, the arbitrators retain a broad 
jurisdiction especially appraising claims that involve the legitimacy of governmental 
regulatory actions that are sensitive to the public interest.35 Accordingly, opting either for a 
Bestandsgarantie or a ‘dulde et liquidere’ approach in property matters would prove 
beneficial to the extent that some guidance is provided to arbitrators in the settlement of 
investment disputes.
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34 M. Sornarajah, “Towards Normlessness”, p. 635.
35 K. Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance, p. 275. The author argues that the dispute 
resolution is at times elevated to a “governance system aimed at ‘regulating the regulators’”.
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